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A 8 S T R A C T 
Many budget measures have been introduced by governments with the 
stated aim of transferring resources to particular groups - in general, 
the groups which are seen to receive lower incomes. An evaluative method 
is required to assess the extent to which resources are actually 
redistributed to households by the budget. This thesis suggests a 
taxonomy for assessing whether a measure of household income that takes 
account of central government budget activities is distributed 
differently from household earnings (market income). 
The taxonomy for evaluating the budget's distributive influence has 
four stages. Each stage progresses from observable household market 
income data to a more comprehensive income measure. 
Stage One is basically an accounting concept. Household market 
income is compared with an income measure which takes account of those 
central government budget transactions which have an obvious or direct 
effect on the sources and uses of household income. 
Stage Two is similar to s~udies of the influence of the budget on 
income distribution, such as those by Gillespie and Musgrave, which are 
referred to as quantitative studies. Quantitative studies are not based 
on structured models of economic activity, but use the results of other 
incidence analysis to approximate the economic effects of budget receipts 
and expenditures on household incomes. 
Stages Three and Four require structured general equilibrium models 
to take consistent account of the behavioural relationships important to · 
the analysis of the economic effects of the budget by household income. 
The Harberger-Mieskowki-Mclure (HMM) two-sector general equilibrium 
models specify both factor and product price changes, incorporating 
theories about the short-run macroeconomic effects of budget measures. 
- xvi -
Conclusions about budget incidence based on the HMM approach, however, 
relate to aggregate factor (capital and labour) income. Multi-sector 
models pioneered by Shaven, Whalley and Fullerton focus on the analysis 
of tax incidence by household income groups. Given the current state of 
the art, it is not possible to analyse the distributional effects of the 
entire budget on household income distribution using general equilibrium 
models. This thesis provides a clearer definition of some of the issues 
involved. 
A quantitative study of the money-income effects of the 1981/82 
government budget is carried out as part of this thesis. The government 
budget is defined as the national income account of the central 
government's current income and outlays. Work by the New Zealand 
Department of Statistics based on a tax modelling system called ASSET 
provides the foundation for manipulating the massive data requirements of 
this thesis topic. The results are expressed by 10 household income 
groups (deciles) and 10 household types and represents-the--en-tii'~='-e--­
population residing in private dwellings. A major contribution of this 
thesis is that it analyses the distribution of government expenditures by · 
household income and household type. 
It is found that the 1981/82 budget does redistribute money-income 
from households in the higher income groups to those in the lower-income 
groups. The personal income tax is shown to be the most important 
redistributive force, based on the assumption that households' actual tax 
payments are the same as their statutory liability for the tax. The 
household types which are estimated to receive the greatest net benefit 
from the 1981/82 central government non-market budget are one-adult and 
twO-adult national-superannuitant household. According to the results, 
government expenditures tend, on average, to be consumed in greater 
proportion by childless household than by households with children. 
Comparison of the results using the Stage One and Stage Two 
approaches, as well as a rough approximation of a Stage Three initial 
income base, suggests that the more theoretically comprehensive the 
evaluative approach, the less redistributive is the budget. Piggott 
- xvii -
(198Gb) has shown that a feature of the SWF general equilibrium models 
that makes them attractive for policymakers interested in social policy 
is that the model can be used to evaluate both the distributional and 
efficiency consequences of a budget change in terms of household 
incomes. This, and the above comparison, are powerful arguments in 
favour of further development of SWF models so that the incidence of the 
budget can be assessed in a theoretically-consistent fashion. 
- xviii -
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CHAPTER ON:: 
EVALUATING THE BUDGET'S DISTRIBUTIVE INFLUENCE 
Most New Zealand Governments have attempted to redistribute personal 
incomes. Various budget measures, primarily in the tax and social 
welfare area, have been introduced with the stated aim of providing more 
income (or charging less tax) for particular groups - in general the 
groups which are seen to receive lower incomes. But although there are 
many government policies which are said to redistribute income, it is not 
clear whether individually or collectively they act to bring about 
changes of the nature or size intended. 
A method is required to analyse the change in personal incomes which 
may be brought about as a result of the- government's budget 
transactions. To start with, government budget policies may be intended 
to achieve several (sometimes inconsistent) goals, and at the very least 
such a met~~d would identify differences between intended and actual 
policy outcomes. In addition, even though much policy is formulated to 
achieve objectives other than income distributive ones, all government 
budget transactions (indeed, all government activity) may affect the 
distribution of personal incomes. Finally, a major contribution of 
modern economic theory has been to show that the statutory or impact 
effect of a policy may differ significantly from its economic effects. 
Any evaluation of the budget's distributive influence would need to 
consider the extent to which budget measures bring about changes in 
relative factor and product prices, output and employment, which in turn 
affect the distribution of personal income. 
This thesis evaluates the money income effects of the central 
government budget (the national income account of the central 
government's income and outlays) on private household income distribution 
in New Zealand for 1981/82. Several different definitions of household 
income are measured, starting from a narrow concept of current market 
income to a more comprehensive definition of personal income which takes 
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into account identifiable income effects of government spending and 
receipts. The object is to evaluate differences in income distribution 
when personal income is defined in various ways and grouped into 
household units classified by income levels and household types. 
2. 
Work by the New Zealand Department of Statistics (see Broad, 1982) 
provides the foundation for manipulating the massive data requirements of 
this analysis. The core is a computerised personal income tax modelling 
system called ASSET (A Simulation System for Evaluating Taxation). It 
measures current dollar gross income and constant dollar disposable 
income for salary and wage earners. It is intended to reflect the impact 
of personal income taxation on the purchasing power of household income. 
ASSET has three important components: 
1) It is based on detailed Household Survey information of expenditure 
and income (but not tax liability) which can be related to the 
demographic characteristics of either individuals or households; 
2) The model is programmed using the computer package SAS (Statistical 
Analysis System)· which makes it possible to process information in 
matrix form. The matrices have been set up with income levels on 
one axis and classes of rebate eligibility on the other; 
3) Relying on the Household Survey information and matrix manipulation, 
ASSET is applied to calculate personal income tax liability and the 
household's liability for indirect taxes on final expenditures. 
This thesis extends the ASSET System to analyse the impact effect of 
the central government budget. In particular, the distribution of the 
household money-income value of all central government non-market revenue 
is calculated and compared with the household distribution of the 
money-income value of all central government non-market expenditure. In 
addition, 1981 Census information is used to adjust the 1982 Household 
Survey data so that the results can be expressed in terms of the 
population of all private households in New Zealand. 
CHAPTER ONE - EVALUATING THE BUDGET'S DISTRIBUTIVE INFLUENCE 
A major contribution of this thesis is that it analyses the 
distribution of government expenditures. To accomplish this, it links 
sources of information about the consumers of government goods and 
services with the ASSET model. For example, Sutton's (1984) data on 
health usage is the basis for estimating the distribution of health 
expenditure by income and household type. 
A. CHAPTER OUTLINE 
3. 
The remainder of this Chapter discusses the focus of this thesis and 
an income taxonumy designed to evaluate the budget's redistributive 
influence. The approach in this thesis has been designed to provide a 
basis for comparing the distributional aims of a government's budget 
revenue and outlay measures with their outcomes. According to this 
approach, the household income effects of budget measures are taken into 
account through the application of existing theoretical and empirical 
evidence about the incidence of budget measures; no attempt is made to 
measure incidence (the extent a budget measure is shifted from the impact 
pcint in terms of personal incomes) as such. A feature of this approach, 
however, is that it provides a model for the explicit specification of 
assumptions about the predicted economic effects of budget measures in 
terms of the household sector. 
Chapter Two discusses literature relevant to the evaluation of the 
budget's influence on household income distribution. Budget incidence is 
the measure of who pays the cost of and who benefits from changes in 
government budget transactions, taking into account changes in relative 
prices and output and employment effects. During the last thirty years, 
numerous overseas studies have analysed the incidence of aspects of 
government budget activity. Early research relied almost solely on the 
theory of public finance. This research has evolved as economists and 
policymakers have become increasingly interested in analysing income 
redistribution, as the available data has expanded, and as (general 
equilibrium) economic theory has broadened to encompass public finance 
issues. 
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Meerman (1978) demonstrates that while budget incidence is most 
usefully seen in terms of the income effects from changes in relative 
factor and product prices, the present state of knowledge is not 
conducive to measuring all these changes. Nevertheless, an advance can 
be made by restricting the measured effects to tax and benefit incidence, 
making specific acknowledgement that relative prices, technology 
and output (RPTO) incidence is (probably unrealistically) assumed to be 
zero. 
The HMM (Herberger, 1962; Mieszkowski, 1967; McLure, 1964, l97la, 
l972a) two-sector general equilibrium (g-e) approach shows how various 
budgetary regimes affect factor returns and commodity prices. This 
provides the basis for deriving a consistent set of tax and expenditure 
incidence assumptions. SWF (Shaven, Whalley, Fullerton) computational 
general equilibrium models use computer techniques to further extend the 
HMM approach. Based on a procedure developed by Scarf (1973) for 
calculating general equilibrium prices in a competitive economy, Shaven 
and Whalley (1972, 1973, 1977), Fullerton et al (1978) and Fullerton 
(1979), amongst others, broaden the HMM approach to include more than two 
sectors, further developing the model to analyse the effects of taxes on 
income groups. 
Early HMM (two-sector) general equilibrium models defined income as 
simply the return to two factors of production (usually labour and 
capital). The more recent SWF (multi-sector) computational g-e models 
analyse the return to several income groups, when income is defined in 
terms of the return to labour and capital endowments. Both HMM and SWF 
models have proved useful in the analysis of alternative tax policies. 
Although they probably could be, the SWF models are not designed to 
observe the behaviour of several different types of households or the 
supply and demand conditions for goods other than specific goods such as 
collective, social and merit goods. 
Despite the considerable development of the general equilibrium 
approach in the last fourteen years, it has not as yet lived up to its 
promise in its treatment of issues related to the effect of the 
government budget on the size distribution of income. As Herberger 
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(1978, p. 62) comments about Fullerton et al (1978), " ••. the division of 
consumers into 12 income groups is an interesting frill but not a 
fundamental feature of the model." 
To apply a general equilibrium model to problems connected with the 
size distribution of income, it is nece&sary to be more specific about 
the anatomy of income. distribution. For example, once the effects of 
various tax provisions on primary factors (labour and capital) are 
determined, it is necessary to know more about how these changes impinge 
differentially on different layers of income distribution. In addition, 
the specification of government as one of several industry groupings does 
not do justice to the variety of activities financed by it. Nor do the 
models adequately distinguish between consumer demand for a · 
privately-produced good and a government-produced good. 
Chapter Two spells out the strengths and limitations of the general 
equilibrium literature. The chief strength of the g-e literature is that 
it has resolved many of the issues involved in the generation of 
theoretically consistent micro- and macro-economic incidence results. A 
great deal of progress has been made in the specification of models to 
evaluate comprehensive .budget incidence. Nevertheless, an inadequacy of 
the work to date is that insufficient data and the present fashion for 
economists to prefer research problems related to corporate behaviour or 
general tax reform have resulted in rather sketchy treatment of the 
observable behaviour of the household and public sectors. The behaviour 
of the household sector is complex and specification of this behaviour in 
relation to the government requires a detailed observation of household 
income and expenditure flows. 
The next step is to specify a model which more fully recognises the 
issues associated with the analysis of the budget's influence on 
household incomes. Chapters Three through Six put these issues in 
perspective and also attempt to generate some empirical results. 
Since this study is founded on the presumption that government 
budget measures may change relative income positions, the definition of 
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income is fundamental to it. Income is defined to give a measure of an 
economic unit's possession and exercise of economic rights and is taken 
to represent a household's economic welfare. The concept of income 
becomes more comprehensive (and the measurement more abstract) depending 
on the definition of budget incidence being evaluated. 
Chapter Three discusses the concept of income in terms of 
households. A comprehensive measure of income would include those items 
making up a household's current economic position taking account of: 
1) Simons' (1950) income concept which comprises gains including those 
from realised and unrealised wealth; 
2) the incidence of all government budget activity; and, 
3) some concept of welfare. 
Unfortunately, there is no measureable income information which 
encompasses all these aspects (indeed, it may not even be possible to 
measure the desired income concept). In the final analysis, the choice 
of the income standard depends on the purpose to which it will be put. 
In this thes~s, the money-income standard is applied to evaluate budget 
redistribution in· relation to income maintenance. The aim of income 
maintenance policies is to meet deficiencies in cash income, rather than 
real income or some theoretician's ideal comprehensive income. So a 
concept of money income is chosen which is consistent with the aim of 
income maintenance policies and serves as a proxy for the relative 
welfare of households. 
A number of different income aggregates are then defined (based on 
the money-income standard) including market income (income earned through 
market activity), total income (market income plus direct monetary 
transfers such as social welfare benefits) and broader income concepts 
defined to be consistent with the view of budget incidence which is 
applied. The New Zealand Department of Statistics Household Survey 
provides the data for the consideration of this wide range of income 
aggregates. This advantage is not enjoyed by researchers conducting 
budget incidence studies for other countries. 
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Chapter Three also discusses the way in which 1981 Census and 1982 
Household Survey data are used to tabulate the results derived by this 
thesis. Researchers from the Department of Statistics derived weightings 
so that the more detailed and up-to-date information in the Household 
Survey could be aggregated to cover the entire Census population resident 
in private households. 
The household is chosen as the income unit because it is an economic 
consumption unit far which income and wealth are pooled and for which 
joint decisions on consumption are taken. Households are further grouped 
into ten household types as first set aut by the Task Force an Tax Reform 
(1982). The household types distinguish national superannuitant 
households (occupants over 60 without children), households with children 
and households whose occupants are adult under sixty without children. 
Table lB.l shows the percentage of persons and percentage of households 
classified by each household type. 
Table 18.1 
C().FARISON OF DISTRIBUTION OF PERSONS Al\0 PRIVATE 
1-DUSEHOLDS BY 1-DUSEHOLD TYPE IN 1981/82 
Household Type 
1 Adult - National Superannuitant 
1 Adult - Other 
2 Adults - National Superannuitant 
2 Adults - Other 
2 Adults with 1 Child 
2 Adults with 2 Children 
2 Adults with 3 or more Children 
3 or more Adults - No Children 
3 or more Adults - With Children 
1 Adult with Children 
All Households 
Percentage (%) of: 
Total Persons in Total Private 
Private H'holds H'holds 
3.6 
2.9 
8.3 
10.0 
7.9 
16.9 
19.0 
9.4 
18.7 
3.4 
100.0 
10.8 
8.7 
12.4 
15.0 
7.8 
12.6 
10.4 
8.3 
10.3 
3.7 
100.0 
Number of: Persons 3,098,650 H'holds 1,035,200 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Source: Department of Statistics, Household Survey 1981/82 aggregated to all 
people resident in private households using the 1981 Census 
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Lncame groups are derived which include 10 percent of private 
households when income is defined as market income. 
income groups are household market-income deciles. 
In other wards, the 
This grouping makes 
it easier to compare the results when different income aggregates are 
analysed by income groups. From Table 1B.2 below, it can be seen that 
the distribution of market income by household is very unequal (see final 
COlumn). Far example, it is possible to see that in 1981/82 the bottom 
10 percent of households (those earning less than $250 per annum) 
received a negative share (-0.1 percent) of market income (because of 
losses). On the other hand, the tap 10 percent is estimated to have 
received a 27.1 percent share of market income. 
Table 18.2 
TrE MARKET INC()£ BRAO<ETS DERIVED TO CONTAIN 10 PERCENT (A DECILE) 
CF I-O.JSEHOLDS AN) TI£ AMOUNT OF MARKET INCOr-£ BY DECILE IN 1981/82 
Percent 
of Total 
Private 
Households 
(Deciles) 
Market Income 
Market Lncome 
Brackets Derived 
to Contain lC% 
of li:Jusehalds 
Total Number 
of 
Households 
(000) 
By Decile of 
Private Households 
Amount Share 
SM % 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Less Than $25 0 
$250-( $3950) 
$3950-( $9750) 
$9750-($13450) 
$13450-($16900) 
$16900-($20250) 
$20250-( $24200) 
$24200-($29200) 
$29200-($36650) 
$3 6650 and over 
10.0 
10.0 
10.0 
10.0 
10.0 
10.0 
10.0 
10.0 
10.0 
10.0 
103 
104 
103 
103 
104 
104 
103 
104 
104 
103 
-22 
170 
731 
1212 
1567 
1922 
2291 
2774 
3387 
5211 
-0.1 
0.9 
3.8 
6.3 
8.1 
10.0 
11.9 
14.4 
17.6 
27.1 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------TOTAL 100.0 1035 19243 100.0 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The concept of the government budget is discussed in Chapter Four. 
Perhaps because of the highly regulated nature of the New Zealand economy 
and the omnipresence of Governments, budget measures impinge on income 
and expenditure flows in a large variety of ways. As Chapter Four shows, 
use of the New Zealand System of National Account (NZSNA) data for 
central government non-market transactions treats a greater variety of 
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government-financed activities than the SWF Studies, but does not 
distinguish some important features of government activity such as the 
provision of social and merit goods. A strength of NZSNA data is that it 
can be linked with other economic aggregates in a consistent fashion. 
Chapter Five analyses the distribution of payments from householas 
to the government first by assessing the extent these payments reduce 
individual household incomes and then by showing how the distribution of 
household money income is changed. Chapter Six analyses the effects of 
government expenditures on households, first attempting to identify the 
consumers of government-financed goods, then imputing a money income 
value and finally showing how the distribution of household income 
changes when these effects are taken into account. 
In Chapters Five and Six, the government's policy intentions are 
first analysed with reference to legislation which introduces particular 
budget measures and documentation about their outcome. When the 
government imposes a tax, legal liability for the tax will be defined by 
statute to rest upon particular consumers or firms. Similarly, when a 
budget spending measure is passed, it will go to purchase specific 
resqurces from a specific market or will involve a transfer of income 
and/or goods to p~rticular households. There is a defined point at which 
the budget measure first takes effect. This point is referred to as the 
statutory or impact point. 
The imposition of a tax may lead to factor and product price and 
quantity changes such that the eventual income gains or losses may differ 
greatly from those at the impact point. Existing economic techniques 
must be applied to make some assessment about what the location of the 
ultimate or most significant economic effects might be. Through the use 
of a general equilibrium model, where two equilibrium positions are 
compared, some significant real income effects can be isolated, or in 
other words, effective incidence (the effect of the budget measure on the 
economy) can be distinguished from the impact or statutory incidence of a 
budget measure. 
CHPPTER ONE - EVALUATING THE BUDGET'S DISTRIBUTIVE INFLUENCE 10. 
To attribute the money-income values of budget measures to household 
income groups, it is frequently necessary to apply proxy distributions 
taken from available data to translate the results from general 
equilibrium studies of budget incidence (expressed in terms of factor 
shares) into household income groups. Take the case of the company 
income tax, which the HMM results suggest is largely paid out of 
capital. The Household Survey does not collect information about capital 
income. It does survey dividend income. Assuming dividend income 
reflects capital ownership, the company income tax can be imputed to 
households based on the proportion of dividend income they receive. 
Chapter Seven concludes with an assessment of those household money 
income effects from government non-market activity which are 
measureable. The distribution of the most comprehensive income measure 
which can be derived based on available data and theoretical evidence is 
compared to the distribution of market income, a measure of income earned 
from market-place activity based on Household Survey information. Also 
discussed is an approximation of RPTO incidence. Attempts by Shaven, 
Whalley, Fullerton and others to further extend the HMM models may 
eventually lead to the development of a method to measure RPTO incidence 
by households. Meantime, Chapter Seven spells out a number of other 
areas for further research which could make a significant contribution 
towards resolving problems identified in this thesis. 
B. THE GOVERNMENT INCOME DISTRIBUTION POLICY 
Evidence of New Zealand policymakers' interest in the effect of 
budget measures on income distribution may be found in recent reports on 
social welfare and tax reform and as part of the debate over what may be 
broadly called an incomes policy. 
a) In an application for a general wage order heard by the Arbitration 
Court in April 1981, the terms of reference included consideration 
of the impact of personal income tax rates on the income positions 
of particular earners. 
b) The Task Force on Tax Reform, established in July 1981, undertook a 
thorough and systematic review of all aspects of central government 
taxation, devoting large sections of research to income distribution 
questions in particular. 
.. 
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c) The 1982 Budget included income tax measures aimed to reduce taxes 
from certain income groups more than others based on research which 
suggested the tax system was not redistributing income in the most 
desirable manner. 
d) The 1983 Budget introduced further tax changes to correct for poorly 
targeted assistance to low-income families in the 1982 Budget. 
e) The 1984 Budget attempted to address problems related to lower 
income groups (particularly low-income families through its Family 
Care package) who did not benefit significantly from the tax 
reduction of 1982 and whose wages were frozen from June 1982 to 
November 1984. 
f) In its August 1985 Statement on Taxation and Benefit Reform, the 
Labour Government announced tax reforms; one of the stated 
objectives of the exercise was to provide assistance to those on low 
incomes. 
g) In March 1986, the Government proposed a Royal Commission on Social 
Policy to consider principles and philosophy over a broad range of 
areas including education, health and housing where there is at 
least some element of merit goods. It was proposed that these 
matters be considered in an integrated framework which permits 
assessment of the possible and desirable total distribution of 
income and social benefits which could be generated. 
Income redistributive objectives of Governments are seldom 
articulated precisely. Since no objecti.ve method for assessing the 
outcome of redistributive policies has been developed, conflicts between 
redistributive goals go unnoticed. For example~ two income maintenance 
objectives that may be identified among the many possibilities are 1) to 
provide a measure of subsistence income to members of the population who 
cannot otherwise obtain such income through participation in the market 
sector; and, 2) to compensate for unacceptable market-wage relativities 
which exist because of monopolies and other market-place distortions. 
The achievement of these objectives is likely to result in a different 
outcome from the more naive (but frequently implied) goal of achieving an 
equal income distribution. A clearer understanding of the mechanism 
which produces changes in money incomes would enhance current debate 
about income redistribution. 
C. THE DESIGN OF THIS STUDY 
As a means of integrating economic theory with the available 
statistical information (getting the most from both inductive and 
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deductive methodologies) this study evaluates the budget's distributive 
influence in four stages. Each stage progresses from observable data to 
what is, theoretically, a more comprehensive income measure. In 
practice, the latter stages are further away from observable data. 
Hence, the latt~r stages involve more data approximations and imputations. 
Figure 1.1 provides a taxonomy for evaluating the budget's 
distributive influence in four stages. The concept of budget incidence 
becomes more comprehensive with each stage, as does the income concept. 
FIGURE 1.1 
TAXONOMY FOR EVALUATING THE BUDGET'S DISTRIBUTIVE INFLUENCE 
STAGE ONE 
STAGE TWO 
STAGE THREE 
STAGE FOUR 
Money Income Including Direct Government Transactions. 
Money Income Adjusted for all Budget Non-Market 
Activities. 
Broad Measurement of Household Income Including 
Budget Transactions. 
Economic Measure of Budget Incidence By Household 
Income and Type. 
C.l: A Taxonomy for Measuring Budget Incidence in Four Stages 
Stage One, the direct money income measurement, refers to the 
difference between the income directly accruing to the household sector 
and income adjusted for the impact of those budget transactions which 
have an obvious or direct effect on the sources and uses of household 
income. Or in other words, the government is treated as a constant which 
only influences household money incomes by directly taxing them or 
through the provision of goods with private benefits (which are evaluated 
in money income terms). 
Stage One measures the statutory incidence of personal income taxes 
with no adjustments for changes to relative prices, output, or the 
employment of factors resulting from the existence of the government. 
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Only those indirect taxes on final household expenditures are analysed 
and they are assumed to be paid entirely by households . The benefits 
from government private expenditure (expenditures which are excludable 
and for which a private beneficiary can be defined) are evaluated at the 
cost of providing them. The most important government-financed private 
goods include health and education. There are also some minor goods, 
such as expenditures by the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, which 
are consumed by farmers. In addition, some subsidies are consumed by 
identifiable private households. 
Stage Two broadens the measurement of income, assuming that the 
welfare of the nation's individuals is not simply affected by government 
policies which impinge directly on households, but is affected by all 
central government non-market transactions. On the receipts side, Stage 
Two considers company tax and other government receipts (such as property 
income), in addition to the government budget transactions taken into 
account in Stage One. On the expenditure side, Stage Two considers 
government indivisible (collective) expenditures as well as the 
expenditures included in Stage One. There are no data which (can ever) 
diFectly measure the money-income value to households of transactions 
such as the company tax or expenditure on collective goods (e.g. 
defence). Thus, considerable approximation is required to take account 
of the household money-income effects of all central government 
non-market activity. 
As with Stage One, Stage Two begins with the identification of the 
distribution of market income among household income groups. All 
government receipts and public expenditures are then imputed to 
households by income group and household type so that the market and 
post-budget income distributions can be compared. To the extent that the 
distributions differ, the impact of government budget transactions may be 
seen to have influenced a redistribution of income. 
General equilibrium theory looks beyond the impact effect of a 
budget policy to the measurement of economic incidence. Economic theory 
predicts that the introduction of the government budget or a change in a 
government budget transaction will cause a shock to the economy which 
will cause adjustments to employment and output, possibly leading to a 
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new income distribution. Two ways of tackling this problem are outlined 
in Stages 1hree and Four. Stage Three imputations are based on 
assumptions about the tax and benefit incidence of government 
transactions, assuming RPTO incidence is zero. To get a tax base 
consistent with government policies (which are assessed on companies as 
well as individuals) all sources of national income are imputed to the 
household sector based on their assumed ownership of factors. Stage Four 
would be a fully integrated multi-sector general equilibrium model 
designed explicitly to solve for budget incidence. 
The measurement of the tax and benefit incidence of government 
transactions in Stages One through Stage Three involves four main steps: 
1) Identification of the economic conditions which must apply to make 
incidence a measureable economic concept; 
2) Based on conclusions of the HMM and SWF general equilibrium models, 
assumptions are made about the incidence of budget measures. 
Although the literature is by no means conclusive about the 
incidence of various government measures, the HMM and SWF results 
are selected because the models give careful and consistent 
attention to economic detail. 
3) These assumptions about the incidence of budget transactions are 
then translated in terms of household money income. 
a) The system of national income accounting and other statistical 
sources distinguish the household sector from the company and 
financial sector. 
b) The money income effects of government expenditures (measured 
at cost) are derived to be added to household income 
(classified by income range and household type) and money 
income effects of government revenues are derived. Government 
receipts deplete household incomes while government provision 
of goods adds implicitly to household incomes. This is 
because the household does not need to spend its income as it 
would to obt ain goods from the private sector. 
4) To assess the extent to which relative household income positions 
may differ because of the existence of the government, a comparison 
is made of household income distributions, when income is adjusted 
to take account of the incidence of government budget measures. 
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Ideally, Stage Four would be based on a comprehensive measure of 
personal income consistent with Simons' comprehensive definition. The 
intention for including a discussion of Stage Four is to show what 
procedures are required to take account of the effects of budget measures 
as elucidated by modern economic theory. Lack of resources prohibits the 
implementation of this final stage. 
The above taxonomy sets out a primarily quantitative approach 
designed to take account of the application of different economic 
theories about incidence. As these theories evolve, more conclusive 
results may emerge and they may be added to the taxonomy. 
The body of this work does not follow the four stages as developed 
above sequentially. Instead, the four stages provide a context for 
discussing the material in each chapter. 
C.2: Accounting for Budget Effects on the Household Sector 
Budget incidence is defined as the change in the distribution of 
income brought about because of the existence of the government. The 
nature of this change can be expressed in terms of factor shares as in 
the HMM studies (functional distribution), or in terms of the change in 
relation to household incomes when households are grouped by income range 
(size distribution). This thesis concentrates on the latter. 
A discussion of what is involved in an economic model designed to 
measure budget incidence is facilitated by the notation as set out below: 
!::..Y = yl + Gl _ yO 
where: 
t::..Y = 
yl = 
Gl = 
change in (real national) income; 
private real income given the existence of government; 
the real income equivalent of the net benefit from 
government transactions; and 
Y0 = real income before a change in government budget policy. 
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A finer breakdown identifies the major elements involved in 
deriving ~Y for the purpose of assessing budget incidence in relation to 
household income distribution: 
Where: 
m is the number of identified income groups: 
h9 is real national income yo by household income group before 
1 
the budget is taken into account (pre-budget distribution); 
G1 consists of; 
g~ which is total government expenditures by household income 
group; 
t 
ri which is total government revenue by household income group; 
h~ is the household distribution of national income after the 
income effects from government budget measures have been taken into 
account (Y1 post-budget distribution) . . 
' . 
The incomes of individual households will change depending an the 
effects of particular budget expenditure or revenue measures. Budget 
measures may have an influence an both the sources and uses sides af 
household incomes. They affect the sources of incomes by changing 
relative factor incomes; and they affect the household's uses of income 
through the prices households pay far purchases of goods and services. 
These changes mean that even if the level of aggregate household income 
is the same before and after the budget ~s taken into account, the 
distribution of income amongst households may change. The difference 
between the share of pre-budget and post-budget household income to each 
household income group is the measure of income redistribution. 
m 
The sum of individual household incomes pre-budget i~l h~, will 
be equal to the sum of individual household incomes after the budget has 
m 
been taken into account, i~l h~ only if the government's budget is 
defined to be balanced and demand-expansionary effects on the aggregate 
economy are ruled aut. This means mare than that total government 
expenditures equals total government receipts. The effect of balancing 
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the budget in the HMM models is that real income effects are analysed 
rather than changes in asset values because of changes in the financial 
system. What it means in terms of the household money-income effects of 
budget measures depends on the level of complexity of the underlying 
economic model. 
These levels of complexity are reflected in the different stages of 
Figure 1.2 on the next page. For example, Stages One and Two treat the 
meesurement of the budget's distributive influences as little more than a 
basic accounting exercise, with some recognition of the results of 
partial equilibrium economic studies. In the case of Stage One, the 
concept of household money-income is simply broadened to incorporate 
adjustments for information in the Household Survey such as: 1) household 
liability for income tax and indirect taxes on final expenditure; and, 2) 
the characteristics of households which identifies them as consumers of 
government private goods such as health and education. Here, total 
government expenditure does not equal total revenue, even in an 
accounting sense. Stage Two further broadens the concept of household 
money income to encompass the general economic principles underlying the 
national income account. The central government income and outlay 
account is balanced by definition, with savings defined as the balancing 
item. Both Stage One and Two are designed to measure current 
money-income values for one year. 
Stage Three sets the the scene to consider balanced-budget economic 
incidence. The assessments of income would involve the measurement of 
the marginal value of incomes to be consistent with the differential 
incidence conclusions of the HMM studies. In this case, the budget is 
defined sa that (in equilibrium) changes in the economy because of 
government spending are equal to changes in the economy because of 
government taxes and charges. The significance of this definition of 
balanced-budget incidence is that (assuming competition and full 
employment) it supposedly isolates the income redistributive effects of 
the budget from the employment and output effects which come about when 
the budget is unbalanced in equilibrium. The problem with this 
definition is that it also rules out the employment and output effects 
which come about because of the type of expenditures, taxes or 
charges. Since the HMM general equilibrium models are long-run, the 
assumption underlying the Stage Three calculations is that all the 
long-run adjustments to the budget take place in the current year. 
Flll.flE 1. 2 
fo..R STAGES HR EVALUATING TI-E EILIX£T'S DISTRIBUTIVE Itfl.lfll:E 
(TO BE ANALYSED BY t-OJSaa.D It-OM GROlF At{) OOJSEH:l..D TYPE) 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------STAGE 01\E : DIRECT t-EASlJlH£NT Of THE MOI'EY STAGE TWO : lo()NEY· INCOI-£ ADJUSTED fOR ALL BUDGET tiJN-W\ill<ET ACTIVITIES 
INCOME EFFECTS OF THE BUDGET 
INCOME SOURCE OR LEVY* 
A. 1 Market Income 
? 
2 Direct Benefits 
3 Total Income 
4 Personal Income Taxes 
5 Income Available to Spend 
? 
6 Subsidy Income 
7 Indirect Taxes and 
Government fees 
? 
8 Income Benefit froro Government 
Private Goods 
OEfiN I TI [].1 
( CUrrent gross personal earnings. 
( Includes income froro salary and wages; 
( dividends; interest; royalties; 
( trusts; self-employed and partnership 
( earnings). 
( Transfer payments including 
( supplementary minillUII prices, social 
( welfare and other benefits. 
( Includes national superannuation, 
( family benefit, unemployment benefit, 
( domestic purposes benefit and so on. 
( Money income accruing to people. 
( Tax assessed on income earned by 
( individuals. 
( Money income available for current 
(expenditure including.social welfare 
( benefits but excluding personal 
( income taxes. 
Government expenditures to producers 
which provide a private money income 
benefit. 
( Taxes on final products or property. 
( Honey income value of government 
( programmes for which a private 
( beneficiary can be identified. 
( Largely education and health. 
B. Money Income Including Direct GoverOIIlent Transactions Valued at Market Prices 
Difference between distributions A and B is a direct or impact measure 
of government budget transactions which have private costs or benefits. 
A • 1 Market Income 
9 Total Payments to Government 
? 
10 Honey Income Benefit from 
Total Government 
Non-Market Expenditure 
Same as A.l Under Stage One. 
( Personal income taxes ( Company taxes 
( Indirect taxes 
( Other receipts e.g. fees 
( Social welfare and other benefits 
( Government private goods 
( All subsidies 
( Indivisible govt expenditures 
( Borrowing from the public 
C. tt:Juseho1d Honey Income Adjusted for all Budget (Non-Market) Activities 
Difference between A and C is a direct or impact measure of the effect 
of all budget transactions on household money incomes 
SlAGE TlflEE: BROAD 1-EASlJlEI-ENT OF INCOI-£ 
D. National Inc0111e 
9 Total Payments to Government 
? 
10 Money income benefit froro 
Total Government Expenditure 
Coapensatlon of en~loyees plus opera-
ting surplus plus consumption of 
fixed capital. 
Same as A. 9 Stage Two above. 
Same as A. 10 Stage Two above. 
E. Broad Measure of Budget Incidence 
Difference between distributions 0 and E. 
STAGE fOUl : ECorniC MEASlJlE Of BLOCET INCI!l::NCE 
f. Collprehensive Measure of Income 
+ 
Transfer Payments 
? 
( National income plus capital gains 
( income before change in government 
( budget pollcy. 
Total Government Expenditure Incidence 
Total Government Tax Incidence 
+ 
ff"TO Incidence 
G. Econaaic Measure of Budget Incidence 
Difference between distributions f and G. 
~ 
~ 
~ 
~ 
f! 
~ 
~ 
~ 
~ 
-Ul 
0 
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~ 
~ 
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~ 
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Finally, Stage Four sets out the issues which economic theory shows 
to be important but for which there is (as yet) no applicable economic 
model. In this case, whether the budget is balanced or not depends on 
the nature of the model which is specified. In general, comparative 
static models require the budget to be balanced in equilibrium while 
growth (dynamic) models may be designed to analyse the income 
redistributive effects of unbalanced budgets on current and future 
generations. 
D. FOCUS OF THIS STUDY 
The focus of this thesis is on changes in household incomes which 
occur over a fiscal year. The fiscal year is chosen as the time period 
because it is appropriate to the normal budget round. An even shorter 
period might be desirable from the point of view of income maintenance 
objectives which are designed to respond to more urgent human needs. 
unfortunately, there is very little data collected for a shorter time 
period . 
Existing general equilibrium economic models are not designed to 
focus on the year period as such. Most HMM AND SWF studies are designed 
to ass~ss the effects of the budget in the long run, so the application 
of their results to a study such as this one assumes that the long-run 
economic decision period takes place within the fiscal year. There is 
not a lot of evidence for or against this assumption because the general 
equilibrium literature has shown little interest in the question of the . 
calendar-time period for the long-run adjustment to be achieved. Indeed, 
it is not even clear that the basic concept of the long-run, a period 
long enough for all factors to be varied, applies to government decision 
making in the same way that it is applies to decisions by the firm. 1 
1. In fact, it is probably short-run considerations which are of most 
relevance to a study of income redistribution. The long-run results 
of HMM and SWF studies show the changes in the pattern of household 
income distribution which occur because of changes in the returns to 
endowments (generally capital and labour) owned by the households. 
They are not able to evaluate what is typically seen as a 
redistributive measure (such as the unemployment benefit) where the 
level of factor returns is determined by the market place but the 
government acts to re-channel some of the returns to households which 
would otherwise receive a low return. Note, however, the general 
equilibrium research that has specified calendar time (including 
Auerbach and Kotlikoff, 1983) suggests that the short-run problems of 
relevance can be handled. 
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For the analysis in this thesis, households are grouped by income 
and type. These groups are not always informative about important 
redistribution among various groups in the population. The budget 
includes certain spending and taxation policies which cause substantial 
variation in a household's relative income position according to 
geographical area, type of dwelling, age composition of occupants in the 
household, racial characteristics of members in the household and so 
forth. Thus, it should be borne in mind that comparisons of average 
households in one income bracket with average households in another may 
not be valid since there may be factors more significant than income 
influencing household behaviour. Much policy, however, is made on 
rougher generalisations about the behaviour of households than 
income-related behaviour. 
Fourteen years ago, SWF general equilibrium models appeared to have 
considerable potential as tools to evaluate the effects of budget 
measures on income distribution. But while the models have developed 
rapidly and continue to impress because of their consistent treatment of 
significant economic effects, they have failed so far in their treatment 
of the size distribution of household income and the expenditure side of 
the government budget. One explanation for this failure is that since 
the models require considerable resources (time, computing, money, data 
and researchers), they have been diverted to policy areas seen by those 
funding the research to have greater priority. For example, Fullerton, 
King, Shaven and Whalley (1980) (1981) analyse the issue of the 
integration of the corporate and personal tax in the United States. 
Provided the resources could be made available, an avenue for 
further research would ,be the specification of a SWF general equilibrium 
model to evaluate the incidence of the entire government budget when the 
results are expressed in terms of the changes in the relative income 
positions of households. Such an exercise requires the derivation of 
several important additional equations. The models would need to be 
designed to consider short-run changes to household incomes and demand 
for government-provided social and merit goods. Even then, definite 
conclusions about the incidence of taxes or of government spending could 
only be reached under highly restrictive assumptions. 
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Meantime, Governments continue to make policy which is intended to 
redistribute household income in some way. A method is required to 
evaluate the budget's distributive influence, utilizing current economic, 
statistical and computing resources to derive empirical results. The 
virtue of the income taxonomy spelled out in this chapter is that it is 
capable of generating empirical results in spite of the limitations of 
current economic theory. The evaluation of these results within 
different stages is a means of giving explicit recognition to the context 
in which they are derived. 
Purists may argue that the results generated by the approaches in 
Stages One, Two and Three are little more than statistical 
manipulations. Until there is a properly specified general equilibrium 
model, however, these are the results that can be generated. lhe 
advantages of this approach are: 
l) It evaluates the totality of government budget activity; 
2) Once developed, it can be easily (and quickly) updated 
so that current budget policies can be assessed; 
3) The underlying assumptions are explicit; 
4) Different assumptions can be easily tested; 
5) As new theoretical results emerge, they can be linked 
into the framework. 
The objective of the exercise is not to predict response to policy 
changes or the time lags involved, but to identify the possible 
first-round changes in money-income distribution. Attempts to quantify 
the income effects are intended to provide an approximation of the extent 
of change within the limitations of current economic theory. They are 
not intended to be an exact measurement of the change in income resulting 
because of the introduction of a budget measure. Although policymakers 
must be cautious about making too much out of this circumstantial 
evidence, it does provide a basis for selecting budget policies which 
meet more closely with their redistributive intentions. 
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E. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
This chapter outlines a taxonomy for evaluating the budget's 
distributive influence which has four stages. Each stage progresses from 
observable data to a more comprehensive income measure. Empirical 
results are derived for the first three stages • . The general conclusion 
which emerges is that the extent of redistribution of income towards the 
low-income households is reduced in relation to the increase in 
theoretical complexity of the model applied to evaluate the budget. 
Table lE.l on the next page compares the final income distributions 
(see Columns D, E and F). Also displayed in Table lE.l for illustrative 
purposes are the distributions of market income (A), total income (B), 
and household income available to spend (C). The Stage Three 
distribution (F) does not favour the low-income households as much as 
Stages One (D) and Two (E). It seems likely that if such concepts as 
excess burden and the index of the marginal utility of government 
expenditure with respect to income and externalities were also taken into 
account, the resulting distribution would be even more in favour of high 
incomes. Also, if the economic incidence of taxes (especially the 
personal income tax) was modelled, the resulting distribution would be 
less in favour of low income households. 
Stage One, the direct money-income measurement, is designed to 
reflect what could be described as a "common sense" view of the areas 
where government has an influence on income distribution. Households pay 
personal income taxes and some indirect taxes and in return they receive 
the benefits from social welfare payments, direct subsidies and 
government private goods such as education and health. 
The distribution of income received from market-place activities 
(salary and wage income, investment income, self-employed income and so 
on) is quite unequal. The lowest two household income deciles (20 
percent of households) earned less than 1 percent of the total of market 
income in 1981/82 (see Column A, Table lE.l). When direct monetary 
benefits are taken into account to derive total income (Column B), the 
distribution becomes more equal with the lowest 20 percent of households 
receiving 6.4 percent of the total. 
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Table lE.l 
f-busehold 
MONEY-INCOME EFFECTS OF THE 1981/82 BUDGET: COMPARISON 
OF DIFFERENT INCOM:: DISTRIBUTIONS 
(By Household Income Group : Each Group Represents a 
Decile, 10%, of Private Households) 
Money Market 
Market f-busehold Income Income 
Income Income W/Direct Adjusted 
For All Available Govt Tran- for Govt 
Market In come Private Total to Spend sactions Budget 
($ p.a.) f-buseholds Income (Stage One) (Stage Two) 
A B c D E 
23. 
Broad 
Income 
Gross 
Domestic 
Product 
Adjusted 
for Govt (Stage Three) 
F 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------Money Income Amount ($ Million) 
Less Than $250 
-22 632 582 748 805 967 
$250-( $3950) 170 772 683 823 871 1288 
$3950-( $9750) 731 1141 985 1165 1234 1951 
$9 7 50- ( $13450) 1212 1425 1170 1309 1394 1998 
$13450-($16900) 1567 1761 1395 1568 1672 2407 
$16900-($20250) 1922 2084 1601 1762 1880 2670 
$20250-( $24200) 2291 2414 1820 1998 2125 2935 
$24200-($29200) 2774 2923 2146 2294 2449 3457 . 
$29200-( $36650) 3387 3521 2527 - 2646 2819 4087 
$36650 and over 5211 5373 3585 3809 3896 6646 
-----------------------------------------~--------------------------------------TOTAL 19243 22046 16494 18122 19145 284D7 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------A B c D E F 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------Proportion of Total (%) 
Less Than $250 -0.1 2.9 3.5 4.2 4.2 3.4 
$250-( $3950) 0.9 3.5 4.1 4.5 4.5 4.5 
$3950-( $9750) 3.8 5.2 6.0 6.4 6.5 6.9 
$9750-($13450) 6.3 6.5 7.2 7.2 7.3 7.0 
$13450-($16900) 8.1 8.0 8. 5 8. 7 8. 7 8.5 
$16900-($20250) 10.0 9.4 9.7 9.7 9.8 9.4 
$20250-( $24200) 11.9 10.9 11.0 11.0 11.1 10.3 
$24200-($29200) 14.4 13.2 13.0 12.7 12.8 12.2 
$29200-( $36650) 17.6 16.0 15.3 14.6 14.7 14.4 
$36650 and over 27.1 24.4 21.7 21.0 20.4 23.4 
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.D 100.0 100.0 
Notes: Numbers may not add exactly because of rounding. Market income 
ranges have been defined so that each contains 10 percent of total private 
households. 
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Further adjustments to income (taking account of personal income 
taxes, subsidy income, indirect taxes and government private goads) 
generate the Stage One definition of income, direct money income 
including direct government transactions. Income valued in this way is 
distributed more in favour of law-income households than is market income 
or total income. The lowest 20 percent of households receive 8.7 percent 
-
of total Stage One income. (see Column D, Table lE.l). 
Chart 1.1 is an illustration of the relative equality of different 
income concepts. Lorenz curves are platted far Columns A, 0 and F of 
Table lE.l to show the relative equality of Market Income and Stage One 
and Stage Three Final Income. The Stage One and Stage Three curves are 
closer to the line of equality than , the curve far Market Income. This 
shows that when income is defined to include budget transactions, it is 
more equally distributed. 
CHART 1.1 
Ra.ATIVE EQUALITY OF MARKET INCOME AND STAGE ONE AND 
STAGE WREE FINAL INCOME: LORENZ DIAGRAM FOR 1981/82 
Percent of 100 
Final 
IncOD'.e 
(Cumulative) 
so 
70 
60 
so 
40 
30 
20 
10 
0 
Source: Tahle lE .l 
10 20 30 40 so 60 70 80 90 100 
Percent of Households by Market Income (Cumulative) 
CHAPTER ON:: - EVALUATING THE Bl.DGET'S DISTRIBUTIVE INFLUENCE 25. 
Table 1E.2 
STAGE TWO: DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLD MOf'.EY INC().£ ADJUSTED FOR 
TOTAL GE?'£RAL GOVERNMENT NON-MARKET ACTIVITIES 
(By 1-busehold Income Group: Each Group Represents 1~ of Private 1-tluseholds) 
Pa~ments to Government Government ExQenditure 
Market 
rousehold Collective Income 
Market Personal Other Total Government Other Total Adjusted 
Income Group Income Pay- Payments Expend. Gov't Gov't for Govt ($ p.a.)* Tax ments C case 1) Expend. Expend. Budget 
(Al+A2) (81+82) 
Al A2 A 81 B2 B c 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------Proportion of Total (%) 
Less than $ 250 0.9 3.1 1.8 3.9 13.9 11.0 
$ 250 - ($ 3950) 1.6 4.6 2.8 4.8 12.9 10.6 
$ 3950 - ($ 9750) 2.8 7.0 4.4 6.5 11.5 10.1 
$ 9750 - ($13450) 4.6 7.5 5.7 7. 5 7.9 7. 8 
$13450 - ($16900) 6.6 8.8 7.4 9.0 8.5 8.7 
$16900 - ($20250) 8.7 10.2 9.3 10.4 8.3 8.9 
$20250 - ( $24200) 10.7 10.6 10.7 11.1 8.1 8.9 
$24200 - ($29200) 14.0 12.3 13.3 12.7 8.7 9.9 
$29200 - ($36650) 17.9 14.9 16.7 15.4 8.7 10.6 
$36650 and over 32.2 21.0 27.9 18.7 11.5 13.5 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Stage Two takes the view that it is households which ultimately make 
all payments to government and consume all government expenditure. Based 
on this view, the entire income and outlay account of the government is 
allocated to households by income group and household type. In this 
case, it is necessary to apply economic theory about the incidence of 
taxes (such as the company income tax) and expenditures (such as national 
defence) which do not directly impact on household incomes. In the text 
of the appropriate chapters, several assumptions are tested. 
Table 1E.2 above shows some of the results based on the Stage Two 
approach. Based on the least extreme assumptions, four conclusions are: 
1) Payments to government are very redistributive with the upper 10 
percent of households contributing 27.9 percent of the money-income 
value of total government revenue and the lowest 10 percent 
contributing 1.8 percent (see Column A, Table lE.2); 
4 .2 
4. 5 
6. 5 
7.3 
8.7 
9.8 
11.1 
12.8 
14.7 
20.4 
100.0 
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2) Personal income taxes are extremely redistributive with the upper 
two deciles paying over 50 percent of the tax; 
26. 
3) The money-income benefits of total government expenditures are more 
evenly distributed than payments to the government. It is estimated 
that 10 percent of households in each income range receive between 
7.8 and 13.5 percent of the money-income value of total government 
expenditure, with the middle income deciles consuming a lower share 
of government spending than the upper and lower income groups (see 
Column 8, Table 1E .2); 
4) Even though Stage Two covers a broader concept of the government 
budget than covered in Stage One, the final distribution of income 
accounting for this broader concept is little different from the 
distribution of "money income including direct government 
transactions" in Stage One (see Columns 0 and E, Table 1£.1). 
Stage Three derives a "broad income measure" based on the view that 
if the entire government budget is to be taken into account, then all of 
the output of the economy should be attributed to households for 
comparative purposes. The proper derivation of Stage Tnree income 
distribution would benefit from a general equilibrium model to guarantee 
consistency between the assumptions for deriving an income base and 
evaluating budget incidence. The results based on this less rigorous 
(but possibly more theoretically valid) approach are tantalising because 
the upper income decile's share is greater than in the other two Stages 
while the share to the lower income deciles is smaller (3.4 percent 
compared with 4.2 percent). 
When the results are analysed by household type, the significant 
redistribution is to national-superannuitant households. The largest 
share of market income (18. 7 percent) is earned by the 15.0 percent of 
households containing two adults (without children or national 
superannuitants). The share earned by three-adult-no children households 
is a more modest 14.2 percent, but households: of this type make up only 
8.3 percent of total households. When adjustments are made for the Stage 
One definitions of "direct" government budget transactions, the income 
share going to two-adult and three-adult household reduces. On the other 
hand, the income share going to one-adult and two-adult 
national-superannuitant households increases, as does the share to 
one-adult households with children. The income shares of national 
superannuitant households are even greater under the Stage Three method 
than under the methods applied by Stages One and Two. 
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CHART 1.2 
COMPARISON OF RELATIVE EQUALITY OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF PAYMENTS 
TO GOVERNMENT ANJ Tr£ MONEY-INCOt-E VALUE OF GOVERNMENT 
EXPENDITURE: LORENZ DIAGRAM BASED ON STAGE TWO DEFINITIONS FOR 1981/82 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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Chart 1.2 is a graphic illustration of the difference between the 
distribution of payments to the government and total government 
expenditure. Total government expenditure is nearly equally 
distributed. Payments to the government are redistributive with those in 
the highest income groups paying the largest share. 
A Stage Four income measure requires further resources to derive an 
empirical income distribution for New Zealand. SWF models show how the 
economic effects of budget measures differ from their impact effects. It 
would be an interesting exercise to see whether this would translate into 
a significantly different household income distribution than is indicated 
by Stages One through Three. 
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Chapter Two describes the nature of the economic effects measured by 
HMM and SWF models. An obvious subject for this thesis could have been 
the extension of these models to treat the size distribution of household 
income and the expenditure side of the government's budget. However, the 
resources required to carry out such an extension are considerable and 
could not reasonably be commanded. 
Chapters Three through Six of this thesis are devoted to the 
analysis of the impact of the entire government budget on household 
incomes and household types. While this task has more modest theoretical 
aims than the SWF studies, it has two things in its favour: 1) it is 
able to generate results given the current state of knowledge; and, 2) 
it clearly identifies areas for further study so that the research of 
this broad topic can be spread among those who are expert in particular 
areas. 
CHAPTER TWO 
REDISTRIBUTION STUDIES : THE THEORY AND THE PRACTICE 
This chapter discusses the insights provided by general equilibrium 
models, especially in relation to their generation of theoretically 
consistent micro- and macro-economic incidence results. It also shows 
the limitations of these models when they are applied to the question at 
the base of this thesis, the evaluation of the budget's influence on 
household incomes. There is potential for existing New Zealand general 
equilibrium models to be augmented to assess budget incidence in relation 
to the household sector. However, the theoretical and computational 
resources involved in structuring this study in relation to a general 
equilibrium model are great. Hence, this thesis is devoted to a clearer 
definition of the issues involved using a quantative approach. 
Section A distinguishes some of the issues involved in the analysis 
of budget incidence, focusing on Meerman's (1978) taxonomy. Meerman 
(1978) clarifies the concepts underlying studies of budget incidence, 
showing at the same time that an attempt to assess even the differential 
incidence of an existing programme is apt to be extremely complex. The 
research inputs of time, money and the massive data requirements may not 
be at all commensurate with the expected benefit from the research. One 
way to reduce the research inputs is to redefine the concern of incidence 
studies by assuming that the impact of government policy on relative 
prices, technology and output is zero. 
Section B examines the Harberger (1962) tax-incidence model and 
extensions to it by Mieszkowski and Mclure (HMM models). The HMM 
two-sector general equilibrium approach integrates a microeconomic and a 
macroeconomic perspective to assess budget incidence within the context 
of modern economic theory. 
Section C surveys empirical work carried out using descendants of 
the Herberger model devoted to evaluating government public finance 
policies. Shaven, Whalley (1972, 1973, 1977) and Fullerton (1979) have 
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developed the HMM model to include several sectors, including consumer 
groups at different income levels. These models are referred to as SWF 
models. Mostly the SWF models have been concerned with stabilisation 
issues of tax policy. Section C discusses how these models treat 
methodological problems which have relevance to the analysis of the size 
distribution of the government budget and suggests some possible 
extensions which would make them more applicable. Pertinent SWF 
incidence results are also discussed. 
Section D is a brief discussion of some general equilibrium models 
of the New Zealand economy. The Victoria University Research Project on 
Economic Planning (RPEP) has two general equilibrium models, Joanna and 
Julianne. Joanna provides greater detail on the effects of tax 
instruments while Julianne is designed to analyse the longer-run effects 
of foreign trade and tariffs on the structure of the economy. The 
canterbury University Department of Economics and Operations Research 
(CUOEOR) is in the process of designing a general equilibrium model of 
the New Zealand economy for the purpose of addressing issues of 
government policy. There is_potential for either the RPEP or the CUDEOR 
models to be applied to the evaluation of the effect of the budget on 
household income redistribution; however, first the models would need to 
be substantially augmented. 
Section E surveys some quantitative studies of the effects of the 
government budget on income distribution. The quantitative research of 
budget incidence by income group has been much criticised because of its 
failure to incorporate many of the concerns that arise in the theoretical 
literature. For example, the research is open to criticism because of 
the limitations of the partial equilibrium approach adopted, its 
inability to fit observed economic relationships within existing 
theoretical models and its failure to incorporate a consistent 
macroeconomic approach. This section argues that quantitative studies 
have been unfairly maligned. Some limitations are inevitable because of 
the complexity of the problem of analysing the distribution of government 
budget measures by income group and because of the narrowness of existing 
theoretical models. Quantitative studies have made an important 
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contribution by translating theoretical results into terms which enable 
issues of budget incidence to be addressed in relation to household 
income groupings. 
31. 
Section F is a summary of the methodology adopted in this thesis. A 
general equilibrium model is not specified as such, but the insights from 
HMM, SWF and RPEP models are applied to assess household money income 
when central government budget measures are taken into account. An 
advantage of this approach is that it highlights some of the extensions 
to general equilibrium models which are required. 
A. BASIC CONCEPTS OF BUDGET INCIDENCE 
Budget incidence is _a measure of who pays the cost of, and who 
benefits from, changes in the government's budget. As the problem of 
incidence is designed in this thesis, the way of summarising the meaning 
of "who" across a total population is to define incidence in terms of 
households grouped into income brackets. Then incidence becomes the 
total change in the distribution of household income, defined to include 
publicly provided goods and services, due to the government's budget 
activities. 
Like most work in economics, the analysis of budget incidence 
involves the comparison of two equilibrium states. Depending on whether 
budget incidence is analysed within a comparative statics context or one 
of equilibrium growth paths, the budget may be balanced or unbalanced in 
equilibrium. 
Within a comparative statics context, the budget must be balanced in 
equilibrium because a stationary state is one in which financial and 
physical stocks are constant. A comparison of stationary states 
simplifies the analysis of budget incidence because it avoids some of the 
complications of deficit financing and the problems raised by defining 
'income' within a growing economy. In this case, balanced budget 
incidence is defined as the total change in the equilibrium distribution 
of household incomes due to an increase in taxes used to finance an 
exactly equivalent increase in expenditure. This implies some symmetry 
between the incidence of taxes and public spending or in other words, the 
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resource value of taxes is equal to the resource value in what they go to 
produce. 
The focus of incidence analysis is an the distribution of income, 
nat the change in the level of incomes. The effect of this tax and 
expenditure incidence symmetry in relation to output depends an whether 
the underlying model is classical or Keynesian. In a classical model, 
national income is held constant and the introduction of a budget measure 
effects the composition of output. In a Keynesian model, budget measures 
can lead to changes in aggregate demand and there can be growth in 
national income. 
If the context of the analysis of budget is that of an exponentially 
growing economy, then as shown by Damar (1944) the budget does not have 
to be balanced. If the equilibria being compared are steady-state growth 
paths, government spending need nat be equal to total tax receipts, even 
in the long run. 1here can be a continuing expanding debt (presumably 
used to finance capital spending which benefits future generations) which 
will increase absolutely through time but will tend to some constant rate 
with respect to the annual real income. Thus, within the context of a 
growing economy, it is nat only the distribution of taxes and 
expenditures by household income groups which matters, but also the 
distributional effects of government budget debt financing. Future and 
present generations are the beneficiaries and the financial supporters of 
the budget, so discounted-present-value-income measures are required. 
A.l: Meerman on Incidence 
One of the clearest expositions on budget incidence in relation to 
household income classes is Meerman (1978). Using what is apparently a 
classical model, he categorises balanced-budget incidence as: 
1) Benefit incidence is the value to the recipients of the 
resource transfer made through the public expenditure. 
2) Tax incidence is the resource transfer away from those who pay 
the tax, defined as equal to the amount of the tax. 
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3) RPTO incidence, the abbreviation for relative price, 
techniques and output incidence, is the residual of the income 
change less the sum of tax incidence (with negative sign) and 
benefit incidence. 
Benefit and tax incidence are the distribution of the direct (first 
round) income effects on the households ultimately enjoying the resource 
transfer or paying for it and RPTO incidence is the associated general 
equilibrium adjustment. Conceptually, as discussed by Meerman, the RPTO 
incidence of a given tax or expenditure can be analysed independently of 
all other effects of those taxes and/or expenditures. Harberger's (1962) 
application of the Stolper-Samuelsen two-sector general equilibrium model 
to the analysis of the incidence of the corporation income tax is 
actually an analytical cal~ulation of RPTO incidence (but for factors, 
not for income classes). 
A.2: Meerman's Model 
In Meerman's model, all income in the economy is received by 
households and consists solely of returns to factors. The factor labour 
is defined as the capitalized value of labour income. Hence, only 
factors and their returns - dividends, interest, wages, and so on -
appear in the household budget constraint. All factors are assumed 
privately owned, but they have no exchange value after their initial sale 
or allocation. This means there are no capital gains and losses, 
simplifying the measurement of income. 
Meerman's analysis of incidence uses comparative statics. He 
defines three equilibrium states (designated by subscripts 1, 2, 3)1• 
The first state refers to an economy in equilibrium without government. 
1. Meerman's definition of three stationary states is an expansion of 
the meaning of comparative statics covering two different periods. 
The first-period analysis is short-run, with Meerman's first 
stationary state at the base. The second-period analysis, which is 
designed to focus on changes in relative prices, technology and 
output, is long-run. Meerman's second stationary state (an economy 
involving government) is at the base and this is compared with the 
third stationary state (after adjustment for a new publicly-financed 
private good). 
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The second and third equilibrium states include government which is 
financed solely by taxes, has a balanced budget and provides goods. The 
third state occurs after the provision of a new government specific good 
financed by an equivalent increase in tax. 
There are a number of households, h, each with its income Hj(j = 
1,2 ••• h) based on the earnings of its factor endowments. Factors owned 
th ---
by the j household are indicated by ~j(k = 1,2 ••. m). Each type of 
factor (including capitalized labour) earns a one period return equal to 
wk ( k = 1, 2 ••• m) • 
There are n private goods and services designated as Qi(i = 
1,2 •.• n) and n prices corresponding to the various Qi designated as 
Pi(i = 1,2 ••. n). Returns per unit of factors as well as prices of 
goods are identical for all households due to perfect competition in 
factor as well as goods markets. There are no externalities or economies 
of scale. Thus, Pi equals marginal cost. 
For each household j, there is a budget constraint: 
n m 
HJ.j = r Pli Qlij = r wlkAlk · i=l k=l J (Al) 
Q .. is the amount of the ith good purchased by the jth lJ 
household whether for consumption or investment. Asset accumulation 
through investment does not affect the supply of factors available 
because the comparisons are of stationary states. 
Now introduce government which is funded solely by taxes and has a 
balanced budget. The government finances either completely private 
consumption and investment goods, or completely public goods and 
transfers. Government private goods are those provided directly to 
households. Government taxing and expenditure measures affect relative 
prices, returns to assets and asset endowments. 
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For household j in Meerman's second stationary state involving 
government: 
35. 
(A2) 
where 
Marginal value to recipient household of 01 financed by government, (i = 1,2 ••• n). (In terms of tne usual utility 
p 
analysis, Bij = MUQijiMUyj) 
G = quantity or total output of public good 
BJ =marginal value per unit of G to household j. 
(In utility analysis, Bg = MUGfMUy) 
Some of the implications of the second-state equilibrium (Meerman's 
first equilibrium introducing the .government) bear further consideration. 
The benefits of the government budget are measured in terms of values 
which are analogous to market sales. The measure of the value of private 
goods and services (Qij) purchased by the household is PiQij· 
The value of government supplied private goods is B~Qij and B}G 
is the value of the government supplied public goods for which the 
household is willing to pay. 
Consumer surplus is not integrated into the analysis. This 
treatment illustrates the approach frequently taken in empirical studies 
of tax incidence. In these empirical studies, tax incidence is defined 
in value terms, not in terms of the total reduction in utility or 
consumer surplus associated with the introduction of a new tax measure. 
In other words, the estimate of the value of the benefits from public 
services is based on the marginal rates of substitution between public 
expenditure measures and privately provided goods and services. In the 
same way that national income accounting ignores the consumer surplus 
inherent in consumption of private goods, this approach ignores consumer 
surplus provided by addition~l units of public goods and services. 2 
2. Piggott· and Whalley (1984, p.l) have shown that this procedure, 
which reflects both the deadweight losses from taxes and the 
consumer surplus from public goods, "can be quantitatively large 
enough to significantly change the measured redistributive impact of 
government policies." 
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Underlying Meerman's analysis is the assumption that the government 
provides publicly financed private goods at zero direct cost to the 
household; their use is assumed to be rationed through non-market 
mechanisms. This means that the marginal value to the household of 
publicly financed private good (Qij) and its public or private cost of 
production are not necessarily equal. If in addition to gQvernment 
allotment, a household purchases part of the consumption of Qij 
privately, the marginal value to the recipient household of the 
government financed good will equal its market price (Pi). But in the 
latter case, the market price (Pi) need not equal the marginal cast of 
publicly financing the goad or service (Qi), depending upon the 
relative efficiency of government provision of the publicly-financed 
private goad. 
Household income (Hj) is measured after adjustments for all 
government effects have taken place - it reflects the adjustments 
each household consumes the total output of the public good (G). 
after 
The 
inclusion of public goods in the identity means that consumption plus 
saving is no _longer identically equal to factor income for each of the 
households, although it is in aggregate. 
Spending per household, that is the price of goods and services 
consumed times the quantity, must equal the return to the factors of the 
household less any tax paid and any transfer received. 
When T =tax or negative tax (transfer), (q = 1,2 ••. z), there is q 
a Lindahl equilibrium and relation (A2) can be rewritten as: 
(A3) 
A.3: Efficient Benefit Taxation 
Equation (A2) only becomes an equality in a Lindahl equilibrium, 
where all taxes are direct. According to a Lindahl solution, where there 
is solely efficient benefit taxation such that the marginal value of 
benefit received equals tax paid, then (A2) above is an equation for 
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household j or for the economy as a whole. This equation becomes (A4) 
and could be written in national accounting terms, assuming that total 
final output equals total factor incomes. 
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(A4) 
n h n h p h g m h E E p2ijQ2ij + E E B2ijQ2ij + r B2ijG2 = E E W2k ·A2k. 
i=l J=l i=l j=l k=l . 1 J J j=l J= 
And for each household j: 
Meerman questions the widespread belief that the adoption of a 
Lindahl solution to the problem of financing public expenditure is 
necessarily Pareto superior in the sense that no household's total 
utility diminishes and at least one increases in moving from one 
equilibrium to another equilibrium . Meerman argues that a Lindahl 
solution is Pareto optimal, not Pareto superior. The assertion of the 
latter requires household welfare comparisons which are unambiguous. The 
change in relative prices resulting from a budget measure may make it 
possible for one household to attain a higher level of utility per dollar 
of private spending while another household may move to a lower 
indifference curve for a given budget constraint. Because consumption 
patterns differ between households, changes in the relative prices faced 
by all households change their true cost-of-living indexes in different 
ways. Since households may prefer lesser incomes with more favourable 
prices, a successful comparison of measured incomes in two different 
static equilibria does not necessarily give unambiguous results. 
A.4: Specification of Three Types of Incidence 
Two types of incidence can be specified from equation (A3): benefit 
incidence and tax incidence. Benefit incidence is defined: 
n p 
E BiQij + BgG 
j 
i=l 
CHAPTER TWO - REDISTRIBUTION STUDIES: THEORY At-il PRACTICE 
Tax incidence could then be expressed as: 
z 
L: T qj 
q=l 
38. 
In the 1960s and 1970s, a number of specialists in public finance 
attempted to assess budget incidence in various countries. Perhaps the 
most familiar quantitative incidence studies are by Gillespie (1965) and 
by the Musgraves (1973). 3 Typically, these studies define a concept of 
tax and benefit incidence which is similar to the above. 
A number of the quantitative studies acknowledge the importance of 
some of the general equilibrium effects of budget incidence. In 
practice, however, the studies were specified in such a way that the 
implicit underlying assumption was that RPTO (relative prices/technology/ 
output) incidence was zero. Because of this assumption, factor incomes 
m 
( L: W21<A2kj) are defined as though the existence of the government 
k=l 
makes no difference. 
One of the most important conclusions of contemporary economic 
theory, however, is that RPTO incidence is significant. Although 
Meerman (1978, p.30l) is one of the first to identify the precise 
problem, most of the controversy concerning empirical studies of budget 
incidence is centred on the assumption, which is quite often implicit, 
that RPTO incidence is zero. 
Meerman was able to identify the problem because he treated the 
issue of redistribution in relation to household size groups (not factor 1 
shares), given a more complex budget concept than is usually at the base 
of empirical budget incidence studies (such as SWF). 
3. See also: Bird and de Wulf (1973); de Wulf (1975). Many of these 
empirical studies base their analysis of the expenditure side of the 
budget on McLure (1974). 
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A.5: Effects of the Budget on Techniques, Output and its Composition 
Government budget transactions do not just effect output. They also 
affect savings decisions, occupational decisions and the development of 
institutions. While this is an obvious point to most economists, it is 
not so obvious how to specify a model to include this sort of effect. A 
rigorous empirical treatment of budget incidence can only be done using 
two approaches: 
a) Assessing differential balanced budget incidence where small 
changes in budget transactions (a new public good financed by 
an equivalent increase in tax) are compared for the combined 
incidence of a tax and the expenditure it finances; and, 
b) An approach where returns to factors, factor prices and the 
quantity of output are specified independently of budget 
activity. 
A.6: Differential Balanced Budget Incidence 
The usual approach in differential balanced budget incidence is to 
define a new (third) state which is the equilibrium occurring after a ~ 
government expenditure (Q5) financed by an equivalent increase in a tax 
(T5). The new expenditure is defined as a specific good (B5) 
with no joint product properties. The new equilibrium state is Meerman's 
stationary state 3, (but more accurately, equilibrium state 2). Assuming 
that the rest of the budget is unchanged and there are no effects on 
techniques, 1 the change in income for household j (D. Hj) on the income 
side is as follows: 
m m p (A6) 
D. H · = r ~ wk Azk · + r w3k t. Akj - t. T sj + B35j Q3sj J k=l J k=l 
Looking at the household j's consumption (C) side, the new equilibrium is: 
D. H· J 
(A7) 
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This equilibrium state will have adjusted to a number of different 
changes. An example will illustrate what they are. Suppose the new 
expenditure programme (Qs) is twenty-four hour creche facilities for 
40. 
the children of low-income families. In the short term, there will be a 
number of effects on the distribution of income. 
Looking first at the source of income to the household, there will 
be two main types of effects: 
• ~ Wi, an increase in the wages to childcare assistants and 
in the returns to the buildings used for the creche and the 
equipment used. There may also be changes to other wage rates • 
. ~ Aij, an increase in employed childcare assistants and 
changes in the distribution of other employed factors. 
_ Secondly, there will be effects because of the change in the budget 
measure: 
~ Tsj, an increase in taxes equal in the aggregate to the 
total costs of Q3sj· 
B~s · Q3s ·, consumption of "free" childcare (hitherto, publiclyJfinanced creches were non-existent) by low-income 
households. 
Finally, there will be effects from changes in output and prices on 
the consumption or uses-of-income side of the equation: 
• ~ Pi, an increase in the price of childcare, plus other 
changes in relative prices . 
. ~ Qij, an increase in the quantity of childcare (in addition 
to Q25 ) plus other changes in outputs. 
Not all of these effects will apply to all households, so there will 
be a reordering of households' relative economic positions. 
Meerman's incidence model assumes an unchanged average price level 
(there is no money), but relative prices can change because of the 
introduction of government or of a new tax. Equations (A6) and (A7) 
measure the change in income at a constant price level, but even where a 
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household's income has increased, it cannot be said for certain that 
total utility has increased (because the expression is Pareto Optimal, 
not Pareto Superior- see Section A.3 above). Nevertheless, for small 
government programmes, changes in relative prices and factor endowments 
are likely to be small, so calculation of the change in money income is a 
good enough indicator of the change in total utility. 
Total incidence: In identities (A6) and (A7), H. is total 
J 
incidence of the new tax or expenditure for household j. Having 
obtained identities (A6) and (A7), the distribution to h households 
where (j=l, 2 •.. h), the total budget incidence is: 
h 
l: ~ H. J j=l 
The three components of this are: 
1) Benefit incidence is B~sj Q3sj' the last term in both 
identities. This is the increase in income for the jth 
household from the new government expenditure, valued in terms 
of its marginal value to the recipient. 
2) Tax incidence is~ Tsj' the third term in equation (A4). 
This is the value of tax paid by the jth household, an 
amount which reduces the household's income. 
3) RPTO incidence is a residual equal to~ Hj (B~sj Q3sj- ~Tsj). 
A.7: Tax and Benefit Incidence Compared 
The first and second terms on the right-hand side of equation 
(A6) encompasses RPTO incidence. They are: 
m m 
r ~ wk A2kj + r w3k ~ Akj 
k=l k=l 
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But, the effects of the increased tax ( Tsj) and the new publicly 
financed expenditure (Qsj) are combined and cannot be separated. To 
calculate the RPTO incidence of either the change in tax or in 
expenditure, then it is necessary for the sole change to be a 
compensating change in either the expenditure or the tax; the common 
method is to replace one tax with an equal yielding alternative. 
Meerman argues that: 
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"An implication of this reasoning is that, conceptually at least, we 
can also decompose total incidence into two symmetrical pieces of 
two parts each: Tax incidence per se (defined as equal to the total 
tax) and the resulting RPTO incidence; Benefit incidence per se and 
the RPTO incidence resulting from the expenditure. A certain 
conceptual symmetry results. We define tax and benefit incidences 
as reducing and increasing incomes directly. Their RPTO incidences 
are more veiled, operating through changes in relative prices in 
factor and product markets, as well as through changing quantity and 
composition of output." (Meerman, 1978, p.305.) 
It is common practice for overseas quantitative incidence studies 
and more recently, the New Zealand Task Force on Tax Reform (1982), to 
study tax incidence ignoring RPTO effects. If these approaches make 
sense, then according to Meerman's "symmetry of incidence", it makes 
sense to study benefit incidence. It is possible conceptually to separate 
tax incidence from the RPTO effects associated with the tax. It is also 
possible to separate benefit incidence from the RPTO effects associated 
with government expenditures. 
A.8: Summary of the Main Points so Far 
1) Measurement of differential balanced budget incidence is 
impossible. Despite the assumption of an unchanged average 
price level, relative prices have changed and it is not 
certain that even when the change in a household's income is 
positive that total utility has increased. Approximate 
measurement is difficult if RPTO incidence is substantial, 
requiring a Harberger-type general equilibrium model. 
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2) It is also impossible to measure benefit incidence. However, 
in general, aggregate benefit incidence and community costs 
will be closely associated. Consequently, costs of government 
expenditures, which can be measured, are a proxy for benefits. 
This procedure brings a useful by-product, identification of 
the costs incurred by the community in providing benefits and 
the benefits to different groups. This is a necessary first 
step in many types of policy analysis. 
3) It is conceptually possible to study both tax and benefit 
incidence independently of RPTO incidence. 
4) Study of RPTO incidence per se is desirable. It would be 
useful to gauge its importance relative to that of benefit 
incidence. 
5) Empirical studies of general tax and/or public spending 
incidence would be improved if the usual failure to consider 
RPTO incidence was acknowledged. 
6) Incidence concepts of both taxes and public expenditures would 
be improved if the symmetry of the two were recognized: tax 
incidence, in conventional definition, is analogous to benefit 
incidence; RPTO incidence with respect to taxes is analogous 
to incidence with respect to expenditure. 
Finally, Meerman calls empirical (quantitative) studies of budget 
incidence "short-run backwards" because they implicitly assume ceteris 
paribus conditions for relative prices, technology, labour supply, the 
level of employment, savings and investment decisions in making incidence 
estimates. But in a more recent article, Meerman and Shame (1980) show 
that to some degree relative price changes for factors of production 
(principally capital and labour) can be taken into account in a study of 
budget incidence using the Harberger model. 
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B. HMM TWO-SECTOR GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODELS 
This section examines a general equilibrium approach to the analysis 
of tax incidence due to Harberger (1962), who developed a two factor, two 
good, two industry model to analyse the incidence of the corporation 
profits tax. Later extensions to Harberger's two-sector model (largely 
by Mclure and Mieszkowski) meant it could be applied to analyse the 
incidence of several types of taxes and government spending within a 
general equilibrium framework. 4 
The main conclusion from Harberger's original theoretical work is 
that the incidence of a tax on capital depends on the responsiveness of 
demand for the final products to the degree of substitutability between 
labour and capital. After carrying out an empirical test using data for 
the United States corporate sector; he concluded that capital bears close 
to (possibly more than) the full amount of the tax. 
The objective of this section is to give an exposition of the 
so-called Harberger model and extensions to it which provide insight into 
the concept of budget incidence. The relevance of these general 
equilibrium models for the quantitative work which is at the core of this 
thesis is that they provide a basis for selecting a set of consistent 
incidence assumptions. 
B.l: The Harberger Model 
The Harberger model assumes the existence of two competitive 
industries, producing x and y, which employ two factors, capital (K) and 
labour (L). The quantity of the two products are chosen so that their 
prices are initially equal to unity. Demand for each product depends on 
its·relative price and on the level of income of consumers. Since there 
4. Harberger's model was inspired by earlier work done in international 
trade (see Heckscher, 1919; Meade 1955; Ohlin 1933; Stolper, 
Samuelson 1941). Nevertheless, Harberger was the first to apply the 
model specifically to incidence analysis and this thesis follows 
Mclure in referring to it as the Harberger model. 
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are no savings5, consumption falls as the result of the imposition of a 
tax and the government uses the tax to gain command over the resulting 
displaced resources. 
45. 
Although all economic groups including the government, are assumed 
to spend their incomes in exactly the same way, at the margin, their 
average propensities to spend may differ and demand as a whole may change 
because of changes in relative prices. The model analyses the new 
equilibrium when small taxes are imposed in a distortion-free world. The 
equilibrium demand position will depend on how consumers react to the 
change in their incomes as factor owners and to whatever price change 
takes place, as well as how the government chooses to spend the proceeds 
of the tax. Harberger assumes that the way in which the government would 
spend the tax proceeds, if the initial prices continued to prevail, would 
just counterbalance the reductions in private expenditures on the two 
goods. Changes in demand are treated as a function of the changes in 
relative prices based on the additional assumption that the 
redistribution of factor incomes will not change the pattern of demand. 
All factors are assumed to be fully employed and this assumption 
links the demand functions for products x and y. Once the level of 
demand for x is known for given prices and full employment income, the 
level of demand for y can be derived from the available information. 
Other assumptions underlying Harberger's model are fixed aggregate 
factor supplies, perfect factor mobility, perfect competition in factor 
and product markets, a closed economic system and 
constant-return-to-scale production functions. Fixed money assets are 
excluded. Furthermore, the economy is in equilibrium before the 
imposition of the tax being analysed and there are no pre-existing taxes 
or other distortions in the system. 
S. Harberger (1962, p.235, 236) carried out empirical work to discover 
how much the net savings rate depends on the rate of return on 
capital. He found that the effect of the corporation tax on the 
rate of savings is probably small. 
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The above assumptions define a particular tax-incidence problem. 
Other effects are excluded. The assumption of fixed factor supplies 
prevents changes in the relationship between work and leisure. Also 
excluded are the effects of taxation on savings, investment and growth, 
and the effects of interactions between the supply of labour and the 
supply of capital. With perfect factor mobility, there are no 
impediments to the movement of labour and capital among indu~t~ies. 
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In the new equilibrium, the after-tax return on capital will be the 
same in both sectors. The reallocation of resources involves not only a 
change in the price of capital, but will also result in changes in wages 
and commodity prices. The model is applicable to analysis of incidence 
in the long run, if long-run incidence is taken to be the change in 
factor prices in the new equilibrium after capital has shifted between 
sectors. The assumption of perfect competition in factor and product 
markets implies that a change in price will affect supply, since as a 
price taker, the firm can only better its position by producing more or 
less of a product. Herberger's assumption of a closed economic system 
enables him to ignore exogenous changes other than the imposition of a 
tax distortion and economies of scale are ruled by the assumptions 
regarding the production functions. Finally, the assumption of no fixed 
money assets implies a continuously balanced budget consistent with a 
differential incidence approach. This makes it possible to consider 
relative price changes only and ignore the effects of absolute price 
changes. 
Following Mclure (1975), in a two-good, two-factor world, any tax or 
subsidy can be classified into one of four logically possible categories: 
1. A general tax an all factors (such as a value-added tax) or a 
general tax on all products (such as a general sales tax); 
2. A tax an one factor (such as a capital gains tax or an 
employment tax); 
3. A tax an one product (a tax an cigarettes); or, 
4. A tax on one factor when it is employed in producing one 
product. 
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A general tax on all factors and a general tax assessed at the same 
rate on all products are classified together because in both cases 
consumer demand will be affected in the same way. No matter whether 
consumers lose buying power through a change in their income as factor 
owners or on the uses of income through a change in relative product 
prices, the overall effect will depend on demand elasticity of product 
and factor substitution. 
The Harberger model was designed to deal with a tax in category 4: 
a surtax on the return to capital in the corporate sector, the sector 
producing product x. Product y is produced by the non-corporate sector. 
Assuming perfect factor mobility, the imposition of a tax on capital 
employed in producing x will lead to a movement of capital from the taxed 
sector to the non-taxed sector of the economy until a new equilibrium is 
reached where the after-tax return on capital will be the same in both 
sectors. In the sense that capital use can be varied within individual 
sectors, the model is long run, although there is no growth in aggregate 
capital stock. The reallocation of resources will be reflected in 
changes in wages and commodity prices. 
Changes in variables are indicated by differential notation. Thus, 
the Harberger model measures infinitesimally small changes in taxes and 
their comparative-static impacts upon other variables. The analysis is 
therefore applicable only for small changes in tax and for discrete 
changes the analysis is only a local approximation. 
B.l.a: Equations Specifying the Harberger Model 
Demand for x in the Harberger model depends on px/Py· In simple 
versions of the model, the basic demand equation is: 
dx = E.d(pxiPy) (81) 
X PxiPy 
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Recent studies applying the Harberger model follow Slutsky in 
setting E as the income compensated elasticity of demand. 6 
Differentiation and use of the convention that all prices are unity7 
produces the standard Harberger equation: 
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(82) 
-X 
Supply of x depends on the assumption that firms are competitive 
where Lx, Kx are the initial amounts of labour and capital 
respectively, and that the production function of xis x = x(Kx,Lx). 
Changes in the output of the industry resulting from changes in the 
factor inputs to the industry is the weighted average of the percentage 
changes in the two inputs where the weights (xl and xK) are the 
partial elasticities of output with respect to the two inputs. The 
formula for the percentage change in the output of x is: 
(83) 
where 1L and xK are the initial relative shares of labour and capital 
respectively, in the total costs of producing x. 
6. In his original article (1962), Harberger simply defined E as the 
price elasticity of demand for x. According to Mclure (1975), 
Harberger said later that he did not intend E to be the fully 
compensated elasticity of demand. Instead E is a reduced-form 
elasticity which subsumes such income effects due to excess burden 
(see section 8.l.a.i.). 
7. Mclure (1975, p.l33) notes two implications of setting all prices at 
unity. "First, any change in a price (dp) is also a fractional or 
(multiplying by 100) percentage change in that price. Second, what 
appear to be taxes levied on a per unit basis (dT) are really also 
ad valorem taxes since all prices are assumed to be unity". 
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The possibilities of factor substitution are indicated by the 
elasticities of substitution. For industry y, the elasticity of 
substitution between labour and capital is Sy, where w is the factor 
price. This gives: 
49. 
(84) 
Quantities are chosen setting initial product prices equal to unity. 
This means w is also the marginal product and (84) can be simplified to: 
dKY - dLY = Sy (dwK - dwl) (85) 
Ky Ly 
In the above expression (85), dwK is the change in the price of 
capital relevant for production decisions in the sector producing product 
y. It measures the change in the price of capital net of the tax. For 
the sector producing x, the relevant change in the price of capital is 
the gross change, dwK + T, where T is a per unit tax. Thus, the 
equation analogous to (85) for the sector producing good x is given by: 
dKx - dlx = Sx (dwK + T - dwl) (86) 
Kx LX 
Expressing all prices in terms of the price of labour, the price of 
labour becomes the numeraire and is taken to be unity both in the 
presence and absence of the tax. So: 
Assuming full employment of all factors, 
cJKY = -dKx 
dly = -dl X 
(87) 
(88) 
(89) 
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The production function of the sector producing goody, y(KY,LY) 
is also assumed continuous, differentiable, and homogeneous of the first 
degree. These properties, along with competition in the factor markets, 
guarantee that factor payments just exhaust revenue, or 
Assuming the schedules are locally straight, for small changes: 
Given that dy = wldly + wKdKY, then competition implies that 
the marginal product of labour in producing y is wl and that of 
capital is wK, so Py 
Py 
(810) 
(811) 
Py·dY = wl.dly + wK.dKY (812) 
Subtracting (812) from (811) gives: 
y.dPy = LY.dwL + KY.dwK (813) 
Dividing both sides .bY y, and using the assumption that the initial 
prices of both factors and outputs are unity, then 
(814) 
where yl and yK are the relative factor shares in the sector 
producing good y. The relationship for the sector producing good x is: 
Equations (87), (814) and (815) can be substituted into equation 
(81), giving: 
X 
(815) 
(816) 
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Substituting equations (814), (87) and (88) into equation (84): 
KX(-dKX) - LX(-dLX) = Sy.dwK (817) 
KYKX LYLX 
Similarly, substituting equation (88) into equation (85): 
dKx - dLx = Sx(dWK + T) (818) 
KX LX 
Three simultaneous equations can be derived by equating the right 
hand sides of equations (816) and (83) and rearranging terms in (817) and 
(818): 
E.xK.T = E(yK- xK)dwK + xLdLX + xKdKX 
LX KX 
(819) 
Sx.T = -Sx.dwK- dlx + dKx 
Lx Kx 
Harberger's model can be applied to measure two important effects 
caused by a subsidy or tax distortion: loss of efficiency (deadweight 
loss or excess burden) and the effects on the distribution of income or 
incidence. Incidence analysis centres on changes in net (rather than 
gross) factor eamings. Because of th~se changes, there may be 
differences in the distribution of pri~ate income as a result of the 
budget policies introduced. It is the purpose of incidence analysis to 
determine how the choice of a budget policy affects the distribution of 
income available for private use. The value of the change in income 
distribution is the change in relative prices because of the tax. 
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B.l.a.i: Analysis of Efficiency Loss 
The analysis of efficiency losses focuses on tax-induced differences 
in gross factor earnings between sectors. Efficiency loss is the 
) 
difference between national income produced by fully-employed resources 
in the presence of a tax and what is produced in its absence. Looking, 
for example, at the case of a tax on capital, in the post-tax 
equilibrium, the value of the marginal product of capital in (taxed) 
industry x exceeds that in industry y by the amount of the tax. An 
efficient allocation of capital would require these two values to be 
equal. The presence of the tax also produces inefficiencies of 
consumption because the marginal rates of substitution of x for y in 
consumption (given by their prices gross of tax) is different from the 
marginal rate of substitution of x and y in production (given by their 
prices net of tax). The value of efficiency loss is dKx. 
Specifying first the concept of excess burden, the tax revenue 
received by the government is T.Kx . Competition ensures that: 
So the marginal rate of substitution is not equal in the two 
industries and the production does not occur along the efficiency locus 
in factor space. The new transformation curve lies inside the efficient 
transformation curve except where this touches the x axis and the y 
axis. This will be reflected in a social loss from the tax in the 
producer surplus sense. It would be measured: 
(wK - 'Wk)(KxO - Kxl) + (w- WKn)(KyO - KYl) = T .dKX 
2 2 
where wKn is the return (wage) to capital net of tax and where w is the 
pre-tax wage. 
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Turning now to the concept of incidence, it is necessary to measure 
the change in capital employed in producing (taxed good) x. The quantity 
of capital transferred from high productivity applications in taxed 
sector x to lower productivity applications in non-taxed sector y is 
dKx. 
To solve for dKx, Cramer's rule is applied to the above 
simultaneous equations in (819) above to give: 
= KX. T -E [YK•Sx.~ + XK•Sy] - Sx•Sy•xl 
KX LX rx KX x LX) 
E (yK - xK) - - S - S l L + K j 
- - y x- --Ky Ly Ky Ly 
(820) 
In the absence of any taxes, capital will be allocated competitively 
so that the rate of return is equal for the two-sectors and capital is 
fully employed. Upon the imposition of a tax in one sector, the gross 
rate of return in that sector must be such that the net rate of return is 
equalized across the sectors and capital is again rully employed. The 
difference between the gross rate of return and the net rate of return to 
capital is, by definition, the tax per unit of capital utilized in the 
taxed sector. 
8.l.a.ii: The Determination of Incidence 
The Harberger model determines incidence by measuring the change in 
price of the taxed factor, capital. Capital's price change will be 
determined by the factor-substitution and output effects of the tax 
distortion. When the taxed industry is characterised by fixed production 
coefficients, there will be no factor-substitution effect. There will be 
no output effect when the two industries have the same factor intensities. 
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The next step is to examine the general solution to the above 
equation, finding values for the demand and supply elasticities. As 
explained more fully in Appendix A, these calculations provide the sign 
for dwK' where: 
.T 
54. 
(B21) 
If dwK is found to be zero, then there is no change in the 
equilibrium price of capital or labour. Since th~ relative prices of 
capital and labour are set equal to 1 and the marginal products of 
factors are directly related to factors' income shares, when dwK is 
equal to zero, labour and capital bear the burden of the tax in 
proportion to their initial contribution in national income. The shares 
of labour and capital in gross income measured in wage units have 
decreased by proportional amounts. 
capital suffers the full burden of tax when: 
d~ = -T.Kx 
K 
(822) 
By assumption, the price of labour does not change. Therefore, the 
change in national income gross of tax, measured in wage units, is KxT 
+ dwK(Kx + KY). Substituting the right-hand side of the equation 
(821) for dwK gives the result that the change in national income gross 
of tax is zero. capital uses the exact amount of the tax, T.Kx, gained 
by the government in tax revenue. 
Appendix A discusses the derivation of conditions, which if 
satisfied, provide the sign dwK. If dwK is positive, then capital's 
relative share of income and labour's share will be proportionately 
greater. If dwK is negative, capital bears a proportionately larger 
share than labour, relative to their original shares in national income. 
Also discussed in Appendix A are the general conclusions from the model. 
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B.l.b: Application of Harberger Model to the United States case. 
Harberger (1962, pp. 230-236) applied his theoretical model to an 
analysis of the United States corporation tax. The importance of this 
application to the approach in this thesis is that it provides the basis 
for the assumption that capital pays 100 percent of the corporation 
income tax. 
Harberger's method was to divide the United States economy into two 
broad sectors, one corporate and one non-corporate. Excluded from 
consideration were the government and rest-of-world sectors, financial 
intermediaries and many services. The unincorporated sector mainly 
comprised agriculture, real estate and miscellaneous repair services. 
Included in the corporate sector were the industries not specifically 
excluded above. Industries classified as corporate paid roughly $20 
billion in corporate income taxes. The non-corporate sector paid only 
$500 million in corporate tax which in Harberger's view was "practically 
no corporation income taxes" (Harberger 1962, p. 231) and qualified it to 
be the non-taxed sector • . 
Harberger argues that because the corporation tax is of large 
magnitude, the pre-tax and post-tax values of (Lx/LY), (Kx/KY), 
xK' xl and yK could differ significantly. He accordingly derives 
two alternative sets of values, displayed by Figure 2.1. Set 1 is based 
on observed values and set 2 represents the values that would have 
emerged in the absence of the tax if each sector is characterised by a 
Cobb-Douglas production function. These values are substituted into 
equation (821). 
Next, available evidence is used to estimate the magnitude of E, Sx 
and Sy. Arguing that the elasticity of demand for agricultural products 
lies below unity and the price of elasticity of demand for residential 
houses lies somewhere in the neighbourhood of unity, Harberger chose 
unity as a reasonable upper bound for Exy (the elasticity of 
substitution between x and y). A value of unity for Exy implies a 
CHAPTER TWO - REDISTRIBUTION STUDIES: THEORY AND PRACTICE 
FIGURE 2.1 
EMPIRICAL APPLICATION OF HARBERGER CORPORATE-TAX-INCIDENCE MODEL 
DATA RELATE TO 1953 to 1955 FOR THE UNITED STATES ECONOMY 
56. 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The corporate sector contributed approximately $240 billion per year 
to national income, earning roughly $40 billion in return to capital 
and with a wage bill averaging -around $200 billion. It paid roughly 
$20 billion in corporation income taxes. 
The non-corporate sector contributed some $40 billion per year to 
the national income. Capital's income was $20 billion and labour's 
was $20 billion. Less than $500 million was paid in income taxes. 
Set I below is derived from the observed values of corporate and 
non-corporate activity. Set II represents the values that would 
have emerged in 1953-55 in the absence of the tax if each sector 
were characterised by a Cobb-Douglas production function. 
(Kx/~.Y) 
Set I 1 
Set II 2 
XK 
1/11 
1/6 
XL YK 
10/11 0.5 
5/6 0.5 
Substituting these figures into equation (B21) obtains expressions 
specified directly in teri.'ls of the elasticities of substitution 
and demand: 
Based on Set 1: 
Based on Set 2: 
dWK = T[-9E + 20Sx] 
-40.5E - llSy - 20Sx 
dwK = T[-8E + 20Sx] 
-16E - 6Sy - 20Sx 
value of -6/7 for the elasticity of demand for products in the 
non-corporate sector and a value of -1/7 for the elasticity of demand for 
the products in the corporate sector. 
Recall that: 
Ex= Exy·Y and that Ey = Exy·x Harberger's data records 
X + y X + y 
that y/(x + y) = $408/$2808 and x/(x + y) = $2408/$280B. (Note: B=billion). 
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Citing evidence from Solow (1961) and Minasian (1961), Harberger 
assumed an elasticity of substitution between labour and capital (Sx) in 
the corporate sector of unity. While recognising the common finding of 
an elasticity of substitution near unity in farm data, Harberger's own 
feeling was that Sy is probably substantially below Sx since close to 
half the contribution of the non-corporate sector comes from real 
estate. Very little labour was used in the real estate industry in 
Harberger's judgement and he finds it "difficult to see how the 
elasticity of substitution between labour and capital in the provision of 
housing services could be very great". (Harberger, 1962, p.233). 
Nevertheless, as a first approximation Harberger derives the case 
where Sx, Sy and Exy are all equal to unity (the Cobb-Douglas case). 
He further applies values of Sy below unity and finds his results are not 
especially sensitive to these reductions. His results are even less 
sensitive to changes in demand elasticity, Exy" While different 
assumptions give different results10 for capital's share of the tax 
burden, the main results range between 90 to 120 percent. In Harberger's 
view (1962, p. 234): 
"It is hard to avoid the conclusion that plausible alternative sets 
of assumptions about the relevant elasticities all yield results in 
which capital bears very close to 100 percent of the tax burden. 
The most plausible assumptions imply that capital bears more than 
the full burden of the tax". 
10. For example, when the assumption of a fixed capital stock is relaxed 
and the corporation income tax is assumed to influence the rate of 
savings (and the total stock of capital), Harberger still finds that 
capital bears close to the full burden of the tax. Harberger also 
attempts to extend his analysis to cover other tax provisions 
relating to capital (such as taxes on capital gains) and relaxes his 
assumption about competition in the corporate sector to accommodate 
the presence of monopoly elements. When he applies empirical 
evidence, to survey the impact of other tax provisions relating to 
capital Harberger concludes that no more than a quarter of the 
corporation income tax is shifted away from capital as a result of 
these provisions. 
CHAPTER TWO - REDISTRIBUTION STUDIES: THEORY AND PRACTICE 58. 
8.2: The HMM Model 
Mclure (1964, 1967, 1970, 1971, l972a, l974a, l974b) and Mieszkowski 
(1963, 1966, 1967, 1969) are two of those who have extended and developed 
the Herberger model. Recent versions of the model are referred to as HMM 
models as acknowledgement of their contributions. The extended HMM 
versions are modeled to treat a greater number of incidence concepts, 
including a range of taxes, government expenditure, and some less 
restrictive assumptions. 
8.2.a: Mieszkowski Analyses Taxes Other Than the Corporation Income 
Tax 
Mieszkowski (1963) applies Herberger's empirical data for the United 
States to estimate the magnitude of taxes other than a tax on capital in 
the corporate sector. Briefly, six main points emerge from Mieszkowski's 
empirical results: 
l) Labour is found to bear the entire burden of a partial tax on labour 
in either sector if E = -l/7, Sx = -1 and Sy = -1. If products · 
(rather than factors) are taxed, capital will bear a proportionately 
larger share of the tax burden if the tax is imposed on a capital 
intensive product in the non-corporate sector. Labour will bear a 
proportionately larger share of the burden of a product-tax imposed 
on the labour-intensive product, x, in the corporate sector. 
2) The incidence of a tax imposed on labour in the corporate sector 
does not vary appreciably with Sx, but the results are sensitive to 
the size of Sy. The larger the value of Sy, the smaller is labour's 
tax burden. Labour's share of the tax burden increases diFectly with 
the size of E, the price elasticity of demand for product x. 
3) The incidence of a tax on labour employed in the non-corporate 
sector is highly sensitive to the size of Sy, the elasticity of 
substitution between labour and capital for industry y. The price 
elasticity of demand also has a significant bearing on the incidence 
of this tax. 
4) The burden of a tax on capital employed in the corporate sector 
increases with the size of Sx (the elasticity of substitution 
between labour and capital for industry x), and decreases with the 
size of Sy. The converse is true for capital employed in the 
non-corporate sector. Further, the larger the value of E, the 
smaller will be the tax burden of a tax imposed on capital in the 
corporate sector. 
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5) The smaller the elasticities of substitution in the industries 
producing goods x andy (other things being equal), the larger is 
labour's share of a tax on product x, produced by the corporate 
sector. 
6) The larger the elasticities of substitution in the two industries, 
the smaller will be capital's tax payment for a tax on the product 
produced in the non-corporate sector, product y. 
B.2.b: HMM Treatment of Demand and Government Spending 
59. 
The above discussion relates to partial taxes imposed on one of the 
two sectors. Another tax to consider is a general tax on all production 
in the economy. 
A general tax on production in the HMM model does not distort 
output, factor utilisation, relative product prices or relative factor 
prices. Thus, it is borne in proportion to initial shares in national 
income or consumption. What the tax does do is raise product prices 
relative to factor prices. But whether it is borne by consumers or by 
the recipients of factor incomes is a meaningless question in the context 
of the model because these two groups are not distinguished. 
As Mieszkowski argues (1963), in order to retain Harberger's simple 
specification of the demand side of the economy, it is necessary to 
stipulate that government spending will be adjusted in such a way that 
unless the tax sets up a disequilibrium in factor markets, relative 
prices and the output composition of the economy will remain unchanged. 
In other words, the government will adjust its spending in such a way 
that the income effect of a tax imposition can be ignored in determining 
' the change in the composition of output. 
Further, the assumption that the redistribution of income among 
groups does not affect demand implies that the consumption patterns of 
the two groups are identical. So, while the Harberger model may be· 
designed to take account of both demand and supply schedules (the uses 
and sources of income), in actual practice the analysis of the uses side 
is not significant. 
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Mieszkowski suggests (1963) that government demand could be 
distinguished from private demand by specifying government spending on 
product x as xG and spending on product y as yG and then calculating 
60. 
dwK for each of the six possible partial taxes. He does not carry out 
this procedure, however, because he argues that apart from the complexity 
of the resulting equations, there is still the question of how to choose 
xG and yG. For a start, to derive xG and yG, the simple 
specification of demand in Harberger's model would have to be replaced 
• 
with a function which takes the income effect of a tax into account. 
Meade (1955) used a precursor of the HMM two-sector model to analyse 
variations in spending patterns among different groups. In analysing 
demand, Meade divides the economy into workers and capitalists. He 
derives sufficient condi~ions whereby a small increase in an excise tax 
in one sector, accompanied by a small decrease in an excise tax in the 
other sector, will increase social welfare when government expenditures 
are held fixed in real terms. Meade's analysis is of particular interest 
because unlike Harberger, he specifies that taxes exist in the system 
before any tax change is imposed and he uses a social welfare function to 
introduce normative distributional weights for the two groups (workers 
and capitalists). In this way he is better able to combine the effects 
of the uses of income with effects of the sources of income when 
analysing tax incidence. 11 
With two demand functions in the model, the demand condition that 
depends on the spending propensities of different groups being the same, 
is relaxed. If relative factor prices are fixed, that is dwK = 0, 
1
a 
tax of any type on good x will decrease the real income of capitalists 
more than would an equal-yield tax on y, if capitalists spend a larger 
proportion of their income on x than do workers. The converse also 
holds. When relative factor prices change, the results on differential 
incidence are unambiguous only if the factor-intensity (output effect), 
11. Wells (1955), Johnson (1956) and Williams (1963) further develop 
this approach. 
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the demand effect, and the factor substitution effect operate in the same 
direction. Taking an example, the substitution of a tax on labour used 
in producing good x for a tax on capital in producing y will be certain 
to increase the real income of capital if x is labour intensive relative 
to y and if capitalists spend a higher proportion of their income on y 
than workers do. 
Mieszkowski (1967) follows Meade's approach and relaxes Harberger's 
assumption that the government spends its income in exactly the same way 
as consumers. He shows that the Harberger model is flexible enough to 
accommodate two demand functions, specifying his version of Harberger's 
model in terms of differential incidence, ignoring excess burden 
effects. The introduction of the different spending patterns for the two 
groups makes the solution of the incidence for various taxes even less 
definite. 
Since Mieszkowski continues to assume that workers and capitalists 
receive only one kind of income, the basic change from Harberger's model 
is in the specification of demand. As well as being a function of 
relative prices, demand is also a function of changes in incomes plus the 
change in the government's demand for products x and y. 
Mieszkowski finds that while the expressions for the change in the 
price of capital relative to the price of labour are more complicated 
because of the way the demand side of the model is specified, the 
principal qualitative results are similar to those for the simpler 
version of the HMM model. In the case of the three partial taxes imposed 
I 
in one 'of the two sectors, the output and demand effects are identical 
for both versions. The only major differences in the results is measured 
by the factor-substitution effect. Here, the untaxed factor will be 
substituted for the taxed factor and this factor substitution acts to 
depress the relative price of the taxed factor. This effect increases 
capital's tax burden when capital is taxed, increases the price of 
capital (and labour's tax burden) when labour is taxed, and is equal to 
zero for a commodity tax. 
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B.2.b: Mclure Extends HMM Results to Cover Trade and Government 
Expenditure 
62. 
Another extension of the general equilibrium approach is to 
introduce trade between countries. Since the standard model of 
international trade, a two-country, two-commodity model, provides the 
basis for Harberger's original work, this extension is consistent. 
Instead of a corporate and non-corporate sector, the Harberger model may 
be interpreted as a two-country trade model where both countries are 
completely specialised in the production of a one commodity and factors 
may be either a~sumed to be mobile or immobile between countries. 
The assumption of perfect factor mobility limits this application of 
the Harberger analysis. Theoretically, tax incidence can only be 
analysed in the long-run and the model cannot be applied to trade 
conditions where one or both factors are immobile. Mclure (1971) shows 
that this assumption can be relaxed so that the model can be used to 
analyse tax incidence under conditions of factor immobility as well as 
factor mobility. 
Mclure's method is to var~ the numeraire of the model. Several 
numeraires are possible, but Mclure elects to set dpy = 0 (where 
product y is the untaxed product)12 Then the model can be solved for 
changes in both relative factor and product prices under various 
assumptions about the factors. Because of the equivalences of taxes in 
the context of the model, complete information about the output effects, 
the factor substitution effect and the total effect on any tax has on 
prices can be determined from the analysis of the total effect of four 
taxes for each mobility assumption. 
12. McLure (1971) reasons that this approach is consistent with the 
assumption that monetary conditions would be such as to stabilise 
the price of the untaxed product. Alternatively, a simple 
description of macroeconomic policy may be added to the model, 
making it possible to solve for changes in absolute prices. For 
example, changes in factor or product prices may be related to the 
velocity of money and changes in the money supply. 
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Mclure's research is particularly valuable because of the steps he 
takes to clarify several questions about the methodology of incidence 
analysis. For example, to develop the HMM model so that the incidence of 
government expenditures can be analysed, Mclure places the model in the 
context of a balanced budget. Unfortunately, his analysis is limited 
because the package of expenditures financed by taxation are defined as 
having a neutral effect in the sense that, at the margin, the government 
spends tax proceeds in exactly the same way as the private sector. 
Further, government services are neither substitutes for, nor complements 
to, either product of the private sector. So, neutral government 
purchases cause no movement in relative prices. 
The implications of Mclure results are briefly set out below: 
Case 1) 
Case 2) 
Case 3) 
Case 4) 
A factor tax levied upon one use of an immobile factor is 
borne entirely by that factor in the taxed use; 
A tax levied on one product under conditions of complete 
factor immobility is borne by the factors specific to that 
industry, not by the consumer of the product, independently 
of the value of all the parameters of the model; 
A general tax on one factor used in both industries is borne 
entirely by the taxed factor, regardless of the mobility of 
either factor. In each case the price of capital in both 
industries falls by the amount of a general tax on capital, 
while the prices of labour and good x are unchanged. The 
results for a general tax on labour are analogous. Thus, a 
truly general property tax is borne by recipients of capital 
income (and rents) and a general labour tax (such as the 
social security tax) by labour; 
The effects on factor prices of a tax on production in one 
industry are unambiguous in sign; 
a) In case 2, the price of labour (the mobile factor), 
falls and the price of capital rises in the untaxed 
industry and falls in the taxed industry. Labour, being 
mobile, is able to shift from the taxed to the untaxed 
industry in an effort to escape the tax. In so doing it 
raises the productivity of capital in the untaxed 
industry and lowers it in the taxed industry. 
b) Analogous results occur in case 3. 
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c) In case 4, (the numerators of the) factor price effects 
of a production tax depend upon the elasticity of demand 
and relative factor intensities in the two industries. 
Case 5) If the taxed factor is mobile but the untaxed factor is not, 
all but one of the price effects of a tax levied on the use of 
one factor in one industry are identical to those of a tax 
levied at the same rate on the production of the industry. 
The Harberger model then lends itself to a consideration of the 
effects of government expenditure of tax :evenues (Mclure, 1972a). 
Mclure divides government activities which influence the distribution of 
real incomes among individuals into three groups: (a) benefits from 
government activities; (b) taxes used to finance these activities and, 
(c) government expenditures themselves. He then examines the 
distributional implications of a balanced-budget increase in various 
types of neutrally financed expenditures and the differential effects of 
changes in the composition of a given amount of public expenditure, both 
under various assumptions of factor mobility. Mclure shows that tax and 
expenditure analysis can be combined to determine the incidence of 
non-neutral financing of non-neutral government expenditures. He 
illustrates his methodology by examining five government programmes: 
1) public purchase of finished products financed by a 
general tax on income or production; 
2) a balanced-budget shift in the composition of government 
procurement of finished goods; 
3) a programme of public utilisation of factors financed as 
in (1) above; 
4) a balanced-budget alteration of the pattern of public 
factor utilisation; and 
5) a balanced-budget shift from purchase of finished goods 
to factor utilisation. 
Taxes and expenditures are assumed to be neutral so as to have no 
impact upon relative product prices or relative factor rewards. In other 
words, taxes reduce all incomes proportionately and expenditures increase 
all incomes proportionately. 
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Mclure (1972a) found that unless the expenditures are subsidies 
(negative taxes, instead of exhaustive expenditures), they generally 
entailed less factor substitution than taxes. 
B,2.c: Feldstein's Comparison of Long-run Steady-State Paths 
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Feldstein (l974a, 1974b) further extends the Harberger model to 
compare the general equilibrium analyses of tax incidence under a 
comparative static approach and under the conditions of a long-run 
steady-state growing economy. He finds that the results implied by the 
steady-state growth approach are very different from the implications of 
the comparative static approach. 
For example, in his analysis of the incidence of a capital income 
tax, Feldstein notes that the magnitude of the tax shifting depends on 
the effect of the tax on the fraction of income that is saved and thus on 
the capital intensity of production. He finds that the capital intensity 
of production is quite sensitive to changes in this overall savings 
rate; the elasticity of the capital intensity with respect to the 
overall savings rate is significantly greater than one. 
The excess of capital stock may be defined as the capital stock in 
the presence of any tax compared with the capital without tax. Since 
Harberger assumes that the percentage excess of capital stock can never 
be greater than the percentage excess of the savings rate that would have 
existed in the absence of the tax over the savings rate in the presence 
of tax, he underestimates the effect of .. a change in savings on the 
capital intensity of the economy. Instead of Harberger's original 
conclusion that capital bears close to the full burden of a tax on 
capital in the corporate sector, Feldstein's results suggest that capital 
may avoid a substantial portion of the burden of the tax if the tax does 
have a significant effect on the overall savings rate. 
In the case of a general tax on labour, Feldstein finds (1974b) that 
a dynamic version of Harberger's model implies that in the long run, 
labour will bear at least 100 percent of the net burden of a tax on 
labour income, even if there is a substantial positive elasticity of 
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labour supply. Capital's return is likely to rise in response to the 
introduction of a tax on labour incomes, so that the owners of capital 
benefit from the imposition of the tax, rather than sharing its burden 
with the workers. 
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Herberger's model shows the effect on tax incidence of differences 
in the supply responses of capital and labour, but does not reflect the 
relation between labour supply and capital formation that prevails in a 
dynamic economy. Feldstein's explicit growth model emphasises the 
difference between the supply of labour and capital. Labour is treated 
as a primary factor while the stock of capital depends an savings out of 
the previous incomes of labour and capital. The past supply of labour 
affects the current stock of capital directly through saving out of 
labour income and indirectly through the effect of labour supply on 
capital income (and therefore o~ the savings of capital owners). 
8.3: Strengths of the HMM Models 
The HMM general equilibrium model is equipped to overcome some of 
the limitations of the partial equilibrium approach. One strength of 
Harberger's original model was that the model was based an empirically 
defined quantities, making possible quantitative study. Mieszkowski, 
McLure and others have since shown that the model can be extended. 
Feldstein has mobilised the model from a comparative static model to a 
dynamic growth model. 
8.3.a: Sources and Uses of Income 
The. Harberger model sheds light on the debate over the incidence of 
general and selective sales and excise taxes because it is constructed to 
distinguish the influence of a tax on relative factor and product prices 
from the macroeconomic effects of that tax on the levels of absolute 
prices. Focusing upon the relative price changes induced by a tax 
reveals the changes in the distribution of private income, combining the 
determinants of the source of income (supply) and use of private income 
(demand). 
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For example, there is no problem determining how an excise tax 
affects individuals in their roles both as recipients of factor incomes . 
and as consumers of products produced by factors because the model takes 
into account the interdependence of markets. The model considers. the 
productive sector through the explicit specification of the returns to 
the various factors as variables and constant returns to scale, initial 
factor endowments and factor shares, elasticities of factor substitution 
and the mobility of factors. It is possible to use the model to analyse 
how the values of these various parameters influence th~ incidence of a 
particular excise tax. Mclure and Mieszkowski specify the demand 
function so that relative prices can be considered. 
Thus, taking an excise tax, for instance, it is possible to assess 
both how the tax affects individuals in their roles as recipients of 
factor incomes (by changing the relative net returns to factors) and how 
it affects them in their roles as consumers (through variations in 
relative product prices). 
8.3.b: Partial Factor Tax Incidence 
Inclusion of the equations describing the conditions underlying the 
supply of products makes it possible to examine the incidence of the tax 
on one use of a factor. Herberger originally used the model to assess the 
effects of the corporate income tax. While the tax was assessed on one 
factor (capital), it was paid by capital in both the corporate and 
non-corporate sectors. If capital is assumed to be completely mobile, 
the effects can be distinguished in terms of an output effect and a 
factor substitution effect. 
The output effect is the effect of an equal yield tax assessed on 
the taxed industry's output and occurs when only one industry is taxed. 
The factor substitution effect occurs when only one factor is taxed in 
an industry and can be isolated as the differential incidence of equal 
yield taxes on (1) the output of the industry and (2) one factor employed 
in that industry. As Mclure (1975, p.l40) notes, however, if the excess 
burdens created by the two taxes are not similar, "this comparison may be 
difficult or misleading". 
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8.3.c: Incidence of General Taxes 
Assuming fixed total factor supplies, the HMM model can be applied 
to the analysis of the incidence of general taxes. As shown by the 
equations presented in earlier section of this Chapter, a general tax on 
income or consumption is borne in proportion to initial shares in income 
or consumption, and is unaffected by the elasticities of. demand and 
supply of the various goods. A general tax on all uses of one factor 
(for example, a property tax), is paid by the factor, rather than being 
shifted in part to consumers or owners of other factors. This result 
holds independently of demand conditions for the factor, the 
factor-intensity of production in the various sectors, and the mobility 
of both factors. 
The assumption of complete inelasticity of factor supplies can be 
relaxed, although the results for both the general income or consumption 
tax or a general tax on all uses of one factor will not be so clear as 
when the factor supplies are assumed to be fixed. 
8.3.d: Expenditure Incidence 
Initially, 1-Brberger assumed "for the sake of simplicity that the 
way in which the Government would spend the tax proceeds, if the initial 
prices continued to prevail, would just counter-balance the reductions in 
private expenditures on the two goods" (Herberger 1962, p.219). 
Mieszkowski and Mclure later extended Herberger's model to consider 
questions of expenditure incidence (Mieszkowski, 1967; Mclure 1972). 
By relaxing the assumption of identical public and private 
expenditure patterns, Mieszkowski was able to isolate the effects of 
public expenditures. If the average propensities of individuals to 
purchase the two goods are not identical, some redistributional effects 
are caused on the side of the uses of income by a change in relative 
product prices. Also, if all marginal propensities to spend on the two 
goods are not identical, effects on product demand and relative prices 
result from the transfer of purchasing power (measured in terms of real 
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income) from the private to the public sector and within the private 
sector. 
69. 
Mclure's assumptions are slightly more restrictive. He assumes that 
consumers have equal marginal propensities to spend on the two goods, but 
not necessarily equal average propensities. Under this treatment, the 
second round effects on demand and relative prices resulting from unequal 
marginal expenditure patterns can be ignored, while changes in income on 
the u~es side can be considered. 
As Mclure has also shown, the Herberger model can be applied to 
examine both the distributional implications of balanced-budget increase 
in various types of neutrally financed expenditures and the differential 
effects of changes in the composition of a given amount of public 
expenditures, both under several assumptions about factor mobility. 
B.3.e: Stabilisation Effects 
An inadequacy of the partial-equilibrium analysis is the inability 
to distinguish the effects of excise taxes on the prices of taxed goods 
from the effects when excise taxes are used as macroeconomic tools of 
fiscal policy. When the numeraire of the HMM model is specified to 
reflect macroeconomic conditions in the economy, tax incidence can be 
isolated. Tax incidence is the income effects arising from the change in 
relative prices (except to the extent that assets and liabilities exist 
which are fixed in money terms) and depends on the structure of taxation 
and the structure's effect on relative prices. Changes in the price 
level, on the other hand, depend on the level of taxes and other 
macroeconomic variables. 
8.4: Weaknesses of HMM Models 
The general equilibrium models underlying the HMM approach enable a 
much fuller treatment of tax incidence problems than the partial 
equilibrium approach, including the integration of both macroeconomic and 
microeconomic relationships, but a large number of weaknesses remain. 
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Most of the weaknesses centre on the inability of the model to deal 
adequately with change, lack of account given to current theoretical 
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developments and poor specification of real world relationships. Private 
investment is set so that demand effects are ignored, the balanced-budget 
multiplier is zero, there is no business cycle and it is unclear whether 
these models can be sufficiently disaggregated to measure individual 
household income changes resulting from government taxing and spending. 
The problems of specifying real world relationships could be 
partially remedied by taking fuller account of recent theoretical 
models. For example, the assumption of perfect competition underlies the 
HMM model, a condition of short-period equilibrium in neo-classical, 
microeconomic models. Growth of the literature on dynamic equilibrium 
shows potential for dealing with budget incidence in a growing economy. 
Herberger's attempts to modify the model to analyse monopoly power only 
roughly indicate how the HMM model. could be specified to deal with 
imperfect competition. 
There are a number of contradictions between Herberger's modelling 
of microeconomic and macroeconomic conditions. Savings are assumed to be 
fixed, yet firms' decisions about changes in output and prices as a 
result of a tax are likely to be influenced by the extent to which they 
are able to change their savings. Harberger's defence of this assumption 
is that if the tax were not imposed, the revenue would be raised by 
alternative tax measures. So, if it is assumed that the marginal 
propensity to save is the same among different economic groups, it is not 
far-fetched to assume that the differential impact of the corporation 
income tax on savings is nil. Another justification for ignoring saving 
is the presumed low elasticity of supply of saving with respect to the 
rate of return on capital. Neither of these justifications, however, are 
consistent with government using budget policies to stimulate investment 
and employment. 
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When taxes besides the corporation income tax are analysed, the 
assumption that the marginal propensity to save is the same among 
different economic groups seems unrealistic, given the clear differences 
in savings behaviour between firms and households in the economy. While 
empirical results seem to shaw a law elasticity of supply of saving with 
respect to the rate of return an capital, the elasticity, with respect to 
labour might well be high enough to affect relative factor prices and 
hence the incidence of a tax an labour or capital or bath. 
The automatic adjustment of the HMM model to achieve full employment 
is consistent with Wicksell's natural rate model where the rate of 
interest at which the volume of loanable funds demanded for investments 
is equal to the volume available from saving so that quantities of real 
capital demanded and supplied are equal. It is inconsistent, however, 
with macroeconomic studies which depend on the trade-off between fiscal 
and monetary policies and full employment. Clearly, when governments 
pursue demand-stimulus policies and finance expenditure through Reserve 
Bank borrowing, the incidence effects will be different from a policy of 
balancing the books. Under usual conditions, full employment is mare 
likely to exist when the budget is unbalanced. 
Another weakness with the model is its static equilibrium 
comparisons and its assumptions that the beginning equilibrium is a zero 
tax world. Not only is this an unrealistic assumption, but such an 
approach limits the ability of the model to handle important tax (and 
government expenditure) influences on savings, investment and economic 
growth. Meerman (1978) discusses the issues involved in measuring 
incidence. It is because of problems like these that he argues for 
setting RPTO incidence at zero and concentrating on measuring the tax and 
expenditure incidence effects of government budgets. 
To measure expenditure incidence, the Herberger model needs further 
refinements. Recall to Herberger's assumption that the government spends 
tax revenue in such a way that (if the initial price relationships 
prevailed) public expenditures would just counterbalance the reductions 
in the private expenditures on the twa goads. This simplification of the 
demand side of the economy is meant to ensure that government expenditure 
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does not affect the output composition of the economy. In other words, 
government spending will always be adjusted in such a way that the income 
effect of a tax imposition can be ignored in determining the change in 
the composition of output. While the demand function can be broken down 
into an income and substitution effect, Mieszkowski argues (1969) that 
the demand function relates solely to the pure substitution effect of a 
relative price change. 
Mieszkowski shows how the model may be relaxed to deal with changes 
in demand and different preferences, but even his approach is still 
limited to a very simple demand function and kills important aggregate 
demand effects from budget transactions. In the real world, changes in 
government behaviour are likely to bring more radical response in the 
marketplace with consumers buying different products from the government 
than they would from the private sector. One justification commonly 
given for the existence of government is that it provides services that 
the private sector does not provide. 
Further, although Mieszkowski and Meade derive approaches to divide 
the behaviour of wage earners from capitalists, they assume that the 
spending behaviour of each would be similar. A more realistic 
description of consumer behaviour would be to distinguish two separate 
spending functions. This is a requirement for any indicator evaluating 
budget incidence by household income distribution since most government 
redistributive measures are intended to benefit some households (thus 
changing their pattern of demand) and not others. 
Finally, the most important weakness as far as this thesis is 
concerned is that the HMM approach cannot measure changes in the 
distribution of income among different households or factor owners 
resulting from changes in relative product prices induced by tax 
changes. The intention of this thesis is to evaluate the redistributive 
impact of the government's budget; HMM models are designed to take the 
distribution as given, dealing with incidence in aggregate without 
showing how the distribution may have changed. 
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B.5: COnclusion 
The approach developed by HMM models facilitates much needed 
empirical work in the area of tax analysis and makes it easier to shake 
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off partial equilibrium methods. A classic example of the way in which 
partial equilibrium analysis misleads, is the conventional analysis of 
the property tax which treats the tax as a number of partial excises that 
are shifted to consumers. By emphasising the impact of the tax on 
housing, this approach loses sight of the fact that the tax is imposed on 
industrial property as well as family housing and is actually a tax on 
profit income. Even if the property tax were imposed only on residential 
real estate, the fact that the price of housing services would increase 
as a result of the tax is probably less important for incidence than the 
decrease in return on capital that would result from a shift of capital 
of the extremely capital-intensive housing sector. 
Because the HMM approach is based on an integrated theory of macro 
and micro-economics, it thus provides a consistent basis for generating 
assumptions about the incidence of both sides of the government budget 
(revenues and expenditures). 13 It could provide a basis for assessing 
the redistributive effects of budget by household income, but first the 
approach needs to be augmented. To begin with, it would be necessary to 
add a household sector. However, this would be only a start. To focus 
on household income distribution, it would be necessary to further divide 
the household sector by income groups. In addition, the government 
sector must be specified so that the government's demand for products is 
distinguished from that of the household sector. The following section 
discusses descendants of the HMM models which apply a multi-sector 
approach to assess the problems of fiscal incidence. 
13. Burbidge (1976) argues that a more consistent approach for setting 
up macro models with micro foundations could be based on the 
non-competitive version of Kaleki's model (1967). Burbidge admits, 
however, that he can only indicate interesting possibilities for 
future research at this time. 
CHAPTER TWO - REDISTRIBUTION STUDIES: THEORY AN:> PRACTICE 74. 
C. SWF MULTI-SECTOR GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODELS 
:his section examines the multi-sector approach to general 
equilibrium analysis of public finance policy as pioneered by Shaven and 
Whalley (1972, 1973, 1977). Fullerton (et al 1978, 1979) further 
developed this approach to describe a general equilibrium model of the 
(U.S.) economy with nineteen producer groups, sixteen consumer goods and 
twelve consumer groups. Others have further developed these models14 , 
but in this thesis they are referred to simply as SWF models. 
The multi-sector approach enables the inclusion of large numbers of 
producers and consumers, simultaneous purchase and supply decisions, many 
taxes or other distortions in the system, large tax changes, and variable 
factor supply. Mostly the SWF models have been concerned with allocation 
issues of tax policy, rather than income distribution issues. However, 
Piggott (l98Da, l980b, 1983) and other recent applied models give 
explicit consideration to the distributional and efficiency effects of 
taxes within the same framework. 
Shaven and Whalley (1972, p.282) identify three shortcomings in the 
HMM studies: 
1) the level of aggregation (two sectors, two factors) 
is too severe to capture the major impact of the 
market imperfection; 
2) the assumption of fixed factor endowments is not 
realistic; 
3) analysing one distortion at a time can be 
misleading since the effect of two simultaneous 
distortions need not even approximate the sum of 
their individual effects. 
Of course, the year before Shaven and Whalley published, Mclure (197la) 
had already showed that the HMM approach could be modified to overcome 
objection 2 (See Section B.2.b). Shaven and Whalley (1972) found that with 
some modification, the algorithmic approach due to Scarf (1969) is applicable 
to each of the problems described above. Within the constraints of computer 
14. For example, Piggott (1980 University of London Ph.D) introduces an 
even greater number of groups, including diverse consumer groups. 
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time and cost, the number of factors and sectors could be increased. 
Hence, several distinct consumers or consuming classes can be specified 
with differing tastes and initial endowments. In their early works, 
Shaven and Whalley define the government as another consumer. They also 
introduced an additional commodity, "capital tax tickets". The 
government consumer can purchase goods and services with the proceeds 
derived from the sale of these tickets. Shaven and Whalley contrived 
this strange arrangement to overcome the problem of how to handle the 
proceeds of a tax introduced into the general equilibrium framework. 
Solving by computer rather than by hand (as in the case of 
Herberger) removes the need to work in small dimensions. Large changes 
in the corporate tax rate can be examined with the Scarf computational 
technique. It is also possible to consider the effects of several 
distortions simultaneously. This is important because taxes compound in 
effect with other taxes, even if only one tax is changed. In addition, 
the approach readily lends itself to dynamic extensions. Finally the 
easier computational technique assisted Fullerton to design a larger 
scale general equili~ium model. He advanced the general equilibrium 
research by building a more detailed model, based an a recent data set 
incorporating all US taxes. 
Fullerton, Henderson and Shaven (1982) survey eight models designed 
primarily to evaluate fiscal reforms. These models are of the SWF type, 
but have some unique features. The models surveyed include: Auerbach and 
Kotlikoff (1983), Ballentine and Thrisk (1979), Fullerton and Gordon 
(1983), Fullerton, Shaven and Whalley (1978, with King- 1981, 1982), 
Keller (1980), Piggott and Whalley (1976, 1982), Serra-Puche (1979 Yale 
Ph . D) and Slemrod (1980 Harvard Ph.D, 1983). Shaven and Whalley (1984) 
survey work by many of the same authors, titling their models applied 
general-eq,ilibrium models of taxation. The following discussion draws 
heavily from the two survey articles, as well as Fullerton (1979) and 
Piggott (198Da, 198Gb and 1983). 
The models of Piggott and Whalley (the United Kingdom), Fullerton, 
Shaven and Whalley (the United States), Ballentine and Thrisk (canada), 
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Keller (the Netherlands) and Serra-Puche (Mexico) are large, general 
purpose models for the countries in brackets. The models of Slemrod and 
of Fullerton and Gordon attempt to specify how financial decisions are 
made by household and firms. Fullerton and Gordon introduce the 
innovation that marginal tax rates on capital differ from average tax 
rates. Auerbach and Kotlikoff study intergenerational incidence. Their 
model is unique in its use of perfect foresight rather than myopic 
expectations. 
Figure 2.2 illustrates the profile of a "typical" applied general 
equilibrium model. Some of the differences in SWF models which have 
specific relevance to redistribution studies are discussed in Section C.l. 
FIQJRE 2.2 
O:rAGRAtoiOF A TYPICAL SWF GaERAL EQUILIBRIUM TAX MODEL 
Con:sumer Side Price System Producer Side 
Per-unit cost 
Ownership of Factors Factor Prices minimization in 
~ each industry 
t l I t. & 
Factor Income Output Prices Factor taxes 
~ & 
Plus Transfers Output or Per-unit factor demand 
Minus Income Taxes Sales Ta::z:es 
l l 
Disposable Incomes Prices faced by & 
Consumers 
1 -J,; 
Commodity demands Commodity demands Total Market 
of r-~- of government, for ' 
demand for 
Households investment, and trade , Commodities 
1' l 
Total Supply Total demand 
~ of ' COMPARE .; for Each Factor r each factor 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Competitive equilibrium achieved when: 1) Demands equal supplies for all 
goods and factors; 2) Zero profits (net of taxes) prevail in all industries; 
and 3) Agents are on their budget constraints (e.g., total government 
expenditures equal to receipts from taxes and from selling endowments of 
capital or "bonds"). Source: Fullerton, t-enderson, Shaven (1982). 
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Turning first to some of the common features of SWF models, the 
producer side has several industrial sectors, in which fully mobile and 
homogeneous labour and capital are used in production in a 
profit-maximising combination. Technology is described by either 
constant returns to scale (CES) or non-increasing-returns-to-scale 
production functions. 
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On the consumer side, there are several household income groups who 
receive an income from their endowments of labour and capital. These 
household income groups also derive income from government transfers and 
in some models, from subsidies. 
The principles of budget-constrained utility maximization are 
applied to model how households decide between different consumption 
goods. Taxes on incomes, factors and outputs are usually ad valorem 
and these enter into the appropriate production and consumption decisions. 
Solution for the equilibrium is carried out using a computer 
algorithm and is reached when demand and supply are equal for all goods 
and factors. In addition, it is usual that in equilibrium producers 
receive no excess profits and all agents are on their budget 
constraints. Most SWF models feature some form of balanced international 
trade, which sometimes refers just to net exports of goods and services, 
and sometimes encompasses capital flows as well. Generally, the models 
do not feature endogenous factor supply, financial assets or a full 
modelling of the government budget. 
SWF models have been mainly applied to the long run analysis of 
alternative tax policies. In particular, they have examined policies 
such as a value-added tax, corporate and personal income tax integration, 
consumption (expenditure) taxes, housing subsidies and inflation 
indexation. Although some of the models measure the distributional 
effects of these policies, no SWF model has been specifically devoted to 
the analysis of the effects of public finance policy on household income 
distribution. 
The following discussion about aspects of SWF models is divided into 
three main areas. First, there is a description of the various 
methodological approaches where they relate to the analysis of the size 
distribution of the government budget. Then, there is a brief discussion 
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of the limitations of the SWF approach, arguing that while it could be 
usefully applied to the analysis of size distribution, it would first 
require substantial augmentation. Finally, there is a discussion of SWF 
incidence results where they pertain to this thesis. 
C.l: SWF Treatment of Methodological Issues 
The following sub-sections discuss how the SWF models treat six 
methodological issues at the base of this thesis. 
of: a) the receipts side of the government budget; 
They are treatment 
b) the expenditure 
side of the government budget; c) the household sector; d) household 
income; e) the budget deficit; f) the meaning of redistribution in 
general-equilibrium models. 
C.l.a: SWF Treatment of Taxes 
SWF models main focal point is the taxing activities of the 
government. In some cases, the focus is further narrowed to study 
corporate taxes. The Scarf simplicial search algorithm means that large 
changes in the corporate tax rate can be examined. Shaven and Whalley 
(1972) re-examine Herberger's original results. While they find some 
errors, the errors offset each other and the conclusion that capital pays 
most of the tax holds. More recent developments in the analysis of 
corporate tax incidence have centred on the financial behaviour of 
corporations. Corporate financial behaviour has been modelled by Slemrod 
(1983) and Fullerton and Gordon (1983). 
Fullerton et al (1978) and Piggott and Whalley (1976, 1982) 
capture the progressivity of the personal income tax by treating the tax 
as a separate linear function of income for each household group. A 
shortcoming of this treatment is that the marginal tax rate each 
household faces stays the same when simulations of a policy change show a 
redistribution of income. 
Slemrod (1983) improves on this shortcoming by endogenizing the 
marginal tax rate. Household behaviour is modelled so that portfolio 
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choices are made on the basis of the real after-tax rate of return to 
each asset (endowment), as well as its riskiness. His model computes a 
household's taxable income on the basis of assets (including the 
endowment of labour) selected by the household and other aspects of 
modelled behaviour that redistributes income to the household. 1he 
marginal tax rate is calculated by applying an approximation of actual 
tax tables to the household's computed taxable income. Slemrod's 
improvement is significant because a common issue of redistributive 
policy is the difficulty of phasing out eligibility for income 
maintenance schemes so that those deciding whether to take a paying job 
are not discouraged by the effective high marginal tax rates. 
79. 
Most of the models are specified to cover all the taxing activities 
of the government (often Local, State and Federal). 1he taxes are not 
modelled according to their statutory liability. Instead they are 
defined to mirror the definitions of g-e models, as shown by Figure 2.3. 
FIQ.I£ 2:3 
SWF TREAnENT OF TAXES 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Type of Tax 
Individual Income Tax 
Company Income Tax 
Estate and Gift Duty 
Customs, Excise and Stamp 
Duties; Vehicle Taxes 
Sales Tax 
Primary Production Taxes, 
Liquor and Gambling Taxes 
Payroll Tax 
Property Taxes 
Source: Piggott (1983). 
SWF Treatment 
Treated as a tax on income (income is 
determined endogenously, see Section C.l.d.) 
Treated as a tax on capital use 
Treated as a tax on income 
Treated as a tax on final and intermediate 
expenditures using input/output table 
Treated as tax on consumer expenditure 
Treated as a general factor Tax 
Treated as a tax on labour use 
Treated as a tax on capital use 
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C.l.b: SWF Treatment of Government Expenditures 
A very important aspect from the point of view of household income 
distribution is the assessment of how government revenue is spent. Some 
of the SWF models only compare tax policies of equal revenue yield and 
make the assumption that the expenditure distortions are unaffected by 
the tax alternatives being considered. Shaven and Whalley (1972) assume 
that all government revenues are redistributed to consumers (including 
the government as one consumer) as transfer payments (there are no public 
goods and services provided). In equilibrium, transfer payments made by 
government to consumers equal taxes collected by the government. Piggott 
(l980a, 198Gb, 1983) and Keller (1980, 1981) attempt to treat government 
expenditures in more depth. 
Piggott (1983) identifies the government as one of four sectors on 
the demand side of his model. The government is treated as a special 
type of consumer. It has an income including that from the capital 
services it is deemed to own, the net surplus from public enterprises, 
the funds it borrows from the private sector, and those tax revenues 
which are not paid out as transfers. Its expenditures cover subsidies, 
transfers, public administration and defence (of which it is the only 
consumer) and various other goods and services. 
Keller (1980, Chapter 8) explains the functions of the government in 
relation to his specification of private and public goods. Private goods 
are characterized by rival consumption, they are provided through the 
market mechanism and each has a price. On the other hand, public goods 
are characterised by non-rival consumption which means that the penefits 
' 
of public goods apply to all individuals while the consumption by one 
individual does not reduce the benefits derived by others. Keller 
assumes that the benefits of public goods apply to private households, 
but not to firms. The provision of public goods is subject to a budget, 
which is determined by the "fisc". 
The "fisc" is a mechanism which collects the tax revenue and returns 
this as lump-sum payments to the public and private households. The 
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transfer to the public household constitutes the public budget. Like a 
private household, the public household demands private goods. Unlike 
the private household, the public household tries to satisfy the 
collective, or public needs. In contrast, private households only try to 
satisfy their own private needs. 
Like the other SWF models, Keller's focus is not on changes in 
government expenditure as such - it is on the changes in government 
expenditure which may come about because of a change in tax. His 
explanation is helpful in elucidating the concept of "balanced-budget 
incidence" and "differential" incidence. It clearly identifies the 
restrictive assumptions required to treat individual preferences for 
public goods within the model. 
C.l.c: The Household Sector 
Modellers have succeeded in incorporating a large number of 
household groups. Beginning with Piggott and Whalley (1976), most of the 
applied SWF general equilibrium models have disaggregated households into 
several income classes. Piggott and Whalley further disaggregate 
households by occupation, family composition and work status (100 
groups). Serra-PUche (1979 Yale Ph.D) disaggregates his model into urban 
and rural sectors. Keller (1980) uses a local linearization procedure to 
solve for tax change equilibria, concentrating on the distributional 
effects between low income/unskilled labour and high income/skilled 
labour. Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1982) distinguish household groups by 
the age of the occupants. 
A major advantage of the SWF general equilibrium models is that they 
are able to treat the effects of the government budget on both the 
sources and uses of household income when households are grouped by 
income and other characteristics. The sources side (income) of household 
behaviour is discussed in the next section. 
The SWF models can be applied to consider the two aspects of the 
uses side of household behaviour: consumption and saving. Looking at 
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consumption, when the production sectors are classified as agriculture, 
housing and manufacturing, the results of analysis of taxes on 
consumption differ significantly by section. This is because household 
consumption patterns differ for these three sectors. The statistical 
data for various countries tends to show that the percentage of income 
devoted to expenditures on food and housing decline markedly with 
income. On the other hand, expenditures on services increase somewhat 
with income and the consumption of manufactured items increases even 
more. The existence of different tax rates by industry justifies even 
further disaggregation. 
C.l.d: 1-busehold Income 
82. 
Household income in the SWF models is endogenous to the model. It 
is the return to endowments (generally defined as the factors, labour and 
capital) owned by the household. Households also receive lump-sum 
transfers from government based on their receipts of unemployment 
compensation, welfare, government employee pensions, veterans benefits, 
social security, and so on. 
Evidence in New Zealand and overseas shows that the asset holdings 
of income groups vary signif.icantly. This argues for models which also 
specify portfolio behaviour as a determinant of household income. In 
general, the largest asset for the lower income income groups is 
owner-occupied housing while the top group holds more corporate equity 
and tax-exempt debt. Slemrod (1980 Ph.D, 1983) treats this issue by 
distinguishing six assets: corporate equity, taxable and tax exempt 
debt, rental and owner-occupied housing and liquid ·assets. 
Another refinement to the determination of household income, which 
has profound implications in relation to the personal income tax, is the 
choice between labour and leisure. Fullerton et al (1978) and Piggott 
and Whalley (1976, 1982) model the labour-leisure choice by applying an 
average figure from the literature for the elasticity of labour supply 
with respect to the after-tax wage. However, they shortcut the exercise 
by using an average elasticity instead of specifying different labour 
supply elasticities and labour endowments by household groups. 
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C.l.e: The Budget Deficit 
Most of the SWF models assume that the government budget is in 
balance. The models tend to ignore financial assets so a balanced budget 
is a necessary assumption, since deficits are financed by an increase in 
government securities or by money creation. As a result of the 
balanced-budget assumption, any change in tax must be matched by an 
offsetting change to another tax or an offsetting change in government 
spending. 
Applied studies of budget effects almost always analyse economies 
(such as the United States) where the government budget is in deficit. 
They commonly assume that the existence of a budget deficit does not 
change incidence or efficiency results. Mclure (1970) shows that in the 
HMM models, the allocation of resources depends on relative prices 
instead of absolute prices. HMM models are solved in terms of relative 
prices and another equation is needed to close the model if absolute 
prices are to be derived. When Mclure closes his model with the quantity 
equation for money, he finds that it has no additional real effects on 
the economy. From this, McLure concludes that the existence of the 
deficit does not change economic decisions. 
When portfolio choice is modelled, however, the existence of a 
budget deficit is important because of its financing effects. In 
particular, the corporate income tax may distort asset demand decisions 
even when it does not distort production decisions. Concern over the 
amount of distortion in asset demand decisions has led to developments by 
Auerbach and Kotlikoff and Serra-Puche aimed at modelling unbalanced 
budgets. 
Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1983) define the government budget 
constraint as follows: 
the present value of expenditures must equal the present 
value of revenue less the initial value of government 
debt, where financing by money creation is not an option 
and private and government capital are perfect 
substitutes in portfolios. 
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They find that government debt crowds out private capital formation and lowers 
the potential efficiency gains when a tax reform is financed by issuing 
government bonds. 
C.l. f: Redistribution Between Households and G-E modelling 
In the HMM model, incidence is measured by the change in the price of the 
taxed factor relative to the size of the tax. Only functional distribution is 
considered. The SWF models measure welfare changes, as well as their 
distribution among households in terms of personal income changes. Piggott 
(198Ga, 198Gb) observed that a social welfare function is implicitly assumed 
in interpreting the measure of welfare cost which is widely used in general 
equilibrium models. Distributional results of these exercises are easily 
reported. Thus, he applies the SWF approach to evaluate a tax change with 
respect to both efficiency and equity in terms of a single index (income). 
Most SWF models measure the response to a policy change by comparing two 
static equilibriums. The underlying assumption about calendar time in the SWF 
models relates to their concept of general equilibrium. The economy to be 
investigated is in equilibrium in the particular year or over a longer period 
represented by average yearly data. The National Accounts and other blocks of 
data are modified so that this equilibrium can be observed. 
Parameters for the model's functions are calculated by calibration to the 
assumed equilibrium for the economy. Estimates of price elasticities of 
demand and substitution elasticities by industry in production are 
introduced. The calibration is such that the moael will replicate the assumed 
equilibrium data set as an equilibrium solution. The equilibrium state is 
characterized by observed prices and quantities. The parameter values are 
determined by solving the equations which describe the equilibrium conditions 
of the model. Provided CES production functions are used (which is generally 
the case in SWF models), specification·of the elasticities of substitution is 
sufficient to guarantee that the solution of these equations is determinate. 
The construction of the benchmark equilibrium state implies that the 
equilibrium conditions of the model under consideration must be satisfied. 
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The construction of the benchmark equilibrium set (BEDS) involves adjusting 
blocks of data that are available separately, but which may nat be consistent 
with equilibrium conditions. The BEDS provides an observation of transactions 
in value terms. To obtain information on equilibrium prices and quantities, a 
units convention must then be adopted. 
C.2: Designing SWF Models to Focus an Redistributive Issues 
The previous section described haw the various SWF models treat same of 
the methodological issues at the base of this thesis. It showed that the 
models give a very thorough coverage to the taxing activities of the 
government. Almost all the models specify a function for government demand 
but their treatment of government spending has been restricted by their 
fixation with modelling the effects of tax changes. Modellers have succeeded 
in incorporating a large number of household groups which are classified by 
the size of their budget constraint where their income from endowments is 
equal to their consumption (and savings are also specified in some models). 
HOusehold income is endogenously determined by the model and tends to be a 
very broad measure indeed, including the return to endowments labour and 
capital and transfers from the government. Most of the SWF models measure the 
reaction to a policy change by differential balanced-budget incidence. 
Finally, the models are marvelously well-designed to treat the income 
distributional effects of tax changes, both with respect to efficiency and 
equity. 
When it comes to the analysis of the influence of total government budget 
activity, however, the SWF models are still in their infancy. Existing models 
are not designed to evaluate the redistributive effects of the expenditure 
side of the government budget. Even worse, their structure obscures many of 
the important issues in relation to expenditure incidence. To focus on the 
probl em in this thesis, they would need further development. Some of the 
developments relate to weaknesses inherent in the models and the others are 
extensions to treat government spending. 
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C .2 .a: Weaknesses of SWF Models 
As the discussion of the HMM models showed, the basis for the general 
equilibrium approach depends on the elasticities of substitution and demand. 
Yet, in the SWF models, key elasticity parameters are little more than 
guesses. While there is some agreement about the elasticity of substitution 
of primary factors, issues such as technical change and substitution among 
intermediate inputs need to be more fully incorporated in the SWF models. 
The SWF models mainly focus on inter-industry differences in tax payments 
and in general the evidence on demand elasticities for outputs and factors is 
not robust enough to point to significant differences. In the case of 
households, the evidence is even less available and the differences are likely 
to be even greater. And yet the SWF and Slemrod models assume Cobb-Douglas 
demands, so that, within an income class, relative expenditures on consumption 
goods are constant. 
The models uniformly assume perfect competition and constant returns to 
scale. Although these assumptions may be convenient abstractions, 
incorporation of imperfect competition and government regulation are likely to 
make a significant difference to the results. More significantly, perfect 
competition rules out the existence of monopolies. Since some of the 
government expenditure is to provide goods where the government has a virtual 
monopoly, this is a major weakness for a study of public finance policy. 
C.2.b.: Augmenting SWF Models 
The most important addition to the SWF model required to assess the 
distributional consequences of budget policy is the addition of a 
better-defined government sector. Two main reasons for this are discussed in 
the following two paragraphs. 
First, as presently specified the models treat the government as very 
little different from a household, except in its capacity to tax. This denies 
the richness and variety of government behaviour and rules out analysis of 
some of the most important things that government's do. Among those functions 
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are the provision of goods where the government acts as a monopolist such as 
in the provision of education. 
Secondly, as the SWF models are designed to analyse distribution solely 
in relation to tax effects. Government spending, as well as other payments to 
it, also have distributional consequences. 
On the tax side, more work is required to take account of the legal 
definition of taxes. The simple characterisation af taxes as ad valorem, 
constant marginal rate taxes may not reflect some significant features of 
taxes. Shaven and Whalley (p. 295) noted that " the institutional workings of 
any particular tax are always far more complex than can be conveniently 
incorporated into a general equilibrium framework". Since then, the models 
have developed a greater capacity for detail. More detailed specification of 
taxes is desirable. 
Personal income taxes probably play the greatest role in redistributing 
income. The personal income tax is also a major source of government 
revenue. Hence, an area of development is the more accurate modelling of the 
progressive rate structure of the personal income tax. Further, the personal 
· income tax structure is also defined by the legal definitions of assessable 
income, exemptions, deductions and rebates which may not be consistent with 
the economic concepts in the model. These differences offset some of the 
redistributive effects of the marginal tax rates. Where significant, these 
factors should also be incorporated into the g-e models. 
calendar time plays an important role in the design of specific 
redistributive policies since the aim is to provide assistance while the 
household is in need and reduce that assistance when circumstances change SWF 
models do not treat this issue specifically; few, if any, g-e models are 
designed to give regard to the calendar time it takes to adjust to a new 
equilibrium. However, some of the recent SWF studies have made innovations 
which show potential for the development of analysis of this sort. For 
example, Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1983) studied the effects of the replacement 
of an income tax by a wage tax and by a consumption tax for 55 different age 
cohorts. The model is able to provide insights about the effects on the 
different cohorts in the transition to the steady state equilibrium, which 
they estimate takes about 40 years. 
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The economy may take a substantial period of time to adjust to tax 
policies and the impact may discriminate between generations. Life cycle 
modelling may be appropriate for some issues. For the issue of income 
maintenance, it is important to know more about the time of the adjustment 
process. 
Already evident is the likelihood of further progress in SWF modelling of 
dynamics and financial behaviour. Since deficits are a feature of the 
Auerbach/Kotlikoff model, it would not be difficult to introduce money on the 
supply side. Portfolio decisions would need to be specified in more detail on 
the demand side, however. Serra-Puche's (1979 Ph.D) model has an initially 
unbalanced budget and is being expanded to include monetary phenomena. 
Slemrod (1983) already has portfolio behaviour with money and debt as 
available assets. Developments like these will assist in the analysis of the 
influence of government deficits on income distribution and tax analysis where 
financial flows are being taxed in non-neutral ways. 
Finally, in New Zealand, the model of the foreign sector is critical to 
an assessment -Of the effects of taxation. There are a significant number of 
duties and excises on imported goods. In addition, company income taxes are 
assessed in the production of goods used fqr export but not for import. A 
useful extension to SWF models would be the addition of a foreign sector. 
C.3: SWF Incidence Results 
The SWF literature provides some conclusions about the incidence of taxes 
and subsidies which are pertinent to this thesis. This section gives a 
flavour of some of them. They will be referred to again where they contribute 
to the analysis in the following chapters. 
In their review of the general equilibrium literature, Shaven and Whalley 
(1984 p.l032), claim that a striking feature of the results from the general 
equilibrium tax models is their suggestion of considerably larger deadweight 
loss from tax distortions (especially at the margin) than had been indicated 
from less complex incidence models. In addition, when their general 
equilibrium effects are taken into account, tax policies appear to have more 
redistributive power than otherwise thought. 
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Shaven and Whalley (1972) examine the imposition and removal of existing 
taxes on income from capital under twelve different model parameter 
specifications. They find in half of the cases examined, capital bears more 
than the full burden of the surtax. In the other six, labour shares in the 
burden. 
Ballentine and Thrisk (1979) analyse changes in local government 
expenditures, corporate and property income taxes, federal income taxes and 
housing subsidies. They find that personal income taxes are markedly 
progressive while property and corporate income taxes have a more mixed 
pattern of incidence. 
Keller (1970) considers changes in marginal tax rates in various 
production and consumption sectors. He finds that the efficiency effects of 
taxes are generally small, with the exception of the corporate income tax. He 
also finds that the changes in marginal tax rates only result in a small 
amount of tax shifting. 
Piggott (l98Da, 198Gb, and Whalley 1976) look specifically at the changes 
in the distribution of household income as a result of tax changes. In both 
Australia and the United Kingdom, taxes are shown to have a significant 
redistributive effect. Subsidies to local authority housing are found to be a 
significant source of welfare loss. 
It is clear that the SWF models are now being successfully applied to a 
range of policy issues and have returned some important insights. In 
interpreting the results for policy purposes, however, it must be kept in mind 
that the knowledge of elasticity values for specifying the parameters is 
limited. Until better elasticity values can be determined, the dilemma is how 
much confidence to have in results of an approach which is so 
elasticity-dependent. Until advances are made, the SWF models are best valued 
for their insights about economic relationships, rather than for their precise 
results. 
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D. GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODELS OF THE NEW ZEALAND ECONOMY 
There are four general equilibrium models of the New Zealand economy 
which could potentially inform a study of the influence of government 
budget revenue and expenditure transactions on household income 
distribution. Joanna and Julianne are two general equilibrium models 
designed by the Victoria University Research Project an Economic Planning 
(RPEP). The canterbury University Department of Economics and Operations 
Research (CUDEOR) is in the process of designing a general equilibrium 
model which is based an SWF techniques using New Zealand data and 
programmed on a personal computer. There is a version of this model 
already in existence designed by Henry (1982 University of Canterbury 
Ph.D, 1982). 
Jo·anna and Julianne are variants of a basic computable general 
equilibrium (c.g.e.) model. Their major emphasis is resource allocation 
and the main force for reallocation is changes in relative prices. 
Although both models have many features like those of the SWF models, 
articles about them do not refer to any overseas literature and their 
antecedents are unclear. 
The differences between Joanna and Julianne lie in two areas - the 
solution technique and the policy focus. Joanna's solution technique 
tends to favour an emphasis on short-run issues. This model provides 
greater detail on the effects of tax instruments, Julianne's design 
lends itself to the analysis of longer-run effects of foreign trade and 
tariffs. 
Joanna is a price-endogenous, twenty-two sector, input-output based 
model which follows the New Zealand System of National Accounts 
classifications with the latest version based on the 1981/82 
interindustry study. Its variables are expressed (and solved) in 
percentage change form, in which the model is linear. Like most general 
budget policy, Joanna does not operate in real time. 
Julianne is expressed in level form and requires a much more complex 
solution routine. This is the reason that it is less amnable to the 
incorporation of government budget and finance flows. Because it does 
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give a level form solution, however, its results can be interpreted in 
terms of real time. 
91. 
One particular advantage of the Joanna model is its flexibility. As 
Wells (1983) points out: 
"It is one of the great strengths of the RPEP that the 
structures have sufficient flexibility to allow 
modifications for the analysis of particular issues, with 
concomitant changes in structure, equilibrium assumptions 
and the endogenous/exogenous status of particular 
variables". 
It is this flexibility that makes the Joanna model particularly 
attractive from the point of view of fiscal incidence analysis. Although 
the SWF models have also shown great flexibility in focusing on different 
tax and foreign trade problems, at the end of the day that flexiblity to 
analyse fiscal policy issues could be constrained by limiting assumptions 
that are apparently not fundamental to the Joanna model. 
Another attractive feature of the Joanna model is that there is 
quite a disaggregated treatment of household incomes by source. Similar 
to SWF models, these income-sources are generated from the endogenous 
factor-employment and price variables. As presently specified, Joanna 
does not disaggregate households by type, so issues related to income 
distribution by size cannot be addressed. 
Joanna treats the government sector's demand as defined in the 
input-output table that is integrated as part of the model's production 
sector. 
CUDEOR also characterise their model as a c.g.e. model. It closely 
mirrors the methodology of the SWF models. So far, the model appears to 
be in its design stage. The value of the CUOEOR work is that it treats 
some of the problems of implementing a c.g.e. model. Information about 
the model can be found in Henry, Manning, McCann, Woodfield (1986) where 
the authors demonstrate the construction of a benchmark equilibrium data 
set (BEDS). BEDS are the adjustments which must be made when there are 
discrepancies between official data and the theoretical restrictions of a 
given c.g.e. model. 
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As discussed in Section C.l.f., a model which is consistent with 
economic theory must also be consistent with the facts. The empirical 
data required to carry out a general equilibrium study in New Zealand 
include specific knowledge about tax rates, capital intensity, consumer 
price elasticities of demand for outputs, and degrees of factor 
substitution. Difficulties arise when the published data and the c.g.e 
model do not have a common theoretical base. For example, the economic 
theory which informs the national incomP. accounts, the source of much 
macroeconomic data, is different from the theoretical basis of c.g.e 
models. 
To illustrate their points, Henry et al use a version of the 
original Herberger two-sector, two factor, one consumer economy. After 
calibrating the model, it is subjected to a replication test. The 
authors succeed in .illustrating that a model yields more robust results 
in a counterfactual exercise if it is possible to replicate its BEDS. 
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Apparently the CUDEOR stable includes, as work-in-Progress, a larger 
c.g.e model of the economy. If it resembles the SWF models, it is likely 
to contain the same strengths and weaknesses described in Section C when 
it comes to the analysis of the budget in relation to the size 
distribution of income. Even so, when the main sectors of the economy 
have been satisfactorily modelled, the CUDEOR c.g.e model, like the SWF 
models, could be amenable to extensions consistent with the measurement 
of fiscal incidence. 
Henry (1982) uses a model similar to Shaven and Whalley (1972) to 
analyse the preferential tax treatment of owner-occupied housing in New 
Zealand. His three sector model is designed to measure deadweight loss 
and explicitly recognizes feedbacks due to income effects based on 
Ballentine and Eris (1975). Henry finds that most of the burden of the 
preferential tax treatment of owner-occupied housing is on the 
non-residential sector. 
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E. QUANTITATIVE STUDIES OF BUDGET REDISTRIBUTION BY SIZE 
Dissatisfaction with partial equilibrium techniques led to the 
development of general equilibrium models of public sector activity. As the 
first four sections of this chapter have shown, these models are extremely 
rich in their treatment of the economy and in their ability to analyse supply 
and demand effects with reference to more than one particular market. As a 
result, g-e models are able to generate theoretically consistent micro- and 
macro- ec~nomic tax incidence results. Nevertheless, these models have not 
focused on the evaluation of the influence of the budget on the current 
distribution of income. This survey of quantitative studies of budget 
redistribution by size (distribution by personal or household income group) 
highlights some of the issues. 
Following Shoup (1972), the studies discussed in this section are called 
quantitative rather than empirical because they are not based on refutable 
hypothesis subject to testing by appeal to another set of data. While failure 
to structure the analysis around a refutable hypothesis is an important 
limitation, it is not a fatal one. Indeed, it is a limitation which the field 
of income redistribution shares with other respectable fields of economic 
analysis, including applied general equilibrium analysis (see Shaven and 
Whalley, 1984, p.l045), the assessment of national income aggregates and 
cost-benefit analysis. 
As will be shown in Section E, quantitative studies are well equipped to 
answer the questions at the base of an evaluation of budget redistribution by 
size, given the current state of knowledge. As well as answering questions 
about income redistribution, these studies serve as important milestones of 
j 
the progress of economics. When they make explicit use of economic theory, 
their methodology reflects the interpretation of that theory into practice. 
The four significant milestones may be broadly characterised as: 1) partial 
equilibrium; 2/ balanced budget or differential fiscal incidence; 3) applied 
general equilibrium results; and 4) general equilibrium modelling. 
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E.l. Partial Eauilibrium Quantitative Studies 
Prior to 1962, most theoretical incidence analysis was concerned 
with taxes only and confined to a partial equilibrium framework. 15 
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While economists such as Brown (1939), Musgrave (1952), Rolph (1954) and 
Wells (1955) attempted to place these partial results within a general 
equilibrium framework, there was no theoretical model specified that 
could be used to obtain precise results about the questions of budget 
incidence by household income distribution in a general equilibrium 
setting. 
This explains why most quantitative studies of redistribution 
carried out prior to 1962, are based primarily on partial incidence 
results. One of the most detailed studies, that by Musgrave and his 
associates for the United States in 1949, sets the scene for later 
empirical analysis in the area of tax incidence (Musgrave et al, 1951). 
Following earlier precedents, Musgrave calculates the burden of all taxes 
to spending units according to income class. Data covering the United 
States population are grouped by family income brackets broken into 
"spending units" as defined by the 1949 Survey of Consumer Finances. 
Information was classified according to the types of household 
expenditure. Musgrave was able to improve on earlier studies because he 
had data to allocate tax costs directly to the income groups without 
first determining individual family tax liability. The total amount of 
tax allocated is determined by the total revenue from tax collections in 
1948. 
Musgrave's study of tax incidence in 1949 produced what was a 
surprising conclusion at the time of publication, that the tax structure 
was regressive for those in the lowest income class. It was generally 
believed that the progressivity of the personal income tax balanced out 
the regressivity of the other taxes. Musgrave found, however, that those 
earning under $1,000 paid 28.1%· of their income in taxes compared to 
those earning between $1,000 and $2,000 who paid only 24.3% of their 
15. Some early quantitative studies include: Musgrave et al (1951), 
Adler (1951), Barna (1945), cartter (1955), and Nicholson (1967). 
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income in taxes. This reflects the number of elderly families in this 
group who are shareholders and as a result pay corporate tax. 
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Ih attempting to quantify budget incidence within a partial 
equilibrium framework, these early studies did not take into account the 
interdependence among markets and of what occurs in product and factor 
markets simultaneously when a tax is imposed. The shape of the supply 
curve is given and so it is not possible to see how the demand for 
factors is affected by the existence of a tax (or other type of budget 
measure). This inability to relate the supply curve to the production 
function and to see how conditions in factor markets change in response 
to a budget transaction when the incidence of a factor tax or subsidy is 
being examined means that a number of incidence issues were overlooked. 
E.2: Fiscal Incidence Studies 
Musgrave's Theory of Public Finance (1959) formalised the concept of 
the government as both collector of taxes and a provider of goods and 
services. After that, most quantitative studies evaluated the 
distribution of the entire budget. Those by Gillespie (1965, 1966), are 
among the most detailed examples. Much later, O'Higgins and Ruggles 
(1981) replicated Gillespie's approach for the United Kingdom and the 
United States. 
De Wulf extensively reviews (1972, 1975) quantitative studies for 
developing countries. He refers to them as fiscal incidence studies 
instead of tax incidence because they treat both taxes and government 
spending. His review discusses many limitations of these studies which 
he argues are still centred largely on partial equilibrium analysis. He 
concludes that the changing research methods in this area reflect the 
increased availability of data and the greater emphasis of government 
policies on redistribution, but in general finds quantitative studies too 
statistically and conceptually weak to bear the weight of interpretation 
given to them. 
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E.3: General Equilibrium Results 
Noting the impressive body of incidence literature produced in the 
previous twenty years, Break (1974) heralded the development of a 
consistent general equilibrium theoretical framework to serve as a 
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basic analytical tool. This referred to Herberger's development of 
two-sector general equilibrium models to analyse corporate tax incidence 
in 1962 and the body of HMM literature since then. 
For Break, the basic dilemma of incidence anaysis is "to reveal the 
basic tax burden picture without simplifying things so much that 
important details are lost in the process" (p.l22). 
Many of those researching the effects of the government budget 
revealed the basic tax burden picture by using the results of general 
equilibrium studies. Instead of building a general equilibrium model, 
researchers simplified things by applying these results within frameworks 
similar to the Musgrave et al (1951) approach. Two approaches of this 
type include Musgrave, Case, Leonard (1974) and Pechman and Okner (1974). 
The 1974 Musgrave et al quantitative study was considerably advanced 
on the study headed by Musgrave in 1951. It treated the government as 
both a collector of taxes and a provider of goods and services and was 
based on the concept of balanced-budget incidence. 
Tax incidence assumptions applied by Musgrave were based on the 
results from general equilibrium models at the time, mainly the HMM 
models. For example, the six corporate tax incidence assumptions and 
five property tax assumptions reflect the debate then about aspects of 
these taxes. Although other taxes also have both uses and sources 
effects, they were not were not the focus of general equilibrium analysis 
available at that time. Musgrave's most "regressive" corporate tax 
assumption (see Figure 2.3, next page) that the tax was fully shifted to 
consumers is consistent with the seminal article by Herberger (1962) (see 
Section B.l.b in this chapter). Musgrave's benchmark assumption that the 
corporation income tax is equally distributed between consumption and 
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capital was justified by Cary Brown (1974) as probably the best choice 
from the range of theoretical results about company tax incidence. 
Figure 2.4 illustrates Musgrave's "benchmark" tax assumptions, as 
well as the "progressive" and "regressive" variants. 
FIGURE 2:4 
t-USGRAVE'S ASSt.f.PTICHi REGARDING TAX INCIIENCE 
Effect in Relation to Income: 
Tax "Progressive" "Benchmark" "Regressive" 
Corporate Income 
Tax 
Falls on dividend 
recipients 
Property Tax Falls on all 
capital income 
receivers 
Employers' Social Falls on employee 
Insurance 
Contributions 
Half falls on all 
capital income 
receivers; half 
passed on to 
consumers. 
Residential 
- occupants 
Commercial 
- half on all 
capital receivers 
- half on consumers 
Passed on to 
consumers 
Personal Income 
Excises 
Falls on taxpayer Falls on taxpayer 
Tobacco 
Alcohol Excise 
Tobacco consumers Tobacco consumers 
Alcohol consumers Alcohol consumers 
Motor Vehs. & Parts 
Business portion Consumers in 
general 
Other portion Vehicle owners 
Consumers in 
general 
Vehicle owners 
Passed on to all 
consumers 
Residential 
- occupants 
Commercial 
- on consumers 
Passed on to 
consumers 
Falls on taxpayer 
Tobacco consumers 
Alcohol consumers 
Consumers in 
general 
Vehicle owners 
Gift, Estate and 
Death 
Households with capital income whose total 
income exceeds $25,000. 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Source: Musgrave, Case, Leonard (1974, pp.259-3ll) 
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As in the first Musgrave study,the "benchmark" results showed that 
aver the range of middle incomes, the percentages of income going to tax 
(the effective tax rates) remain broadly constant. With the regressive 
assumptions, the effective tax rates fall slightly as income rises. The 
effective tax rates rise quite sharply, especially for incomes aver 
$35,000, when the progressive assumptions are applied. Unlike the early 
Study, this one did not show the tax structure to be so regressive for 
the lower income group. 
After analysing the distributive effects of public expenditure in 
addition to the distribution of tax payments, Musgrave calculated the 
net residue (the difference between the income value of benefits gained 
and tax paid) for different income groups. Musgrave nets aut indivisible 
benefits and looks only at those expenditures for which specific benefit 
allocations are feasible (transfer payments included) based an the 
assumption that each expenditure dollar for programmes -subject to a 
specific allocation is financed by an average tax dallar.16 His 
results show that in 1968 those in the lower income brackets in the 
United States gained a net benefit from the government's budget while 
those earning in the higher brackets paid more in tax than they received 
in benefits. Gillespie's (1965, 1966) results far canada were similar, 
showing that the net result of fiscal expenditure favours low incomes. 
The net residue is mainly neutral aver a wide range of middle incomes and 
burdens those on high incomes. 
Pechman and Okner (1974) focus on the tax side only in their study 
based an the differential incidence approach. They purposely avoid 
tracing through the effects of government expenditure in order to 
discover who pays taxes. They justify the exclusion of government an the 
general equilibrium grounds that substituting government spending for 
private spending does not significantly alter relative factor prices or 
the relative prices paid by consumers. 
16. An average tax dollar was used as a measure because these specific 
expenditures were not tied to a specific tax but financed from 
general tax revenue. 
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Eight sets of tax incidence assumptions are adapted by Pechman and 
Okner. Similar to Musgrave et al, these are classified into three basic 
variants, each designed to illustrate a major approach to incidence. 
Variant 1 analyses the distribution of tax payments if it is assumed that 
supplies of labour and capital are fixed and that there is perfect 
competition, price flexibility and perfect factor mobility. Variant 2 
fallows the assumptions about the values of income and taxes that are 
implicit in the U.S. national income accounts. Variant 3 is a compromise 
of the ather twa approaches. Similar to Musgrave et al (1974), the 
results did nat shaw a U-shaped pattern of the effective tax rate as did 
Musgrave's 1951 study. Instead, Rechman and Okner found that the curve 
of effective tax rates moves up as income rises. 
E.4: General Equilibrium Modelling 
Although Musgrave et al (1974) and Pechman and Okner (1974) attempt 
to incorporate general equilibrium results, their basic approaches are 
still partial equilibrium. Reynolds and Smolensky (1977) contrived to 
model a general equilibrium approach, perhaps without knowing they were 
doing sa. 
Their approach is designed to explore the response of measured 
income inequality aver time to a definition of income which is mare 
comprehensive than usual. The authors' definition of income includes the 
benefits and burdens of government expenditures and taxes at all levels 
of government. The motivation is to detect changes in final income 
distributions aver two decades by constructing a systematic intertemporal 
comparison of the size distribution of income for 1950, 1961 and 1970. 
The results far each of these years can be interpreted as the adjustments 
consistent with their theory (a BEDS). Then, if each year is seen to be 
a steady state equilibrium, the intertemparal comparisons become a 
general equilibrium model. 
The line of studies starting with Musgrave et al (1951) are usually 
intended to answer the question: what impact does the budget have in 
redistributing income? Reynolds and Smolensky argue that this question 
cannot be satisfactorily answered, based on the insoluble identification 
problem involved in distinguishing government activity from ather 
economic activity. Hence their research problem: what happened to the 
size distribution of income in the United States between 1950 and 1970? 
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According to the authors, any measure of redistribution involves 
comparing a distribution of money income 'before' certain taxes, 
transfers, and other government expenditures with a distribution 'after' 
factor and product market changes brought about by government jointly 
determine a new consumption set attainable by each individual. This is 
what is meant by the net redistributive effect of government. The 
problem is choosing a proper set of parameters. This implies breaking 
into the general interdependence of public and private decisions with 
some counterfactual measure of the 'before' distribution. The issue 
becomes, what is the appropriate counterfactual? 
Reynolds and Smolensky's time series research shows that there was 
no significant change in the dispersion of final income distributions 
from 1950 to 1970. The authors conclude that while the government's 
budget measures reduced income inequality in a given year, the amount of 
this reduction did not increase between 1950 and 1970. The overall tax 
system was found to have drifted from a progressive to slightly 
regressive distribution, but these changes were offset by changes in 
government spending patterns, especially increases in transfer programmes. 
Despite their attempts to define a different approach from earlier 
studies of income redistribution, what Reynolds and Smolensky's actually 
did differed little from Musgrave's (1974) approach. Even though they 
published in 1977, the authors did not show any familiarity with the HMM 
and SWF models. Their only reference to the HMM work was to Mclure's 
1974 paper on the theory and methodology of estimating benefit and 
expenditure incidence. 
An important contribution of the Reynolds and Smolensky work, 
however, is that it does not try to find cunning ways around the analysis 
of government expenditure. In order to get theoretically consistent 
answers about tax incidence, the mainstream general equilibrium 
literature (with the possible exception of Mclure and certainly Meerman) 
treats the expenditure side of the government budget as if it is 
expendable. Reynolds and Smolensky's attempts to treat the entire 
government, give an indication (albeit slightly rough) of the sorts of 
issues involved if a more 'realistic' treatment of government behaviour 
is adopted. 
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E.S Significance of Quantitative Studies 
With the advent of SWF empirical general equilibrium models in the 
1970s, the flurry of quantitative fiscal incidence studies stopped. If 
nothing else, the general equilibrium literature made a convincing case 
about the internal inconsistency of the assumptions of such studies and 
this reduced the interest in devoting the (considerable) resources 
required to carry them out. However, the policy problem considered by 
quantitative studies is much wider than what has been considered by the 
general equilibrium literature. The focus of quantitative studies is not 
only tax incidence, but extends to the effects of public sector activity 
on household income distribution. 
Curiously, the incidence results of both general equilibrium 
empirical studies and quantitative studies are quite similar when 
tabulated by household income. So until the general equilibrium models 
are extended to treat the wider issues, quantitative studies provide a 
means of analysing the effects of budget transactions. Because they are 
n_ot based on a particular model, an important feature of quantitative 
studies is that they are forced to spell out the reasons for, and, 
consequences of, all their assumptions. If this shows them to be 
inconsistent, then at least the inconsistencies are obvious. 
As discussed in Section C, the SWF general equilibrium models, while 
more theoretically valid, are not without their own limitations, even 
leaving aside their narrow concentration on tax changes. In particular, 
they treat the data collection process in a very rough fashion. Because 
the data set for an incidence model is so comprehensive, the information 
sources are necessarily divergent. The two sides of a single account are 
often collected by different agencies with different procedures, and thus 
do not match. In order to use all of this data together, adjustments 
must be made to ensure each part is consistent with the rest. The 
problem is, diverse data sets (which are only adjusted for inconsistent 
classifications and definitions) will not necessarily describe a general 
equilibrium. The consequences of this problem are seldom made obvious 
because the SWF literature is devoted to theoretical application. 
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F. METHODOLOGY IN THIS THESIS 
The problem at the base of this thesis, the effect of the central 
government budget on household income distribution, can be treated in the 
most comprehensive fashion if the methodology that is adopted is that of 
a quantitative study. After fourteen years and the addition of numerous 
sectors and many exciting innovations, the main focus of the general 
equilibrium models of the public sector has not widened much beyond the 
consideration of tax incidence. As Shaven and Whalley (1984) candidly 
state, in the few cases where models include public goods in household 
utility functions, it "complicates the tax models". This focus is too 
narrow to encompass the problem at the base of this thesis, which in the 
end is related to an assessment of expenditure, as well as tax, incidence. 
Although the thesis does not apply a general equilibrium model as 
such, many important contributions of the general equilibrium literature 
are applied to the methodology that is adopted. Meerman's (1978) belief 
that the research inputs of time an data were not commensurate with the 
expected benefit from the research has been born out by the experience of 
SWF general equilibrium studies. The extent of their innovation has not 
been matched by the depth of their policy prescription. But Meerman's 
use of general equilibrium concepts to define incidence and the necessity 
of defining RPTO incidence as zero is helpful. Also, the insights 
provided by the HMM, SWF and New Zealand general equilibrium models 
provide a basis for the many rough assumptions required by quantitative 
studies of fiscal incidence. 
The emphasis here is on making the best use of available 
methodologies to treat the very immediate problem posed by income 
maintenance policies. For the theoretician, the big gap in the g-e 
treatment of the public sector presents an extremely fascinating research 
opportunity. Meantime, quantitative studies provide a framework for 
treating theoretical issues explicitly, even if not consistently. 
CHAPTER THREE 
INCOME: 11-E APPROPRIATE MEASURE 
FOR ASSESSING BUDGET INCIIENCE 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
The familiarity of the word "income" disguises !JTOblems in 
establishing what, in principle, is meant by income. lhcome plays a 
major role in studies of budget incidence, so it is important that the 
different features of the income concept are unmasked. lhcome is a 
multivariate concept which in its wider sense is interpreted to represent 
the gain to factors of production, the economic welfare of households, a 
measure of the ability to pay taxes, the basis for .measuring the net 
benefit or loss to a household as a result of budget measures. Ih the 
Shaven, Whalley and Fullerton (SWF) empirical general-equilibrium 
studies, household income is defined as the household budget con~traint 
and also represents a pattern of distribution against which equilibrium 
adjustments to budget transactions are assessed. This Chapter discusses 
the concspt of comprehensive income and the choice of a statistical 
measure which is applicable to the quantitat~ve assessment of the 
·budget's distributive influence. 
As described in Chapter One, the method chosen to evaluate the 
incidence of the government budget (or in other words, who pays the cost 
of, and who benefits from, changes in the government's budget) will vary 
depending on the level of theoretical sophistication. Chapter Two shows 
that at this stage, the theoretical and computational resources required 
to empirically assess budget incidence within a general equilibrium model 
are great and that a satisfactory conclusion will only be gained when the 
existing models are substantially augmented. Thus, the method adopted in 
this thesis is similar to a quantitative study. As such, it can apply 
the latest insights from the general equilibrium literature, but it is 
not based on an internally consistent economic model. The basic approach 
of quantitative studies is to tabulate budget-money-income effects in 
terms of households grouped into income brackets. Then the buaget's 
influence is assessed by measuring the c·hange in the distribution of 
household money income, when income is defined to include a value for 
government-provided goods and services, less payments (taxes, charges and 
so on) to the government in a given year. 
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To clarify some of the methodological issues, an income taxonomy is 
set out in four stages in Chapter One (see Figure 1.2). Chapter Three 
defines and values initial income for each of the four stages. Initial 
income is the distribution of income before account is taken of 
government budget transactions. 
The choice of a particular income concept has significant 
implications for both the theoretical and statistical results. Starting 
with an income concept obtained from consumer surveys - or which is 
derived by adding consumption to savings, ~from national income~ by 
defining income as inclusive or exclusive of government transfers, will 
lead to different results. Depending on the income measure used, the 
proportion of household money-income paid in taxes (the effective tax 
rate), received in benefits (effective benefits), or the net effect of 
the two (effective budget incidence), will differ. More importantly, the 
pattern of relative household incomes will vary. For example, retired 
people may not earn an income from working but they may earn an income 
from assets. An income measure which includes income from assets will 
show retired people to be relatively much better off than one which does 
not. 
Simons' comprehensive income measure provides a starting point for a 
discussion of income as a measure of personal gain. 1he definition of 
income which is applied to measure budget incidence in this thesis flows 
from the use to which the concept is to be put. For example, the income 
concept is required to account for individual welfare as well as gain. 
Additional adjustments are necessary if the income measure is to be used 
as a common denominator for assessing budget incidence. The nature of 
these adjustments is discussed in the following Sections. 
Chapter Three is divided into six Sections. Section A defines a 
comprehensive income concept. In addition, Section A also discusses the 
choice of an income concept which reflects economic welfare. Section B 
shows that the precise definition of the income concept may depend on the 
empirical method for assessing budget incidence. Section C describes how 
the use of the four stages outlined in Chapter One resolves some of the 
problems of finding empirical measures of the theoretical income effects 
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of the budget. Section 0 discusses the choice of an income unit at the 
base of a study of budget incidence. Section E tabulates market income 
by household income group and household type and examines the application 
of this concept as the initial income measure for Stages One and Two. 
Section F derives an approximate initial income distribution for Stages 
Three and Four. Section G is the Chapter summary and conclusion. 
A. AN INCOME CONCEPT: COMPREHENSIVE INCOME 
This section reviews the development of the concept of comprehensive 
income. Comprehensive income is defined as the amount that a person can 
consume without experiencing any increase or decrease in their capital. 
This is the income concept which according to Goode (1977) was developed 
explicitly for income tax purposes. 1 However, the concept can be 
reconciled with a concept of national income going back to at least as 
far as Adam Smith (1776, Book 2, p.271): 
"The gross revenue of all the inhabitants of a great 
country, comprehends the annual produce of their 
land and labour ••• after deducting the expense of 
maintaining ••. their fixed •.• and circulating 
capital or what, without encroaching upon their 
capital, they can place in the stock reserved for 
immediate consumption ... " 
Comprehensive income is the concept which appears to be most commonly 
applied to assess the relationship between income and other economic 
variables. It is the concept behind the national income accounts which show 
the gain in a year, taking account of capital stock. While this is one of the 
preferred definitions of income, its interpretation is subject to a number of 
conceptual and practical considerations. 
A.l: Comprehensive Income as a Measure of Economic Rights 
While income has been regarded as a measure of personal gain for some 
time, the meaning of "gain" has evolved to incorporate the idea of 
1. The Americans knew the concept from Haig and Simons (1938). 
However, according to Goode, this concept was presented earlier by 
von Schanz (1853-1931), a German economist who was the founder and 
editor of Finanz-Archiv in 1896. Schanz was anticipated by Davidson 
writing in Swedish in 1889. 
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purchasing power. For example, the general equilibrium models 
incorporate income by defining household consumer classes where income is 
equal to consumption plus savings. 
Writing originally in 1921, Haig defined income as "the net 
accretion of one's economic power between two points in time". 
Simons (1938), saw the concept of economic power in terms of rights 
and the potential of what is gained to fulfill need. He defines personal 
income as "the algebraic sum of (a) the market value of rights exercised 
in consumption and (b) the change in the value of the store of property 
rights between the beginning and end of the period in question". Income 
is seen as gain and can be measured by adding consumption during a time 
period to wealth (accumulated income) at the end of the period less 
wealth at the beginning of the period. 
Culyer (1973, p. 48) simply defined income as 'potential 
consumption', that is: 
"the value of consumption that is possible in any 
time period without reducing the value of ••. wealth." 
Under Simons' definition, a person's store of property rights is 
equivalent to the income value derived from ownership of factors. In 
empirical terms, income could thus be seen as including money-income, income 
in kind, fringe benefits received as personal income, gifts, capital gains, 
undistributed corporate earnings, income earned from foreign sources and so 
on. 2 
In the context of an economy where there is a government, an individual's 
economic power to fulfill need would be reduced by the government's tax claims 
and enhanced by the provision of public goods (which obviates their 
acquisition through the market or meets needs not met in the market pla~e). 
2. As Goode 1977, p.S, expresses it: "In an enumeration that may have 
appeared deliberately provocative in 1896 in the light of much 
doctrine and tax practice, Schanz made clear that his definition 
included not only ordinary profits but also the usufruct of 
property, gifts, inheritances, legacies, lottery winnings, insurance 
proceeds, annuities, and windfall gains of all kinds and that all 
interest paid and capital losses should be deducted." 
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HOwever, although the net money-income gain from government taxing and 
expenditure activities is consistent with a comprehensive income measure, 
early economists did not include it as such. 
Simons' definition of income presents valuation problems centred on 
the condition that there is to be no reduction in capital. A major 
problem is to find a satisfactory measure of the net change in capital 
values over a period. Or as expressed by Kaldo~ in what he calls 
'ordinary terminology': 
"Income is Consumption plus Net Savings; the problem 
of defining Income is really identical with the 
problem of defining Net Saving; which in turn is 
merely a different aspect of the problem of what is 
meant by 'maintaining capital intact'"· (1955, p.57). 
If capital comprises only non-human wealth and it is said to be intact if 
the money value does not change within the period, the net change in capital 
can be measured. Unfortunately, this narrow perspective rules out some of the 
significant determinants of economic power and gain related to human capital. 
The problems compound when it comes to finding empirical data which 
properly account for the relative economic positions of individuals or 
households, measuring both consumption and accumulation. As Simons argues: 
"Money affords, of course, a very imperfect unit for 
purposes of such measurement ••• The measurement of 
consumption also presents grave difficulties, in 
principle, especially in the case of receipts in 
kind." 
Accumulation is difficult to measure in practice because of the 
existence of unrealised and realised capital gains. Fer example, hew is 
the position of someone who wholly owns his or her house to be compared 
with someone en a similar income who has a mortgaged house or with 
another person on the same income who has sold a house to buy paintings? 
Perhaps the differences in financing heme ownership could be explained by 
the age of the adults in a household. A life cycle approach measures 
income defined to include earned and realised income as well as capital 
gains over a person's lifetime. This gets around some problems of 
comparison because it can be assumed that everyone realises their capital 
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aver a life time, providing that a change in the ownership of assets 
(such as through inheritances or bequests) is treated as realising the 
asset. Using realised income only as a proxy far the concept of 
accumulation may provide a mare workable empirical approximation of 
accrued income (than comparisons of capital plus realised gains). Over a 
taxpayer's whole life, the accumulated total of realised income should 
came to the same total as the accumulated total of accrued (consumption 
and wealth) income. 
The basic treatment of income in the general equilibrium literature 
is consistent with Simons' concept of income, defined as the algebraic 
sum of the individual's consumption expense and accumulation during the 
accounting period. The SWF literatures provides the basis far there to 
·be a consistent linkage between personal income (the returns to personal 
endowments of labour and capital,) and national income (the total return 
to labour and capital, a macroeconomic aggregate). Same account is taken 
of the government's influence an income by the direct inclusion of 
lump-sum transfers such as unemployment compensation and social 
security. Tax payments are subtracted from household income. Finally, 
the ma~els acknowledge the supply and demand effects an household income 
by defining the various income groups by their budget constraints where 
consumption plus savings equals income less tax. 
As discussed in Chapter Twa, the representation of reality created 
by general-equilibrium incidence models is extremely stylised, even when 
the models are disaggregated in 100 sectors like Piggott and Whalley 
(1976). The income concept is heavily qualified because of the limiting 
assumptions applied in deriving the model. The general equilibrium 
approach is centred on the specification of the household demand far 
several consumer goads. The detail of the determination of household 
income from changes in the return to factors and relative prices is 
largely ignored. lhis is because income levels are imposed as the 
household budget constraints rather than endogenously determined by the 
model. Some of the SWF models have made a beginning at treating the 
issue of capital gains for a number of sectors by modelling household 
assets (see Slemrod, 1983). A logical further development would be to 
model the income flaws generated by these assets. 
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Now turn to a life cycle approach to measuring income, which is 
itself not without its problems. The major difficulty, already mentioned 
is that of valuing capital gains (or losses) given changes in asset 
prices. Furthermore, there are several reasons why the life-cycle income 
approach is not a good measure of an individual's perceived welfare at a 
particular point in time. These include imperfections in the capital 
market that make it difficult to borrow on future earnings; the inherent 
uncertainty of the future income pattern for individuals; and the 
shortsightedness of consumers, who limit their aspirations to what they 
can afford now out of current money income. Or, to put it in more 
down-to-earth terms, the knowledge that with government-provided 
superannuation it is possible to have a certain income twenty years from 
now has little current welfare value if a person is presently unemployed 
and unable to qualify for an unemployment benefit. 
In summary, a comprehensive measure of income is one that takes 
account of individual economic rights to acquire preferred goods and 
services. The problem is to find a method for measuring this concept. 
A.2: Income and Economic Welfare 
Putting aside the problems of evaluating net savings, the purchasing 
power of money-income or of an even broader income concept covering an 
individual's total contribution to gross domestic product, any 
statistical measure of income can only provide a rough comparison of an 
individual's satisfaction relative to other individuals. As income is 
used to acquire houses and cars and television sets and other apparently 
marvellous inventions (which often need continual maintenance and 
repairs), there is usually a dawning awareness that the secret of 
happiness lies not in the multiplicity of possessions but in the paucity 
of wants. 
And having a large income does not necessarily bring a release from 
the problems of need. This is evidenced by comments by Princess Anne's 
husband a few years ago "that we are like any other young family with a 
mortgage to pay" or the Marquis of Tavistock, who when returning an 
antique Maori head to New Zealand, complained to the newspapers about 
being "lumbered with" the huge Woburn .abbey estate. 
I~CM:: Tt£ APPRCFRIATE MEASLRE FOR ASSESSING BLOGET INCIIENCE 110. 
Ihcreasing income is not always a significant way of reducing wants, 
because reducing wants often does not come down to just having enough 
income to acquire the latest model car or the fanciest video gear. Much 
of the time it translates into more esoteric things such as having 
children who are healthy, beautiful and talented. Or it means having a 
career that is as exciting or a tennis serve that is as good as someone 
else's. It can even mean "mundane" things such as getting rid of pimply 
skin, body odour or some aspect of poor health. 
D1 short, most measures of income and wealth do not really come 
close to evaluating the significant factors which determine the quality 
of life or what economists broadly refer to as economic welfare. 
Further, they do not reflect differences in individual tastes and 
preferences. Thus, while it may be possible to order relative household 
income or the relative wealth positions of households, it is not possible 
to know if these measures also order households in terms of the 
household's perception of welfare. 
In addition, knowing a person's income tells us very little about 
the costs entailed in acquiring the income - costs which vary between 
individuals - such as the time taken to get to work and back, the hours 
spent away from home and family, the extent of mental stress and illne~s 
suffered to maintain the income, the extent of feeling imprisoned to an 
occupation or employer. Clearly, earning a large income and/or having 
considerable wealth is no guarantee on its own that an individual is 
loved or able to enjoy life. 
Nevertheless, taken to its ultimate conclusion, the argument that 
income is not a good measure of welfare becomes, for some, a 
rationalisation for accepting things as they are. This denies the 
considerable evidence that having a low income correlates with hardship 
in the form of poor nutrition, poor health, alienation from society, lack 
of opportunity and many other maladies which are signs of deprivation, if 
not in an absolute sense, at least in a relative sense. Finally, the 
extent of the government's budget influence on the economy depends on the 
constraints of limited factor endowment, the current state of technology 
and consumer tastes. Income is a unit of analysis which can be applied 
to sum these disparate effects over the population. 
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A.3: The Time Dimension and the Formation of a Consistent Model 
Three different time elements can be identified in the study of 
redistribution. First, the common objective of an explicitly 
redistributive policy is ta deal with a short-run crisis, such as 
providing a subsistence income ta an unemployed person or to ather 
persons unable ta work. Behind this short-run consideration, which tends 
to result in budget measures aimed at providing an immediate money-income 
benefit, lurk the second and third time-frames. The second time-frame is 
the time reference of household decision-making. The third time-frame 
relates ta the time it takes far a new government measure to result in a 
new equilibrium, usually a lang-run consideration. 
Turning ta the first aspect of "time", explicit government 
redistributive policy requires a means of identifying those requiring 
mare income. Mast income statistics are measured over a calendar year. 
A limitation af annual income as a measure far assessing budget incidence 
is that the effect af budget measures will vary between people who 
possess capital value and annual income in varying proportions. Another 
limitation is that an annual income measure may hide those households 
requiring immediate income support during the seasons of the year when 
they are unable ta earn income. 
Far an understanding af the time-frame governing household 
decisions, it is necessary to engage in a study of human behaviour beyond 
the scope af this thesis. For the majority of household decisions, the 
appropriate income concept might be found to be permanent income. 
Underlying the permanent income concept is the assumption that people 
incorporate a view about their life-time income into their current 
decisions. The definition of a person's "permanent income" includes an 
assessment of expected wage income, capital receipts and the probability 
of survival. capital receipts refer to bequests and gifts received. 
General-equilibrium analysis can provide insight into the issue of how a 
specific change in government policy changes permanent incomes in the 
long run. 
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The standard Harberger (HMM) model (which was discussed in Chapter 
Two and put to one side) defines net saving as zero and assumes a no 
growth economy where capital and investment remain constant. Under these 
conditions, the change in the distribution of capital to each sector can 
be measured. Since most of the general equilibrium models are long-run 
(because capital can shift between sectors), their treatment of income 
could be seen as consistent with a life cycle 
In interpreting the results of general equilibrium analysis, it must 
be acknowledged that the perfect capital market assumption plays a key 
role in generating an equivalence between an individual's expenditure 
base and lifetime receipts. The effect of this assumption is that 
individuals can (and because they are rational, they do) borrow and lend 
freely at an interest rate appropriate to allocating resources 
efficiently. The assumption of a perfect capital market assists in 
analysing life cycle issues. Unfortunatelyr however, it may obscure some 
of the significant. effects of relevance to income support policy. In 
real life, the ability to borrow and the interest rate available for 
lending and borrowing may be more a function of an individual's current 
comprehensive income than of their expected future income. Even when 
individuals have perfect information, they might not be able to take the 
desired action if their comprehensive income is below that of others 
wishing to borrow. 
A fundamental question for income maintenance policy is what 
relevance "permanent income" has for those individuals eligible for 
government-provided income support. One common belief is that an 
increased level of income support will result in an increase in capital 
values because some of th~ income-support money will be invested rather 
than spent to meet current needs. While it is possible that in general 
that individuals respond to increased income by increasing their assets, 
it seems implausible that the response of low-income individuals would be 
as marked as for the middle and higher income groups. A more plausible 
case can be made for the view that the time horizon of households is 
related to income with those on higher incomes having longer time 
horizons. 
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The time-frame relevant to the adjustment to a new equilibrium after 
a government measure is introduced involves a counterfactual problem. 
The valuation of the real spending power of individuals once their 
current income has been adjusted for claims on it by the government and, 
in turn, for goods and services which the government supplies in return 
for its levies on individual earnings, requires a view of the ongoing 
effects of previous government activity. The level of the individual's 
income in any given year will have been influenced by previous government 
measures and the influence may have a significant effect on 
redistributing incomes. 
A strength of HMM and SWF models is that they treat the issue of the 
counterfactual consistently. Instead of aggregating results obtained 
from a number of partial static analyses, each cast within its own time 
dimension, total budget incidence is cast within one time dimension. A 
general equilibrium budget change is the comparison of two equilibria -
one before the budget measure is introduced and the other after the 
economy has adjusted to its introduction. The SWF empirical studies 
resolve the contradiction between the desire t~ measure change over 
calendar time for policy purposes and the fact that the time period for 
the differential incidence adjustment is unknown by assuming that the 
important tax and benefit effects on money-income are particularly 
significant in a calendar time period (probably a year). · 
Most SWF general equilibrium models for assessing the effects of the 
budget on income distribution are long run. These models attempt to 
determine whether recipients of government budget policies benefit when 
all adjustments to taxing and spending have taken place. The usual 
approach is to define the problem as one of balanced budget incidence, 
comparing two comparative static equilibria. In this case, as far as 
general equilibrium theory is concerned, the actual time it takes to get 
to a long-run is irrelevant. But in reality, human life is limited, so 
the time it takes to get a long-run is relevant. 
VICTORIA UNIVERSITY OF WELLINGTON 
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8. INCOME CONCEPTS UNDERLYING EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF BUDGET INCIDENCE 
A whole spectrum of income concepts have been applied to the 
determination of budget incidence, or in the case of some earlier 
studies, to determining tax incidence. The income measure adopted is 
determined by the definition of redistribution and the nature of 
restrictive assumptions which are imposed. This section is devoted to a 
discussion of some of the main treatments of income in the empirical and 
quantitative studies of budget incidence. 
Mclure (1974, p.5) attempted a general statement of the problem 
underlying the estimation of budget incidence. It "involves determining 
how the real incomes of various groups, where income includes the 
benefits of public services, differ from what they would be in the 
absence of government." 
In the Mclure analysis, income is a measure of gain, which takes 
account of the effects of the budget but while the above statement claims 
to represent the treatment of income in studies of "balanced-budget 
incidence", a closer look at the literature shows that different budget 
incidence studies attempt to grapple with different characteristics of 
the income concept. Not all the income concepts are designed. to be 
consistent with the balanced-budget incidence approach. Also, many 
researchers have found ways of measuring the benefits of public services 
by defining an initial income base which includes government. 
Implicitly or explicitly, studies of budget incidence attempt to 
come to terms with up to four main characteristics of the income concept: 
a) Is the measure of income a common denominator which can be 
used for making a theoretically consistent comparison of the · 
pre- and post-budget economic position of an individual or 
househol rP. 
b) Is the measure a comprehensive standard of some defined 
household or individual "economic position", over a given 
periorP. For example, does it cover all the elements of gain 
which a household considers to be income? 
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c) Does the measure enable a ranking or ordering of individuals 
or households in terms of their "economic positions••, however 
defined. In other words, is the measure one which can be 
adjusted for the effects of different government policies as 
well as showing the changes in the relative incomes of 
households? 
d) Does the income measure provide the appropriate base for 
assessing effective incidence, that is, the capacity to pay 
taxes. For example, the improved economic position of the 
household from an excellent government-provided education 
system would show up in (a) above but it might not add 
directly to the cash income of the household (at least not 
immediately) so the household's ability to meet current tax 
demands would not be enhanced. 
Different studies have emphasised the above issues in various ways. 
It appears that the different treatments relate to the methodological 
approach and, often, an implicit view of the policy q~estion which is 
being addressed by studies of budget incidence. 
8.1: A Selection of Empirical Income Measures 
Gillespie (1965 and 1966) whose contribution to the literature was a 
confident attempt to assess the effects of the expenditure side of the 
government budget, as well as the revenue side, gave explicit treatment 
to characteristics a) and b). 
Looking at characteristic b) first, Gillespie set out to measure the 
change in an individual's "economic position". In defining "economic 
position", Gillespie reasoned that each individual owns a collection of 
assets (including the capitalised value of labour) and the income flows 
from these define the individual's economic position relative to that of 
all other individuals. But, Gillespie felt that the lack of sufficiently 
detailed data on individual holdings of all assets precluded empirical 
investigation and chose instead to rely on current income as the 
reflection of an individual's asset position. His definition of current 
income includes salaries, rent, interest and transfer payments. 
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OJrrent income is further distinguished as either "family 
money-income" or "broad income", the main difference being that "broad 
income" includes non-money items which are a source of income for some 
families. Examples of non-money income are food and fuel grown and 
consumed on the farm and imputed interest of financial intermediaries. 
Gillespie's "broad income" measure is similar to personal income as 
defined in the canadian National Accounts. He aggregates income by 
family units. 
116. 
Gillespie's is a comparative static approach, in common with the 
more formally specified general equilibrium studies. The original income 
base or the pre-budget equilibrium is "in the abstract realm of pure 
theory, a private economy .•. [which exists p]rior to time "t" [such 
that] the individual had no method of satisfying his social wants, wants, 
that is, that can only be satisfied by goods consumed (or, at least, 
which are available for consumption) in equal amounts by all." 
(Gillespie, 1966, p.l.) 
Then, at time "t", a government is created to provide goods which 
satisfy individual's social wants. The economy makes a complete 
adjustment to the introduction of the government at time "t + 1". 
Gillespie's measure of fiscal incidence is the measure of the change in 
an individual's "economic position" due to taxes and the benefits from 
government expenditures (measured in current-money-income terms, as 
discussed above) compared to the individual's position before the 
introduction of the government. 
To render the money-income concept consistent with what he calls 
"fiscal incidence" analysis, Gillespie adjusts his empirical measure of 
current income before the introduction of the government (the pre-budget 
income distribution) to take into account retained corporate earnings, 
capital gains income, the unshifted portion of the corporate income tax 
and the backward shifted portion of social security contributions. 
Bishop (1961) argues for an even broader empirical income measure 
than Gillespie's. "If the burden of all taxes is to be imputed to 
individuals, all of the income or product on which the burden may fall 
must also be imputed to individuals". (p.46). This is not so much a 
question of theoretical consistency or defining an individual's economic 
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position (a and b above) as a question of whether the income measure 
provides an appropriate base for assessing effective incidence (d above) 
for different income earners (c above). Bishop's approach, however, does 
make an important theoretical contribution in as much as it is a 
precursor to Herberger's treatment in 1962 of the effect of taxes on both 
the sources and uses of income. "If account is taken of the full effects 
of economy-wide taxes, it becomes difficult to distinguish the effects of 
general taxes on sales from the effects of taxes on factor income". 
(p.43). thus, national product rather than personal income should be the 
income concept for assessing tax incidence. 3 
However, Bishop favours net national product (which in the United 
States income accounts includes indirect taxes) as the appropriate income 
measure rather than gross national product. Gross and net in the United 
States accounts refers to total product before and after deduction of 
capital consumption allowances. Bishop ignores capital consumption 
allowances because "it may be legitimately assumed that in the aggregate 
capital must be maintained and that the weight of the tax burden relates 
to how much net product is diverted from other uses''. 
Meerman (1974) further develops Bishop's use of ·net national product 
as the underlying income base, agreeing that the logic of budget 
incidence analysis requires that all output be distributed to private 
claimants. In this respect, Meerman's argument is concerned with income 
characteristic d) (see introduction to Section B above), the expression 
of an income base wide enough to give an appropriate measure of 
"effective budget incidence". 
In addition, Meerman rekindles some earlier arguments in the 
literature relating to the theoretical basis for deriving pre-tax income 
so that it represents a distribution in the absence of government. 
Studies based on Musgrave et al (1951) followed what Meerman identifies 
as "the adjusted national income approach" where personal income is the 
3. there is an additional question here which Bishop does not address. 
The Americans have traditionally measured national, rather than 
domestic output. National output includes the income and products 
of overseas assets owned by residents while domestic product refers 
to production within the country only. An important question is 
which base "bears the burden" of taxation'? 
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pivotal concept. To derive a pre-budget income measure, personal income 
is then "adjusted" to take into account: 
1) Those taxes which are assumed to burden factors of production 
directly such as the unshifted corporate profits tax, unshifted 
export taxes, the portion of the employer's social security 
contribution (which is assumed to be paid by the wage earner through 
reduced wages); 
2) ather income or gains (for example, undistributed profits, capital 
gains); and then, 
3) personal transfer payments are subtracted out an the basis that 
these are nan-market incomes which would nat exist without the 
government. 
This resulting augmented income measure is referred to by different 
authors as "adjusted income" or "broad income". As a pre-budget or 
baseline income distribution, it is designed to exclude any adjustment 
for the influence of the government. Prior to Meerman, this was 
interpreted to mean that all taxes which were believed to be shifted to 
the uses of income (that is, paid by consumers) are excluded. In 
practice, this means that indirect business taxes and that portion of 
ather taxes which are assumed to be paid by households as final consumers 
(such as the corporate income tax), would nat exist in the absence of the 
government and are therefore excluded. 
Meerman nates that national income is an appropriate measure of all 
factor income; however, it does not include indirect taxes. Under the 
United States national income accounting approach, factor incomes sum to 
national income which is then adjusted to market prices by an adjustment 
for indirect taxes. National income plus indirect taxes is equal to net 
national product. 
To avoid the problem of including indirect taxes in the pre-budget 
measure of income, national income could be selected as the appropriate 
base. Meerman shows, however, that indirect taxes are no different from 
other taxes inasmuch as they represent the resource claims or purchasing 
power of the government. Thus, in Meerman's view, net national product 
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(NNP) is the relevant national income concept because it takes account of 
such resource claims. 
Another way of looking at this issue is from the sources and users 
sides of the household account. The sources or income side of a 
household transactions account already includes indirect taxes (they are 
only paid when the income is spent). When this income is grossed up to 
total domestic product, an allowance for indirect taxes is explicitly 
added into the income base to derive the real value of broad income in 
the absence of the government. From the users side of the household 
account, spending power is greater in the absence of indirect taxes both 
because factor incomes would be higher and because market prices are 
lower. 
The conclusion to use net national product at the base makes it more 
difficult to generate a pre-budget income distribution in quantitative 
studies where only the income function is specified and where the effects 
of changes in demand are ignored. As Meerman points out, there is no 
reason to believe that the pattern of the incidence of indirect taxe~ as 
derived from patterns of consumption "would be the same pattern implicit 
in 'restoring' factor incomes to NNP to get a conceptually more valid 
measure of total pre-tax income. In short, increasing tne factor incomes 
of various income brackets for the presumed incidence of indirect taxes 
according to current canons of tax incidence would not be a valid 
procedure." (Meerman, 1974, p.522) 
The SWF general equilibrium studies of budget incidence would have 
no difficulty with Meerman's conclusion that pre-budget income cannot 
account for indirect taxes simply by adjusting the uses of income. The 
Herberger approach and later models would enable account to be taken of 
the existence of indirect taxes on both factor incomes and aggregate 
demand (that is, in terms of both the uses and sources of income). 
Moon (1977) takes a different angle to the national accounting 
approach followed by Bishop and Meerman in their discussion of an income 
measure. Going back to the introduction to Section B, her emphasis is on 
income characteristics b) and c). Her interest is to derive an income 
measure which is a comprehensive standard of household (family) "economic 
position" and which enables ranking in terms of this standard. 
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In Moon's view, the effectiveness of programmes with redistribution 
goals cannot be determined unless families can be adequately ranked by 
level of "economic status". "Economic status" is a concept designed to 
indicate a family's command over all goods and services. Since families 
at the same income level may vary substantially in their ability to 
consume goods and services, Moon finds the traditional money-income 
measure is inadequate, preferring "broader, yet quantifiable measures of 
economic welfa-:re". 
Thus Moon develops what she considers to be "a comprehensive measure 
of economic welfare" which captures the yearly potential consumption for 
families consistent with a life-cycle hypothesis of savings. A family's 
utility is treated as a function of attainable consumption in both the 
current and future time periods and is maximised subject to the resources 
available to it over- time._ 
The present value of an individual's or household's total resources 
is defined as the stock of assets at the beginning of the present period 
plus the current nan-Property income plus the expected non-property 
income adjusted for the years of life expectancy for the individual and 
the rate of return on assets. Consumption in any given time period is 
proportional to the present value of the total resource flow accruing to 
one individual over the remaining years of life. The exact proportion 
devoted to consumption in each time period depends on the age of the 
person, the rate of return on assets, and the form of the utility 
function. 
Moon's theoretical measure of economic welfare (Wt) is defined as: 
where 
t 
... 
Ct 
... 
Ht 
st 
= 
= 
= 
= 
time period 
an "expanded" concept of current potential consumption. 
all current net inflows of resources available to the household 
for consumption (except property income). 
share of net worth available for consumption. 
U.CG£: Tl£ APPRI:FRIATE MEASLRE FOR ASSESSING BUDGET INCII:ENCE 121. 
In her theoretical measure of economic welfare, Moon further adjusts 
household income plus savings to take account of a concept of family 
needs. lhen the current resource component (Ht) is defined to 
include: 1) household earnings; 2) ather income, including cash gifts 
from relatives, private pension payments and so on; 3) the net value of 
the government (including both taxes and expenditures, similar to the 
concept in this thesis; 4) a measure of intrafamily transfers which are 
mainly in-kind contributions centred on the provision of accomodation and 
which have particular relevance for the elderly; and 5) the value of 
leisure and non-market productive activities. 
Moon found that including leisure and other non-market activities in 
income, created problems of valuation. The income values for these 
activities are difficult to identify (and quantify) precisely because 
they do not correspond to market transactions. So, although they quite 
probably generate economic welfare, it would be difficult to include them 
in a study which needs to establish the relative measured income 
positions of people or households. 
Moon's is a primarily micro-economic approach viewed within a 
standard utility function framework. Her particular interest is in 
applying her measure of economic welfare to an aged family. Moon's main 
contribution to the economics literature is an empirical measure of 
annuity and the valuation of in-kind benefits to the aged for programmes 
such as medicaid. Her contribution to quantitative studies is a more 
comprehensive concept of the household budget constraint, which takes 
account of the determinants of income and consumption. 
8.2: Ihcome Defined in Redistributive Studies 
In the end, the definitions of initial and final income may rest on 
whether income redistribution is seen as either a normative or a 
positive issue. When the analysis of income redistribution is treated 
as a positive issue, the consideration is to isolate the measurable 
feature of the concept and then define it in that way. When it is 
treated as a normative issue, the first consideration is what the purpose 
of the analysis is and then some concessions must be made to scientific 
rigour in order to achieve answers. 
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The choice of an income base and, in turn, the definition of income, 
comes back to the underlying theoretical approach adopted and the 
definition of the problem to be evaluated. Behrens and Smolensky (1973) 
explicitly discuss how income redistribution ought to be defined, 
presenting four alternative general equilibrium definitions of 
redistribution. Reynolds and Smolensky (1977) try to adapt Behrens and 
Smolensky's definitions to measure the -redistribution of income in the 
United States, apparently finding that the general equilibrium problems 
involved make it difficult to apply any of them as empirical measures. 
Behrens, Reynolds and Smolensky (BRS) argue that definitions of 
redistribution differ because they result from different "counter-
factuals". Any measure of redistribution involves comparing a 
distribution of money-income "before" certain taxes, transfers and other 
government expenditures with a distribution "after" and this implies 
breaking into the ongoing interaction of interdependent public and 
private decisions with some "counterfactual" to measure the distribution 
of income "before" any changes take place. This is called the "baseline" 
distribution and is similar to the concept of "initial" income. 
Four different approaches for measuring the net distributive effect 
of the government are· distinguished. From these, four different baseline 
distributions may be derived. 
1) The zero government case excludes all government 
expenditures and taxes from the baseline (that is, the 
pre-budget income distribution) and includes all effects of 
government fiscal activities i~ redistribution. 
2) The Lindahl equilibrium case including transfer payments is 
the baseline where non-taxed recipient benefits (transfer 
payments) are considered to be allocative budget measures and 
are included in the baseline distribution consistent with the 
conditions for Pareto-optimality. The view taken in this case 
is that transfer payments provide benefits to those who pay 
taxes, rather than to the direct recipients. 
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3) The Lindahl equilibrium case excluding transfer payments 
from the base line where non-taxed recipient benefits are 
removed from the baseline distribution and included as the 
redistributive effects of the government. This is consistent 
with Lampman's view that redistribution is the receipt of 
"consumer-power income" by the individuals that does not 
correspond to their "producer-contribution". 
4) The Smolensky-Behrens case has as its essential 
characteristic that the primary distribution is an optimal one 
in terms of some social welfare function. Or in other words, 
the government's allocative and redistributive activities are 
designed to meet some explicit ability-to-pay criterion which 
is reflected in the baseline distribution. 
Turning to cases 2) and 3) above, a Lindahl equilibrium establishes 
the conditions where the value of benefits received from government 
spending are equal to the taxes paid (see O'lapter Two, Section A.3 for a 
discussion of the Lindahl equilibrium in relation to Meerman's model). 
The government's allocative policies (the government-provided collective 
goods and services) can be distinguished from its redistributive policies 
(government measures with the explicit aim of changing the existing 
income distribution). 
Briefly, under the Lindahl conditions the allocative activities of 
the government may be defined as those activities which increase the 
efficient use of resources. The government is the institutional 
arrangement where individuals group together to buy collective goods and 
services,. which because they are allocated efficiently, are paid for at 
"market prices". According to an efficient Lindahl solution, the income 
value of each collective good to each taxpayer is equal to the product of 
the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) and the amount of the public 
good. The difference between the taxpayer's MRS and the tax paid 
represents the entire redistributive effect of public good. The effects 
on factor incomes which arise incidentally from the government's 
allocative activities can then be excluded from the baseline (they are 
to do with the efficient allocation of resources). 
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Behrens, Reynolds and Smolensky's concepts of redistribution by no 
means exhaust the theoretical possibilities, but they illustrate the wide 
range of interpretations which might be given to the notion of 
redistribution. Reynolds and Smolensky (1977, p.23) believe that none of 
the definitions has much operational value from an empirical view. In 
other words, they are unable to resolve the difficulty of isolating 
government-generated effects on income distribution from the other 
on-going economic effects. 
The authors believe that of all the options, the zero government 
budget is an extreme and theoretically inappropriate conceptual 
experiment, particularly because any observable pre-budget distribution 
already reflects a host of market adjustments to government behaviour. 
In practice, some economic analysts. seem to assume that the distribution 
of "pretax" market incomes would be no different if government were 
zero. This is not a very fruitful interpretation either since government 
effects are unlikely to be zero. 
In contrast, Mclure (1974, p.2l) argues, that despite its 
shortcomings, the zero-based budget alternative is the best for studies 
of budget incidence, mainly because it is easier to implement 
operationally. Even if the conceptual basis of the three other BRS 
alternatives discussed above is thought to be stronger, their empirical 
content is not great. For example, making the second measure of 
redistribution consistent with a Lindahl equilibrium, depends critically 
upon knowing the pattern of benevolence in an economy of millions of 
individuals (because transfer payments are evaluated on the assumption 
that they benefit those who pay for them, not the recipients). 1he 
I 
Smolensky and Behrens fourth redistribution concept fares as poorly. What 
constitutes an optimum distribution or the "best initial distribution" 
is, of course conceptually unknown and, therefore, cannot have an 
empirical representation. 
A major difficulty is finding a theoretical construct which 
consistently treats notions of redistribution, government activities and 
of income. Meerman (1978) shows how a comparative statics approach may 
be defined so that the change in income distribution from a change in 
budget policy can be assessed. His method does not depend on the 
assumption of a zero government counterfactual (see Chapter Two, Section 
A). The difficulty with the Meerman approach is that the adjustment is 
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long-run (capital can move between sectors) and the time period of the 
adjustment is unspecified. 
The burden of the BRS discussion is to argue that it may not be 
sensible to try to discover the aggregate redistributive impact of 
government in a given year. Instead, Reynolds and Smolensky's research 
traces differences in the size distribution of income over a period of 
some 20 years by comparing income in three different years (1950, 1961, 
1970) which is defined to include the benefits and burdens of government 
at all levels. 
Reynolds and Smolensky claim that measuring changes between years 
makes fewer demands upon the conventional technique than trying to 
measure the size and nature of redistribution in a single year. Firstly, 
it obviates the need for a hypothetical counterfactual to measure the 
"before" distribution (the distribution of money income before taxes and 
redistributive transfers provided by the government). Conceptually, the 
final distribution of income is viewed as the simultaneous outcome of 
both public and private activity even though the calculations are 
performed in a stepwise sequence which suggests independence. The final 
distribution in the first year becomes the base for assessing any change 
in the pattern of redistribution. Secondly, any biases are in the same 
direction in most years, and thirdly the biases are likely to be of 
similar magnitude within the range of distributive change in the United 
States during relatively short time intervals. These two conditions are 
sufficient to ensure that any measured, sizeable, distributive change by 
income class will be of the appropriate direction and magnitude. 
Despite their reservations on theoretical grounds, Reynolds and 
Smolensky do discuss the redistribution of income by expenditure and tax 
categories for each of the three years. The authors argue that in a 
strictly arithmetic sense, differences between initial and final income 
inequality in a single year can be attributed ~o certain taxes or 
expenditures. Although this kind of disaggregation ignores all indirect 
behavioural effects due to a budget's effects (that might present an 
entirely different impression if they were known), it makes for useful 
speculation so long as the limitations of the comparisons are born in 
mind~ The authors main intent, however, remains to concentrate attention 
on the changing distribution of final income over the period bounded by 
the three years studied. 
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C. THREE INCOME MEASURES BEHIND FOUR STAGES 
As shown by the above discussion, defining an income concept 
appropriate for assessing the influence of the budget on income 
distribution, presents great complexities. An additional problem is 
presented because the choice of an initial household-income concept, as 
discussed in Section B above, is conditional on its use as a standard for 
so many alternative assessments, especially if the concept is to be 
adjusted for the effects of government budget policies. It is the common 
denominator for a theoretically consistent comparison of pre- and 
post-budget economic positions of the income unit; it is expected to be a 
comprehensive standard of "economic position" which ranks households by 
consumer power, the "ability to pay taxes" and economic welfare. 
Finally, it must also provide a base for assessing effective incidence 
for individual taxes and government expenditures. 
When it comes to finding an empirical measure of a particular income 
concept or government measure, there are major information problems. On 
the one hand, there are many cases where the statistics consistent with a 
given concept are unavailable. On the other hand, there are cases where 
the theoretical specification of the concept is not adaptable for precise 
statistical measurement. 
Existing definitions of taxable income, adopted by different 
countries for assessing personal income tax, cannot be defended because 
they do not consistently define an income concept. The definitions of 
income assessable for tax are not appropriate because they are the 
outcome of a long series of legislative acts and judicial decisions which 
reflect heterogeneous and sometimes conflicting principles and 
compromises dictated by purely administrative considerations. 
llrt assessment of "the power of the household to consume" in terms of 
budget incidence, involves a mixed compound. It contains elements of a 
stock (an individual's disposable wealth at a point in time, the size of 
the government) elements of a "flow" (the regularly recurrent receipts, 
such as dividend or interest payments, wages or salaries in the case of 
an individual or tax revenue in the case of a government) as well as 
elements which cannot be properly classed in either category (the casual 
receipts like bequests, gifts or capital gains and so on whose recurrence 
may be wholly unpredictable). 
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Figure 3.1 below summarises the stages for measuring budget 
incidence in regard to how initial income is defined for each one. In 
all four cases, income is regarded as a proxy for welfare or utility. 
FI~ 3.1 
Stage 
One 
Two 
Three 
Four 
I~Qt.£ CON:EPTS UNOERL YING 11-REE STAGES 
Initial Income or 
Pre-Budget-Income 
Household Survey: 
Market Income 
Household Survey: 
Market In come 
Final Income or 
Post-Budget-Income 
Money-Income Ind 
Direct Budget 
Transactions 
Income Valued for 
all Budget Trans-
actions 
Bishop: Broad Measure of 
Group Domestic Product Income 
Simons' Comprehensive 
Income 
General Equilibrium 
Income 
Valuation 
Market Prices 
Market Prices 
. 
Market Prices 
Real Values 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------Source: See text for deriviation. 
Stages One and Two may be seen simply as accounting identities where 
behavioural relationships only play a role when direct statistical 
measurement is impossible. 
Stage One, the direct measurement, refers to the difference between 
market-place income directly accruing to the household sector and an 
income measure defined to take account of those budget activities which 
have an impact on the sources and uses of household income. Stage Two 
broadens the measurement of final income to incorporate values for the 
money-income effects of the entire central government income and outlay 
account. 
Stage Three widens the initial income base, assuming along with 
Bishop and Meerman, that· the welfare of persons is related to their 
country's national product. Unlike Bishop and Meerman's approach, 
however, consumption of fixed capital is included in the initial income 
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measure. Because the national income accounts and other statistical 
sources distinguish the household sector from the company and financial 
128. 
sector, this approach involves considerable imputation and approximation. 
Stage Four is a comprehensive measure of income which is defined to 
be consistent with Simons' comprehensive definition of personal income. 
Simons' definition differs from Meerman and Bishop because it includes a 
measure for net accumulation during a period (that is, the change in 
capital). 
As the reader will have surmised from the earlier discussion in the 
Chapter (see especially Section 8.2), the use of initial income 
(pre-budget) and final income (past-budget) designations is nat entirely 
accurate. Since the government budgeting process is dynamic, and because 
there are lags involved with the private sector's response to budget 
measures, the pre-budget-income distribution will be influenced by 
earlier budget transactions and the past-budget distribution may nat 
include all current-year budget transactions. 
The meaning of the initial income and final income designations 
differs .far each Stage. For Stage Qne and Stage Twa, pre-budget income 
refers to the national income measure of market incomes earned by the 
household sector before the money-income values of the current year's 
payments to the government are deducted and benefits from the government 
are added. When fully specified as general equilibrium models, the Stage 
Three and Stage Four pre-budget measures would refer to household income 
before a small change in government budget policy. The final-budget 
equilibrium would refer to the equilibrium adjustment to the small change. 
INCG£: n£ APPRCFRIATE MEASl.RE FOR ASSESSING BUDGET INCIDENCE 129. 
D. GROUPING INCOME INFORMATION : THE HOUSEHOLD UNIT 
To generalise the results of this assessment of the effects of the 
budget on incomes, some groupings are required. The choice of a unit of 
analysis will make a difference to the interpretation of the results and 
will differ depending on the context in which incidence is analysed. The 
incidence problem may be viewed as a problem of properly allocating 
resources by factors (land, labour and capital) or even by social class. 
This is the nature of the incidence problem analysed by the HMM models. 
This thesis analyses the problem of incidence in terms of "size 
distribution of income" which is the grouping of earners by income 
range. The multi-sector SWF models extend the HMM approach to analyse 
tax incidence by size group by specifying several household consumption 
groups. 
Income recipients may be further grouped by family relationship, 
household relationship or treated as individuals. A major consideration 
in choosing between these units is to define a group which is both an 
income sharing unit, a consumption unit and the appropriate group to 
share the benefits from factor ownership. The literature has 
concentrated on the former two characteristics. 
The choice of a unit for assessing the income effects of budget 
transactions must take account of a variety of factors beside taxation. 
For example, the relative ability to pay (cash) in income tax may be more 
a function of individual behaviour than of household or family behaviour, 
while an individual's economic position may be mainly determined by 
living arrangements which are a function of family life. Households not 
only pool income and expenditure, they also pool wealth, in the form of 
housing. Even when elderly relations or other, perhaps unrelated, 
members of the household do not share equally in the pooling of income, 
expenditure and wealth, they do benefit from the household relationship. 
To treat them as an individual unit would not take proper account of 
this. In addition, the household is a common denominator for a much 
wider variety of social groupings than is the family. 
Titmuss (1965), found that family relationships had an important 
part to play in determining taxation arrangements.. His work is 
suggestive that assessments of ability to pay tax be based on the family 
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unit, rather than an individual, income concept. Because of the nature 
of tax legislation relating to gifting and estate management, the 
appropriate unit for the Titmuss analysis would include several 
generations resident in a number of private dwellings. 
1here is a variety of views for how to define a household unit. 
Webb and Sieve (1971) note that the household unit is used in the United 
Kingdom Family Expenditure Surveys because it is seen as the unit which 
pools income and shares expenditure. However, they think that family 
units which consist of single people, related-childless couples or 
couples with children, is a better representation of both an income and 
expenditure unit than the private household. 1hey find evidence for this 
in the behaviour of young adult offspring "who are sharing the parental 
home before marriage" but who "participate only partially in the 
budgeting of the rest of the family". Webb and Sieve believe that 
married children, lodgers and families sharing accommodation should be 
presumed to be financially independent of the rest of the household. 
OUlyer (1973, p.48) says in his analysis of income distribution 
studies for the U.K. that the "basic unit is naturally the nuclear family 
of adults and their children". re acknowledges that there is also a 
. question as to how far to include other household members; but he thinks 
the decision comes down to the extent to which income is shared within 
the household. If incomes were not shared very extensively, "poverty 
amongst ••• the elderly will be understated by using the household as a 
unit." t-e concludes that the best unit is the nuclear family and income 
transferred outside the nuclear family should be treated as separate 
sources of income for those additional household members. 
Recent debate about the unit for assessing personal income tax has 
questioned whether even the nuclear family unit represents a group which 
pools income and shares consumption. 1he supporting argument is that 
often even in the best relationships, income or the potential to consume · 
is not shared equally among family members. Ih addition, given the 
decline in the proportion of nuclear families in New Zealand and the 
trend towards single adult and three adult households, the individual may 
be the fairest unit on which to base policy. 
Much policy in New Zealand, has concentrated on family 
relationships. For example, the domestic purposes benefit is only paid 
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to a solo parent unit when there is no other nuclear family support (the 
existence of a de facto relationship rules out eligilibility for this 
benefit). Eligibility for other benefits, such as the family benefit and 
national superannuation, is also defined by family relationships. 
Increasingly, however, eligibility criteria for benefits, tax 
expenditures or rebates have been defined to take some account of private 
home ownership or in other words to target, the household as the 
recipient unit. Government measures which target the household include 
the home ownership rebate and the rates rebate. 
In the end, the unit of analysis selected for this thesis was the 
private dwelling. The private dwelling was chosen because it came 
closest to representing factor ownership and could be more easily adopted 
to the methodology of general equilibrium studies. In practical terms, 
factor ownership comes down to ownership of shares in productive units 
(companies) and property. The latter two factors may be broadly 
considered as wealth. There are little ·data about wealth ownership in 
New Zealand, but a case can be made that for the majority of people, a 
home is the ~ajar if not the only sourCe of wealth4. Thus, the private 
dwelling or household is the appropriate unit at the base of a study of 
income redistriqution because it is a unit which pools income, 
expenditure and wealth. 
In conclusion, then, for most of the quantitative results in this 
thesis the private dwelling is the unit of analysis. It is referred to 
as a household unit. This unit is the same as the unit at the base of 
the Census and House~old Survey. Household units are grouped by 
household types J Household types are defined by the age and number of 
adults residing in private dwellings rather than by family units. 
Single-adult and three-adult households make up a significant proportion 
of the households. However, both the Household Survey and the Census 
also collect information on an individual basis. A feature of the way 
the SAS computer technique (the technique used to analyse the data) 
operates is that the results can be tabulated in both household units and 
individual units, when the basic information is specified by both units. 
4. Another major source of wealth is superannuation. If wealth could 
be measured, the present value of a private super scheme may in many 
cases exceed the present value of a person's home. 
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E. NEW ZEALAND HOUSEHOLD INCOME DISTRIBUTION 
This section applies available New Zealand income data to tabulate 
the initial distribution of market income by household-market-income 
deciles and household type. Initial income refers to the income 
concept at the base of the four stages. Initial income in Stage One and 
Stage Two is market income; for Stage Three it is national income; and, 
for Stage Four, it is national income adjusted for capital gains. 
Section E focuses on the distribution of market income, the initial 
income for Stages One and Two. Section F discusses the derivation income 
for Stages Three and Four. 
Appendix Three describes the four main sources of income data which 
are collected regularly by the Department of Statistics. The sources are 
the 1981 Census of Population and Dwellings, the Household Survey, Inland 
Revenue data published in Incomes and Income Tax and the New Zealand 
system of National Accounts. 
The Household Survey5 is the main data source for this thesis. It 
collects information about household expenditure and other household 
characteristics which can be adapted to derive initial income 
distribution as outlined in Figure 3.1 above. There are also sufficient 
data in the Household Survey to analyse ·households tax liability and to 
estimate the consumption of government-provided goods by income group. 
Household survey income data can be aggregated up to represent the 
entire population of private households as reported by the 1981 census. 
Section E.l discusses the Household Survey definitions of income and 
household composition and the method for aggregating this information to 
the total population of private dwellings in 1981/82. Household Survey 
data are then grouped by market income in Section E.2, consistent with 
Stages One and Two. Section E.3 describes the distributions of persons 
by household type and some of the characteristics which have significance 
for the analysis in the thesis. 
5. The Department of Statistics' formal title is the Household Income 
and Expenditure Survey (HIES). 
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Section E.4 shows several ways in which the results can be expressed and 
Section E.S discusses the limitations of market income as a measure of 
initial income in a study of budget incidence. 
E.l: Aggregating Hbusehold Survey Information to Cover All Private 
Hbuseholds 
The Household Survey asks respondents about all sources of income, 
including regular income and income which comes irregularly. Regular 
income is income where there is at least one receipt per year over more 
than one year. 1his includes income from wages and salaries, 
self-employment income, rents, interest, dividends, social welfare 
benefits including national superannuation and the family benefit, other 
pensions, annuities, maintenance and other regular income. Irregular 
income includes inheritances; lump sum payments from the Accident 
Compensation Corporation, social welfare, superannuation and insurance 
schemes; capital gains; and gambling winnings. 
Only regular income is analysed in this thesis. This is because 
other types of income tend to be too unpredictable to be properly 
assessed by the small Household Survey sample and secondly, irregular 
income does not influence current income trends an a regular basis6• 
The aggregate measure of regular income before the assessment of 
personal income tax is defined as "total income" in the Household 
Survey. As well as earned income, this measure includes government 
transfer payments such as national superannuation and the family benefit. 
A private household is determined, far Household Survey purposes, by 
whether living essentials are shared. A private household can contain a 
single individual living in a private dwelling with separate housekeeping 
arrangemeots. Or it can be a group of persons living in or sharing a 
private dwelling for most of the reference period who participate (in 
some measure at least) in consumption of food purchased for joint use by 
6. For example, winning the Golden Kiwi will be of obvious benefit to 
the household involved, but it is a random event and cannot be 
meaningfully generalised for income maintenance policy. 
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members, or who, if not dependent upon a household member, contribute 
some portion of income towards the provision of living essentials for the 
household as a whole. 
If at the interview stage, people occupying a permanent private 
dwelling could be separated into groups, each achieving independence with 
respect to the purchase of food and the sharing of meals, then each group 
is considered a separate private household. Relationships between 
household members are defined with reference to the head of 
household.7 The head is selected by the household from those members 
who are at least fifteen years old and who earn a substantial income. 
The total weekly income of each household is obtained by adding together 
the income attributed to each earner in the household. 
Institutions, which are publicly or co-operatively awned dwellings, 
are excluded from the Household Survey sample population. People living 
in institutions or grouP-living establishments such as boarding houses, 
hotels, motels and hostels are also excluded from the Household Survey. 
So are people who are long-stay hospital patients or prisoners. However, 
children at boarding school are taken into account by including 
expenditure on behalf of those children in the record-keeping of the 
parent or guardian. 
The 1981/82 Household Survey covered 3,487 households. In this 
thesis, the 1981 Population Census is used to derive the total private 
household population in 1981/82. The method used to gross up the 
Household Survey data is discussed in Appendix Three, Section Two. 
Analysis of Census data shows that most of the population lives in 
private households. Adjusting the data for the 1981/82 Household Survey 
results in about 95 percent of the population and 98 percent of income 
taxpayers, being resident in private households. The approximate 5 
percent of the population ~ho live in what are referred to in census 
terminology as "non-Private" households reside in institutions such as 
boarding houses or public institutions such as hospitals and prisons. 
7. A more explicit classification of family relationships is recorded 
by the 1982/83 and later surveys. 
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Grossing up the Household Survey data to the 1981 Census results in 
approximately 1,035,200 private households8 in New Zealand in 1981/82. 
It is estimated that about 3,098,650 people lived in the 1,035,200 
private households. 
A useful feature of the Household Survey data and the Census is that 
households· can be classified in different ways such as by type of 
household ownership or household composition, as well as by income 
group. Grouping households according to their composition, determined by 
the number of adults and children in the household and the receipt of 
national superannuation, makes it possible to compare income 
distributions within fairly homogeneous groups. 
The data are grouped by number of occupants in the household with 
eligibility for the family benefit determining whether occupants are 
adults or children. The groups are not entirely homogeneous. For 
example, young (non-national-superannuitant) two-adult households 
comprise those made up of one parent and one adult child, childless 
married couples (legal or de facto), two unrelated adults sharing 
accommodation, or two adults related other than by marriage. However, 
about 76 percent of young two-adult households comprise married couples. 
1he census data are used to adjust the Household Survey data 
slightly to more accurately represent the distribution of households by 
income and household type for the entire private household 
population.9 The next Section tabulates this information by income 
group and household type. 
E.2: Distribution of Households By Market Income Group and 
Household Type 
The measure used to tabulate households by income group is market 
income. Market income includes all the types of income which households 
earn through paid employment, or through investment or other market-place 
8. lhis figure includes about 30,000 private households derived when 
Census incomplete (non-specified) data are pieced together to 
make-up p~ivate household (dwelling) units. 
9. For an explanation of how the Household Survey data are scaled up to 
the census private household population see Appendix 3: WEIGHTS. 
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acti vities. Market income is composed of wages and salaries, 
self-employment income, investment income, and other regular income. It 
does not include income from social welfare benefits or other 
government-income-support policies. These latter activities are 
conducted by the government and are not the direct outcome of market 
forces. 
Table 3E.l shows the number of private households in New Zealand 
distributed into categories based on market income and household type. 
The largest household type is the two-adult (non-national-superannuitant) 
household which accounted for 155,360 households. The household type 
commonly treated as a representative household, is the two-adult, 
two-child household. Interestingly, this type is only the second largest 
of the ten household-type classifications and covers 130,820 households 
in total. 
Table 3E.1 
f'.l.M3ER OF PRIVATE 1-DJSEHl..DS: TABULATED BY 
I:ECILE OF H.JUSEH(lJ) ~ I~ ANJ t-O.JSEHOLD TYPE 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
H:Jusehold 
Market 
Income 
($ pa) 
Less Than $250 
$250-( $3,950) 
$3,950-( $9,750) 
$9,750-($13,450) 
$13,450-($16,900) 
$16,900-($20,250) 
$20,250-($24,200) 
$24,200-($29,200) 
$29,200-($36,650) 
$36,650 and over 
1 Adult 2 Adults 
Nat Oth Nat Oth 
Sup SL4J 
1-tlusehold Type 
2 Adults 
with 
Children 
3 or more 1 Adult All 
Adults with HDuse-
1 2 3+ No With 
Chil- Chil-
dren dren 
Chld 'n holds 
(Thousands of Households) 
41 8 23 4 3 2 2 17 103 
42 10 33 3 2 2 2 7 104 
17 16 23 9 8 9 8 4 3 5 103 
4 21 14 12 12 15 12 4 4 4 103 
13 10 14 12 21 16 4 7 104 
10 8 19 12 19 18 8 7 104 
5 5 23 11 23 16 7 12 103 
3 5 30 8 15 13 11 16 104 .. 
4 26 8 14 9 19 22 104 
3 14 5 10 11 27 32 103 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Total 111 90 128 155 81 131 108 86 107 38 1035 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Notes: Numbers may not add due to rounding to nearest thousand. Cells with 
insufficient observations designated (-). Sources: Estimated distribution 
based on data from the Department of Statistics Household Survey 1981/82, 
and weighted using data from the 1981 Census of Population and Dwellings to 
represent the total population of private households. 
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The third largest household type is the twa-adult, national 
superannuitant household (households with at least one national 
superannuitant). This group accounts far 128,170 households. Three 
other household types each account far at least 100,000 households. 
1hese are: 1) one-adult households receiving national superannuation; 2) 
twa-adult households with-three-children; and, 3) three-or-mare-adult 
households with-children. 
Another way of picturing the information in Table 3E.l is to shaw 
the proportion of households in each cell. Table 3E.2 shows the 
percentage distribution of private households by market income groups 
(decile) and household type. The largest cells (representing the mast 
households) are far one-adult national superannuitant households in the 
twa lowest income groups. 
Table 3E.2 
n£ DISTRIBUTI~ OF PRIVATE HlJSEI-0...05 
BY 1-Wsao..D MARKET If\COt.£ DECILES AN) HOUSEHOLD TYPE 
1-busehald Type 
-------------------------------------------------------------
Household 
Market 
Income 
($ p.a.) 
Less 1han $250 
$250-~ $3, 950~ $3,950- $9,750 
$9,750-($13,450) 
$13,450-($16,900) 
$16,900-($20,250) 
$20,250-($24,200) 
$24,200-($29,200) 
$29 ,200-( $36,650) 
$36,650 and aver 
1 Adult 
Nat Oth 
Sup 
2 Adults 
Nat Oth 
Sup 
2 Adults 
with 
01ildren 
1 2 
3 or mare 1 Adult All 
Adults with Hause-
3+ No With 
Chil- 01i1-
dren dren 
01ld'n holds 
As a Proportion of Total l-buseha1ds (%) 
4.0 0.8 2.2 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.2 1.6 10.0 
4.1 1.0 3.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 o. 7 10.0 
1.7 1.5 2.2 0.9 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.4 0.3 0.5 10.0 
0.4 2.0 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.4 1.1 0.4 0.4 0.4 10.0 
1.3 1.0 1.4 1.2 2.0 1.6 0.4 0.7 10.0 
1.0 0.8 1.8 1.1 1.9 1.7 o. 7 o. 7 10.0 
0.5 0.5 2.2 1.0 2.2 1.6 0.7 1.1 10.0 
0.3 0.5 2.9 0.8 1.5 1.2 1.1 1.6 10.0 
0.4 2.5 0.7 1.4 0.9 1.8 2.2 10.0 --
0.3 1.4 0.5 1.0 1.0 2.6 3.1 10.0 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Total 10.8 8.7 12.4 15.0 7.8 12.6 10.4 8.3 10.3 3.7 100.0 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Sources: Estimated distribution based an data from the Department of 
Statistics Household Survey 1981/82, and weighted using data from the 1981 
Census of Population and Dwellings to represent the total papulation of 
private households. See Table 3E.l for number of households. Cells with 
insufficient observations designated (-). 
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The bottom row of Table 3E.2 shows the percentage distribution of 
households by household type. 
As can be seen, 15.0 percent of households were two-adult, 
non-national-superannuitant households. Combining these with the 
two-adult, national-superannuitant households, results in 27.4 percent of 
private households comprising two adults (without children). In 
comparison, households with two adults and two children, comprised only 
12.6 percent of the total private household population. Thus, 
childless two adult households were far more "typical" than two-adult, 
two-children households. 
Less than half of the private households in New Zealand (only about 
44.8 percent) include children as members. Of those households with 
children in residence, 68.9 percent also contain two adults. The 
remaining 31.1 percent comprise either one-adult or three-or-more adults 
residing with the children. 
As can be seen from the final column of Table 3E.2 (which shows the 
percentage of households in each market-incom~ group), the results are 
tabulated so that approximately 10 percent of all households fall into 
each income group. The income ranges, which vary from market incomes of 
less than $250 per year to $36,650 or over, have been specified so that 
they each contain 10 percent of households by household-market income. 
In 1981/82, the average wage for a full-time wage and salary earner 
was around $13,350 per year. About 40 percent of all private households 
had market incomes below this amount. This is despite the fact that 
there was more than one earner in many of these households. 
A large proportion of households in the lower market-income groups 
are national-superannuitant households, especially one-adult, 
national-superannuitant households. Nearly 48 percent of the households 
in the four lowest income groups are one-adult or two-adult, 
national-superannuitant households. National-superannuitant households 
make up 58 percent of households in the three lowest income groups and 72 
percent of the households in the lowest two income groups. 
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Table 3E.3 compares the income distribution by the different 
household types. One-adult, national-superannuitant households and 
one-adult, households-with-children are most heavily concentrated in the 
lower-income ranges. Childless two-adult households and three-adult 
households, with-and without-children are most heavily concentrated in 
the upper income ranges. 
Table 3E.3 
THE DISTRIBUTICJ4 OF PRIVATE HOUSEtllLDS OF EAOi HOUSEHO..D TYPE 
BY HOUSEHOLD MARKET INCOME 
H:Jusehold Type 
1 Adult 2 Adults 2 Adults 
with 
O'lildren 
3 or more 1 Adult All 
Adults with House-
H:Jusehold 
Market 
Income 
($ p.a.) 
Chld'n holds 
Nat Oth Nat Oth 1 
Sup Sup 
2 3+ No With 
Chil- Chil-
dren dren 
----------------~--------------------------------------------------------------As a Proportion of the Total Households of Each Type (%) 
Less Than $250 37.3 9.1 
$250-( $3,950) 37.7 11.5 
$3,950-( $9,750) 
$9, 750-($13,450) 
$13,450-($16,900) 
$16,900-($20,250) 
$20,250-($24,200) 
$24, 200-( $29, 200) 
$29,200-( $36,650) 
$36,650 and over 
15.7 17.7 
3.8 23.1 
- 15.0 
- 11.7 
6.2 
3.0 
18.0 2.6 3.3 1.6 2.4 
26.1 2.2 3.1 1.7 1.6 
17.8 6.0 9.7 7.1 7.8 4.5 
10.7 8.115.4 11!4 11.0 4.9 
7.9 9.3 15.2 16.2 15.1 4.4 
6.4 12.3 14.6 14.8 16.8 8.9 
4.1 14.6 13.4 17.3 15.3 8.5 
3.7 19.1 9.6 11.5 11.9 13.1 
2.9 16.6 9.4 10.9 8.2 22.2 
2.4 9.3 6.3 7.5 9.9 31.8 
44.5 
18.0 
3.1 13.5 
4.3 10.4 
6.5 
7.0 
11.0 
15.4 
20.9 
29.9 
10.0 
10.0 
10.0 
10.0 
10.0 
10.0 
10.0 
10.0 
10.0 
10.0 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Sources: Estimated distribution based an data from the Department of 
Statistics Household Survey 1981/82, and weighted using data from the 1981 
Census of Population and Dwellings to represent the total population of 
private households. See Table 3E.l far number of households. Cells with 
insufficient observations designated (-). 
If different income measures are used to classify households into 
income ranges, the distribution of households will change. When market 
income is the measure used to distribute hquseholds, a surprisingly 
large percentage earn very low market incomes. A mo.re appropriate 
measure to assess a household's economic position might be total income. 
Total Lncome comprises market income as well as benefit income (social 
welfare benefits, including national superannuation). 
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Table 3E.4 compares the different distributions using two income 
definitions - market or market-place income and total income. When 
the income measure used to group households by income range is total 
household (regular) income, the distribution of households moves towards 
the higher income ranges. 
Table 3E.4 
C(MlAR!SON OF PERCENTAGE HClJSEHJLO DISTRIBUTI~ 
BASED ON TWO INCG£ DEFINITICJ6: MARKET INCOt€ AN) TOTAL INCOMEa) 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
1981/82 
Household Income Range 
CS p.a.) 
Less Than $250 
$250-( $3,950) 
$3 , 950-( $9,750) 
$9,750-($13,450) 
$13,450-($16,900) 
$16,900-($20,250) 
$2 0, 2 50-( $24, 2 00) 
$24,200-($29,200) 
$29,200-($36, 650). 
$36,650 and over 
Total 
Private Households Grouped By: 
Range of 
Market 
Income (%) 
10.0 
10.0 
10.0 
10.0 
10.0 
10.0 
10.0 
10.0 
10.0 
10.0 
100.0 
Range of 
Total 
Income (%) 
0.3 
1.8 
21.0 
11.3 
10.8 
11.0 
11.1 
10.4 
11 .. 1 
11.2 
100.0 
Note: a) Total Income is Market Income plus Social Welfare Benefits. 
Sources: Estimated based on the Department of Statistics Household 
Survey 1981/82, aggregated for the entire population of private 
households based on the 1981 Census of Population and Dwellings. 
Transfer payments (government-provided monetary benefits) resulted 
in total incomes of above $3,950 a year for most households10• 
Nevertheless, even when total income is the income measure which is 
applied, 34.4 percent of households are estimated to receive less than 
the average wage as measured by the Labour Department. 
In the end, the choice of market income as the initial income 
concept for Stages One and Two comes down to the question of the best 
means of illustrating the effects of the government budget. Transfer 
10. The lower income groups include self-employed earners who have made 
a loss in their business, normally a temporary condition. 
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payments, like taxes, are budget measures. Market income is defined to 
reflect money-income earned in the market place, excluding the budget. 
E.3.b: Distribution of Persons by Household Type 
Using households as the income unit gives one perspective on income 
distribution. Another perspective is gained when income distribution is 
analysed in terms of the total population of private household 
occupants. Table 3E.5 compares the percentage of people occupying 
private households of each type with the percentage of households of that type. 
Table 3E.5 
ClJoPARISON OF DISTRIBUTICJ-4 OF PERSONS AND PRIVATE 
I-IJUSEHOLOS BY HOUSEHOLD TYPE 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Household Type 
1 Adult - National Superannuitant 
1 Adult - Other 
Total Single Adult Households 
2 Adults - National Superannuitant 
2 Adults - Other 
Percentage of 
Total Persons (%) 
3.6 
2.9 
6.5 
8.3 
10.0 
Total 2-Adult Households Without Children 18.3 
2 Adults with 1 Child 7.9 
2 Adults with 2 Children 16.9 
2 Adults with 3 or more Children 19.0 
Total 2-Adult Households With Children 43.8 
Total 2-Adult Households 62.1 
3 or more Adults - No Children 9.4 
3 or more Adults - With Children 18.7 
Total 3-Adult Households 28.1 
1 Adult with Children 3.4 
Total Households with Children 65.9 
All Households 100.0 
Percentage of Total 
Households (%) 
10.8 
8.7 
19.5 
12.4 
15.0 
27.4 
7.8 
12.6 
10.4 
30.8 
58.2 
8.3 
10.3 
18.6 
3.7 
44.8 
100.0 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Total Number Persons: 3,098,650 Households: 1,035,200 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Sources: Estimated based on the Department of Statistics Household Survey 
1981/82, aggregated for the entire population of private households based on 
the 1981 census of Fbpulation and Dwellings. 
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For example, as can be seen from Table 3E.5, those people living in 
single-adult households made up 19.5 percent of private households but 
accounted for only 6.5 percent of the total number of occupants in 
private households. On the other hand, the 44.1 percent of households 
with children accounted for 65.9 percent of all occupants. If typical 
family households are defined as two adults with any number of children, 
then typical family households made up less than a third of the 
household population and accounted for under 44 percent of all people 
residing in private households. 
As Table 3E.6 shows, there is a fairly direct relationship between 
market income and household size (see COlumn E). The higher the income, 
the greater the number of occupants per household, on average. The 
average number of occupants per household in the two lowest income groups 
is only around half the average number in the two highest income groups. 
Table 3E.6 
AVERAGE t-U43ER OF OCCLPANTS PW OiiLDREN PER 1-DJSEHLO 
BY RAta OF HOUSEHCLD MARKET INCOM:: 
-----------------------------------------------------------~-------------------
rousehold 
Market Income 
($ p.a.) 
Less Than $25 0 
$250-( $3,950) 
$3,950-( $9,750) 
.. $9' 750-($13, 450) 
$13,450-($16,900) 
$16,900-($20,250) 
$20,250-($24,200) 
$24,200-($29,200) 
$29 ,200-( $36, 650) 
$36,650 and over 
Private 
f-b useholds 
Distri 
Number· bution 
(000) (%) 
A 8 
103 10.0 
104 10.0 
103 10.0 
103 10.0 
104 10.0 
104 10.0 
103 10.0 
104 10.0 
104 10.0 
103 10.0 
Occupants 
of Prvt H'holds Average Average 
---------------- Number Number Distri of of 
Number bution Occupants Childrena 
(000) (%) Per f-busehold Per 1-busehold 
C D E F 
193 6.2 1.9 0.5 
179 5.8 1.7 0.3 
252 8.1 2.4 0.9 
284 9.2 2.8 0.9 
334 10.8 3.2 1.3 
342 11.0 3.3 1.3 
366 11.8 3.6 1.4 
353 11.4 3.4 1.1 
362 11.7 3.5 1.0 
433 14.0 4.2 1.2 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------TOTAL 1,035 100.0 3,099 100.0 3.0 1.0 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Note: a) Defined as those eligible for the Family Benefit. Sources: Depart-
ment of Statistics Hbusehold Survey 1981/82, aggregated for the entire pop-
ulation of households based on the 1981 Census of Population and Dwellings. 
The average number of children per household, however, does not vary 
so directly with income (see Table 3E.6, COlumn F). "Middle-income" 
households (households with incomes between $13,450 and $24,200), have 
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the most children, on average. The ratio of children per household is 
below average for the four lowest household income groups and is 
especially so for the two lowest groups. 
As can be seen from Table 3E.7, the average number of earners per 
household, on average, increases directly with the size of an average 
household's market income. 
Table 3E. 7 
f-busehold 
Market 
Income 
($ p.a.) 
AVERAGE NlM3ER OF EARNERS PER t-OJSEHOLO 
BY FWa: OF HOUSEHOLD MARKET INCOME 
Salary and 
Wage Earners 
Average Number of: 
Those w/Wkly Earnings 
of over $20a 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Less lhan $250 0.07 0.08 
$250-( $3,950) 0.45 0.63 
$3,950-( $9,750) 0.90 1.26 
$9,750-($13,450) 1.23 . 1.29 
$13,450-($16,900) 1.89 1.46 
$16,900-($20,250) 1.63 1.65 
$20,250-($24,200) 1.85 1.85 
$24, 200-( $29, 200) 1.97 2.04 
$29,200-($36,650) 2.30 2.32 
$36,650 and over 2.71 2.84 
TOTAL 1.44 1.53 
Total Number of Earners (000) 1,502 1,591 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Note: a) Definition adopted to exclude those working on a more occasional 
basis. Sources: Department of Statistics Household Survey 1981/82 
aggregated up to the entire private household population based on the 1981 
Census of Population and Dwellings. 
The trend shown by Table 3E.7 is the result of a variety of factors 
related to how the data are tabulated and this table must be seen as 
illus~rative only. As with the earlier tables, it is not meant to imply 
knowledge about cause and effect. 
Nevertheless, a comparison of Tables 3E.6 and 3E.7 shows that it was 
more typical for a private household to include two salary and wage 
earners in 1981/82 than to include two children of an age to receive the 
family benefit. In addition, the data illustrated by the tables show 
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that, on average, high-income households are in that position not only 
due to high individual incomes11, but also due to having more than one 
income earner. 
E.4: Comparisons of Relative Equality Based on Different 
Income Definitions 
The income distribution will vary depending on whether the income 
measure is narrowly confined to wage and salary income, is broadened to 
become assessable income or to include social welfare benefits and so 
on. This section briefly explores differences in income distributions 
when income is defined in various ways. 
Table 3E.8 shows the shares of different types of income by range of 
household market income. 
Table 3E.8 
1981/82 t-O.JSEI-O..D It<CDE SHARES COK'ARED USING DIFFERENT INCG£ DEFINITIONS 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Percentage Shares of Income Defined As: 
f-busehold Percent -~-----------------------------------------------Market of Total Divid- Self- Wage & 
Income Private Market end employment Salary Total 
($ p.a.) Hseholds Income Income Income Income Income 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Less Than $250 10.0 -0.1 0.2 -1.4 0.1 2.7 
$250-( $3,950) 10.0 0.9 2.3 o.o 0.4 3.5 
$3,950-( $9, 750) 10.0 3.8 6.1 4.0 2.6 5.0 
$9, 750-($13,450) 10.0 6.3 5.1 3.9 6.5 6.4 $13,450-($16,900) 10.0 8.2 7.7 7.1 8.3 8.0 
$16,900-($20,250) 10.0 10.0 4.3 7.2 10.8 9.5 
$20, 250-( $24, 200) 10.0 11.9 5.4 6.4 13.3 11.0 
$24,200-( $29 ,200) 10.0 14.4 2.2 11.6 15.3 13.3 
$29,200-($36,650) 10.0 17.7 8.0 15.0 18.6 16.1 
$36,350 and over 10.0 27.1 58.7 46.3 23.8 24.6 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Million of H'holds 1.035 
Amnt Income 
Distributed ($M) 19,242 327 2,441 15,268 21,694 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Sources: Income distributions estimated using the Department of Statistics 
Household Survey 1981/82, aggregated for the entire population of private 
households based on the 1981 Census of Population and Dwellings. 
11. The data also show that average salary and wage earnings per 
household occupant rise as household income increases. 
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There are various summary measures which could be applied to assess 
inequality. One way of illustrating the distribution of income shares is 
to chart Lorenz diagrams. Lorenz diagrams relate the cumulative share of 
income to the cumulative proportion of household income groups. These 
charts do not claim to be more than simple illustrations of some of the 
material of interest to the reader. Another common measures is the Gini 
coefficient. Another measure, the coefficient of variation tends to give 
greater importance to the upper tail of any distribution. In contrast, 
the Atkinson measure of equality becomes more sensitive towards the 
bottom end of a distribution. Sawyer (1976) discusses these summary 
measures and their limitations. 
The diagram below uses a Lorenz curve to illustrate the relative 
equality of three of the income measures shown in Table 3E.8. Total 
income is closest to the line of equality because it is more equally 
distributed than market income and dividend income. 
CHART 3.1 
CGFARISON OF Tl-£ RELATIVE EQUALITY CF ~RKET INa::M:, 
DIVIDEND INCOME AND TOTAL INCOME FOR 1981/82 
(L()ea DIA~M OF RELATIVE EQUALITY) 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Percent of 100 
Income 
(C:.nnulati ve) 
90 
80 
70 
60 
so 
40 
30 
20 
10 
0 
Source: Table 3E.8 
I 
I 
10 20 30 40 so 60 70 80 90 100 
Percent of Households by ~~rket Inco~e (C~~ative) 
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Table 3E.9 represents another simple summary of the variation in 
inequality for different income measures. The percentage of income 
(measured in different ways) going to those households earning market 
income below the average wage of $13,450 is compared with the percentage 
going to those earning above the average wage. The higher the share of 
income going to households earning less than $13,450, the more equal the 
distribution. As pointed out in an earlier section of the paper, about 
40 percent of households receive market income of below the average wage. 
Table 3E.9 
HOOSEHlJ) IND£ SHARES TO THOSE EARNING BELOW ANJ ABOVE $13, 350 
~ARED USIN; DIFFERENT Il\Olo£ lEFINITIONS F~ 1981/82 
Percentage Shares of Income for All Private Households 
Household 
Market 
Income Range 
($ p.a.) 
Percent 
of Total 
Private 
Hseholds 
Market 
Income 
Divid-
end 
Income 
Self-
employment 
Income 
Wage & 
Salary 
Income 
Total 
Income 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Less Than $13,450 40 
Over $13,450 60 
100 
Source: Table 3E8. 
11 
89 
100 
14 
86 
100 
7 
93 
100 
10 
90 
100 
As Table 3E.9 shows for 1981/82, none of the income sources 
distribute anything like a 40 percent share of income to households with 
market income of less than $13,450. A very small proportion of 
self-employment income, only 7 percent, is earned by households in income 
groups below $13,450. About 10 percent of wage and salary income and 11 
percent of market income is earned by households on less than $13,450 a 
year. Even when social welfare benefit income is added to market income 
to derive total income, the share of total income going to the lowest 40 
percent of households is only 18 percent. 
The pattern of income distribution takes on different contours when 
analysed in terms of the number of the occupants of private households. 
in 1981/82. For example, only 29.3 percent of the 3,098,650 people 
residing in private households lived in the 40 percent of households 
which earned market incomes below the average wage. 
18 
82 
-100 
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The proportion of disposable income (that is income adjusted for 
personal income tax payments) distributed to households earning below 
$13,340 is over 20 percent. This is greater than the share of any of the 
other income definitions illustrated by Table 3E.9. This gives an 
indication of the redistributive impact of the tax system. 
Table 3E.l0 illustrates shares of national superannuation and social 
welfare benefit income to households earning above and below the average 
wage. While 77 percent of national superannuation income accrues to 
lower income households, only 56 percent of total social welfare payments 
are distributed to those households with incomes below $13,450. A large 
part of the remaining 44 percent is distributed as family benefit to 
higher income households. National superannuation is one form of benefit 
which is distributed in favour of low-income households with only 23 
percent of income from this source going to those households with market 
incomes above $13,450. 
Table 3E.l0 
HCl.JSEJ-O..D INDo£ SHARES TO TiiOSE EARNING BELOW ANJ ABOVE $13,350 
COM=»ARED Fffi DIFFERENT SOCIAL WB.FARE DEFINITIONS 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------HJusehold 
Market 
Income Range 
($ p.a.) 
Percent of 
Total Private 
Households 
Percentage Share of Income Defined ~: 
--------------------------------------National 
Superannuation 
Social Welfare 
Benefit Income 
------------~------------------------------- ------------------------Less than $13,450 
Over $13,450 
40 
_§Q 
100 
77 
23 
-100 
56 
44 
-100 
----------- ----~------------------------------------------------------------Sources: Estimated from the Department of Statistics 1981/82 Household Survey, 
aggregated to the total private household population using the 1981 Census of 
Pbpulation and Dwellings. 
The above discussion highlights the significance of taxation and 
social welfare benefits. Since these budget measures are aimed at 
bringing about a more equitable distribution of income, their inclusion 
in the initial income measure makes a considerable difference. 1he 
market income concept includes personal income taxes but excludes income 
from social welfare benefits. 
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One measure of income not included in our comparisons is income from 
capital. Unfortunately, the 1981/82 Household Survey did not collect 
information about capital income. One measure of income collected by the 
Survey that could be a proxy for capital income is investment income. 
About 27 percent of investment income is earned by households with 
incomes below $13,450. 
E .4.a: Market Income Distribution 
The tables on the following pages illustrate the distribution of 
market income by income range (decile) and household type. 1his is the 
base for the assessment of a final income measure which encompasses the 
government budget in Stages One and Two. Table 3E.ll shows the total 
amount of market income accruing to each income range in 1981/82. 
Table 3E.ll 
ESTIMATED AMlJNT OF MARKET IND£ IN 1981/82 
BY RAtG:: «F PRIVATE I-O.JSEHClD tJMKET It-COtE ANJ HOUSEHOlD TYPE 
------------------------------------------------------------------1-busehold Type 
------------------------------------------------------------1 Adult 2 Adults 2 Adults 3 or more 1 Adult All 
with Adults with 1-buse-
H:lusehold O'lildren 01ld'n holds 
Market 
-------------------------------------------------------------Income Nat Oth Nat Oth 1 2 3+ No With ($ pa) Sup SL.P Chil- O'lil-
dren dren 
----------------- . ------------------------------------------------$ Million 
Less 1han S250 202 30 188 23 -1 13 
-
109 585 
$250-( $3,950) 265 47 323 20 12 8 10 47 749 
$3,950-( $9,750) 198 123 325 74 69 83 75 52 35 51 1087 
$9,750-($13,450) 70 246 255 146 158 186 153 63 69 51 1395 
$13,450-($16,900) 
-
203 210 223 196 340 265 77 122 1728 
$16,900-($20,250) 
-
195 200 358 228 369 352 165 167 2060 $20,250-($24,200) 
-
126 143 504 244 " 516 381 172 280 2386 
$24,200-($29,200) 75 153 789 214 410 355 308 475 2881 
$29,200-($36,650) 152 844 258 469 297 646 764 3494 .. 
$36,650 and over 186 666 344 540 534 1399 1627 5330 
---------------------------------------------------------------------Total 893 1126 2135 3648 1721 2935 2422 2898 . 3559 357 21694 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Note: Empty cells, designated (-) have insufficient observations. 
Sources: Estimated distribution based on data from the Department 
of Statistics Household Survey 1981/82, and weighted using data 
from the 1981 census of Population and Dwellings to represent the 
total population of private households. 
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Table 3E.l2 illustrates the varying patterns of income distribution 
for each household type. The market income of one adult, national 
superannuitant households is concentrated in the three lowest income 
groups. This is in contrast to the three-adult households (with and 
without children) whose incomes are concentrated in the two highest 
income brackets. 
Table 3E.12 
DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHCLD MARKET INCOtE FOR 1981/82 
BY PRIVATE HOUSEHOLD TYPE 
----------------------------------------------------------1-husehold Type 
-------------------------------------------1 Adult 2 Adults 2 Adults 
with 
O'lildren 
3 or more 1 Adult All 
Adults with Hause-
Household 
Market 
01ld'n holds 
Income 
($ p.a.) 
Nat Oth 
Sup 
Nat Oth 
Sup 
1 2 3+ No With 
Chil- 01il-
dren · dren 
--------------------------------------------------------Proportion of the Total for Each Household Type (%) 
Less Than $250 22.6 2.6 8.8 0.6 -1.0 0.4 o.o 30.6 2.7 
$250-( $3,950) 29.7 4.2 15.1 0.6 0.7 0.3 0.4 13.2 3.5 
$3,950~( $9,750) 22.2 11.0 15.2 2.0 4.0 2.8 3.1 1.8 1.0 14.2 5.0 
$9,750-($13,450) 7.8 21.8 11.9 4.0 9.2 6.3 6.3 2.2 1.9 14.2 6.4 
$13,450-($16,900) 
-
18.1 9.8 6.1 11.4 11.6 11.0 2.6 3.4 8.0 
$16,900-($20,250) 
-
17.3 9.3 9.8 13.2 12.6 14.6 5.7 4.7 9.5 
$20,250-($24,200) 
-
11.2 6.7 13.8 14.2 17.6 15.7 5.9 7.9 11.0 
$24,200-($29,200) 6.7 7.2 21.6 12.4 14.0 14.7 10.6 13.3 13.3 $29,200-($36,650) 7.1 23.2 15.0 16.0 12.3 22.3 21.5 16.1 
$36,650 and aver 8. 7 18.2 20.0 18.4 22.0 48.3 45.7 24.6 
-----------------------~----------------------------------------------------Total (%) 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
---------- --------------------------------------------------------------------Notes: Numbers may nat add due to rounding to nearest thousand. Empty cells, 
designated (-) have insufficient observations. Sources: Estimated 
distribution based an data from the Department of Statistics Household 
Survey 1981/82, and weighted using data from the 1981 census of Population 
and Dwellings to represent the total papulation of private households. 
There is same validity in using an income measure which includes 
social welfare benefits as the base income measure when assessing the 
effective rate of taxes an households. The effective rate measures taxes 
as a proportion an household income. Bath taxes and social welfare 
income are included in total income. 
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Table 3E.l3 is arranged so that the differences between average 
income by income group and household type can be compared for market and 
total income. 
Table 3E.D 
AVERAGE HOUSEHOLD MARKET INCOME PER YEAR 
BY RANGE OF HOUSEHOLD ~ INCOtw£ AND HOUSEHOLD TYPE 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Household 
Market 
Income 
($ pa) 
Household Type 
-------------------------------------------------------------1 Adult 2 Adults 2 Adults 
with 
Children 
3 or more 1 Adult All 
Adults with House-
Chld'n holds 
Nat Oth Nat Oth l 2 3+ No With 
Chil- Chil-
dren dren 
Sup Sup 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Market Income: Thousands of Dollars Per Year 
Less Than $250 
-1 -5 --1 -4 -. 
$250-( $3,950) 2 l 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 
$3,950-( $9, 750) 6 7 7 7 7 8 8 7 7 7 7 
$9,750-($13,450) 12 12 12 11 12 12 12 12 11 12 12 
$13,450-($16,900) 
-
15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 
$16,900-($20,250) 
-
18 1a 19 19 18 18 19 18 19 
$20,250-( $24,200) 
-
23 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 
$24,200-($29,200) 
-
27 26 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 
$29,200-($36,650) 
-
33 33 33 32 32 33 33 33 
$36,650 and over 54 46 67 54 49 so 49 so 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------Total 3 12 9 23 20 22 21 32 31 5 19 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------Total Income: Thousands of Dollars Per Year 
Less Than $250 5 4 8 6 -5 6 2 7 6 
$250-( $3,950) 6 5 10 6 5 4 6 7 7 
$3,950-( $9,750) 11 8 14 8 9 9 9 13 ll 10 11 
$9,750-($13,450) 16 12 19 12 13 13 13 15 15 13 14 
$13,450-($16,900) 
-
15 21 16 16 16 16 20 18 17 
$16,900-($20,250) 
-
18 24 19 19 19 19 21 22 20 
$20,250-(S24,200) 
-
23 27 22 22 23 23 ! 24 24 23 
$24,200-($29,200) 
-
27 33 27 27 27 28 ' 27 29 28 
$29,200-($36,650) 
-
41 33 34 33 33 34 34 34 
$36,650 and over 61 46 67 55 so 51 51 52 
~-----------------------------------------------------------------------------Total 8 13 17 23 21 22 22 34 33 94 21 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Note: Empty cells, designated (-), either earned income below $500 per year or 
had too few observations. Sources: Estimated distribution based on data 
from the Department of Statistics Household Survey 1981/82, and weighted 
using data from the 1981 Census of Pbpulation and Dwellings to represent the 
total population of private households. Sources: Estimated distribution 
based on data from the Department of Statistics Household Survey 1981/82, 
and weighted using data from the 1981 Census of Population and Dwellings to 
represent the total population of private households. 
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E.S: Limitations of Market Jncome as lnitial lncome 
Market income fits nicely with the income concept and the conceptual 
basis for measuring budget incidence that underlies Stage One. Stage One 
intends to be no more than a simple statistical-accounting exercise and 
for this, market income is an excellent base. Market income is 
consistent with the NZSNA concept of household earnings from market 
production. It also represents income before payments to the government 
are substracted and benefits from government are added. 
As the Stage One analysis unfolds, it is possible to see the 
difference between the distribution of market income and other income 
defined to include a money-income value for government activity. For 
example, total income is defined to include the money-income value of 
government transfer payments. As a comparison of market income and total 
income in Table 3E.l3 shows, total income is greater for the lower income 
groups than is market income. 
Market income is also the initial income base for Stage Two. Stage 
Two is designed to analyse the distribution of income when income is 
defined to take account of all government current non-market activity. 
Again, within the context of what Stage Two sets out to achieve, market 
income is an acceptable initial income base. Stage Two is not designed 
to measure behavioral relationships as such. It is simply an accounting 
exercise where household earnings from market production (market income) 
are compared with an income measure defined to take account of all 
government budget activity for the same fiscal year. 
But does market income represent the distribution of income when 
government activities are excluded? Clearly, it does not. For example, 
included in market income are the salaries of government employees. For 
these to be considered normal market incomes, it is necessary to assume 
that the government simply mirrors private sector activity and that the 
same jobs would have existed in its absence. 
Putting aside the specific example of public sector salaries, 
economic theory suggests that government budget policies have an ongoing 
influence in the market place. The issue becomes how to isolate the 
important redistributive effects of a particular budget policy from 
effects of other ongoing activities. Here, a ~eneral equilibrium 
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approach appears to offer the best potential of analysing the important 
effects (see Section 8). 
In the SWF general equilibrium models, "initial" household income is 
specified as the budget constraint. 1he emphasis of the SWF models is on 
the households as consumers. Consumers have an initial endowment of 
factors, but these do not translate directly into income flows. Instead, 
these are the basis for specifying the economic effects of taxes. __ 
The models are usually expressed mainly in terms of the factors 
labour and capital. How values for these expressions are derived varies, 
but Shaven and Whalley (1984) consider that a ''rich" consumer group owns 
all the capital while a "poor" consumer owns all the labour. 
Each of the consumers in the general equilibrium model has an 
initi~l endowment of N commodities and a set of preferences resulting in 
demand functions for each commodity. Market demands are the sum of each 
consumer's demands. Commodity-market demands depend on all prices, they 
are non~egative, homogeneous to degree zero (there is no money illusion) 
and they satisfy Walras Law that at any set of prices, the total value of 
consumer expenditures (plus savings) equals consumer incomes (less taxes). 
The difference between the SWF approach and this'study is that the 
SWF approach is attempting to discover how a particular policy change 
effects the distribution of income. The initial income distribution 
itself is not material to the results, only the change in the 
distribution. 
In contrast, this study is first of all concerned to discover what 
the household income distribution is, and then to analyse which 
particular government policies caused it to be that way. The question 
becomes one of whether a study of the distribution of income generated by 
factor endowments would provide a better insight into the distribution of 
income. It seems likely that it would be a more comprehensive treatment 
of households economic positions than provided by the measure of 
market-income alone. Given the absence of statistical information, the 
next Section approximates two household income distributions, using 
information in the Household Survey to get a perspective on household 
endowments. 
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F. BROAO MEASURES OF' INCOME: STAGES THREE AND FOUR 
Governments exist to promote the aims and asoirations of their 
citizens. Thus, while some budget transactions may impact on corporate 
entities or land holdings, they will ultimately affect the money incomes 
of people, through their corporate shareholdings, salaries and 
consumption or as renters and land owners. According to this view, all 
of the income costs and benefits of budget transactions ultimately accrue 
to households. The Stage Three and Stage F'our income definitions are 
premised on this view. This section discusses the derivation of a 
statistical measure of income consistent with these two definitions. 
F' .1 : Stage Three Ini tiel Income 
To assess the economic effects of the entire budget, as depicted in 
Stage Three, an income measure is required which takes into account all 
those sources of income at the base of government levies and the value of 
government expenditure transactions. One current income measure which 
broadly encompasses the above considerations is gross dome~tic product. 
This measure has the added feature of consistency with the national 
income definitions adopted to analyse budget transactions. The following 
section uses Household Survey data anq SAS (the matrix al~ocation 
procedures provided by the Statistical Analysis System), to impute the 
components of gross domestic product to households. 
Gross domestic product (GOP) is the total market value of goods 
and services produced in New Zealand12 within a given (year) period. 
It is an added-value concept and the costs of goods and services utilised 
in the process of production are deducted. GOP includes consumption of 
fixed capital, which is the amount required during the period to 
maintain the fixed capital assets intact. In a sense, consumption of 
fixed capital represents the annualised income stream from ownership of 
capital, excluding the capital gain. Also included in gross domestic 
product are indirect taxes which are treated by producers as a cost of 
12. Households owning the product need not be located in New Zealand. 
Therefore, taxes and expenditures on these products could have a 
measureable impact on overseas households. 
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production (and thus deducted from operating surplus). However, since 
indirect taxes add to the market price of output, they are added to gross 
domestic product. 
Subsidies are current grants (expenditures) made by central and 
local government (to private and public enterprises and producer boards) 
which are intended to ensure a guaranteed price or to enable market 
prices of goods and services to be held below the costs of production. 
They are the opposite of indirect taxes and as such are deducted from the 
measure of GOP. Note that under the NZSNA definitions, only industries 
may receive subsidies. CUrrent grants made by the government to 
households or private non-profit services are defined as transfer 
payments. 
Figure 3.2 illustrates the version of the GOP account used to 
calculate Stage 1hree initial income. Some of the figures have since 
been revised by the Department of Statistics. 
·FIGtRE 3.2 
~ OGESTIC PR(D.CT ANl EXPeDinft: 
~------------------------------------------------------------------------------1981 Change 1982 Change 1983 
Year Ended 31 MaiCh ($M) (%) ($M) (%) ($M) 
~--------------------------------------------------------------------------~--Compensation of Employees 13,100 20.4 15,778 9.5 17,276 
Operating Surplus 7,704 21.1 9,332 8.7 10,146 
Consumption of Fixed Capital 1,670 12.1 1,872 18.0 2,152 
Indirect Taxes 2,343 24.4 2,914 17.9 3,435 
Less Subsidies -355 69.0 -600 28.2 -769 
- - -Gross Domestic Product 24,461 19.8 29,2J6 10.0 32,240 
Final Consumption Expenditure 
(A) General Government 4,152 21.0 5,022 12.1 5,632 
(8) Private 14,564 16.8 17,011 12.0 19,058 
Increase in Stocks 1,404 11.2 1,561 -34.8 1,018 
Gross Fixed Qapital Formation 4,448 39.7 6,216 19.4 7,425 
Statistical Discrepancy 158 145.6 388 -36.9 245 
24,726 22.1 30,198 10.5 33,378 
Gross National Expenditure 
Exports of Goods and Services 7,024 18.1 8,292 9.9 9,116 
Less Imports of G:lods &: Services 7,289 26.1 9,194 11.5 10,254 
Expenditure on Gross Domestic 
Product 24z 461 19.8 29z296 10.0 32z240 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Source: Department of Statistics, October 1984. 
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Because the information from the Household Survey which is used to 
impute gross domestic product to households relates to private households 
only (which account for about 95 percent of the total population), the 
figures on the consolidated account illustrated by Figure 3.2 need to be 
adjusted. Roughly, 95 percent of each item will be imputed to private 
households. However, since residents of private households are more 
likely to be earning an income than are residents of nan-private 
households, mare than 95 percent of several of the macroeconomic 
aggregates are imputed to private households. For example, mare than 95 
percent of salary and wages and consumption of fixed capital is allocated 
to private households. 
The Stage Three income measure is derived from the production side 
of the gross domestic product account. 
Figure 3.3 illustrates the values of the components b f gross 
domestic product which are imputed to private households. 1hey are 
adjusted to reflect the characteristics of the private household 
papulation. 
FI~ 3.3 
ESTIMAlED GROSS COESTIC PRIDJ:T A~UING TO PRIVATE HlJSEKLDS: 
t4\RC-I YEAR 1982 
Macroeconomic Aggregate 
Compensation of Employees 
Operating Surplus 
Consumption of Fixed capital 
Indirect Taxesa 
Less Subsidiesb 
Total GOP to Private Households 
NZSNA 
($M) 
15,778 
9,332 
1,872 
2,914 
-600 
$29,296 
Adjustment Thesis 
($M) 
9~ 15,500 
96% 8,960 
95% 1,850 
9;a; 2,770 
9~ -575 
$28,505 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Notes: a) Includes indirect taxes received by Local Government, the largest 
source which is property rates. b) Source: This table derived from Figure 
3.2 to account for income accruing to private householas only. 
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Compensation of employees, the largest item, is defined by NZSNA 
to include: 
1) All cash wages and salaries paid to employees (before the 
deduction of income tax); 
2) Contributions made by employers to social security and 
superannuation schemes ir. respect of their employees; and, 
3) Wages and salaries in kind. It excludes wage and salary 
payments to working proprietors, regarding them as returns to 
capital or in other words, as a distribution of surplus rather 
than payment for labour. Also excluded are tool, clothing and 
car allowances and meal and entertainment expenses. These are 
regarded as intermediate consumption since they are 
reimbursements of expenses incurred by employers for business 
purposes and not for the enhancement of the income of the 
employees. 
Compensation of employees can be derived from Household Survey 
information. When the Household Survey salary and wage data are scaled 
up for the Census private household population, a figure of $15,268 
million is derived. Adding $100 million other regular income 
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(allowances) and the genuine wage and salary component of self-employment 
income (estimated as $133 million), brings the total to $15,500 million. 
This total is just over 98 percent of the published national income 
figure for compensation to employees. 1his is consistent with the fact 
that there is a higher proportion of salary and wage earners in the 
private household population than in the non-private household population. 
Since there are no data about households' involvement in business, 
the remaining elements of GOP must be imputed to households. 
Operating surplus is defined by NZSNA as the gross output of 
resident industries at producers' values less the sum of their 
intermediate consumption. Basically, it is the pre-tax profit of market 
producers. Gross output is calculated by adjusting total sales for 
changes in the stocks of finished goods and work-in-progress to derive a 
value for goods produced. When calculating intermediate consumption, 
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purchases by market producers are adjusted for changes in the stock of 
raw materials in order to derive a value for goods used. In practice, 
there is a limitation to the Department of Statistics calculations 
because the stock change valuations used are based on business accounting 
practices and reflect changes in unit prices of goods held in stock, as 
well as changes in their quantities. The effect of this is that 
. 
operating surplus includes an element of capital gains or losses arising 
from fluctuation in prices which do not relate to the production vintage 
of the goods. 
CoflSt.Jqltion of fixed capital is the NZSNA figure for the amount 
required during the period of account to maintain fixed capital assets 
intact. While in principle consumption of fixed capital should be 
charged for durable assets owned by central and local government, no such 
estimates are presently calculated for non-market government producers. 
Based on the presumption that both consumers and shareholders share 
equally in the benefits of the existence of profit-making establishments 
(consumers benefit because access to goods adds to their "consumption 
potential" and shareholders gain because ownership of capital ·enhances 
their inGome-earning potential), half of operating surplus is imputed to 
households on the basis of Household Survey expenditure patterns (using 
Household Survey data on dividend income) and the other half on the basis 
of shareholdings. Consumption of fixed capital is imputed based on those 
who can be identified as owners of capital because of dividend income and 
those identified by virtue of being self-employed. 
Lndirect-tax income is imputed to households in relation to their 
payment of sales taxes, local government property rates and specific 
taxes (such as alcohol duties) based on the assumption that all the tax 
is shifted to the consumers of the goods concerned. The remaining 
indirect taxes are grouped together and imputed to household income 
groups on the basis of household consumption by household type and 
income. Subsidy income is imputed (subtracted) from household income 
on the same basis. These procedures are the mirror image of the 
procedures carried out to impute indirect taxes (and subsidies) to 
household income groups. (See Chapters Five and Six). 
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Table 3F.l shows the money-income values of the different components 
of gross domestic product by household market income range based on the 
above discussion about the basis for imputation of these values. The 
distributions vary a great deal from one another, but in common with the 
other measures of income discussed in Section E.3, a much larger share of 
income accrues to those in the higher income groups than to those in the 
lower income groups. 
Table 3F .l 
STAGE~ : INITIAL INC!).£ 
1981/82 GROSS OO~IC PRODUCT BY RANGE OF 
et:J.FENSATICN TO J-OJSEKLDS 
---------~---------------------------------------------------------------------Household Compensation Total 
Market of Consumption Gross 
Income Employees Operating of Fixed Indirect Less Domestic 
($p.a.) ($M) Surplus Capital Taxes Subsidies Product 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------$ Million 
Less Than $250 7 82 -16 83 16 140 
$250-( $3,950) 71 369 40 125 18 587 
$3,950-( $9,750) 430 776 129 185 72 1448 
$9,750-($13,540) 1018 553 89 205 49 1816 
$13,450-($16,900) 1292 697 131 242 60 2302 
$16,900-($20,250) 1670 681 129 286 54 2712 
$20,250-($24,200) 2047 704 123 291 64 3101 
$24,200-($29,200) 2366 950 202 "344 80 3782 
$29,200-($36,650) 2878 1181 251 414 68 4656 
$36,650 and Over 3721 2967 772 595 94 7961 
-------------------------------------------------------------TOTAL 15500 8960 1850 2770 575 28505 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Proportion of Total (%) 
Less Than $250 0.9 -0.9 3.0 2.8 0.5 
$250-( $3,950) 0.5 4.1 2.2 4.5 3.1 2.1 
$3, 950-( $9, 750) 2.8 8.7 7.0 6.7 12.5 5.1 
$9,750-($13,540) 6.5 6.2 4.8 7.4 8.5 6.4 
$13,450-($16,900) 8.3 7.8 7.1 8.7 10.5 8.1 
$16,900-($20,250) 10.8 7.6 7.0 10.3 9.4 9.5 
$20,250-($24,200) 13.2 7.8 6.6 10.5 11.1 10.9 
$24,200-($29,200) 15.3 10.6 10.9 12.4 13.9 13.3 
$29,200-($36,650) 18.6 13.2 13.6 15.0 11.8 16.3 .. 
$36,650 and Over 24.0 33.1 41.7 21.5 16.4 27.9 
------------------------------------------------------------TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Notes: a) Includes Local Authority property rates. b) Subsidies include 
Local Authority Subsidies. Source: This is a very rough approximation of a 
broader measure of income as explained in the text. 
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Table 3F.2 
STAGE ~ : INITIAL INCOME 
1981/82 GROSS DO~TIC PRODUCT (GDP) BY PRIVATE HOUSEHOLD TYPE 
Household Type 
---------------------------------------------------------~---1 Adult 2 Adults 2 Adults 
with 
Children 
3 or more l Adult All 
Adults · with House-
Chld'n holds 
-------------------------------------------------------------Nat Oth Nat Oth l 2 3+ No With 
Sup Sup Chil- Chil-
dren dren 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------~--$ Million 
Compensation of 
Employees 117 886 647 3104 1339 2243 1773 2322 2899 170 15500 
Operating 
Surplus 722 387 1507 1158 792 1156 950 1182 1009 97 8960 
Consumption of 
Fixed Capital . 109 84 234 239 163 309 277 207 . 220 8 1850 
Indirect Taxes 106 143 271 441 218 379 310 405 449 48 2770 
--------------------------------------------------------------
Sub Total 1054 1500 2659 4942 2512 4087 3310 4116 4577 323 29080 
Less Subsidies 12 19 29 82 41 74 96 85 129 8 575 
Total Stage Three 
Initial Income 1042 1481 2630 4860 2471 4013 3214 4031 4448 315 28505 
Compensation of 
Employees 
Operating 
Surplus 
Consumption of 
Fixed Capital 
Indirect Taxes 
Sub Total 
Less Subsidies 
% of Total 
--------------------------------------------------------------Proportion of Total (%) 
0.8 5.7 4.2 20.0 8.6 14.5 11.4 15.0 18.7 l.l 100.0 
8.1 4.3 16.8 12.9 8.8 12.9 10.6 13.2 11.3 l.l 100.0 
5.9 4.6 12.6 12.9 8.8 16.7 15.0 11.2 11.9 0.4 100.0 
3.8 5.2 9.8 15.9 7.9 13.7 11.2 14.6 16.2 1.7 100.0 
-------------------------------------------------------------~-
3.6 5.2 9.1 17.0 8.6 14.1 11.4 14.2 15.7 1.1 100.0 
2.1 3.3 5.0 14.3 7.1 12.9 16.7 14.8 22.4 1.4 100.0 
--------------------------------------------------------------3.7 5.2 9.2 17.0 8.7 14.1 11.3 14.1 15.6 1.1 100.0 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Sources: This is a very rough approximation as explained in the text. 
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F .2: Staae Four Definition of Income 
There are two main reasons for distinguishing a Stage Three and the 
Stage Four initial income concept. The significance of the Stage Three 
concept is that it attempts to define an income base consistent with the 
base of government activity. Stage Four is designed to measure a 
comprehensive income concept which is theoretically consistent with the 
concepts underlying the concept of budget incidence. Here the pre-budget 
household budget constraint would be effected both on the sources of 
income side and on the uses of income side. 
The two main differences between Stage Three and Stage Four initial 
income are: 
l) the inclusion of capital gains to make Stage Four a 
comprehensive income concept; and, 
2) the treatment of the counterfactual so that a comparison of 
Stage Four final income with initial income isolates the effects 
government from other market effects on both the sources and 
uses side of the economy. 
Data limitations preclude the actual measurement of capital gains. 
More importantly, the Stage Four concept of income cannot to be measured 
without the use of general-equilibrium techniques. Meantime, an adjusted 
broad measure of income is derived below for comparison with the other 
income concepts discussed in this Chapter. 
Turning first to the treatment of the counterfactual, it is 
debateable whether indirect taxes should be included in the original 
income measure in the same pattern as they are assessed. Indirect taxes 
are compulsory levies paid to the government by producers in respect of 
the production, sale, purchase and use of goods and services, and which 
are treated as an expense of production. The discussion turns on whether 
the existence of the taxes influence prices pre- or post-budget. ihis 
has implications for the results because the imputation of indirect 
business taxes as income to individuals will alter not only the overall 
effective rate of taxation (the proportion of income which is paid in 
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tax), but also the apparent distribution of the money-income effects of 
the budget by income group. 
Subsidies include payments to ensure a return to producers while 
enabling market prices of goods and services to be held below the costs 
of production. They have the opposite effect to indirect taxes on market 
prices and the same arguments about the counterfactual pertain to them. 
Although the pre- and post-budget effects of indirect taxes and 
subsidies may not be the same , they do contribute to the total level ~f 
pre-budget income. So they are distributed based on household 
expenditure patterns and shareholdings of companies. 
Turning to operating surplus and the consumption of fixed capital, 
they could be considered to be the income from household endowments !or 
capital. Thus, the income from ownership of the factors of production 
contributing to these sources of GOP could be interpreted as accruing to 
those who are shareholders. Based on this probably extreme assumption, 
both operating surplus and the consumption of fixed capital are 
distributed based on the distribution of dividend income as measured by 
the Hbusehold Survey. As shown by Table 3F.3, this assumption results in 
over half of the value of operating surplus and the consumption of fixed 
capital being distributed to the upper household income range. 
A comparison of the final column of Table 3F.3 with the final column 
of Table 3F.l shows that initial income is much less equally distributed 
to households under the Stage Four conditions than under· the Stages Three 
conditions. Although the Stage Four ~pproach is very rough, the results 
are further evidence that where the theoretical concept of income. 
distribution becomes more consistent theoretically, the distribution of 
income appears to be less equal. 
Finally, it must be emphasised that both Stage Three and Stage Four 
initial incomes are only approximations. The calculations are included 
here to see what differences, if any, wider definitions make to the 
results. 
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Table 3F.3 
STAGE FOUR: ADJUSTED GROSS DOt-ESTIC PRODUCT 
BY RANGE OF PRIVATE HOUS8iOLD ~AAKET INCOME 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------Con sump-
Campen- tion Total 
Household sat ion of Gross 
Market of Fixed Indirect Less Domestic Operating 
Income Range Employees Surplus Capital Taxes Subs~dies Product 
($ p.a.) 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------$ Million 
Less Than $250 7 18 3 6 2 32 
$250-( $3,950) 71 206 42 155 38 436 
$3,950-( $9,750) 430 547 113 313 76 1327 
$9,750-($13,540) 1018 457 94 183 39 1713 
$13,450-($16,900) 1292 690 143 200 40 2285 
$16,900-($20,250) 1670 385 80 199 37 2297 
$20,250-($24,200) 2047 484 100 216 39 2808 
$24,200-($29,200) 2366 197 40 296 56 2843 
$29,200-($36,650) 2878 716 148 343 64 4021 
$36,650 and Over 3721 5260 1087 859 184 10743 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total 15500 8960 1850 2770 575 28505 
-----------------~------------------------------------------.-------
As ? Proportion of Total (%) 
Less Than $250 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.1 
$250-( $3,950) 0.5 2.3 2.3 5.6 6.7 1.5 
$3,950-( $9,750) 2.8 . 6.1 6.1 11.3 13.7 4.7 
$9,750-($13,540) 6.5 5.1· 5.1 6.6 6.8 6.0 $13,450-($16,900) 8.3 7.7 7.7 7.2 7.0 8.0 
$16,900-($20,250) 10.8 4.3 4.3 7.2 6.4 8.1 
$20,250-($24,200) 13.2 5.4 5.4 7.8 6.8 9.8 
$24,200-($29,200) 15.3 2.2 2.2 10.7 9.7 10.0 
$29,200-($36,650) 18.6 8.0 8.0 12.4 11.1 14.1 
$36,650 and Over 24.0 58.7 58.7 :n.o 32.0 37.7 
-..-..--------------------------------------------------------Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------Source: This is a very rough approximation only for illustrative 
purposes, as explained in the text. 
Turning to the analysis of the Stage Four initial income 
distribution by household type (see Table 3F.4), the largest share goes 
to childless three-or-more adult households. The share to one-and 
two-adult, national-superannuitant households is much larger than the 
share under the Stage Three conditions. On the other hand, the share to 
single-adult households (with and without children) is much smaller. 
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Table 3F .4 
STAGE FOUR: ADJUSTED GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 
BY PRIVATE HOUSEHOLD TYPE 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Household Type 
-------------------------------------------------------------1 Adult 2 Adults 2 Adults 3 or more 1 Adult All 
with Adults with House-
Children Chld'n holds 
-------------------------------------------------------------Economic Nat Oth Nat Oth 1 2 3+ No With 
Aggregate Sup Sup Chil- Chil-
dren dren 
-------------------~---------------------------------------------------------$ Million 
Compensation of 
Employees 117 886 647 3105 1339 2243 1773 2321 2899 170 15500 
Operating 
Surplus 1040 143 2419 287 1658 448 349 1998 600 18 8960 
COnsumption 
of Fixed 
capital 215 29 500 59 342 92 72 413 124 4 1850 
Indirect Taxes 362 114 659 346 219 241 180 402 219 28 2770 
Less Subsidies 90 22 161 63 44 42 30 84 33 6 575 
--------------------------------------------------------------Total Stage Four 
Initial Income 1644 1150 4064 3734 3514 2982 2344 5050 3809 214 28505 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------As a Proportion of Total (%) 
Compensation of 
Employees 0.8 5.7 4.2 20.0 8. 6 14.5 11.4 15.0 18.7 1.1 100.0 
Operating 
Surplus 11.6 1.6 27.0 .. 3.2 18. s 5.0 3.9 22.3 6.7 0.2 100.0 
Consumption 
; of Fixed 
capital 11.6 1.6 27.0 3.2 18.5 5.0 3.9 22.3 6.7 0.2 100.0 
Indirect Taxes 13.1 4.1 23.8 12.5 7.9 8.7 6.5 14.5 7.9 1.0 100.0 
~Subsidies 15.7 :;.. 8 28.0 11.0 7.7 7.3 5.2 14.6 5.7 1.0 100.0 
.. 
--------------------------------------------------------------% of Total 
Stage Four 
Initial Income 5.8 4.0 14.3 13.1 12.3 10.5 8.2 17.7 13.4 0.7 100.0 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Source: This is a very rough approximation only for illustrative purposes, as 
explained in the text. 
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G. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
An income concept that reflects both the concept of gain and the 
concept of what that gain will purchase is important to defining the 
economic position of a household. In other words, the initial income 
measure represents the household budget constraint. If the concept of 
gain takes account of the households endowments, then the initial income 
concept can also be a base for assessing the influence of the 
government's budget on income distribution. 
In order to assess the economic effects of the budget, the other 
characteristic of the initial income measure is that it is based on an 
explicit view of the effect of government. This probably involves a 
counterfactual. 
Sections E and F have analysed some patterns _of income distribution 
by household income group and household type in New Zealand in 1981/82 
based on different income concepts. In each case, the income 
distribution is far from equal. The different initial income concepts 
underlying the four different stages are shown by-Table 3G.l. 
Table 3G.l 
INITIAL INXIE DEFDED FOR STAGES OF TAXONJMY 
(Figures Relate to March Year 1982) 
Prnount Percentage Distribution of 
Stages cne Stage Sta!:je Sta!:jes One Stage Stage 
& Two Three Four & Two Three Four 
1-busehold Gross ~s Gross Gross 
Market Market Domestic Domestic Market Domestic Domestic 
Income Range Income Product Product Income Product Product 
~------------------------------------------------------------------------------$ Million .Percent (%) 
Less Than $250 
-22 140 32 -0.1 0.5 0.1 $250-( $3,950) 170 587 436 0.9 2.1 1.5 
$3,950-( $9,750) 731 1448 1327 3.8 5.1 4.7 $9,750-($13,540) 1212 1816 1713 6.3 6.4 6.0 
$13,450-($16,900) 1567 2302 2285. 8.1 8.1 8.0 
$16,900-($20,250) 1922 2712 2297 10.0 9.5 8.1 $20,250-($24,200) 2291 3101 2808 11.9 10.9 9.8 
$24,200-($29,200) 2774 3782 2843 14.4 13.3 10.0 
$29,200-($36,650) 3387 4656 4021 17.6 16.3 14.1 
$36,650 and Over 5211 7961 10743 27.1 27.9 37.7 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Total 19243 28505 28505 100.0 100.0 100.0 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Source: See Text for derivation. For definition of each stage, see Figure 
1.2 in Chapter One. 
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As the initial income concept becomes more complex, the statistical 
measure of it becomes less robust. The Stage Three and Stage Four 
definitions must be seen as very approximate. Nevertheless, the evidence 
is that different economic assumptions make a significant difference and 
so any analysis of income distribution must be precise about the 
assumotions it does adopt. 
The conclusion from this analysis is that the distribution of 
initial income becomes less equal as the income concept becomes more 
theoretically complex. If nothing else, this conclusion is tantilising 
because it means that the application of further research resources would 
be justified, if only to see if a more rigorous approach comes up with 
the same answer. 
The difference between the Stage One and Stage Two initial income 
distribution and the Stage Three initial income distribution is 
illustrated by Chart 3.2 below. 
CHART 3.2 
CCJ.PARISON CF ll£ RELATIVE EQUALITY OF INITIAL INC()€: 
STAGE TWO AN:> STAGE THREE DEFINITIONS 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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The next chapters are devoted to answering the question whether an 
income definition which takes account af government expenditure and 
revenue measures is distributed any differently. The main approach is 
based an the Stage Twa methodology, which as shown in Chapter Three, is 
mainly an accounting method. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE GOVERNMENT BUDGET : AN INCOME AND OUTLAY ACCOUNT 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chapter Four discusses the concept of the government budget. By 
definition, the budget should take into account all the fiscal activities 
of the government. Haw these activities are taken into account varies a 
great deal in economic analysis. Far instance, there is a considerable 
difference in the treatment of the budget by quantitative studies of the 
redistributive effects of the budget and by general equilibrium studies 
of incidence. Quantitative studies have tended to define the government 
budget in terms of some existing accounting or statistical statement of 
tax receipts and expenditures. General equilibrium studies have defined 
the budget to cover all the taxing activities of government, but have 
generally ignored ather sources of government revenue and mast government 
expenditures. 
Section A explores the concept of the government budget. Budget 
transactions _defined in their broadest sense include the government 
provision of goods and services and the financing of all those 
activities, where the governmen~ or state operates directly to influence 
factor incomes, prices and consumer demand. 
Section B examines the budget concepts specified by quantitative 
studies and empirical general equilibrium studies of budget incidence. 
Although the concept of the budget is treated more elegantly by general 
equilibrium studies, the approach of these studies is much narrower than 
that of recent quantitative studies. 
Section C describes the main sources of information about New 
Zealand central government budget transactions. The Department of 
Statistics New Zealand Systems of National Accounts (NZSNA) data are 
selected as the most appropriate for assessing the influence of the 
budget an household income distribution. 
Section 0 describes the NZSNA central government accounts in 
detail. The Section defines the main items of receipts to be assessed in 
Chapter Five and expenditures to be assessed in Chapter Six. 
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A. THE CONCEPT OF THE BUDGET 
There are five issues central to the classification of government 
transactions far the purpose of assessing their influence an household 
incomes. They are: 
1) Policy Context: 
What are the objectives in attempting to assess the budget 
impact? For example, is the objective to assess short-term 
income distribution or changes to income distribution in the 
long-term? 1his makes a difference as to whether capital, as 
well as current, government expenditures are included in the 
budget concept. 
2) Coverage: 
Which revenues and expenditures should be included? The Shaven, 
Whalley and Fullerton (SWF) models have concentrated on taxes but 
as argued in Chapter Two, government expenditures also have a 
money-income value to households. 
3) The Balanced Budget G)Jestion: 
Should the analysis assume that the government budget is 
balanced? If so, how this identity is defined varies according 
to the concepts underlying the four stages. 
4) Allocation: 
Who benefits from and pays for government budget transactions? 
5) valuation: 
How are the money-income benefits and costs assessed? 
The way in which the five above issues are resolved will shape 
the methodological approach which is adopted. 
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A.l: Policy COntext 
The policy issue examined in this thesis is the immediate effect 
of the government budget on household current incomes in a given 
year. Put simply, it addresses the question of who pays for the 
activities of the government and who gets what in return. 1his 
involves the derivation of current income measures which account for 
government budget transactions, so that the relative income positions 
of households can be compared with and without the income gains and 
losses associated with the government's budget activity. In ather 
words, this study attempts to explore the extent to which an income 
measure which includes an estimate of the money-income value of 
government activities is distributed differently from household market 
incomes. At issue is not so ruch whether the government makes 
permanent changes to incomes but whether an income concept that takes 
account of government activities ·is distributed differently than 
market-income· (the income distribution which is the outcome of 
private-sector market place activity) in a given year. 
To clarify the nature of the problems analysed in this thesis, 
the discussion of the government's budget is illustrated using the 
-four stages as a means of distinguishing the assumed statistical and 
economic conditions underlying the results. As discussed in Chapter 
One, budget policies may contribute to a redistribution of income even 
when they are intended to achieve other ends. 1he different policy 
contexts implicit in the four stages are consistent with this view. 
Differences in the policy contexts spring from the different 
underlying hypotheses about how a change in government policy affects 
the household sector. 
The Stage One policy context is the change in the distribution of 
household money income which comes about when government policies 
which are intended to directly tax or benefit households are taken 
into account. Direct taxes on households include direct taxes on 
income (the personal income tax) and direct taxes on household 
expenditure ("direct" indirect taxes). Government-provided goods and 
services which are directly consumed by households include subsidies 
on the final goods consumed by households, monetary benefits, health, 
education and other government-provided private goods. 
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The weakness of the treatment of the budget in Stage One is that 
the exclusion of certain budget transactions, such as expenditure on 
collective goods, implies that their effects are neutral in beth an 
accounting and an economic sense. There is no reason why this should 
be the case. The strength of this treatment is that it identifies 
households' statutory liability to make payments to the government and 
households which consume government-provided goods and services, using 
direct statistical measurements from the Household Survey, the Census 
and the Census of Health. 
Stage Two hypothesizes that ultimately households pay for all 
government activities and are the consumers of all the goods and 
services provided by the government. The policy context is to measure 
the change in income distribution for a current year when all central 
government non-market activity is taken into account. Stage Three 
takes the view that if households are ultimately the financial 
supporters of the government and consumers of government-provided 
goods, then all the national income and expenditure should be 
attributed to households. 
Stage Four considers the money-income effects of the budget when 
relative prices, technology and qutput changes are taken into 
account. They are assumed to be zero in the Stage One and Stage Three 
case. It is not possible to isolate only the effects of the 
government budget on current household money-incomes using a general 
equilibrium approach but so a necessary assumption in the Stage Four 
case would be that the most important effects on income distribution 
take place in the current calendar year. 
A .2 : Coverage 
The government is a tax collector, as well as an enforcement 
agency and major trading enterprise, which uses its revenues to 
provide goods and services. In addition, the government undertakes 
fiscal, monetary, regulatory and institutional functions which 
influence factor incomes, prices, the level of economic output, 
consumer demand and so an. Also, the government exercises influence 
over the behaviour of public trading corporations and local 
authorities. Thus, it could be argued then those institutions should 
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be included as part of the budget transactions which are analysed. 
This is because the activities of these public entities could 
accentuate or mitigate the central government's own activity. 
Ideally, the budget concept at the base of a redistribution study 
should take all government activities into account. Even though many 
of these transactions do not have explicit redistributive aims, they 
may have influences on the economy which lead to a different- pattern 
of household income distribution. The research in this thesis, 
however, is narrowly focussed on government budget activities only -
that is the activities associated with the collection of revenue and 
the expenditure of that revenue. 
Because it is designed to concentrate on only the government 
policies which have _a direct or immediate impact effect on income 
distribution, the Stage One coverage is the narrowest. Government 
revenue transactions include personal income taxes and indirect taxes 
assessed on final expenditure items. Included as government 
expenditures are transfer payments (social welfare expenditure), 
subsidies (on income or on the prices of .final consumption goods) and 
government private expenditures (expenditure for which there is a 
private beneficiary) on health and education. Stage Two coverage 
extends to the entire central government income and outlay account. 
With their consistent treatment of the economy, the Stage Three and 
Stage Four treatments could be designed in principle, to cover all 
aspects of government activity, econometric and computational 
resources permitting. 
A.3: The Balanced Budget Question 
As is the case with income data, the choice of government budget 
data can vary depending on the level of theoretical complexity of the 
analysis. The definition of a balanced budget varies in relation to 
the four stages outlined in Chapter One. 
A.3.a: Balanced Budget : Staae One 
In the Stage One case, only those government transactions which 
have a direct or statutory effect on household income or expenditure 
• 
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are considered. The budget is not balanced in either an accounting or 
in an economic sense. Stage One is a quantitative study and there is 
no explicit budget constraint either for the government or 
households. It relies on the accuracy of published data sources for 
its logic. 
The Stage One approach is similar to earlier apptoaches 
(Nicholson, 1964, and Economic Trends) where the intention was to 
assess the income-redistributive benefits of social welfare policies. 
The difference is that Stage One has broadened its coverage to all 
policies which directly benefit households. 
A.3.b: Balanced Budget : Stage Two 
In Stage Two, the government budget is balanced in a accounting 
sense. The basic data measure the production and expenditures of the 
real sector as recorded by the NZSNA Government Income and Outlay 
account (discussed further in Sections C and 0 of this Chapter). By 
definition, this account is balanced and the balancing item is a 
residual, savings. Excluded from this acccun~ are government capital 
expenditure items, activities carried out by government trading 
enterprises and local government activity. 
The approach in Stage Two is to assume that households are 
ultimately liable for all payments to the government and are also 
ultimately the beneficiaries of all government service activities, 
even if the initial points of impact are companies or ether non-human 
entities. In essence, the Stage Two methodology re-classifies NZSNA 
national accounting information about central government public 
account activity in terms of money-income totals for different 
household types and household income groups. 
A.3.c: Balanced Budget : Stages Three and Four 
As Musgrave first pointed out (Public Finance, 1959), a budget 
which is balanced in an accounting sense is not necessarily balanced 
in an economic sense. For the real economy, different government 
expenditures and different compulsory levies (taxes and so en) may 
have different multiplier effects. When a financial sector is added, 
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the conditions for budget balance could be long-run or extend across 
different generations of taxpayers. So in the end, the analysis of 
the economic effects of the budget requires that a particular 
methodological approach be adopted and the way in which the balanced 
budget is achieved will be required to be consistent with that 
approach. A simple Harberger model specifies a budget that is 
balanced in an accounting and an economic sense. For the balanced 
budget condition to hold in the Herberger model, there must be full 
employment, no economic growth, constant investment and no financial 
sector. 
As Meerman (1974), argues (see Chapter Two, Section A), it may be 
that it is the adjustment of relative prices, technology and ouput 
(RPTO) to government budget transactions which has the most 
significant effect on income distribution. To consider these RPTO 
effects, a more complex model is required. For most of the SWF 
models, the budget is balanced such that its change in tax yield plus 
government net borrowing is equal to the change in government 
expenditure. Recent versions of the models incorporate financial 
assets, as Section C.l.e of Chapter Two points out. 
A.4: Allocation Effects 
The government's allocation role is its role of providing 
services to households as opposed to its role of stabilising economic 
activity. Section B, Chapter Three, discussed the various Reynolds 
and Smolensky (1977) treatments of the government's allocative role. 
The definition of the government's allocative role makes a difference 
to the specification of pre-budget income distribution and to the 
meaning of the government's redistributive activities. 
Stage One considers only those forms of government allocation 
which are designed wi~h the specific objective of providing a service 
to households. The amount households are required to pay to the 
government is greater than the cost to the government of providing for 
these direct services. Arguably, the difference between direct 
receipts and government direct expenditures in a given year is the 
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amount extra individuals are willing to pay in income tax because they 
consider the extra tax a reverse way of supporting government 
redistributive programmes. 
A case can be made, that even government allocation measures 
which result in government-provided goods being consumed by industry 
may have an effect (in national accounting terms) on changing the 
money-incomes earned by households. ihe mechanism for this is either 
through factors which influence the source of household income or 
factors which influence the use of household income. For example, 
taxes on companies affect households by putting up prices on 
households' uses of income (the taxes add to product prices) and may 
also change _households' source of income (by _leading to a reduction in 
wages). Benefits (such as subsidies) accruing to companies will also 
affect the uses and sources of household income (by changing prices or 
wages). Therefore, Stage Two treats all allocation effects as 
potentially having a money-income effects which lead to a change in 
household money income. 
A.S: Valuation 
The basis for all calculations conducted in this thesis is the 
household money income effects of budget transactions. A household's 
income is reduced by its tax liability and increased by the amount of 
private benefit it receives because of government expenditures. 1his 
benefit is valued in terms of what the government-provided good or 
service costs the government to provide. In other words, the fact 
that the government provides these goods means that the purchasing 
power of the household's income is enhanced. 
A.6: Conclusion 
Section A has outlined the budget concept consistent with the 
objectives of this thesis. The next Section summarises how the 
concept is treated in the literature.' The Sections C and D discuss 
the nature of the available budget data in New Zealand. 
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B. BUDGET CONCEPT IN EMPIRICAL G-E MODELS AND QUANTITATIVE STUDIES 
General equilibrium research has focussed on the tax side of the 
budget. Government expenditures are considered as transfer payments 
which enhance the incomes of households, increasing their purchasing 
power for goods produced by the private sector. As Shaven and Whalley 
(1984 p.l017) candidly state: 
II in a few cases [the SWF] models have been used with public 
goods in household utility functions, although this complicates tax 
models." 
The original Herberger model (1962) assumes that government provides 
the same goods and services as the private sector, but finances them 
through taxes rather than by the market-price mechanism. Public finance 
literature suggests that this convenient modelling technique is a poor 
representation of what governments do. For example, the very reason that 
the government provides services such as defence and police services is 
because the private sector does not produce these goods. Or if the 
private sector does produce private equivalents, they may not"provide the 
same collective or public benefit of the government-provided services. 
In fact, the theory of the firm suggests that a profit-motivated private 
sector would provide collective goods only as an unavoidable externality 
to the production of goods for individual or private benefit. 
Keller (1980) makes some important innovations to the Harberger 
approach. 1-2 defines a "public household" which has as one of its 
functions the provision of public (non-rival consumption) goods. The 
public househould provides public goods by transforming private goods 
like labour and capital into a good such as national defence. The 
provision of public goods is done subject to a budget constraint which is 
exogenously determined by a second department of the public sector, 
called the "fisc". The net receipts of the "fisc" (tax receipts less 
transfer and subsidies) determine the total level of the "public 
budget". The "public household" decides on the composition of the basket 
of public goods within this budget constraint. 
A limitation of the Keller approach is that the only objective of 
the public household is the provision of public goods. The reality is 
CHAPTER FOLR - 11-£ GOVE:JWoENT BUDGET: AN INCOME Af'll OUTLAY ACCOUNT 17 6. 
that governments provide goods and services which may have either private 
and/or public good characteristics. A strength of the Keller approach is 
that he also models household preferences for public goods. 
Piggott (1980) defines the government sector as one of four 
consumers. So like the household sector, the foreign sector and the 
corporate sector, the government has its own demand function. This 
approach enables Piggott to analyse a greater variety of government 
activities than previously covered by SWF studies. The government has an 
income which, in addition to taxes, includes income from the capital 
services it is deemed to own, the net surplus from public enterprises, 
the purchasing power it borrows from the private sector and those 
revenues not paid out as transfers. Its expenditures cover not only 
public administration and defence, but various other goods and services 
as well. The problem is that Piggott assumes that the government is the 
consumer of public administration -and defence, rather than the household 
sector. Thus, Piggott finesses one of the crucial issues of an analysis 
of income distribution, the question of who benefits from public good. 
Recent SWF modelshave incorporated a budget constraint, while 
allowing for a budget deficit. In this case, the models define a 
government debt instrument on the revenue side of the budget. For 
example, Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1982) define the· government budget 
constraint so that the present value of expenditures equals the present 
value of revenue less the initial value of debt where financing by money 
creation is not an option. According to the models, private and 
government capital are perfect substitutes in portfolios, but government 
debt is found to crowd out private capital formation. 
Introduction of money into the SWF models enables the specification 
of an unbalanced budget. Pioneering work in this area is represented by 
the work of Slemrod (1983) and Serra-Auche (1979 Yale Ph.d.). Slemrod 
has modelled portfolio behaviour with money and debt as available 
assets. Although Serra-Ruche's model has an initially unbalanced budget, 
it is being expanded to include monetary behaviour. 
The models with budget deficits rely on the simulation of a budget 
constraint rather than differential incidence to measure changes in 
income distribution. For these results to have any meaning, it is 
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important to model household preferences for public goods. The value of 
the change in government purchases can then be included in the 
calculation of the household's welfare change. 
Since the SWF models have thus far largely avoided modelling 
household preferences for public goods, it is useful to turn to the 
quantitative studies to see what they do. Gillespie (1965, 1966) 
combines expenditure analysis with tax analysis in order to determine the 
redistributional impact of the entire United States and Canadian 
budgets. The entire budget refers to three levels of government, 
federal, state and local. To avoid the modelling complications which 
arise when there is a budget deficit, Gillespie assumes that for all 
practical purposes that the budget is balanced. Musgrave et al (1974) 
and Reynolds and Smolensky (1977) also adopt the Gillespie approach of 
analysing both the tax and expenditure side of the budget. Perhaps 
because other forms of government revenue are not large in the US and 
canada, none of the studies include receipts other than taxes. 
Webb and Sieve (1971) suggest that the coverage of the budget 
concept depends on the concept of redistribution analysed. They would 
classify the North American studies in the previous paragraph as studies 
in public finance, although they acknowledge that some expenditures not 
specifically designated as social policies may benefit households. 
Nicholoson's (1964) analysis for the United Kingdom Central Statistical 
Office is a narrower study of the net redistributive effect of some taxes 
and publicly financed social services. 
Like the later SWF empirical general equilibrium studies, the 
quantitative studies find the analysis of government expenditures less 
straightforward than the analysis of the distributional consequences of 
taxes. However, unlike the SWF studies, the quantitative studies 
explicitly address questions of expenditure incidence. As a result , the 
quantitative studies can analyse the net distributional effects of the 
budget on household incomes rather than the distributional effects of 
taxes alone. 
,• .. 
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C. NEW ZEALAND BUDGET DATA 
The most familiar source of data covering central government 
activity has traditionally appeared in the annual Budget document as 
Budget Table 2. Budget Table 2 information for 1981/82 and the years 
immediately preceding and following is illustrated by Figure 4.1 on the 
following page. Budget Table 2 is designed to show net government cash 
expenditure classified by function and government receipts classified by 
major source. It represants the public debt accounting concept of the 
government's budget cash statement and shows the amount of central 
government Public Account spending which is financed through borrowing in 
the year to 31 March. 
The Public Account is the main account of the central government's 
budget transactions as expressed in its annual Budget exercise. 1he 
Department of Statistics' NZSNA accounting system attempts to analyse the 
Rublic Account information in economic terms. 
According to the NZSNA definitions, this information is 
re-classified into market and non-market production accounts, a 
government income and outlay account and a government capital finance 
account.1 The information is also further classified by function in 
both the market and non-market production accounts and the gross capital 
accumulation accounts. Much of the required information about budget 
transactions could be expected to be in the public domain overseas; 
however, with the relatively recent development of NZSNA accounts in New 
Zealand the government account is still being developed. 
C.l: The Public Account as Summarised by Budget Table 2 
The Public Account, which Budget Table 2 is intended to summarise, 
is designed to account mainly for the transactions of central government 
non-trading activities. Major non-trading activities include social 
welfare, education and health (although each of these Departments may 
also engage in some trading activity). 
1. The capital finance account has not been fully developed at this 
stage. By 1983, gross accumulation and the finance of gross 
accumulation were available. Still missing are accounts of net 
acquisition of financial assets plus net borrowing and net 
incurrence of liabilities. 
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FIGURE 4.1 
CENTRAL GOVERNENT EXPeDITIJRE AN:l ITS FINANCING : BUDGET TABLE 2 BASIS 
(Actual Figures in 1980/81, 1981/82, and 1982/83 Expressed by 
Amount, $Million, and as % of Total Spending/Total Revenue) 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1980/81 1981/82 1982/83 
%of %of %of 
$M Total $M Total $M Total 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Net Expenditure 
Administration 786 8.6 914 8.2 833 6.6 
Foreign Relations 578 6.3 720 6.4 808 6.4 
Development of Industry 797 8.7 1,184 10.6 1,430 11.3 
Education 1,292 14.1 1,493 13.3 1,639 12.9 
Social Services 2,590 28.4 3,042 27.2 3, 744 29.5 
realth 1,356 14.8 1,601 14.3 1,766 13.9 
Transport & Communications 333 3.6 461 4.1 496 3.9 
Debt Services 897 9.8 1,211 10.8 1,492 11.8 
Mise. In vest. Transactions 94 1.0 1,164 1.5 1,557 4.5 
Subtotal 8,722 95.5 10,790 96.4 12,265 96.8 
Misc.Financing Transactions 411 4.5 407 3.6 408 3.2 
Net Government Expenditure 9,133 100.0 11,197 100.0 12,673 100.0 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Financed from -
Taxation 
Income Tax 5,299 69.6 6,515 71.0 7,456 70.9 
CUstoms, Sales Tax, 
and Beer Duty 1,189 15.6 1,634 17.8 1,873 17.8 
Highways Tax 189 2.5 212 2.3 233 2.2 
Motor Spirits Tax 140 1.8 147 1.6 184 1.7 
Other Taxation 234 3.1 291 3.2 352 3.3 
Total Taxation 7,050 92.7 · 8,798 95.9 10,098 96.0 
Interest, Profits, and 
Misc. Receipts 558 7.3 580 6.3 808 7.7 
Reserve Bank Payment/ 
Receipt 
-208 -2.3 -391 -3.7 
Total Receipts 7,609 100.0 9,170 100.0 10,515 100.0 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Deficit Before Borrowing 1,525 2,026 2,158 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Note: Numbers may not add due to rounding. Source: 1984 Budget. 
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central government trading activities are mainly conducted by 
trading departments and government corporations. Trading departments' 
include the Post Office and the Railways. 1heir transactions are largely 
excluded from the Public Account, because the Departments are structured 
like market-orientated producers to trade according to some concept of 
profit. It is intended that trading departments cover their expenditure 
by revenue, showing eitner a positive or zero cash position by 31 March 
each year. Public corporations, such as Air New Zealand and the Bank of 
New Zealand, are structured like private corporations with the New 
Zealand taxpayer (the owner) · as the shareholders. 
In most cases, the only expenditure items in the Public Account 
relating to trading departments or public corporations are additional 
funds (generally for capital expenditures) voted by Parliament. In the 
Public Accounts, revenue items reported for these entities include 
interest earned on capital advanced and a portion of the surpluses of 
trading departments and public corporations. The amounts actually 
recorded on the receipts side of the A.Jblic Account depend on the 
statutory arrangement made with each separate public trading body. 
Neither the PUblic Account nor Budget Table 2 are designed for 
assessing the government's economic influence on the economy. Because the 
Public Account and Budget Table 2 are cash flow accounts, they do not 
necessarily represent the actual flows of government sponsored goods and 
services within the real economy. Some of the limitations of these cash 
flow treatments are spelled out below. 2 
a) Large portions of government income which are excluded from both 
accounts (such as the surpluses of government companies, trading 
departments and corporations) have an influence the level of 
aggregate demand. 
b) There is no consistent treatment which distinguishes between 
monetary transactions (such as cash advances to the Hbusing 
Corporation to finance their loan activities) and real transactions 
which result in the production of goods and services. 
2. See also Buckle, Snively (1979). 
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c) The timing of cash expenditures may not reflect the timing of actual 
central government output. For example, in some years progress 
payments are made before 31 March for projects which have not been 
completed. In other years, cash payments may be delayed until after 
31 March, even though projects were completed before that date. 
d) Public Account information does not treat unincorporated government 
trading organisations consistently. For example, information about 
Lands and Survey farms and New Zealand Forest Service Production and 
Sawmills is included in the public account while the transactions of 
the Railways3 and Electricity Division of the MinistrJ of Energy 
are outside the Public Account. 
e) Expenditures and receipts (taxes on wealth and gifts) related to 
financial assets are not treated consistently in the Public Accounts. 
C.2: The Department of Statistics NZSNA Treatment of the Public Account 
-In the New Zealand System of National Accounts (NZSNA), Public 
Account information is classified within the context of annual (more 
recently, quarterly) analysis of New Zealand's econo~ic output. As the 
NZSNA framework is developed, there is potential to analyse government 
budget incidence effects in relation to different sectors, including the 
household sector, the corporate sector and the financial sector. At 
present, use of NZSNA Public Account data enable linkage with other 
consistent data sources, such as input and output tables, which has the 
potential of widening the empirical analysis of the government budget. 
For example, with the input and output tables, it is possible to assess 
the effects of indirect taxes in greater depth. 
A set of self-balancing accounts record central government 
activity. This comprise a production account, an income and outlay 
account and a capital finance account. 
3. Since 1981/82, Railways has been formed into a government-owned 
corporation with independent control over its financial assets and 
liabilities. 
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Data sources for the analysis of the public account for NZSNA 
purposes vary with the sources of funding. For those government 
departments funded directly from the consolidated account, 4 the prime 
source of information is the government's computerised accounting system. 
Data for the education boards, which are indirectly funded from the 
consolidated account, are extracted from the annual accounts of 
individual boards. For the hospital boards, the Department of Statistics 
conducts an annual survey to obtain the necessary data for NZSNA purposes. 
Each item of government expenditure, usually valued in casrt terms, 
is classified in a manner consistent with the economic concepts defined 
by the NZSNA system. In the end, however, the NZSNA can only be as good 
as the original Public Account information which, because it is also 
collected for Parliamentary purposes, has considerable limitations for 
the purposes of economic analysis. 
The NZSNA groupings reflect the fact that· the New Zealand economy is 
mixed, both in the sense that total activity is divided between the 
private and public sector, and that the public sector's activities are 
divided between production for sale (market activities) and production of 
services which are not sold (non-market activities). 5 For NZSNA 
accounting ·purposes, government economic activities fall into two 
categories: 
1) market production (establishments producing goods or services for 
sale in the market at prices normally designed to cover the cost of 
production); and 
2) non-market production or establishments which produce government 
services. 
4. The bulk of government expenditure is met from the consolidated 
account by way of annual appropriations through Parliamentary votes 
and permanent appropriations. Receipts from taxation, departmental 
receipts and interest received, and dividends and profits from 
corporations and government lending organisations are recorded in 
the consolidated account. 
5. Private sector activity is also divided into market activities and 
non-market (non-profit) service activities. 
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Figure 4.2 shows central government activities classified by the 
NZSNA institutional sector system. The central government has 
establishments which are classified as producer enterprises, financial 
intermediaries and as within general government. General government is 
split between market and non~arket production depending on whether the 
goods and services provided are financed by compulsory payments to the 
government or whether they are financed by a charge similar to a market 
price. 
FI~ 4.2 
~ ZEAlANJ STANJARD INSTITUTICNU. SECTOR 
CLASSIFICATION (F CENTRAL GOVERtHNT ACTIVITIES 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1.00 Producer Enterprises . 
1.30 Government Enterprises 
1.31 central Government owned and/or controlled market producer enterprises. 
(a) Government owned and/or controlled corporations or companies. 
(b) Unincorporated government trading organisations. 
2. oo Financ.ial Intermediaries 
2.10 central Bank 
2.20 Trading Banks 
2.21 central Government 
2.30 Insurance and Pension Funds 
2. 31 central Government 
2.40 Other Financial Intermediaries 
2.41 central Government 
3. oo General Government 
3.10 central Government 
3.11 Central Government (Excluding Funded Social Security Schemes) 
(a) Non~arket Oriented Goods and Services (Production Group 22). 
or 
(b) Market Oriented Goods and Services (Production Groups l-21). 
3.12 Funded Social Security Schemes 
3.13 Post Office Savings Bank 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Source: Department of Statistics. 
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This thesis only analyses the transactions relating to 
classification 3.ll(a), non-market central government. This approach 
assumes that the market operations of the government are self-funding, an 
assumption not always borne out in actuality. 
Not analysed are the household money-income effects of central 
government producer enterprises which include government owned and/or 
controlled corporations or companies and unincorporated trading 
organisations. The government corporations or companies hold and manage 
their own assets and liabilities, as well as their tangible assets. 
Examples include Air New Zealand and the Broadcasting Corporation of New 
Zealand. Unincorporated government trading organisations sell most of 
the goods and services they produce to the public; however, they may not 
be structured so as to exercise control over their financial assets and 
liabilities. 
The New Zealand government is also active in the field of financial 
intermediation. The government's central bank, the Reserve Bank of New 
Zealand, does not operate independently as does the central bank in the 
United States, but is directly responsible to the Minister of Finance. 
Central government trading-bank activity relates to the transactions of 
its wholly-owned Bank of New Zealand. The State Insurance Company and 
the Government Life Insurance Office operate insurance and pension funds 
for the central government. BNZ Savings Bank Ltd and the Development 
Finance Corporation are examples of other financial intermediaries 
responsible to the government. 
General government activities are defined to include the 
government's non-market transactions. Not all these activities are 
funded through the Public Account, however. Among those organisations 
which may be only partially funded through the Public Account are the 
Fire Service Commission, the Earthquake and War Damage Commission, the 
Fishing Industry Board, the National Provident Fund and the Rural Banking 
and Finance Corporation. The Accident Compensation Corporation is a 
totally self-funded organisation (classified as 3.12). Although the Post 
Office Savings Bank carries on many of the activities of a financial 
intermediary, it provides a number of non-market services which make it 
unique. For example, it collects television licence fees and motor 
vehicle registration fees. 
CHAPTER FOl.R - TI-E ~ BUDGET: AN INCOME AND OUTLAY ACCOUNT 185. 
Activities classified in Section 3.11 as government services are 
further classified into two distinct areas: 
a) Services provided by government which are either collective or 
regulatory in nature and which may not be conveniently or 
economically sold on the market. These are treated as indivisible 
goods in many studies of income redistribution and include defence 
spending, crime prevention and the provision of parks and reserves. 
b) Services which could be 'sold' on the market (and indeed which are 
sold in foreign countries) but because of government policy are 
provided on a universal basis and funded from general or specific 
taxation. Examples include hospital and medical services, education 
and accident compensation. 
The valuation of output of non-market government activities used in 
the NZSNA differs from that of market activities in that the elements of 
operating surplus6 (or in other words, pre-tax profit) and consumption 
of fixed capital are excluded.7 Given the inherent difficulties in 
assigning a market value to the gross output of government services which 
are not sold on the market and the current lack of a suitable method for 
assessing consumption of fixed capital, the valuation of gross output· is 
recorded as equal to the sum of gross inputs. Usually these inputs are 
assessed in cash terms. 
The NZSNA's biggest limitation (which applies to almost all of the 
(data about the government's non-market activities) is that the costs of 
government inputs determine the value of the goods and services provided 
(produced) by the government. This treatment is convenient for a study 
of the income effects of the government budget because it automatically 
6. Defined as the gross output of resident industries at producers' 
values, less the sum of their intermediate consumption, compensation 
of employees, consumption of fixed capital and indirect taxes net of 
subsidies. 
7. Consumption of fixed capital is the measure of the decrease in the 
value of durable assets due to wear and tear, foreseen obsolescence 
and the normal rate of accidental damage. A major limitation of 
NZSNA is that consumption of fixed capital is not charged for the 
decrease in the value of durable assets owned by central government. 
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results in tax receipts equating with government spending when the 
financial sector and behavioral relationships are ignored. Valuing 
government output at cost presents considerable difficulties, however, 
when it comes to assessing excess burden effects. The problems involved 
in valuing government output when there are no market prices is a reason 
why the analysis of the incidence of government expenditures seems to be 
more difficult than the analysis of tax incidence. 
Another limitation of the NZSNA accounts is that they are sometimes 
based on data which has not previously been part of the public domain and 
which may not measure up to tests of accountability. The NZSNA central 
government income and outlay account is based on accounts of activities 
which are subject to the scrutiny of Parliament and the Controller and 
Auditor General. Ih contrast, private companies produce accounts which 
are audited independently and companies listed on the sharemarket are 
further monitored by investment analysts. 
NZSNA accounts of the government's non-market activities are the 
basic government-budget data applied in this thesis. As discussed in 
this section, the NZSNA data are preferable to the more familiar PUblic 
Account (Budget Table 2) data because they attempt to treat government 
transactions in a consistent economic accounting sense. In addition, 
the national accounts provide a framework for the integration of all 
economic national income accounting statistics. Hence, the analysis of 
government activity can be cast in the context of macroeconomic activity. 
Although the national accounts are the basis for the macroeconomic 
data, this thesis also uses a large number of other data sources to 
examine the nature of specific government revenues and expenditures. Of 
particular value on the expenditure side are the annual Estimates of 
Expenditures. Further tax information is available from the Department 
of Inland Revenue, OJstoms and the Post Office. Since much of this 
information is also used as the basis of deriving the NZSNA aggregates, 
linking data from these various sources can be carried out in a 
consistent fashion. 
•'· 
CHAPTER FOLR - TI-E GOVERNENT BUDGET: AN INCOME AN:> OUTLAY ACCOUNT 187. 
0. THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INCOME AND OUTLAY ACCOUNT 
Section 0 discusses the central government income and outlay 
account. Subsections 0.1 and 0.2 describe the components of outlay and 
disbursements. Subsection 0.3 discusses things excluded from the 
government income and outlay account which should be included in a study 
of budget incidence. Finally, subsection 0.4 examines adjustments to the 
NZSNA in order to evaluate economic effects. 
Government activities, as recorded by NZSNA, include market and 
non-market activities. Although both types of activities affect 
household income distribution, it is the government non-market activities 
which are analysed in this thesis. The NZSNA analysis covers expenditure 
funded from the consolidated account of the public accounts, either 
directly as in the case of government departments such as Justice and the 
Treasury, ar by transfer funding as in the case of education boards and 
hospital boards. 
The current income and disbursements related to central government 
Public Account activities are illustrated in Figure 4.3, the Central 
Government Income and Outlay Account. This account is a self-balancing 
account where receipts are equal to disbursements. Savings, listed an 
the disbursement side of the account, is the residual or balancing item; 
it is a source of finance in the Capital Finance Account. 
0.1: Central Government Outlays 
Public Account and other information about government non-market 
transactions can be classified to represent the economic activities of 
different departments. These economic activities are grouped in the 
disbursement side on the NZSNA Central Government Income and Outlay 
Account. Far example, the aspects of education which represent final 
public consumption expenditure are classified as disbursements. Other 
parts of the education budget are used for capital finance. Section 
O.l.a describes the main 1tems of disbursements in the current income and 
outlay account. 
In addition, within the NZSNA, there is a framework for 
disaggregating central government services by functional classification. 
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FIGURE 4.3 
CENTRAL GOVERf'.IENT INC().£ AND OUTLAY ACCOUNT 
FOR 1980/81, 1981/82 and 1982/83 
-----------------------------------------------------~-------------------------Year Ending 31 March: 1981 % l982a % 
$M Change $M Change 
1983 
$M 
---------------------------------------------------------------------~---------Disbursements 
Final Consumption Expenditure 3,564.8 21.2 4,319.9 11.7 4, 824.4 
Interest Concessions 53.6 -8.9 64.3 7.9 69.4 
Interest Payments - Internal 688.0 14.4 845.5 21.0 1,023.2 
- External 256.3 62.4 416.3 23.7 515.0 
Royalties & Patents Fees 1.0 -80.0 0.2 
Subsidies 335.4 71.5 575.1 28.3 738.0 
Social Assistance Grants 2,810. 7 17.9 3,312.8 20.9 4,005.9 
CUrrent Transfers to: 
Private Non-Profit-Making 
Organisations 64.5 25.6 81.0 59.6 113.1 
Local Authorities 136.3 34.7 183.6 18.2 217.1 
Central Government 98.5 46.0 143.8 3.1 148.2 
Others Within New Zealand 2.3 52.2 3.5 8.6 3.8 
Rest of the World 19.0 -15.8 16.6 19.3 19.8 
Savings -234.4 71.5 -402.1 55.3 -624.4 
Total Disbursements 7,795.3 22.6 9,560.5 15.6 11,051.4 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Receipts 
Operating Surplus 9.4 23.4 11.6 74.1 20.2 
Withdrawals from Trading Accounts 20.3 -5.0 19.1 138.2 45.6 
Property Income - Interest 618.8 10.9 686.0 6.4 729.6 
- Dividends 7.4 20.3 8.9 -9.0 8.1 
- R~alties 2.7 40.7 3.8 142.1 9.2 
Interest Concession 6.5 16.9 7.6 128.9 17.4 
Indirect Taxes - Import Duties 231.2 45.8 337.2 49.6 504.4 
- Others 1,516. 7 22.7 1,860.4 12.0 2,083.0 
Direct Taxes - On !hearne 5,299.1 22.9 6,514.7 14.4 7,456.5 
- On Others 30.3 9.9 33.3 74.2 58.0 
Compulsory Fees, Fines & Penalties 33.9 12.1 38.0 42.6 54.2 
CUrrent Transfers n.e.c. 18.8 112.2 39.9 68.9 66.1 
Total Receipts 7,795.3 22.6 9,560.5 15.6 11,051.4 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------~---Notes: a) Numbers in this column do not add exactly due to rounding of some 
estimates. b) Also included in this category are net casualty insurance 
claims which were not greater than $0.1 Million in any recent year. 
Source: Department of Statistics (latest available figu~es in March 1985). 
These classifications are similar to the classifications in Table 2 of 
the Budget. The figures are not comparable, however, because of the more 
rigorous treatment given to the economic classification of transactions 
in NZSNA. The functional classification of government expenditure is 
discussed in Section D.l.b. 
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O.l.a: Disbursements Defined 
This section defines the individual disbursements in Figure 4.3. 
The final const.JqJtion expenditure of central government is current 
public account expenditure on final goods and services, such as 
education. Government final consumption expenditure is valued at net 
input costs, the surrogate for market prices in the non-market 
sector. The value of the non-market output is understated when 
compared with that of market output because of the omission of any 
surplus or any measure of consumption of fixed capital from the 
non-market account. 
Interest concessions are reimbursement by central government to 
lending authorities, who, following government policy, charge 
qualified borrowers an interest rate below the normal market rate. 
The reimbursement is based on the difference between the rate that 
would have been charged (usually the prevailing market rate) and the 
actual rate charged. For example, the Housing Corporation gets 
interest concessions on borrowing from the government. 
Internal interest payments are payments on debt to finance 
government activity which is borrowed within New Zealand incl~ding 
Government securities such as Government Tap Issues, Inflation Proof 
Bonds, Kiwi Savings Stock and so on. Extemal interest payments are 
payments on debt financed overseas and information about this is found 
in Table 14 of the Budget, which shows interest on public debt as 
recorded in Budget Table 13. Royalties and patents fees are 
payments made by the government to use privately-owned materials. 
Subsidies are current grants that may be made by central (or 
local) government to private and public enterprises and producer 
boards. For a fuller listing of subsidies, see Chapter Six, Figure 
6.12. They include payments to ensure a guaranteed price or to enable 
market prices of goods and services to be held below the costs of 
production. Under NZSNA definition, only market-production 
enterprises receive subsidies. CUrrent grants made by the government 
to households and producers of private non-profit services to 
households are regarded as current transfers (not as subsidies) and 
are social assistance grants by definition. 
189. 
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Social assistance grants are similar to the economic concept of 
transfer payments to households. This category includes all monetary 
benefits paid to individuals and households including family benefit, 
unemployment benefits, sickness benefits, national superannuation, the 
costs incurred by the government for free prescriptions and doctors' 
consultation subsidies as well as education subsidies to private schools 
and private non-Profit educational authorities. Also included is the 
grant paid to private hospitals on behalf of individuals. 
CUrrent transfers are unrequited transfers of income which do not 
conform with the definition of items classified in other categories. 
1hese transfers, considered to be payments for non-market activities, are 
made from current government income and add to the current. income of 
recipients. OUrrent transfers are classified according to the type of 
recipient. The main categories of transfers and examples of the 
recipients are outlined in Figure 4.4. Recipients of central government 
transfer expenditures are: 1) Private non-Profit-making organisations; 2) 
Local Authorities; 3) Central Government; 4) Others within New Zealand; 
and 5) Rest of the world. -
FIG:.RE 4.4 
EXPWl.ES OF TRANSFER PAvtENTS · 
--------------------------------~---------------------------------------------
Category of Transfer 
Private Non-Profit Organisations 
Serving Households (PNPs) 
Local Authorities 
Government Outside the Public Account 
Government Inside the Public Account 
Others Within New Zealand 
Rest of the World 
Example 
Grants to Plunket Society, 
Foundation for the Blind etc • . 
Grants to nassella tussock boards, 
central government contribution to 
road maintenance 
Grants to Royal Society of 
New Zealand 
Transfers to trust accounts 
Miscellaneous grants not classified 
elsewherea 
Subscriptions to international 
organisations; Foreign aid for 
current expenditure purposes. 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
a) Primarily from Votes Agriculture and Fisheries, Health and the Forest 
Service. Source: Department of Statistics. 
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Savings completes the disbursements side of Figure 4.3. It is the 
residual in the government income and outlay account. It is a source of 
finance in the government capital finance account. In recent years, 
savings has been negative because the central government's current 
expenditure has been greater than its current receipts. 
D.Lb: Functional Classification of Central Government Outlays 
As mentioned in the introduction to this section, central government 
outlays can also be classified by function. Government outlays summarise 
the aggregate supply of government-provided goods and services. The 
actual products represented by this summary are many and varied. A 
number of different forms of income and family support are provided 
through the Department of Social Welfare. Final education expenditure 
goes to provide products such as public and private schools, 
kindergarten, pre-school, correspondence school, teacher training and 
tertiary education. The products of expenditure on national defence 
include armies, navies and airforces. 
When compiling the government account, the Department of Statistics 
attempts to disaggregate information about government activities so that 
it can be classified as closely as possible to national income accounting 
definitions. Three problems which arise relate to the nature of the 
budget round and the way in which government departments account for 
their activities. First, when departments overspend in one area, they 
may re-classify an expenditure to fit with an appropriation which is 
underspent. Secondly, the budgeting process has been structured largely 
as a form of financial management and the classifications relate to how 
much things cost rather than to what government departments do. Thirdly, 
an expenditure-conscious government may reduce spending by restricting 
new programmes. This can result in new functions being classified under 
existing programmes. Where possible, the Department of Statistics 
attempts to adjust for these deficiencies. 
Figure 4.5 on the next two pages reclassifies the information 
contained in the disbursements side of Figure 4.3 by function. The right 
hand column of the Figure outlines the criteria for imputing the 
expenditures to household income groups in Chapter Six. 
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FIGURE 4.5 
CENTRAL GOVERNENT OUTLAYS CLASSIFIED BY FUNCTION 
1981/82 
Function Amount ($M) 
Agriculture & Fisheries Support Services 
Final Consumption Expenditure 
Education 
Social, Recreational & 
Research Services 
Industries 
1.5 
Interest Concessions (Rural Bank) 
39.4 
104.5 
15.5 
3.4 
6.6 
170.9 
Lands & Survey 
Agriculture & Fisheries 
Education 
Final Consumption Expenditure 1,260.0 
(less National Library -9.6) 
Social Assistance Grants 104.5 
General Benefits 
Final Consumption Expenditure 
General Administration 
Defence 
Social, Recreational & 
Research Services 
Industries 
Royalties and Patent Fees 
National Library 
Health 
Final Consumption Expenditure 
Social Assistance Grants 
!-busing 
Social Assistance Grants 
Home Ownership Rebates 
Interest Concessions 
Maori Affairs 
Final Consumption Expenditure 
General Administration 
Education 
Social Welfare 
Industries 
Interest COncessions 
Social Welfare Benefits 
Social Assistance Grants 
National Superannuation 
1,364.5 
861.5 
587.3 
219.4 
97.3 
0.2 
9.6 
1,775.3 
1,121.9 
314.4 
1,436.3 
40.0 
34.8 
74.8 
2.0 
3.5 
3.9 
8.1 
4.0 
-
1,895.8 
Sub-
TOtal 
(SM) 
21.5 
l-Ow 
Allocated to Households (see C~apter Six) 
Farmers by occupation 
) 
) Distributed by: 
) households, persons, 
) income, expenditure, 
) and property ownership 
) 
Per capita health 
expenditure by age 
Energy: General Benefit 
rest: Housing Corp 
By Maori race 
By Nat.Sup.(Household Survey 
data identify recipients) 
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-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Function 
Family Benefit 
Domestic Purposes (less 
.amount 
(SM) 
297.7 
Maintenance Receipt) 239.8 
Unemployment Benefit 156.4 
Sickness & Invalids 104.0 
War Pensions (includes miners & 
special annuities) 
Widows (includes $2.7m lump 
sum on death) 
Telephone Rentals ($1.8m) & 
TV Licence 
Subsidies 
Handicapped Child Allowance 
Orphan Benefit 
Misc. (Labour Dept, 
apprentices, etc.) 
Subsidies 
Interest 
Internal Payments 
N.Z. Debt Services 
Share acquisitions in 
ADS and IBRO 
Security encashment 
ADS and IBRO 
786.7 
1.2 
1.4 
55.0 
79.1 
65.4 
2.6 
1.4 
0.9 
10.8 
2,853.9 
575.1 
Security encashment IMF 
International Finance 
Agreement 1.2 845.5 
External Payments (Overseas 
Debt Services) 
-
416.3 
Sub-
Tot'al 
( $1"1) 
1,261.8 
How 
Allocated to Households 
(see Chapter Six) 
)Household Survey data 
) identify recipients 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) Household Survey 
) data identify 
) recipients 
) 
) 
) 
Agric. subsidies to farmers 
Expend. on subsidised items 
General Benefits 
Savings 
General Benefit 
OJrrent Transfers 428.5 General Benefit 
Savings (-402.1) Household Savings 
Total Central Government CUrrent Outlays 9,560.5 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Note: Main Sub-totals as % of Total Expenditure 
Social Welfare Benefits 
General Benefits 
realth 
Education 
Interest (less concessions) 
Subsidies 
Miscellaneous 
CUrrent Transfers 
Savings 
Other 
Total 
Amount 
2,853.9 
l,ns.3 
1,436.3 
1,364.5 
1,261.8 
575.1 
428.5 
(-)402.1 
267.2 
9, 560.5 
% 
2978 
18.6 
15.0 
14.3 .. 
13.2 
6.0 
4.5 
(-)4.2 
2.8 
Ioo.o 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Source: Department of Statistics (latest available statistics in March 1985). 
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0.2: Central Government Receipts 
The income which government uses to finance its expenditure 
activities is collected in a variety of ways - not just through taxation 
as implied in much of the budget incidence literature. As is the case 
with government expenditures, the NZSNA format classifies government 
receipts: 1) by economic criteria in the incom~ and outlay account 
(discussed in Section 0.2.a); and, 2) by functional classifications 
(that is, receipts by source as discussed in Section 0.2.b). 
D.2.a: Receipts Side of the Income and Outlay Account 
Referring back to the bottom section of Figure 4.3, this section 
describes the receipts side of the government's income and outlay 
account. These receipts mainly-comprise payments to the consolidated 
account of the central government's Public Account. They do not include 
charges for goods and services provided by government trading 
departments, although they include the operating surplus of some trading 
departments. A common characterisitic of most of the receipts classified 
in Figure 4.3 is that they are compulsory payments to the government in 
the sense that the requirement to make the payment is specified by law or 
statute. 
By far the most important government revenue item is direct 
taxes. In 1981/82, direct taxes were 68 percent of the central 
government receipts. Direct taxes on income are levies made at regular 
intervals by central government on both individuals and producers' income 
from all sources. 
Other direct taxes include levies by central government on the 
financial assets and the net, or total, worth of enterprises, private 
non-profit organisations and households; and on the possession, or use, 
of goods by individuals or households. Examples are motor vehicle 
registration and licence fees paid by households. Excluded are 
non-recurrent levies in respect of these items such as estate and gift 
duties. 
The second largest receipt item is indirect taxes. Indirect taxes 
are compulsory levies paid to the government by producers in respect of 
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the production, sale, purchase and use of goods and services, and which 
producers treat as an expense of production. These taxes are paid by 
market and non-market production groups to central and local government 
institutional sectors.8 For a full breakdown of indirect tax receipts 
by NZSNA category, see Figure 5.6. 
Property income is the third largest central government receipt. 
TMis refers to income from government-owned financial assets earned as 
interest, dividends and royalties. A major component of this is interest 
income for money borrowed from the Public Account (primarily by the 
Department of Energy, the f-lo using Corporation and the Rural Bank). The 
receipt item entitled 'interest concessions' refers to an adjustment to 
account for concessions on money borrowed at below market rates from the 
Public Account. 9 
Other receipt items include operating surplus, withdrawals from 
trading accounts, compulsory fees, fines and penalties and current 
transfers not classified under other headings. Operating surplus 
refers to those particular amounts of the profits of trading departments 
and government corp~rations paid into the Public Account according to 
statutory requirement. Withdrawals from trading accounts refer to 
receipts earmarked for the central government, though collected by 
trading departments. 
Co~tlsory fees, fines and penalties are payments made by both 
producers and households which are obligatory and unavoidable. These 
include court fines, passport fines and motor vehicle change of 
ownership, if paid by the household. CUrrent transfers not elsewhere 
· classified include such things as transfers from school committees to 
the relevant Education Authorities. 
8. Tax is paid by non-market entities include property rates, payments 
by the central government to local authorities and local authority 
payment of motor vehicle registration fees to central government. 
9. Combined with this item are net casualty insurance claims which 
relate to the difference between insurance claimed and insurances 
owed. The small size of this item reflects the fact that the 
government is not in the business of insuring its property to any 
large extent. Usual practice is to write off an asset that is lost 
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D.2.b: Central Government Income Classified by Source 
The personal income tax is an extremely important source of central 
government revenue. This is shown by Figure 4.6 where central government 
income is classified by source (similar to the classification of 
government expenditures by function in Figure 4.5). Personal income tax 
payments made up 61.1 per cent of total central government income in 
1981/82. 
Figure 4.6 also illustrates the methods used far allocating 
different taxes to household income group in the final right-hand 
column. The personal income tax is imputed to households according to 
those in the household earning an income subject to income tax. 
The second most important source of government revenue is the sales 
tax which accounted for 10.9 percent of revenue in 1981/82. It is 
allocated to household income groups according to household expenditure 
on taxable income items. 
Property income, the third most important source of government 
revenue, is not a tax. Mainly, this item comprises interest income 
earned when money from the consolidated account is loaned to government 
departments for capital developments. Since the interest is paid aut of 
trading department income, it adds to the cost to the taxpayer of paying 
for trading department services. As such, it is a tax on all users. To 
allocate payment of the tax to households, it is treated as a general tax 
(the opposite of a general benefit). As discussed in Chapter Five, there 
are several possible ways in which this general tax payment may be 
spread amongst household income types. For example, it may be a function 
of household income, the number of household occupants, household 
expenditure, and so on. 
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FIGURE 4.6 
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT INCOME (REVENUE) FOR 1981/82 CLASSIFIED BY SOURCE 
Sub- % of How Allocated 
Amount Total Total to H'holds 
($M) ($M) (see Chapter Five) 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Personal Income Tax Paymentsa 
Tax Deductions (PAYE) 4,895.0 Personal Income Tax 
Income Tax Individuals lz290.7 Payers 
Gross Individuals Income Tax 6,185.7 
Less Refunds (386. 8) 
Individuals Income Tax 5z798.9 
Non-resident Withholding Tax 36.3 
Absentee Income Tax 9.0 
45.3 
Total Personal Irx:ome Tax 5,844.2 61.1 
Taxes Effect 
Sales Tax 1,038.0 10.9 Expenditures from 
Prq:lerty IrCane 
Household Survey 
Interest 686. o· Opposite of General 
Dividends 8.9 Benefits - Is a 
Royalties 3.8 General Tax. 
Imputed Interest .Concessions 7.6 Based on Several 
Total Property Incane 706.3 7.4 Assumptions. 
Company Income Tax Payments 703.8 7.4 Imputed Based on 
Several Assumptions 
Other Indirect Tax Payments 
Motor Vehicles Fees 20.4 ) Distributed 
Motor Spirit Duty 276.2 ) According to 
Racing Duty 51.0 ) Expenditure 
Road User Charges 82.5 ) Patterns · 
Stamp guty 59.2 ) Illustrated By 
Other 121.0 ) the 1-l.ousehold 
Total Other Indirect 610.3 6.4 ) Survey 
Import Duties 337.2 ) 
- Beer 74.3 ) 
- Cigarettes, Cigars & Tobacco 112.7 ) 
- Spirits & Spiritous Mixtures 25.1 ) 
Total Import and Excise Duties 549.3 5.7 ) 
Miscellaneous Receipts 
Operating Surplus 11.6 ) Opposite of 
Withdrawals from Trading Accounts 19.1 ) General 
Compulsory Fees, Fines & Penalties 38.0 ) Benefit 
Current Transfers 39.9 108.6 1.1 ) 
Total Central Government Income 9z560.5 100.0 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Notes: a) Includes direct taxes on others. These amounts from Inland Revenue 
Annual Report for 1981/82. b) An additional $115.5 in taxes collected 
outside public account reduces this figure from $236.4 million (Total 
Government Income becomes $9,675.9 million). Source: Departments of 
Statistics. 
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0.3: Government Activities Excluded from Income and Outlay Account 
By choosing to use the central government income and outlay account 
as the basis for analysing the influence of the budget, a number of 
government activities are excluded. In particular, excluded are the 
activities of; 1) trading depart~ents and government-owned financial 
intermediaries; 2) government capital formation; 3) the budget activities 
of local authorities; and 4) extra-budgetary operations, including some 
economic-management operations not reflected in bwdget transactions. 
D. 3. a: Trading Departments 
Recent government policies related to the operations of trading 
departments and financial intermediaries have been labelled as 
State-Owned Enterprise policies. It appears that the aim of such 
policies is to separate the government's provision of private-goods from 
its functions related to the provision public goods. In as much as the 
government-provided private good commands a market price, the 
distributional implications of the government providing that good are 
irrelevant. What is relevant, however, is whether the changes in the 
structure of State-Owned Enterprises effect household income distribution. 
Normally, government-provision of goods is likely to result in some 
divergence between the market price for the good and what it costs the 
government to produce. In theory, this is reflected in the statutory 
payments from government trading departments into the consolidated 
account. 
D .3. b: The Central Government Capital Finance Account 
The government builds hydro-electric power plants, highways, Post 
Offices, new schools and other public utilities. These capital 
expenditures will influence current household behaviour. Individuals may 
reduce savings for bequests to the extent that these capital goods can be 
viewed as ensuring a higher standard of living for future generations. 
Individuals may also save less because expenditure on capital projects 
now is viewed as enabling lower tax rates or higher social security 
benefits in the future. Appendix Four records the NZSNA information 
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about central government capital formation in 1980/81, 1981/82 and 
1982/83. 
Capital expenditures are not treated in this thesis. This is 
because of the decision to focus on redistribution which satisfies income 
maintenance policies. In other words, an attempt is made to calculate 
the current money-income values of government expenditures to 
households. This treatment goes against the literature which argues that 
households' current decisions are based on a recognition of future income 
from capital. 
D.3.c: Budget Activities of Local Authorities 
Perhaps one role of studies of the influence of the budget is the 
evaluation of economic activities which are financed by compulsory levies 
rather than by market prices. Based on this definition of the focus of 
an incidence study, the effects of local government should be analysed in 
conjunction with the central government. This is the approach adopted in 
the North American quantitative studies by Gillespie and Musgrave. 
0.3.d: Extra-budgetary Operations 
Break (1982) discusses two extra-budgetary areas of operation, 
credit programmes and tax expenditures. Credit programmes are subsidies 
provided implicitly through an expenditure (such as a subsidy which 
exists on housing loans when they are provided by the government at below 
market rates of interest). Tax expenditures refer to government goods 
delivered through the tax system. For example, the government assists 
households to consume education by allowing them to deduct school fees 
and donations. Information about these operations are not usually 
included in the published accounts of central government activities, 
either in the United States or New Zealand. 
Pope (1981) shows tax expenditures in New Zealand to be quite large 
in relation to sources of tax revenue. Figure 4.7 (Section D.4.a of this 
Chapter) includes Rope's estimates of business and personal tax 
expenditures in 1980 and 1981. Some tax expenditures are treated 
implicitly in this study through adjustments in personal tax liability 
using ASSET. 
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Finally, government economic-management policies not recorded by 
budget transactions could also have implications for the distribution of 
income by household. For example, policies to finance the budget deficit 
would have monetary effects which lead to changes in income, possibly by 
crowding out investment or through changes in interest rates. 
There is no doubt that these extra-budgetary operations could have a 
significant effect on income distribution. Future studies could take 
such things into account. 
0.4. The Economic Meaning of National Income Accounts 
As noted in Section C, the NZSNA definitions are not necessarily 
consistent with the economic concepts required for a general equilibrium 
study of budget incidence. Pope (1981) attempts to classify national 
government accounts data by economic function. The general equilibrium 
studies take this process a step further by re-specifying national 
accounts data to be consistent with the conditions of general 
equilibrium. (see StHilaire and Whalley, 1983 and Henry et al, 1986). 
D.4.a: Pope's Public Sector Dimensions 
Pope uses available data to analyse government as a tax collector, 
as a spender, as a producer, as a provider of household incomes, as a 
provider of goods and services and so on. Turning to what the government 
provides, "provision" is applied in a broad sense to cover the fact that 
the government may provide more than it produces but not less than it 
finances. He includes, for instance, tax expenditures. Though they are 
neither production nor strictly speaking, financial payments by the 
government, they are provided by the government similarly to transfer 
payments. 
Government is treated as providing three general classes of goods 
and services: 1) non-market goods and services; 2) transfer payments; and 
3) marketable goods and services. Non-market goods and services can be 
further disaggregated into individual and economic welfare goods and 
services and collective goods. These classifications (based on 1980 and 
1981 data) are illustrated by Figure 4.7. 
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FIGURE 4.7 
PROVISI~ OF GOCOS AND SERVICES BY CENTRAL GOVERMENT 
IN 1979/80 and 1980/81 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------March Year 1980 % 1981 
($M) Change ($M) 
--------------------------------Categories 
Collective Goods 1,119 27.3 1,424 
Individual and Economic Welfare 1,846 25.0 2,307 
Transfers 
A) Current 
a) Social Assistance 2,508 12.0 2,810 
b) Other 258 15.1 297 
c) i Subsidies 342 -2.1 335 
ii Interest Concessions 43 25.6 54 
B) Debt Interest 790 14.6 905 
C) Financial Transfers 
1) Mise. In vestment 4 23400.0 94 
2) Misc. Finance 372 10.5 411 
D) Tax Expenditures 
l) Personal 475 1.5 482 
2) Business 239 54.0 368 
Marketable Goods and Services 2,101 17.8 2,475 
----------------------------------------------------------------~----TOTAL 10,097 18.5 11,962 
Sources: Table coqliled by Pope, 1981. The data shown were either 
obtained directly or derived. Categories 1, 2, 3), 3B) and 4, were 
based on the following Department of Statistics publications: 
Monthly Abstract of Statistics (May 1981) Appendix II; Monthly 
Abstract of Statistics (September 1981) Appendix II; Monthly 
Abstract of Statistics (February 1982), National Accounts Section. 
For Category 3C): Budget Table 1. For category 3D): Department of 
Statistics, Income and Income Tax; Report of Task Force on Tax 
Reform (April 1982) and Goddard (1981). 
A starting point of a general equilibrium model focussed on 
expenditure incidence would be to specify behavioural relationships (such 
as consumer preferences for collective goods) based on classifications 
such as Pope's. It is not proposed to build such a model in this 
thesis. The national account functional classifications of government 
expenditures are largely applied instead (see Chapter Six) because they 
can be more easily analysed given the available statistics 
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D.4.b: General Equilibrium Adjustments to National Accounts Data 
For the SWF general equilibrium studies, substantial changes are 
made to the national accounts to make them consistent with equilibrium 
conditions. The necessity arises because the detailed information 
presented in the National Accounts is largely a by-product of the 
process of assembling macroeconomic aggregates and typically does not 
aim at consistency in various areas of detail. According to 
St-Hilaire and Whalley (1983, p.l77): 
"General equilibrium analysis, perhaps the most widely used 
theoretical framework for economy-wide microeconomic analysis, is 
only explicity recognised in the construction of current national 
income accounts in the aggregate income-expenditure indentity, 
but not in subaggregate d!=tail." 
D .5: The Budget Concept : Conclusion 
In summary, with some recent exceptions, the SWF literature 
models tax incidence rather than budget incidence. Recent work by 
Keller, Pigott and Whalley incorporates government expenditure on 
transfers, subsidies, and public consumption. ~e generalised 
treatment of government activities by these models, however, fails to 
observe the various (and myriad) influences of government measures on 
household money incomes (see Chapter Two, Section C). 
This is one reason why this thesis has chosen the methodology of 
a quantitative study. In this way it is possible to analyse each 
government income and outlay item. Or in other words, household 
incomes can be adjusted to take account of government expenditures, as 
well as receipts. 
CHAPTER FIVE 
PAYMENTS TO CENTRAL GOVERNMENT BY HOUSEHOLD INCOME GROUP 
The private sector pays for government-provided goods and services 
in several ways. Chapter Five analyses the distribution of payments to 
the government by household income group and household type. 
By far the largest payment to the government is the personal income 
tax which accounts for 61.1 percent of total central government revenue 
for March year 1982. Next in importance is indirect taxes (or more 
accurately, taxes assessed on economic transactions other than 
income-flows) which provide 23.0 percent of revenue. Only 7.4 percent of 
central government revenue is from the company income tax. This is less 
than the 8.5 percent of revenue contributed by other receipts which 
comprise government property income (mainly interest income) and 
miscellaneous government receipts. 
Figure 5.1 below classifies central government revenue, as defined 
by the NZSNA central government income and outlay account, into the four 
main revenue sources. 
FIGURE 5.1 : CENTRAL GOVERNENT INCa.£ FOR MARCH YEAR 1982 
a.ASSIFIED BY MAIN SllJRCE 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------Revenue Source Amount ($M) % of Total 
A. Personal Income Tax 5,844.2 61.1 
B. Indirect Taxes 2, 197.6 23.0 
Import & Excise Duties etc 1,159.6 12.1 
Wholesale Sales Tax 1,038.0 10.9 
c. Company Income Tax 703.8 7.4 
D. Other Receipts 814.9 8.5 
Government Property Income 706.3 7.4 
Miscellaneous 108.6 1.1 
Total Government Revenue 91 560.5 100.0 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------Source: NZSNA, Department of Statistics. 
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This Chapter discusses the nature of payments to the government and 
the empirical information required to assess their distribution by 
household type and household income group. It also discusses the 
incidence of these payments in light of the results of the empirical 
general equilibrium models surveyed in Sections C and D of Chapter Two. 
Chapter Five is divided in four substantive Sections devoted to the 
-- four main sources of revenue listed in Figure 5.1. Each section has four 
main parts which 1) outline the main legal and institutional features of 
the revenue source under consideration; 2) survey the literature on the 
incidence of the tax or payment; 3) discuss the method used in this 
thesis to calculate the money-income value of the payment to government 
by household income group and household type; and, 4) discuss the 
quantitative results in light of the methodologies behind each of the 
four stages. 
1. Description of the Statutory Requirements 
The interpretation of the statutory requirements fer taxes and other 
payments to the government has empirical and theoretical implications. 
Knowledge of the tax statutes assists in identifying immediate liability 
in terms of whether a payment to the government is initiated in the 
household sector or some other sector. This knowledge is also required 
to assess the amount of immediate tax liability. 
It has become the practice of the empirical economic general 
equilibrium models to analyse the theoretical concept of a particular 
tax, rather than the legal and institutional features of the tax. 
Chapter Two, Section C.l.a. discusses this aspect of the SWF models (see 
Figure 2.3). For example, the usual theoretical treatment of personal 
income taxes is to apply a simple marginal tax rate scale on personal (or 
household) incomes. In reality, the personal income tax is a very 
complicated tax which comprises a number of tax rebates, exemptions and 
deductions (not to mention exceptions). By introducing the discussion of 
each major source of revenue with a description of its legal and 
institutional features, this thesis identifies some of the gaps in the 
current research about the economic effects of actual government 
revenue-earning transactions. 
--- --- - - - - - ----
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2. The Incidence of Government Receipts 
Economic analysis suggests that the value of a tax (or other payment 
to government) in money-income or resource terms may differ from its 
statutory liability because of changes in economic relationships as a 
result of the imposition of the tax. Progress in the study of tax 
incidence is surveyed in Chapter Two where it is concluded that there are 
still a number of controversial issues to be resolved. A choice is made 
to use the framework of a quantitative study in this thesis, rather than 
a fully-fledged general equilibrium model. 
The Stage One approach is designed to analyse the direct effects of 
the government's collection of revenue. In the language of 
economic-incidence, this means that Stage One is concerned with the 
statutory or impact point of the tax or other payment to the government. 
The Stage Two approach is designed to apply assumptions about the 
economic effects of payments to the government based on the general 
equilibrium literature. Although the general equilibrium literature does 
analyse the incidence of taxes by household income groups, the main 
thrust of the research has been to identify the nature of the economic 
relationships and how they change when a particular tax change is 
introduced. As discussed in Chapters Two and Four, the revenue side of 
the government budget is more complex than set out by general equi librium 
models such as the HMM (Harberger, McLure and Mieszkowski) and SWF 
(Shaven, Whalley and Fullerton) models. The HMM models basically treat 
taxes on two factors (labour and capital) and two products. The SWF 
general equilibrium incidence models analyse the! incidence of a wide 
range of taxes (giving particularly careful attention to the analysis of 
the company income tax) but usually ignore other sources of government 
revenue. Also, the analysis of the incidence of the revenue side of the 
budget, in terms of household income distribution, requires further 
development. As a result, some of the underlying incidence assumptions 
adopted for Stage Two are necessarily rough. 
Stages Three and Four would require a formal economic model similar 
to SWF general equilibrium models to estimate tax incidence based on 
behavioural relationships. There are two major short-comings of existing 
SWF models when they are applied to analyse the distributional effects of 
-·~ - - ___ __. _. _ ""''- - - .L - - ~--- "-1.--- ,~- ' ·-
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between household factor ownership, the deriviation of household income, 
and the effects of budget revenues are not specified by SWF models to 
focus on the policy issues of income maintenance and income 
redistribution. Chapter Five discusses the second shortcoming which is 
that SWF models analyse the effects of an economic concept of a tax 
rather than the effects of a tax which has been lega~ly imposed. 
3. Imputing Payments to Households 
Stages One and Two start from the analysis of the observable data 
about the effects of the revenue side of the budget on household income 
distribution. The first concern is to use the data to estimate the 
money-income value of payments to central government by household income 
groups and household type. The second concern is to discover what 
insights, if any, are provided by an analysis of observable data which 
are applicable to the formal general equilibrium analysis of tax 
incidence. Then, if a Stage Three and Stage Four approach were adopted 
-- at some future date, the analysis could be augmented to take account of 
any significant insights. 
The basic source of data for the quantitative research in Chapter 
Five is the 1981/82 Household Survey. As has been explained ·in Chapter 
Three, the data are weighted based on the 1981 Census so that the results 
can be aggregated to the entire private household population. Subsidiary 
information is provided by statistics from Inland Revenue published in 
Income and Income Tax, the Customs Department and the Department of 
Statistics ASSET and Inter-Industry Sections. 
4. Payments to Goverment by Household Income Groups and Household Type 
The conclusion of each major Section in Chapter Five discusses the 
quantitative results of the Stage One and Stage Two approaches. This 
thesis extends the research of the 1982 Task Force in Tax Reform and the 
1985 Institute of Policy Studies research into the incidence of indirect 
taxes (see Broad and Bacica, 1985; Scott, Goss and Davis, 1985) to 
incorporate the analysis the distribution of the company income tax and 
other government receipts. Also discussed are the possible differences 
to the results if the methodologies inherent in a Stage Three and Stage 
Four approach could be applied. 
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A. PERSONAL INCOME TAX PAY~NTS 
Since they contributed over 60 percent of government revenue in 
1981/82, personal income taxes are potentially the most important 
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influence on household income distribution. The analysis of the 
distribution of the personal income tax is also important because the tax 
is apparently designed to perform the major redistributive job of the 
government. 
The redistributive objective of the personal income tax is intended 
to be achieved primarily by the schedule of marginal tax rates. The 
marginal rate scale is designed so that, excluding the effects of 
exemptions and rebates, average tax rates rise with income. Those on 
higher taxable incomes not only pay more in absolute terms but also they 
pay a larger proportion of their total taxable income in tax. In 
practice, however, the definition of taxable income does not include all 
sources of income. Further, the actual amount of tax paid may be reduced 
by exemptions, deductions and rebates. These features of the personal 
income tax may offset some of the redistributive effects of the marginal 
tax scale. 
A.l: The Statutory Requirement for Personal Income Tax Payment 
The act covering statutory liability for income tax - The Income Tax 
Act 1976 - covers the taxation of income from persons and companies. 
Income defined as subject to personal income tax can be classified under 
three main headings: (1) salary and wage income; (2) investment incomes 
and (3) self-employment income. 
In 1981/82, there were 1,711,900 tax returns filed. Of these, 
1,268,520 or 74.1 percent of returns were filed by individuals whose main 
source of taxable income was wages and salaries. In comparison, 17.5 
percent of tax returns were filed by individuals whose main source of 
taxable income was investment income (investment income earners are those 
who derived a major part of their incomes from national superannuation, 
dividends, rents and royalties, overseas income, annuities, estate income 
and interest). Another 8.4 percent were filed by those who mainly earned 
self-employment income (including partnerships, sole traders and other 
unincorporated enterprises). 
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Turning to the components of the personal income tax base, 74.2 
. percent of income subject to personal income tax 
income. Assessable profits from self-employment 
percent of total income; national superannuation 
percent and interest income (less exempt income) 
is salary 
accounted 
accounted 
accounted 
and wage 
for 8. 8 
for 6.1 
for 4.7 
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percent. This leaves 6.2 percent of income from other miscellaneous 
sources including salaries for shareholder employees of companies, rents, 
royalties, dividends, estate income, unemployment benefit income, 
earnings related Accident Compensation and income from pensions, 
superannuation or annuities. 
The amount of personal income tax finally assessed depends on a 
complicated system of rebates, exemptions, and legal exceptions, which 
differ according to the source of income. Treatment under The Income Tax 
Act 1976 can differ quite markedly depending on whether the source of 
income is wages and salaries, self-employed earnings, partnership 
returns, farmer income or whether the recipients are low-income 
families. For example, there are more opportunities to deduct expenses 
incurred while deriving investment income or self-employed income. 
Another difference is that provisional tax is paid twice a year on an 
estimate of annual self-employment and investment earnings. In 
comparison, pay-as-you-earn (PAYE) deductions are made from salaries and 
wages when they are paid out and remitted by employers to the government 
on a monthly basis. 
The personal income tax receipts received by the government in a 
given financial year do not relate directly to income earned in that 
particular year. This is because returns are filed after the financial 
year is finished. 1 If there is any difference between PAYE tax 
deducted or tax provisionally paid and the actual tax owed, an adjustment 
or "square up" is made. If there is an overpayment, the taxpayer will 
receive a refund or credit against future tax. If insufficient tax was 
paid, there will be further ("terminal") tax to pay. 
1. Salary and wage earners file their returns by 7 June following the 
completion of the financial year on 31 March. Self-employed and 
other provisional taxpayers file by 7 September when they are 
required to pay one-third of the amount of tax liability assessed. 
They pay the remainder, plus any terminal tax from the year before, 
on 7 March, nearly a full year after the completion of the financial 
year. 
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Salary and wage earners are assessed an their total taxable income 
earned in the year just completed, less any deduction far expenses and 
special exemptions. Rebates and the (PAYE) taxes already paid are 
deducted from the tax assessed to give either a refund or further tax to 
pay. A majority of salary and wage earners receive refunds of overpaid 
tax. Refunds can arise as a result of exemptions and rebates (since 
these are claims which are nat covered by the Tax Code Declaration) or 
because the wage earner was employed for part of the year only. In 
contrast, a self-employed taxpayer is likely to pay the lowest rate of 
provisional tax that is legally possible and then make a larger terminal 
tax payment. 
The graduated tax scale and marginal tax rates applies to all forms 
of personal income. Figure 5.2 shows the rates of income tax payable for 
the year commencing 1 April 1981 on each dollar of taxable income. 
FIG.R: 5.2 
TI-E PERSONAL INCG£ TAX SCALE 
(Applicable between 1 April 1981 and 1 October 1982) 
Income Range 
Rate per 
Dollar 
~-------------------------------------------------------------------------$ 
Up to 5,500 
5,500 to 12,600 
12,601 to 17,600 
17,601 to 22,000 
Over 22,000 
Source: 1980 Budget. 
t 
14.5 
35.0 
48.0 
55.0 
60.0 
"Taxable income" is the definition of income to which the marginal 
tax scale is applied. "Assessable income" is the balance of "total 
earned income" after deduction of employment-related expenses and 
exclusion of income which is specially designated to be exempt from tax. 
"Taxable income" is "assessable income" less further "special 
exemptions". This confusing array of definitions arises because of the 
history of changes to the income tax structure. Although the tax is 
basically assessed on sources of income, features of it are designed to 
promote certain uses of income as can be seen from the list of 
exemptions, special exemptions and rebates on the next few pages. 
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FIGURE 5.3 : EXEWf INCOt-E IN 1981/82 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
(i) Social welfare benefits except for National Superannuation and 
the unemployment benefit when the recipient has no dependent 
children; 
(ii) A certain portion of interest and dividend income (depending 
on the prevailing legislation). In 1981/82, the first $200 
interest and dividend incomea was exempt from taxation; 
(iii) Maintenance and alimony; 
(iv) Educational bursaries and scholarships. 
Note: a) Dividends paid from tax-free reserves are not considered to be 
assessable income. Source: 1982 New Zealand Official Yearbook. 
Figure 5.3 above lists the types of income whi~h were exempt from 
the personal income tax in 1981/82. Besides income exemptions, there are 
also expenditures which may be deducted from taxable income called 
"special exemptions". The special exemptions available in 1981/82 were 
for life insurance and superannuation contributions. These exemptions 
are summarised by Figure 5.4 below. 
The basic liability for personal income tax is obtained by applying 
the appropriate tax rate scale to taxable income. Then rebates are 
deducted from the total tax payable. Figure 5.5 on the following page 
lists the rebates allowable for the 31 March 1982 income year. 
FIQF£ 5.4 : EXaFTICJ5 FOR LIFE INSURANCE AND SUPERANN.JATICt4 
IN 1981/82 
Income Tax Exernotion 
Life insurance, personal accident 
and sickness premiums paid for 
self, wife or children, and 
superannuation 
Amount of Exemption 
The amount paid or contributed up 
to an exemption of -
$800 if a member or an employer-
subsidised superannuation 
fund for the whole year with 
proportionate increases if a 
member for only part of the 
year. 
$1,000 in other cases. 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------Source: 1982 New Zealand Offical Yearbook. 
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FIGJRE 5.5 : REBATES ALLOWED IN 1981/82 TAX YEAR 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Rebate Amount 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------D"lildren's Children under 15 or still at school and who derive 
income may personally claim a rebate of $78. 
Wife/husband (spouse) .$156, decreases by 20 cents for each dollar by which 
spouse's income exceeds $520. Where spouse's income 
Low income family 
exceeds $1,300 - no rebate allowable. 
Allowable to the principal income earner in a family 
with a child for whom the family benefit is paid. 
Also available to solo parents and widows with a 
child. The rebate is $468 a year where the combined 
income of both spouses is less than $9,800 per year, 
and decreases by 12~ for each dollar of income over 
$9,800 and is thereby extinguished when income 
reaches $13,700. 
Housekeeper (under Limited to the smaller of 40 cents for each complete 
certain circumstances) dollar of payments made or $156. 
Dependent relative Limited to the smaller of 40 cents for each complete 
Back pay 
Overtime 
dollar contributed to support a relative; or $60. 
6 cents per $1 of back pay received which relates to a 
previous income year. 
10 cents per hour for every hour of qualifying overtime 
worked • 
Shift . 40 cents for each qualifying shift worked. 
Young family 
Special Home, Farm, 
or Fishing Vessel 
Ownership Account 
Home vendor 
mortgage interest 
School fees and 
charitable donations 
Property rates or 
Chatham Islands Dues 
Interest on first 
home mortgage 
Allowable to principal income earner in a family with at 
least 1 child under 5 years of age. The rebate is 
$468 where the sole or principal income earner 
derives less than $13,700 per annum. Rebates 
decrease by 12 cents for each dollar of income over 
$13,700 per annum and is extinguished when the income 
reaches $17,600. 
45 cents for each $1 of annual savings increase in 
Special Home, Farm, or Fishing Vessel Ownership 
account. Maximum rebatable savings are: 
Home ownership - $3,000 per year (rebate $1,350) 
Farm ownership - $5,000 per year (rebate $2,250) 
Fishing vessel ownership - $5,000 per year (rebate 
52,250) 
20 cents for each $1 of net interest received in respect 
of a "Home Vendor Mortgage11 , subject to a maximum 
rebate of $500. This rebate is in substitution for, 
and not additional to, the relevant interest 
exemption which would otherwise be available. 
SO cents for each dollar of payments made up to $3SO. 
Maximum rebate $17S. 
Up to $25 in respect of rates paid to a local authority 
or dues paid to the local council on an owner-
occupied residence. 
The lesser of $1,000 or SO percent of qualifying 
mortgage interest paid by an owner-occupier of a 
first home. The rebate is allowable in respect of 
the firstS years of ownership and occupancy. 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Source: 1982 Yearbook. 
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A.2: The Incidence of the Personal Income Tax 
The mainstream view about the incidence of the personal income tax 
is that it lives up to its popular label as a direct tax. That is, the 
tax is paid by the person legally liable, reducing that person's income 
by exactly the amount of tax assessed. In the jargon of tax incidence, 
it is a tax which stays where it is put and is not shifted. Or to put it 
another way, the apparent and the effective incidence of the personal 
income tax are the same. An examination of the empirical research into 
the personal income tax, however, shows that analysis has not addressed 
some of the features of the tax which may have significant distributive 
effects. 
The conditions which must be fulfilled for the personal income tax 
incidence to be evaluated are very restrictive if the Herberger general 
equilibrium model is applied. The persons earning the taxed income must 
be fairly similar to one another in terms of ability; there must be full 
employment; no factor mobility, and, the tax must be assessed on all 
forms of personal income. These conditions are not exactly fulfilled in 
practice because, for example, taxpayers have widely varying abilities 
and skills; there is unemployment; the common Australian-New Zealand 
labour market means that the size of the labour force can change in 
response to tax changes; and the tax is not assessed on all forms of 
personal remuneration. 
McLure's (1971) research suggests that if the condition of no factor 
mobility is relaxed and the peronal income tax is a general tax on factor 
labour in both (afl) industries, then the tax is borne by labour, 
regardless of either its mobility or that of capital (see Section 8.2.b., 
Chapter Two). This suggests that the common Australian/New Zealand 
labour market is not necessarily grounds for changing the assumption that 
the personal income tax is not shifted. 
But while both Australia and New Zealand have a personal income tax, 
it is not the same in both countries. So, in reality it seems likely 
that the international mobility of New Zealanders would have an effect on 
the incidence of taxation for domestic New Zealand households. 
As Bhagwati (1982) puts it, citizenship without obligation to pay 
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income tax is the same as "representation without taxation". A 
consideration of public finance 'theory suggests that an assessment of 
additional tax payments by local residents to support overseas citizens 
should take into account the cost of government-provided goods funded 
from taxation such as education. 
It is also questionable whether the personal income.J:.ax could be 
considered a general tax on one factor. While the marginal tax scale is 
common to all taxpayers, the definition of taxable income is not. For 
example, the practice of remunerating employees with tax-free allowances 
is quite widespread. However, the actual remuneration package, commonly 
covering low-interest housing finance, motor vehicles, travel, 
entertainment and so on, varies from employer to employer and for 
individual employees working for the same employer. Tax-free forms of 
remuneration are less evident in the public sector, and this creates 
distortions with subsidiary industrial consequences. Individuals may 
move to jobs which appear relatively more attractive because of tax-free 
allowances which increase their personal remuneration, but not their 
tax. One reason some employees move between industries is because labour 
is not homogeneous. As people move between jobs, employers will adjust 
their remuneration policies to attract the quality of employees they 
desire. The ability of employers to make these adjustments, will depend 
on their ability to change their productive capacity. Employees' success 
in shifting the personal. income tax away from themselves depends on the 
elasticity of demand for the goods they produce and the elasticities of 
substitution between different types of labour and capital involved in 
production. If these immensely more complex relationships were specified 
in existing general equilibrium models, they could show some shifting of 
the personal income tax. 
Another influence on the incidence of the personal income tax is the 
distinction made far tax purposes between gains of an income nature 
(dividends, interest income) and those of a capital nature (increases in 
property values). With few exceptions, only the former are assessable 
for tax. Under competitive conditions, the individual will accumulate 
tax-free endowments depending on the relevant elasticities of demand and 
substitution and this could lead to some of the tax being shifted. 
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The general equilibrium SWF empirical results are usually derived by 
applying formulas for marginal taxes at an increased rate for each higher 
household group. Most general equilibrium models apply these formulas on 
the implicit assumption that the personal income tax is not shifted 
substantially from households. In the recent literature, the response of 
factors, prices and outputs is not modelled as precisely as, for example, 
the response to a change in a tax on capital. 
Fullerton et al (1978), Piggott and Whalley (1982, 1984) capture the 
progressivity of the personal income tax by treating the personal income 
tax as a separate linear function of income for each household income 
group. A limitation of this treatment is that each household faces a 
marginal tax rate that is unchanging even if simulations of a policy 
change show a redistribution of income. · A significant modelling 
improvement is that by Slemrod (1983), who has endogenized the marginal 
tax rate. In his model, hoUseholds make portfolio choices on the basis 
of the real after-tax rate of return to each asset, as well as its 
riskiness. Taxable income is determined on the basis of the assets that 
are selected by the household. An approximation of tax tables is then 
applied to compute the household's taxable income. 
Piggott (1983 p. 8, 9) treats the personal income tax in some detail 
in his general equilibrium model of the Australian economy. As in New 
Zealand, the tax unit is not the household (the unit at the base of most 
of the analysis) but the individual. The average taxable income of each 
household is estimated from the household's total income, taking account 
of personal allowances, exemptions such as that of owner-occupied 
housing, and various other deductions. Then the taxable income of the 
principle income earners is approximated by multiplying the taxable 
income by the average proportion of household income earned by the main 
income recipient. The marginal tax rate for principle earners is then 
calculated for each model household from the legal tax rate schedule. 
Piggott uses this rate to analyse the behaviour of consumers towards such 
"tax-distorted choices" as the purchase of owner-occupied housing 
services, and in a model variant where leisure is given explicit 
recognition (the "labour-leisure choice"); he finds that the personal 
income tax is very redistributive with those in the highest income 
brackets paying the largest share of tax. 
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In summary, existing analysis of the personal income tax does not 
consider some significant legal features which could lead it to be 
shifted from its original impact. For example, the incidence of the tax 
could differ among taxpayers with income from different sources; advances 
along the lines of the Slemrod research could provide answers here. 
Despite the above reservations, the Stage One and Two approaches, which 
are the basis for the quantitative work on this thesis, assume that the 
personal income tax is not shifted. 
A.3: The E~pirical Calculation of Personal Income Tax Payments By 
Household Lncome Group 
The New Zealand Department of Statistics analyses the personal 
income tax structure using "A Simulation System for Evaluating Taxation" 
(ASSET). Since this is the basis for the analysis of the personal income 
tax in this thesis, this section briefly outlines how the ASSET model 
derives the amount of tax paid by households (see also Broad, 1982). 
ASSET has been designed so that users may interact with the computer 
processing. ASSET is intended to assist those giving policy advice in 
forecasting the effects of changes in various income tax instruments. It 
is based on information about individual taxpayers so that the taxpayers 
are classifiable by the main rebates each can claim. The tax liability 
for each taxpayer is known from the application of the appropriate annual 
tax schedule. Based on projections of income levels and hours worked, 
tax estimates can be prepared which simulate the impact of changing 
incomes and tax schedules over time. Instead of projecting income 
levels, this thesis uses the levels as estimated by the 1981/82 New 
,i Zealand System of National Accounts. 
One of the important features of the ASSET model is that it models 
the personal tax schedule in considerable detail. The detail of the 
modelling goes beyond that of the overseas studies surveyed by this 
thesis. The Household Survey can be used to derive statutory liability 
for personal income taxes. The advantage of using Household Survey data 
is that it allows the liability for personal income taxes to be assessed 
in terms of household income groups and by type of household. Because of 
the information collected by the survey, it is possible to describe in 
detail the distribution of eligibility for rebates and exemptions. 
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Household Survey data for household incomes (disaggregated into 
principal earner and spouse) property rates, life insurance premiums and 
superannuation schemes are incorporated into ASSET. Income analysed 
covers wages and salaries, self-employment income, investment income, 
social welfare benefits (some are taxable) and other regular income (such 
as rental income). 
A limitation of the Household Survey is that it does not seek 
specific information about income taxes. As a result, ASSET is based on 
an application of the tax law, rather than actual Inland Revenue data 
describing taxpayers. Since it is not based on actual tax payments, 
ASSET does not take into account avoidance or evasion of taxes. Inland 
Revenue data, which does cover actual tax payments, is not a suitable 
basis for ASSET because it provides too little detail about the 
characteristics of taxpayers, is not able to be analysed by household and 
it does not give as complete coverage, since those earning below $11,500 
were not required to file returns in 1981/82. 
A.3.a: ASSET Derivation of Taxable Income 
The first step in the estimation of the amount of tax paid by 
households is the derivation of assessable income by household; To 
assist, the Household Survey questionnaire asks for information about 
sources of income consistent with the legal definition of assessable 
income. Exempt income (noted in Figure 5.3) is excluded from the 
calculation of assessable income. The ASSET model is applied to 
determine the amount of a household's eligibility for allowable expenses 
and exemptions. These are subtracted from assessable income to yield 
taxable income. 
ASSET ignores the different timing of tax payments for different 
sources of income (for example, it ignores the pattern where 
self-employed earners pay provisional tax in September and terminal tax 
in the following March). Income data are synchronised so that they are 
all evaluated at the average earning rates of the base year. The PAYE 
concept is extended to all income sources. Tax liability is calculated 
for the income level prevailing in a particular period as if that level 
of income was received for a full year. The PAYE concept is also 
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extended far all allowances. Far instance, rebates which are in fact 
allowed only as end-of-year adjustments to the amount of tax paid, are 
spread throughout the year in which they are effective. 
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Data an employment-related expenses claimed for tax assessment 
purposes are collected by Inland Revenue from tax returns. 
Unfortunately, these Inland Revenue data do not provide sufficient 
information to aggregate individual earners claiming expenses into 
household units and the Household Survey does not request sufficient 
information sa that actual employment-related expenses by households can 
be known. 
To derive a money-income value of employment-related expenses, two 
cases were tested far this thesis. This was an innovation of the ASSET 
model which simply applies the $52.00 standard deduction to every 
household. Case 1, (the Standard Case far the ASSET model) assumes that 
employment-related expenses are the minimum standard deduction which 
amounts to 2 percent of employment income with a maximum of $52 
(employment income -covers -wages, salaries, National Superannuation, and 
the taxable forms of the unemployment benefit). Case 2 derives a 
coefficient far each income group based on the latest Incomes and Income 
Tax data. The coefficient measured is the relationship between 
employment-related expenses, income level and occupation. This is then 
applied to calculate employment related expenses according to the 
occupation of respondents in the Household Survey and then merged into 
the tax data file. 
Data an the amount of household expenditure on life insurance, 
personal accident and sickness premiums and superannuation schemes by 
household is available from the Household Survey. ASSET applies this 
information to calculate taxpayer eligibility for an exemption for life, 
sickness and accident insurance, as well as superannuation (see Figure 
5.4). Another expenditure which reduces taxable income is the fee for 
having a tax return prepared. However, while the Household Survey does 
record expenditure for tax consultants, the ASSET model does not take 
this tax exemption into account for 1981/82. 
In summary, the ASSET model derives taxable income by adding 
together assessable income and subtracting employment-related expenses 
and an exemption for insurances and superannuation. The next step is to 
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determine the actual amount of tax paid per household. 
A.3.b: ASSET Calculation of Tax Liability 
The basic tax liability is obtained by applying the appropriate tax 
rate scale to taxable income. Figure 5.2 shows the scale that is 
applicable for the 1981/82 year. The final tax liability is calculated 
by subtracting tax rebates (if and when applicable). Eligibility for the 
spouse rebate, the low-income family rebate and the young family rebate 
can be determined from the Household Survey. 
Note that ASSET does not take account of all the rebates specified 
in Figure 5.5. The only rebateable expenditure currently surveyed by the 
Household Survey is property and water rates paid to local authorities. 
In 1981/82, this rebate was allowed to owner-occupiers paying rates. The 
value of some rebates such as the spouse rebate, can be imputed to 
households based on Household Survey data about the characteristics (age, 
income and so on) of the occupants of households. The school fees and 
donations rebate can be estimated from households' expenditures on 
donations and school fees as recorded by the Household Survey. Household 
Survey data are insufficient to calculate rebates for housekeeper/child 
care and support for dependent relatives. The first-home mortgage 
interest rebate can be roughly estimated (see Broad and Bacica, 1985, 
p .39). 
Unless specified otherwise, the rebates are ascribed to the 
principal earner. Data collected by the Household Survey enables the 
identification of the principal income recipient as the earner with the 
largest income. It is not always possible for taxpayers to claim all of 
the rebates for which they are eligible. Especially in the case of low 
income earners, taxpayers may be eligible for rebates greater than the 
amount of their tax liability. If the taxpayer's basic tax liability is 
extinguished before all the rebates have been taken up, the remaining 
rebates are of nil worth. 
The income to be used for calculating the abatement of the spouse 
rebate is the income of the spouse in his/her own right. The 
interpretation of this which is recognised by the Inland R~venue 
Department is total income less: 
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(i) Social Welfare benefits, except where taxable; 
(ii) Housekeeping money; 
(iii) Board paid by children living at home; 
(iv) Maintenance and alimony; and, (v) Income before marriage. 
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Intra-family transactions are excluded from the Household Survey, 
which means items (ii) and (iii) are not known and have not been 
incorporated in the approach followed by this thesis. Further, since the 
date of marriage is not known, it is not possible to adjust income for 
(v). The Household Survey does record information about social welfare 
benefits and maintenance and alimony. Thus, to calculate the 
money-income value of the spouse rebate, only items (i) and (iv) are 
subtracted from total income to yield a spouse's 'income in own right'. 
Eligibility for the low income family rebate (household with income 
of less than $13,700 a year caring for children) and the young family 
rebate (principal income less than $17,600 and caring for a child under 
5) can be determined using the Household Survey data. The amount of tax 
paid per household is found after these rebates, as well as the spouse 
rebate and the property rates rebate, are substracted from the basic tax 
on taxable income. 
A.4: Conclusion : The Distribution of Personal Income Tax Payments 
When the tax scale and the exemptions and rebates are calculated to 
determine statutory liability as discussed above, the personal income tax 
appears to be an extremely progressive tax. The bottom 50 percent of 
households are liable for only 16.5 percent of the tax while the top 10 
percent of householders are liable for 32.2 percent of the tax. The 
discussion below looks first at these results and then analyses them in 
light of other approaches. 
A.4.a: Quantitative Results 
The percentage distribution of the personal income tax by household 
type and household market income group is illustrated by Table SA.l. 
Households are grouped by market income into deciles (10 percent of 
private households fall into each range). The upper decile of households 
has a statutory liability for 32.2 percent of personal income tax whl.le 
the lowest decile is only liable for 0.9 percent of personal income tax. 
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Table 5A.l 
PERCENTAGE OF 1981/82 PERSONAL INCOME TAX PAID 
BY HOUSEHOLD fviARJ<ET INCOME GROUP AND HOUSEHOLD TYPE 
Household Type 
------------------------------------------------------------1 Adult 2 Adults 2 Adults 
with 
Children 
3 or More 1 Adult All 
Adults with House-
Household 
Market 
Income 
CS p.a.) 
Chid' n holds* 
Nat Oth Nat Oth 
Sup Sup 
1 2 3+ No With 
Chil- Chil-
dren dren 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Percentage of $5,552 Million Personal Income Tax Liability 
Less Than $250 0.5 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.9 
$250-( $3,950) 0.7 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.6 
$3,950-( $9,750) 0.8 0.4 1.0 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 2.8 
$9,750-($13,450) 0.4 1.0 1.0 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.2 4.6 
$13,450-($16,900) 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.7 1.2 0.9 0.2 0.3 6.6 
$16,900-($20,250) 1.0 1.0 1.5 1.0 1.5 1.4 0.6 0.6 8.7 
$20,250-($24,200) 0.7 0.7 2.1 1.1 2.5 1.8 0.6 1.1 10.7 
$24,200-($29,200) 0.5 0.9 3.7 1.1 2.1 1.8 1.3 1.9 14.0 
$29,200-($36,650) 0.9 4.4 1.5 2.7 1.7 2.8 3.4 17.9 
$36,650 and over 1.3 4.3 2.6 4.0 3.7 7.5 8.4 32.2 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------- · Total 3.4 5.2 8.9 17.4 8.6 14.6 11.9 13.5. 15.9 0.7 100.0 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Notes: Cells with insignificant observations designated(-). The table is 
designed so that 10 percent of all households fall in each income range. 
Sources: Estimated using data from the Department of Statistics Household 
Survey 1981/82, and weighted using data from the 1981 Census of Population 
and Dwellings to represent the total population of private households. 
Turning to a discussion of the analysis by household types, two-adult 
households without national superannuation income were the household-type 
generally liable for the greatest percentage of the personal income tax. 
This household type accounted for 15.0 percent of households and included 
10 percent of occupants of private households but paid an estimated 17.4 
percent of personal income tax in 1981/82. 
Note that the results in this thesis are tabulated in matrix form to 
show the different patterns of distribution for each household type and 
income group. For example, in Table 5A.l, an interesting result is the 
large proportion of tax contributed by national-superannuitant households 
in the three lowest income groups. In interpreting these results, it 
should be kept in mind that while every care is taken to insure that the 
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individual cell values are as accurate as possible, they are not as 
accurate as usually expected of official stati stics. The analyses should 
be seen as qualitative estimates by relative distributions between 
different t ypes of households rather than providing definitive estimates. 
Table 5A.2 shows that the average money-income value of liability for 
. . 
the personal income tax increases with household income. This is true for 
all households and for the different household-type classifications. Both 
this Table and Table 5A.l suggest that liability for personal income tax is 
progressive in the sense that on average those on higher income are liable 
for more of the tax, both in absolute amount and in percentage-share terms, 
than those on low incomes. 
Table 5A.2 
1981/82 PERSCJW.. INOM: TAX: AVERAGE AKJUNT PER Ha.JSEH(U) PER YEAR 
BY RANGE OF HJUSEHWJ ~ INCOE ANJ Hl.JSEHOLD TYPE 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Household 
Market 
Income 
CS p.a.) 
Household Type 
------------------------------------------------------------1 Adult 2 Adults 2 Adults 
with 
Children 
3 or More 1 Adult All 
Adults . with House-
Chld'n holds 
------------------------------------------------------------Nat Oth Nat Oth 
Sup Sup 
1· 2 3+ No With 
Chil- Chil-
dren dren 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------$000 Per Year Per Household 
Less Than $250 .7 .1 1.1 .1 .1 .2 .s 
$250-( $3,950) 1.0 .1 1.3 .3 .3 .3 .1 .9 
$3,950-( $9,750) 2.6 1.3 2.7 1.0 .6 .6 .5 2.2 .8 .7 1.6 
$9,750-($13,450) 5. 0 2.8 4.2 2.2 1.9 1.8 1.8 2.6 2.1 2.6 2.6 
$13,450-($16,900) 4.1 5.3 3.5 3.5 3.3 3.3 3.8 2.7 3.8 
$16,900-($20,250) 5.8 6.9 4.6 4.9 4.6 4.6 4.8 4.5 5.0 
$20 ,250-( $24,200) 7.6 7.9 5.4 6.0 6.4 6.5 5.2 5.3 6.1 
$24,200-($29,200) 
-
11.0 11.0 7.3 8.6 8.4 8.4 6.7 6.7 7. 9 
$29,200-($36,650) 
-
14.0 10.0 12.0 11.0 11.0 8.8 9.0 10.0 
$36,650 and over 
-
26.0 17.0 30.0 24.0 20.0 16.0 16.0 18.0 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Average ($000) 1.8 3.4 4.1 6.6 6.2 6.6 6.5 9.2 8.8 1.2 5.7 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Sources: Estimated using data from the Department of Statistics Household 
Survey 1981/82, and weighted using data from the 1981 Census to represent 
the total population of private households. Cells with insufficient 
observations designated(-). 
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Table 5A.3 
THE PROGRESSIVITY OF THE 1981/82 PERSONAL INCOME TAX: 
DIFFERENT nEFFECTIVE RATE" DEFINITIONS COWARED 
Household 
Market 
Income 
($ p.a.) 
Less Than $250 
$250-( $3,950) 
$3,950-( $9,750) 
$9,750-($13,450) 
$13,450-($16,900) 
$16,900-($20,250) 
$20,250-($24,200) 
$24,200-($29,200) 
$29,200-($36,650) 
$36,650 and over 
Average Household Personal Income Tax 
as a Proportion of Household Income Defined as: 
Market Income 
(%) 
-250.0 
54.0 
23.0 
22.0 
25.0 
27.0 
28.0 
30.0 
31.0 
36.0 
Total Income 
(%) 
9.6 
12.0 
15.0 
19.0 
22.0 
25.0 
26.0 
29.0 
30.0 
36.0 
Total Expenditure 
(%) 
8.6 
12.0 
15.0 
22.0 
26.0 
30.0 
34.0 
39.0 
41.0 
61.0 
____ ....._._ ___________ ~------------------------------------
Overall Average 31.0 27.0 35.0 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Sources: Personal income distribution estimated using the Department of 
Statistics ASSET, 1981/82 Household Survey. 
Progressivity refers to the extent to which a tax increases with 
income. In assessing it, a number of different concepts may be applied. 
Table 5A.3 measures the progressivity by relating the amount of personal 
income tax to market income, total income and total expenditure. Another 
term for the Table 5A.3 relationships is "effective rates of income 
tax". When a definition of market income is applied, the liability for 
the personal income tax is regressive for the bottom two deciles of 
households. Those with market incomes of less than S250 paid more: in 
income tax than they earned by working in paid employment. Those earning 
between $250 and S3,950 paid 54.0 percent of their market income in tax. 
The degree of progressivity (in the effective rates) is greater when 
personal income taxes are measured as a proportion of total income or as 
a proportion of total household expenditure. 
A.4.b: Developments to the Analysis of the Personal Income Tax 
As Section A.2 discussed, the decision to model the personal income 
tax as though it is not shifted may mean that some significant economic 
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and behavioural effects are ignored. Before concluding this Section, it 
is worth focussing an how the results might differ if these were taken 
into account. 
Evidence that the personal income tax may be shifted in New Zealand 
is provided by Buckle (1981). He suggests that when employees bargain 
for higher wage?, a basis for their bargaining position is the known or 
expected amount of increased tax which results from movement into higher 
marginal tax brackets with increased wages. 
To assess the extent to which the personal income tax is (or is not) 
paid by those legally liable for it requires the specification of a 
number of relationships not p_resently modelled in the literature 
attempting to empirically assess personal income tax incidence. These 
include such things as the relationship between households and companies 
and the response of companies to a tax on the wages and salaries they 
pay. If the personal income tax is not paid by those directly liable, 
then it could be shifted to shareholders through dividend payouts, other 
shareholder-employee remuneration, or lower share prices and capital 
gains. It could also lead to changes in output and employment. And of 
course, it could lead to price changes for goods sold to local and 
overseas consumers. 
As Fullerton et al (1982) point aut, researchers investigating tax 
incidence based an general equilibrium models still have not "reached a 
consensus on the value of the few 'key' elasticity parameters. First 
among these is the elasticity of labour supply". Their examination shows 
that the results of tax incidence studies are very sensitive to this 
parameter. The results of such models would be improved if there were 
labour supply functions by age, income, marital status (depending an the 
tax code) and demographic area. 
Moreover, the models of tax incidence and ASSET make very little 
distinction between the way in which the tax code is administered to 
salary and wage earners and the way in which it is administered to other 
forms of personal income. Another behavioural effect ignored by the 
models is the evasion of tax. The probable net effect of these 
deficiencies in the modelling of the personal income tax is that the 
share of the tax personal income tax paid by the higher-income groups is 
-.. ·-- -~--~-"""',;., 
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B. INDIRECT TAXES 
After personal income taxes, the next largest source of central 
government revenue is indirect tax. Taxes classified as indirect by the 
New Zealand system of National Accounts (NZSNA) include wholesale sales 
taxes, excises, customs and import duties, ?ervice charges, and 
regulatory ·(permission-to-use) taxes. 
Indirect taxes may be distinguished from direct taxes. The person 
(or enterprise) legally liable for an indirect tax is not seen to be the 
entity paying the economic cost of the tax, while the entity legally 
liable for a direct tax is the same entity seen to bear the economic cost 
of the tax. If the classification of direct and indirect was ever based 
on a theoretical concept, it was a partial equilibrium view. As shown in 
Chapter Two, both "direct" taxes on factors and "indirect taxes" on goods 
and services can incur economic costs that are borne by entities other 
than those legally liable to pay the tax. Another way of classifying 
indirect taxes is as taxes that are initially assessed on producers' 
- costs, in contrast to direct taxes which are initially assessed on 
household and company income. 
Figure 5.6 on the following page shows indirect taxes, classified by 
NZSNA, and the amount of revenue collected from them in 1980, 1981, 1982 
and 1983. The Department of Statistics (1983, p.50) makes the following 
points about the NZSNA classification of indirect taxes: 
(a) "Tne distinction between the payment of an indirect tax and the 
payment for goods and services provided by government is based on 
the compulsory and unavoidable nature of the indirect tax. Also, 
for government revenue to be classified as income from the sale of 
goods and services there must be a clear link between the payment 
and the provision of the specific goods and services; and 
(b) Only producers pay [are liable for] indirect taxes. A number of 
payments, such as motor vehicle registration fees, are made directly 
by both producers and households. In this case, the amount paid by 
households is not classified as an indirect tax and is excluded.3 
However, householders as occupiers of their own dwellings are 
considered to be producers, and therefore rates, stamp duty and 
other compulsory levies associated with their property, are indirect 
taxes." 
3. Motor vehicle registration fees paid by households are included as 
direct taxes. 
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FIGURE 5.6 
INDIRECT TAXES BY NZSNA CATEGORY 
(Market and Non-Market Government Activity) 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Year Ending 31 March 1980 % 1981 % 1982 % 1983 
$M Change $M Change $M Change $M 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Indirect Taxes Received by Centzal Gaven ment 
Earthquake & War Damage 
Commission Premiums 33.11 13.0 37.40 28.9 48.20 1.5.3 55.59 
Energy Resources 
Levy a 18.58 5.8 19.65 23.1 . 24.19 66.3 40.22 
Excise Duty on: 
- Beer 58.16 10.5 64.28 15.6 74.33 100.6 149.14 
- Cigarettes, Cigars 
& Tobacco 100.77 -2.4 98.39 14.6 112.74 9.6 123.58 
- Spirits and 
Spirituous Mixtures 18.46 6.2 19.60 28.2 25.12 5.4 26.47 
Fire Services 
Commission Levy 37.52 10.0 41.28 17.2 48.40 43.1 69.24 
Foreign Travel Tax b 9.29 
Heavy Traffic Fees c 0.31 6.5 0.33 
Import Duty 212.25 9.0 231.33 45.8 337.20 7.3 361.79 
Intn'l Departure Tax 6.30 97.6 12.45 15.5 14.38 2.4 14.72 
Land Tax 10.73 8.0 11.59 191.4 33.77 1.8 34.38 
Lottery Duty 5.48 16.2 6.37 7.4 6.84 1.6 6.95 
Meat, Game and Fish 
Inspection Fees 0.01 1000.0 0.20 
Mileage Tax c 0.51 -86.3 0.07 -71.4 0.03 -33.3 0.02 
Motor Spirit Duty, d 265.01 -1.9 260.05 6.2 276.20 14.8 317.20 
Motor Vehicle Fees e 18.50 4.4 19.31 5.6 20.39 83.0 37.31 
Racing Duty 42.75 7.7 46.06 10.7 50.99 11.9 57.04 
Road User Charges 51.23 33.5 68.37 20. 7 82.53 17.5 96.95 
Sales Tax 624.10 31.7 821.67 26.3 1038.02 16.7 1211.75 
Stamp Duty 30.46 29.9 39.58 49.8 59.28 -7.6 54.80 
Other f 37.28 26.6 43.46 38.8 60.34 25.5 75. 73 
------------------------------------------------------------Total Central Govt 1580.82 16.7 1841.45 25.6 2312.95 18.2 2732.88 
------------------------------------------------------------
' 
Indirt!ct Taxes Received by Local Governnent 
Rates 386.31 24.5 461.70 
Petrol Tax 17.88 12.5 . 17.75 
Other 13.43 15.0 16.93 
Total Local Govt 417.59 23.7 496.34 
Total Indirect Taxes 1998.41 18.2 2337.79 
21.4 560.69 
1.0 17.92 
35.0 22.85 
21.2 601.47 
24.7 2914.28 
17.3 657.58 
3.1 18.47 
14.8 26.24 
16.8 702.29 
17.9 3435.17 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Notes: a) Introduced 1 January 1977. b) Introduced 1976; replaced by 
International Departure Tax from 1 July 1979. c) Replaced by Road User 
Charges from 1 April 1978. d) Additional Duty introduced 23 May 1975. e) 
Comprise Motor Vehicle Registration, Licence and Change of Ownership Fees 
paid by producers. f) Includes Domestic Air Travel Tax. Source: 
Department of Statistics, NZSNA. 
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FIQJRE 5. 7 
1981/82 INDIRECT TAXES CLASSIFIED BY MAIN SOURCE 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
NZSNA 
$M 
Adiustment 
Qf 
I'D 
Amount Paid By 
Private Households 
$M $M 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------1. Wholesales Sales Taxes 1038.02 95 986 
Direct 706 
Intermediate 280 
2. Import Duties, Excise Duties 
and Other 1,159.56 95 1,101 
Specific Taxes a 590.83 558 
Import Duties 337.20 320 
Other Indirect Taxes 231.53 223 
Non-Market Indirect Taxes ~z !97 .55 95 2,087 
Market Indirect Taxes b 115.37 
Total NZSNA 2,312.95 
Notes: a) Includes Energy Resources Levy, -Domestic Air Travel Tax, Motor 
Spirits Duty, Motor Fees Payments, Tobacco and Alcohol Duties, Racing and 
Lottery Duty. b) Includes Earthquake and War Damages Commission Premiums 
($48.20 million), Fire Services Commission Levy ($48.40 million) and some 
other ($18.77 million) which are "taxes11 to finance central government 
market activity (as opposed to its non-market ac~ivity). Source: NZSNA, 
Department of Statistics. -
B.l: The Statutory Incidence of Indirect Taxes 
For the purposes of this study, 4 indirect taxes are divided into 
two main groups: (1) wholesale sales taxes, and (2) import, excise duties 
and other. Both of these groups include some taxes which can be directly 
allocated and some taxes which can only be allocated by adopting 
assumptions about their economic effect. The former are called "direct" 
indirect taxes and are assessed on goods intended for retail sale 
directly to consumers. The remaining indirect taxes fall on intermediate 
goods used in the production of final goods (such as taxes on business 
machines and road user charges) and are thus referred to as 
"intermediate" indirect taxes. The values for indirect taxes analysed in 
this thesis are shown by Figure 5.7 above. 
4. A study (partly based on research already underway for this thesis) of the 
incidence of indirect taxes was conducted by Broad and Bacica (1985) 
because of Treasury interest in the effects of a value-added "goods and 
services" tax. Since Broad and Bacica focussed on indirect taxes, some of 
the procedures for calculating the money income value of indirect taxes 
oaid by households were refined beyond those discussed in this section. 
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B.l.a: The Statutory Incidence of the Wholesale Sales Tax 
Of the various indirect taxes, the wholesale sales tax provides the 
single most important revenue source, accounting for 10.9 percent of 
total central government revenue. The 'Nholesale sales tax is assessed on 
the wholesale stage of distribution, usually at an ad valorem rate 
varying from 10 percent to 60 percent. When implemented in 1933, the 
wholesale sales tax base was fairly broad. By the early 1970s, the tax 
base had narrowed because the number of goods exempt from the tax had 
increased progressively. 
During the 1970s attempts were made to raise more indirect tax 
revenue. Policies to widen the wholesale sales tax base (to tax goods 
such as alcohol, tobacco, home appliances, ice cream, boats, caravans, 
and household cleaners, to name only a few) brought about a marked growth 
in sales tax revenue. Between March 1978 and March 1~81, sales tax 
revenue rose by over 100 percent. Despite this, the wholesale sales tax 
base for 1981/82 is still very narrow, comprising less than 25 percent of 
private consumption expenditure. The general principle followed by 
policymakers in deciding to add items to the tax base is whether they are 
considered to be "luxuries" or discretionary expenditures "not having 
educational, health, or lifesaving uses". This selection, of course, 
involves a value jUdgment since tastes in luxuries differ. 
Government agencies do not keep records of wholesale sales tax 
receipts classified by the goods on which the tax is assessed. A rough 
impression of the different sources of wholesale sales tax can be gained 
by examining Figure 5.8 (on the following page) which shows a breakdown 
of wholesale sales tax receipts5 by licensed wholesalers (classified by 
main commodity sales) for the 1981/82 financial year. 
5. Note that the total wholesale sales tax collected by Customs is 
slightly more ($1,061.6 million as opposed to $1,038.0 million) than 
that measured by the Department of Statistics. This is probably 
explained by timing differences, but also the Customs figures may 
include some excise taxes. 
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FIGURE 5.8 
SALES TAX RECEIPTS BY LICENSED WHOLESALERS 
1981/82 Financial Yeara 
228. 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Commodity 
Sales Tax 
Receipts 
Amount $(M) % 
Licensed 
Wholesalers 
No. % 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Confectionery and ice cream 
Alcoholic liquor, soft drinks and 
cordials 
Petroleum products 
Tobacco manufacturers 
Cosmetics and Toiletries 
Photographic film, cameras -
photographic and optical equipment 
Tyres and tubes (manufacturers only) 
Travel goods 
Printed matter and stationery 
Jewellery, watches and clocks 
Marine engines and accessories 
Machinery and general engineering 
products including machine tools 
Household articles and appliances, 
ornaments including hand tools 
Office machines and appliances 
Batteries (manufacturers only) 
Television receiver, radio and tele-
communication equip~ent, sound 
15.7 
156.2 
30.1 
28.4 
38.4 
10.1 
15.8 
3.9 
29.3 
16.4 
3.2 
54.0 
74.9 
12.6 
2.3 
recorders and reproducers 40.0 
Sound recordings 9.1 
Motor vehicles other than motorcycles 310.9 
Parts of motor vehicles 85.2 
Motor cycles including parts 14.8 
Trailers and caravans 3. 6 
Aircraft 0.2 
Firearms and ammunition 1.1 
Toys and games 6. 4 
Boats , 3.9 
General merchandise 28.4 
International departure tax 14.4 
Other electrical goods 5.1 
Exports neg 
Souvenirs 0.3 
OATT 8.5 
Cleansing Preparations neg 
CNG neg 
1.5 
14.7 
2.8 
2.7 
3.6 
1.0 
1.5 
0.4 
2.8 
1.5 · 
0.3 
~ •. 1 . 
7.1 
1.2 
0.2 
3.8 
0.8 
29.3 
8.0 
1.4 
0.3 
0.1 
0.6 
0.4 
2.7 
1.3 
0.5 
0.8 
Misc. - Unallocated 38.4 3.6 
232 
407 
37 
13 
233 
54 
8 
162 
910 
661 
78 
1,654 
1,025 
96 
9 
232 
91 
202 
631 
55 
183 
12 
37 
284 
413 
752 
204 
188 
26 
52 
95 
9 
3 
2.6 
4.5 
0.4 
0.1 
2.6 
0.6 
1.8 
10.1 
7.3 
0.9 
18.3 
11.3 
1.1 
0.1 
2.6 
1.0 
2.2 
7.0 
0.6 
2.0 
0.1 
0.4 
3.1 
4.6 
8.3 
2.3 
2.1 
0.3 
0.6 
1.0 
0.1 
Total 1,061.6 100.0 9,048 100.0 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
a) Excludes tax paid at wharf on imports by non-licensed taxpayers. Source: 
Customs Department. 
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There were less than 10,000 licensed wholesale sales taxpayers in 
1981/82. The exact amount of sales tax collected for specific items 
cannot be determined from Figure 5.8 because the sub groups are quite 
broad. It appears, however, that the major source of wholesale sales tax 
revenue is sales of motor vehicles. This commodity group accounted far 
29.3 percent of the sales tax receipts analysed. Another point that 
emerges from Figure 5.8 is the concentration of the tax in the 
manufacturing sector. There is no wholesale sales tax an services. 
The Customs Department estimates that goods purchased directly by 
private consumers make up roughly 60 percent of the wholesale sales tax 
base. When the Household Survey and ASSET are used with tax rates to 
estimate the distribution of "direct" wholesale sales taxes, about 
two-thirds of total wholesale sales taxes can be explained. The 
remainder of the sales tax base comprises business inputs such as plant 
and machinery components, motor vehicles and parts, computers, and raw 
materials. Taxes on these items are considered to be "intermediate" 
wholesale sales taxes. 
B.l.b: · Statutory Incidence of Import, Excise Duties and Other 
In direct Taxes 
After the wholesale sales tax, the next largest source of indirect 
tax is import duty. Import duty is assessed an a range of items (about 
2,500), but as is the case with the wholesale sales tax, there is little 
information about the amount of revenue collected from each item. In 
1981/82, the law regarding import duties was set aut in the Customs 
Tariff (1978 revision). According to the 1982 New Zealand Yearbook, 
tariff rates were set "with the intention of according domestic industry 
a reasonable level of protection against competing imports". The rates 
also vary according to the country where the goods originate. Some 
import duties are "direct" (in the sense that they are levied on final 
goods) but most are "intermediate" (levied on intermediate goods). 
Specific taxes is a designation used in this thesis to cover taxes 
assessed for a specific purpose. Most can be specifically linked with an 
item of household expenditure that is surveyed by the Household Survey 
and which is identical to the base for the tax. There are seven indirect 
taxes which have a specific function and which can be directly imputed to 
households based on actual expenditures reported by the Household 
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Survey. These include the energy resources levy, the domestiG air travel 
tax, the portion of motor spirits duty and motor vehicle fees paid 
directly by households as producers, tobacco, alcohol, lottery, and 
racing duties. 
Other indirect taxes tend to be "intermediate.. taxes mainly 
comprising the portion of motor vehicle fees and charges paid by 
businesses, road user charges and stamp duty. Road user charges are 
assessed on all heavy motor vehicles and non-petrol-powered vehicles 
which transport goods at a cost that varies according to their nominated 
gross weight, their axle configuration and the distance they travel. 
Stamp duty is payable on documents, executed in New Zealand or elsewhere, 
affecting property situated, or to be situated in New Zealand. The rates 
of stamp duty vary for each type of document and are recorded in Figure 
AS.l in Appendix Five. 
8.2: Incidence of Taxes on Expenditures 
The usual assumption is that indirect taxes are entirely shifted to 
the prices of final goods. Since those on low incomes tend to spend a 
larger proportion of their income on goods and services, it is usually 
argued that indirect tax payments are greater for them and the tax is 
regressive. 
New Zealand policymakers have tried to avoid some of the regressive 
effects of the tax by applying indirect taxes on a selected array . of what 
they consider to be luxury or non-necessary goods. Nevertheless, there 
are two reasons why this policy still results in a regressive indirect 
tax structure. First, even "luxuries" may be purchased by those on low 
incomes (sometimes low-income households may spend more on them than 
high-income households). Second, if the economic effects of indirect 
taxes are assessed, general equilibrium analysis suggests that (part of) 
the tax could be shifted from the taxed products to untaxed products. 
In considering the effects of a selective tax, the HMM results· 
suggest that consumers of the tax-free product could pay a portion of the 
tax depending on the elasticities of substitution between products and 
factors in production and the demand elasticities of final products. The 
consumers of the untaxed product could bear some of the burden of an 
--- - --- ~ --- ----~· ·-"- "-'--·• .,..._ ~"".J. """~""~~"'"'t!"' • •""ol""'l ~ol""'l"""'' ' ~o 
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the rise in price of the taxed product could result in changes in 
consumer demand and factor shares which lead to increases in the price of 
the untaxed product. The supply and demand response is likely to vary 
for different indirect taxes. 
goods (such as cigarettes and 
responsive to price rises. 6 
For example, excise duties are assessed on 
alcohol) for which demand apparently is not 
In the SWF literature, most indirect taxes (primarily sales taxes) 
are treated on the demand side of the model. Consumer demand is 
determined by maximizing individual utilities subject to their income 
constraints. The prices used in these exercises are the cost covering 
prices of producers, plus any final output taxes, including sales tax, 
excise tax, tariffs, and so on, applied to the commodities demanded. 
"Intermediate" indirect taxes are represented in the specification 
of intermediate activities in SWF models through the use of an 
input-output matrix. Prices are set by the zero profit rule and 
intermediate indirect taxes are included in the producer price of the 
using industry. 
Although the SWF models apparently treat indirect taxes in a very 
detailed way, the published results are not precise as to how payments of 
these taxes are distributed by household type or income group. Piggott 
(1980a) finds that "final output taxes" (sales taxes, excises, tariffs, 
motor vehicle taxes etc.) have no significant influence on the 
distribution of income. However, while he publishes the effective rates 
of these taxes on different commodities, he does not publish results 
showing how this translates into a money-income payment by household 1 
income groups. 
In the derivation of the quantitative results for this thesis, all 
indirect taxes are assumed to be 100 percent shifted to households 
through prices of the final goods they consume. In the Stage One case, 
only "direct" indirect taxes are considered. Stage Two considers 
"intermediate" indirect taxes as well. 
6. There is continuing debate in the responsiveness of demand to 
price changes for these items, but one study suggests that no 
conclusive measure of price responsiveness can be assessed from 
available evidence in New Zealand (Easton and Kay, 1983). 
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8.3: Imputing Indirect Tax Payments to Households 
The method for imputing wholesale sales taxes to households is 
discussed in Section 8.3.a and the imputation of other forms of indirect 
taxes is discussed in Section 8.3.b. This section also discusses the 
quantitative results of the analyses of individual indirect taxes. 
8.3 . a: Wholesale Sales Tax Payments Imputed to Households 
To impute "direct" wholesale sales taxes to households, household 
expenditures on final goads subject to wholesale sales tax are identified 
from the Household Survey. Rates of tax applicable to each item in the 
Household Survey commodity classification were provided by the Customs 
Department. Retail markups are from the Department of Statistics 
Inter-Industry files or based on data accumulated for the 1981 Task Force 
on Tax Reform. Information about markups is applied to derive the 
wholesale value of the taxed item, tax inclusive. The tax rates are then 
used to calculate the amount of tax paid by each household. 
Where Customs regulations refer to specific (rather than ad · 
valorem) tax rates, ad valorem equivalents are prepared by estimating 
the cost structure of the commodity. s·ince this is basically a study of 
first round effects only, the tax is calculated on purchases of new goads 
and any tax capitalised on second-hand goods is ignored. 
As mentioned earlier, the information recorded about the actual 
wholesale sales tax collected is very rough. Thus, the calculations of 
payments of the tax based on household expenaiture cannot be checked. It 
appears that the amount of the tax paid directly by households could be 
over-estimated by this thesis. For example, the results show that nearly 
70 percent of the wholesale sales tax is paid directly by households but 
Customs' rough quess was 60 percent. Also, the calculations far this 
thesis shaw that wholesale sales taxes on tobacco and alcohol are the 
most important "direct" indirect taxes paid by households; however, 
Customs' information suggests that motor vehicles are the largest source 
of wholesale sales taxes. Table 58.1 is an estimate of the average 
amount of wholesale sales tax directly assessed on expenditures made by 
households. The amounts of tax paid on 10 major expenditure groups are 
analysed by income group (for a listing of what each column contains, see 
n11mj::ari ,..~ 1 r.nde listina 1mrlPr thP table). 
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Table 58.1 
AVERAGE DIRECT WHOLESALE SALES TAX PAYMENTS FOR 1981/82 
PER PRIVATE 1-WSEHOLD BY RANGE OF HOUSEHOLD ~ET INCOME 
(Cost in Money-Income Terms, $s Per Annum Per Household) 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Household l. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. Total a 
Market Income 
($ p.a.) 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Average $ Per Year Per Household 
Less than $250 0 0 9 13 2 15 70 17 6 7 160 
$250-( $3,950) 77 0 9 16 1 20 110 18 4 10 250 
$3,950-( $9,750) 96 0 15 23 2 20 190 31 10 16 440 
$9,570-($13,450) 85 0 19 26 3 40 230 26 12 13 520 
$13,450-($16,900) 93 0 23 34 4 27 240 38 17 18 590 $16,900-($20,250) 130 4 31 36 4 30 310 38 2l 2l 760 
$20,250-($24,200) 81 2 31 40 6 34 300 52 25 21 720 
$24,200-($29,200) 73 0 36 42 7 52 390 53 33 22 880 
- $29,200-($36,650) 170 9 52 47 6 44 480 74 35 29 1100 
$36,650 and over 330 6 63 55 7 . 56 610 79 35 30 1400 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------TOTAL 110 2 29 33 4 33 290 43 20 19 680 
Codes to Numerical Columns 
1. New Cars & Motorcycles 6. Home Appliances & Furnishings 
2. Other Vehicles 7. Tobacco & Alcohol 
3. Vehicle Maintenance 8. Personal Supplies 
4. Food 9. Recreational Equipment 
5. Home Maintenance & Fuel 10. Household Equipment & Supplies 
Note: a) Total includes all wholesale sales taxes directly allocated and 
comprises some items not included in previous ten columns. Source: 
Estimates derived from Household Survey information on household 
expenditures, Customs information on tax rates and margins from the 
inter-industry study, weighted to the aggregate population from the 1981 
Census of Population and Dwellings. 
As recorded in Table 58.1, it is estimated that an average household 
paid $680 directly in tax for goods assessed wholesale sales tax (see 
"Total" column). For an average household, the largest "direct" 
wholesale tax payment is for wholesale-based taxes on tobacco and alcohol 
(see Table 58.1, Column 7). In 1981/82, an average of $290 was spent on 
this tax or nearly 43 percent of the total amount of wholesale sales tax 
paid per year by an average household. Since household expenditure on 
alcoholic beverages is under-reported, the amount of tax estimated to be 
paid per household could also be under-reported. The second major source 
of revenue from wholesale-based taxes is new cars and motor-cycles, which 
accounted for nearly 15 percent of the total amount of wholesale sales 
tax paid by an average household (see Column 1). 
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The general pattern is for the average amount of wholesale sales tax 
paid to increase with household income. This pattern applies 
particularly well to wholesale-based taxes on food, fuel, tobacco and 
alcohol. It does not appear to apply to new cars and motor-cycles or to 
vehicle spare parts. Although in both these cases the highest income 
group pays the most tax, the distribution of tax payments is multi-modal. 
As Table 58.2 shows below, the 10 percent of households in the 
highest income group are estimated to pay the largest share of direct 
wholesale sales taxes. The share for the highest household income group 
is 21.1 percent compared with the lowest income group's share of 2.3 
percent. Two-adult households without children and three-adult 
households, both with and without children, are the household types which 
pay the largest shares of indirect taxes. 
·Table 58.2 
PROPORTION a: TOTAL OIRECTa 1981/82 wtO..ESALE SALES TAX PAID 
BY ~OF HaJSEHl.O MARKET INOJ.E ANO PRIVATE HD.JSaO..O TYPE 
-----------------------------------------------·----------
1-tlusehold 
Market 
Income 
($ p.a.) 
Household Type 
------------------------------------------------------------l Adult 2 Adults 
Nat Oth Nat Oth 1 
Sup Sup 
2 Adults 
with 
O"!ildren 
3 or More l Adult All 
Adults with House-
2 3+ No With 
Chil- Chil-
dren dren 
O"!ld'n holds 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Proportion of the Total for All Households (%) 
Less Than $250 0.4 0.1 0.6 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.6 2.3 
$250-( $3,950) 0+7 0.1 1.6 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.3 3.6 
$3,950-( $9,750) 0;.8 0.8 1.2 0.5 0.6 0.8 0.7 0.3 0.3 0.3 6.4 
$9, 750-($13,450) 0.2 1.4 0.9 1.2 1.0 1.0 0.6 0.4 0.7 0.2 7.6 
$13,450-($16,900) 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.1 1.9 1.2 0.3 0.9 8.6 
$16,900-($20,250) 0.9 1.0 2.4 1.1 1.9 1.7 1.0 0.9 11.2 
$20,250-( $24,200) 0.5 0.8 2.3 0.9 1.9 1.5 1.2 1.5 10.5 
$24,200-($29,200) 0.4 0.4 3.9 0.8 1.6 1.4 2.1 2.3 12.9 
$29,200-($36,650) 0.2 3.2 0.8 1.5 1.0 4.7 4.2 15.8 
$36,650 and over 0.6 2.2 0.9 1.4 1.4 7.8 6.8 21.1 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------TOTAL 2.4 5.3 8.4 17.3 7.6 12.1 9.8 17.9 17.5 1.7 100.0 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Note: a) Includes wholesale sales tax directly assessed on consumer goods 
but not that assessed on intermediate goods. Sources: Money-income value 
and taxes estimated using data from the Department of Statistics Household 
Survey 1981/82 aggregated for the population of private households based on 
the 1981 Census of Population of Dwellings. The appropriate tax rate 
derived using margins spelled out in the 1981/82 input/output tables. 
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As their market incomes rise, households consume more in absolute 
money terms and pay a greater amount of "direct" wholesale sales tax. 
When "direct" wholesale sales tax payments are said to be regressive, the 
assessment is based an the effective tax rate when the tax is taken as a 
proportion of income. As shown by Column A, Table 58.3 the wholesale 
sales tax directly assess~d on households takes an increasing proportion 
of income as their market incomes decrease. In this case, the tax is 
regressive in the sense that it reduces the incomes of lower income 
households in greater proportion than it does higher-income households. 
Table 58.3 
DIRECT WHOLESALES SALES TAX PAYMENTS FOR 1981/82 BY PRIVATE HOUSEHOLDS 
AS A PROPORTION OF HOUSEJiOLO INCOME AND EXPENDITURE 
Household 
Market Income 
($ p.a.) 
BY RANGE OF HOUSEJ-OJ) MARKET INCOME 
Percentage of: 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Market Total Total 
Income Income Expenditure 
A B c 
Less than $250 -72.ob 2.7 2.5 
$250-( $3,950) 15.0 3.4 3.2 
$3,950-( $9,750) 6.2 4.2 4.1 
$9,570-($13,450) 4.4 3.8 4.3 
$13,450-($16,900) 3.9 3.5 4.1 
$16,900-($20,250) 4.1 3.8 4.5 
$20,250-($24,200) 3.2 3.1 4.0 
$24,200-($29,200) 3.3 3.2 4.3 
$29,200-($36,650) 3.3 3.2 4.3 
$36,650 and over 2.9 2.8 4.8 
TOTAL 3.7 3.3 4.2 
Notes: a) Includes wholesale sales tax directly assesised an consumer goods; 
b) Negative signifies that indirect tax payments exceeded household market 
income. This is possible because some households may have earned losses and 
their expenditure would have been financed through dis-saving. Sources: 
Tables IE.l, 58.2 and the Department of Statistics Household Survey. 
Column B shows the effective rates of wholesale sales tax based on 
total income (defined to include social welfare benefits). The wholesale 
sales tax does not appear to be quite as regressive when total income is 
the base instead of market income. When measured as a proportion of 
household expenditure, the direct wholesale sales tax appears to be 
proportional or even slightly progressive. 
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About a third of wholesale sales tax is collected from assessments 
of intermediate goods. Companies and other businesses are liable for 
wholesale sales taxes assessed on cars purchased for business use and 
business machines. It is likely that these taxes are passed on to 
households, although the extent the statutory taxpayers are able to do 
this by raising prices depends on their market power. This research 
assumes that intermediate wholesale sales taxes are passed on in their 
entirety to final goods. Basea-on this assumption, the intermediate 
portion of the wholesale sales tax is imputed to households in relation 
to their total expenditure as reported by the Household Survey. 
8.3.b: Specific Taxes, Imoort and Excise Duties and Other 
Specific taxes are divided into two groups, "non-gambling" and 
"gambling". The five "non-gambling" taxes include the energy resources 
levy, the domestic air travel tax, motor spirits duty, motor vehicle fees 
and tobacco and alcohol duties. Table 58.4 illustrates some of the main 
distributive characteristics of the five, non-gambling, specific taxes. 
Table 58.4 
SPECIFIC TAX PAvt-ENTS BY HClJSEHl..D MARKET INQl.£ IN 1.981/82 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------Household $ Per As a Proportion of Household:b 
Market Year Per Distri- Market Total 
Income Household butiona Income Income Expenditure 
CS p.a.) ( $) (%) (%) (%) (%) 
A 8 c D E 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------Less than $25 0 160 3.2 -72.0 2.7 2.5 
$250-( $3,950) 220 4.5 13.0 3.0 2.9 
$3,950-( $9,750) 340 7.0 4.8 3.2 3.2 
$9,570-($13,450) 390 8.1 3.4 2.9 3.3 
$13,450-($16,900) 440 9.0 2.9 2.6 3.0 
$16,900-($20,250) 520 10.8 2.8 2.6 3.1 
$20,250-($24,200) 530 10.9 2.4 2.3 3.0 
$24,200-($29,200) 610 12.7 2.3 2.2 3.0 
$29,200-($36,650) 730 15.0 2.2 2.2 2.9 
$36,650 and over 920 18.9 1.8 1.8 3.0 
TOTAL 490 100.0 2.6 2.3 3.0 
-------------------------------------------~------------------------~-----Notes: a) Distribution refers to share of total specific taxes of $503 
million paid by each group. b) Columns C, D and E are "effective 
rates11 of specific tax. Sources: Estimated using data from the 
Department of Statistics Household Survey 1981/82 aggregated for the 
population of private households based on the 1981 Census of Population 
of Dwellings. The appropriate tax rate applied to a tax base derived 
using margins spelled out in the 1981/82 input/output tables. 
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As shown by Table 58.4, specific tax payments affect household 
income groups similarly to direct wholesale sales taxes. In absolute 
terms, households pay more in specific taxes the higher their incomes 
(see Column A of Table). However, low income households pay a larger 
proportion of their market income in specific taxes than do higher income 
households (see Column C). The degree of regressivity is reduced when 
the measure of income includes social welfare benefits (see Column D). 
Finally, when specific taxes are measured in relation to household 
expenditure, they are close to being proportional. As Column E shows, 
households pay about 3 percent of their average expenditure in specific 
taxes at each income level. 
Lottery and racing duty are imputed to households based on 
information about these expenditures collected by the Household Survey. 
Table 5B.5 shows some of the significant relationships for lottery duty 
and racing duty. 
Table 58.5 
LOTTERY AN) RACING DUTY PAID FOR 1981/82 BY PRIVATE HaJSEJ-KLOS 
BY 1-KJUSEHOLD ~ INCOME 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------Lottery Duty Racing Dutya 
------------------------ -------------------------Av Av Av Av. 
Household % of Per Per % of Per Per 
Market Total House- Per- Total House- Per-
Income Total Tax hold son Total Tax hold son 
($ p.a.) $000 (%) ($) ($) $000 (%) ($) ($) 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------Less than $250 272 4.2 3 1.4 1249 2.6 12 6.5 
$250-( $3,950) 380 5.8 4 2.1 1876 3.9 18 10.0 
$3,950-( $9,750) 280 4.3 3 l.l 1623 3.4 16 6.4 
$9,570-($13,450) 471 7.2 5 1.7 5281 10.9 51 19.0 
$13,450-($16,900) 539 8.3 5 1.6 4454 9.2 43 13.0 
$16,900-($20,250) 726 11.2 7 2.1 5283 10.9 51 15.0 
$20,250-($24,200) 886 13.6 9 2.4 6644 13.9 64 18.0 
$24,200-($29,200) 801 12.3 8 2.3 5831 12.0 56 17.0 
$29,200-($36,650) 1063 16.4 10 2.9 6244 12.9 60 17.0 
$36,650 and over 1080 16.6 10 2.5 9914 20.5 96 23.0 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------TOTAL 6500 100.0 6 2.1 48400 100.0 47 16.0 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------Note: a) Assuming that 95 percent of racing duty was paid by private 
households could understate the contribution from non-private 
households such as prisons where off-course betting is one of the few 
money-making occupations available. Source: Distributions based on 
expenditure patterns in the Household Survey. 
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The remaining indirect taxes imputed to households are import duties 
and other indirect taxes. There has probably been more analysis of the 
economic effects of import duties in New Zealand than of any other tax. 
Vigorous debate has focussed on the employment effects of these taxes, 
but there has been little rigorous attempt to relate these effects to 
household income groups. In this thesis, import duties and other taxes 
are treated in the same way as the intermediate wholesale sales taxes. 
They are imputed to households in relation to their total expenditure as 
reported by the Household Survey. 
8.4: Conclusion: The Distribution of Indirect Taxes 
8.4.a: Quantitative Results 
Table 58.6 summarises the distribution of indirect taxes by income 
group. 
Table 58.6 
1981/82 INDIRECT TAXESa BY HOUSEHOLD INCOt-£ GROUP 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1-busehold 
Market 
Income 
($ p.a.) 
A 
Direct 
Whole-
sale 
Sales 
Tax 
$M 
B c D E F G H· 
Stage One Stage Two: 
Racing "Direct" Inter- Total 
Spec- and Indirect Taxes mediate Indirect Taxes 
ific Lottery --------------- Indirect -------------Taxes Duty Amnt Dist Taxes Amnt Dist 
$M $M $M (%) $M $M (%) 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Less than S250 16 16 2 34 2.7 32 66 3.1 
$250-( $3,950) 26 22 2 50 3.9 40 90 4.3 
$3950-( $9, 750) 45 35 2 82 6.5 53 135 6.5 
$9570-($13,450) 53 41 " 100 7.9 61 161 7. 7 0 
$13450-($16, 900) 61 45 5 111 8.8 74 185 8.9 
S16900-(S20,250) 79 54 6 138 11.0 87 225 10.8 
$20250-( $24,200) . 75 55 7 137 10.8 92 229 11.0 
$24200-($29,200) 91 64 7 162 12.8 104 266 . 12.7 
$29200-( $36,650) 112 76 7 195 15.4 126 321 15.4 
$36650 and over 149 95 11 255 20.2 154 409 19.6 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------TOTAL 706 503 55 1264 100.0 823 2087b 100.0 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------Notes: a) See text, Chapter Five for treatment of indirect taxes. b) The 
total amount of indirect tax payments recorded by the 1981/82 Central 
Government Income and Outlay Account was $2,197.6 million. The amount of 
$2,087 million is 95 percent of this, representing the population residing 
in private households. Sources: See Tables in Section B, Chapter Five. 
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Columns A, 8 and C of Table 58.6 comprise taxes which can be imputed 
directly to households using Household Survey data about final 
expenditures which are subject to indirect taxes. The amount of tax 
distributed to households is calculated by adjusting the expenditures for 
the usual retail margins and applying the percentage tax rate to the 
wholesale value of the expenditure. It is assumed that the total 
money-income amount of any indirect tax is passed on to final 
expenditures made by the household sector. 
Column D of Table 58.6 sums all the tax distributed directly to 
households in relation to Household Survey expenditure patterns. It is 
the same as the direct measure of indirect taxes referred to in Stage One 
of the income taxonomy developed in Chapter One. As Column E shows, each 
of the five deciles in the upper market-income groups are estimated to 
pay more than 10 percent of indirect taxes defined as Stage One indirect 
taxes. 
Column F shows the amount of "intermediate" indirect taxes by 
household income group. These taxes are imp~ted to household income 
groups in proportion to their share of household expenditures. 
"Intermediate" indirect taxes are then added to Stage One "direct" 
indirect taxes (Column D) to arrive at the total of all indirect taxes 
paid by private households into the central government income and outlay 
account (Column G). This is the definition of indirect taxes which is 
applied to Stage Two of the income taxonomy set out in Chapter One. 
According to both the Stage One and Stage Two approaches, the share 
of indirect taxes paid by household market-income groups is very 
similar. Like Column E, Column H shows that each of the five upper 
market-income groups is estimated to pay a share of indirect taxes 
greater than the share of households (10 percent) in each group. In both 
cases, the 10 percent of households in the highest income group (earning 
over $36,650 per year) are estimated to pay about 20 percent of all 
indirect taxes. An impression that could be gained from Table 58.6 is 
that indirect taxes are redistributive. Nevertheless, when indirect 
taxes are taken as a proportion of market or total household income, they 
do not appear to be so redistributive. This can be seen from a 
comparison of Charts 5.1 and 5.2 on the next page. 
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CHART 5.1 
11-E SHARES OF INDIRECT TAX PA'ft.ENTS BY HOUSEHOLD 
INCOt-1£ C£CILE IN 1981/82 
Snare 25~--------------------------------------~ 
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01art 5.1 is a graphic means of illustrating the conclusion that 
those in the higher income groups pay the larger shares of indirect 
taxes. For the three groups of taxes recorded by the Chart, the 10 
percent of households in the lowest-income group paid a share of taxes 
equal to less than 5 percent. In contrast, the 10 percent of households 
in the upper income group paid around 20 percent of each type o~ indirect 
tax. However, when the indirect taxes are taken as a percentage of total 
income (see Chart 5.2) the picture changes. In contrast to the personal 
income tax, indirect taxes take a smaller proportion of total income as 
household income rises. 
CHART 5.2 
CCM'ARISON OF EFFECTIVE RATES OF INDIRECT AND DIRECT TAX 
(Amount of Tax as a Proportion of Total Income for Household Income Group) 
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Total Income 
Paid in Tax 40 
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Table 58.7 shows the distribution of indirect tax payments by 
household type. Households with three or more adults are estimated to 
pay the biggest share of this tax. They represent 8.3 percent of 
households but paid 15.8 percent of indirect taxes in 1981/82. In 
comparison, one-adult, national-superannuitant households pay a small 
share of indirect tax. They account for 10.8 percent of the private 
household population but are only estimated to pay 3.0 percent of 
indirect tax. 
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When the effective rate of indirect tax is analysed in relation to 
household market income (see next to bottom row of Table 58.7), the 
position of the national-superannuitant and single-parent households 
appears worse than for other household types. Single-parent households 
are estimated to pay an average of 20.0 percent of their market income in 
indirect tax, single-adult, national-superannuitant households pay 17.3 
percent, and two-adult national superannuitants pay 15.0 percent. In 
contrast, indirect taxes are estimated to equal less than 12 percent of 
market income for the other household types. ···--- ·-· · · · 
Table 58.7 
1981/82 STAGE TWO INDIRECT TAXES: ESTIMATED DISTRIBUTION BY HOUSEHOLD TYPE 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Household Type 
------------------------------------------------------------1 Adult 2 Adults 2 Adults 
with 
O"lildren 
3 or More 1 Adult All 
Adults with House-
Chld'n holds 
------------------------------------------------------------Nat Oth Nat Oth 
Sup Sup 
1 2 3+ No With 
O"lil- O"lil-
dren dren 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Total Indirect Taxes 
Amount (SM) 62 111 181 349 164 271 221 330 360 38 2087 
Percentage 
Distribution 3.0 5.3 8.7 16.7 7.9 13.0 10.6 15.8 17.2 1.8 100.0 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Comparative Figures 
Distribution of 
Households(%) 10.8 8.7 12.4 15.0 7.8 12.6 10.4 8.3 10.3 3·.7 100.0 
Total Indirect Taxes as a Percentage of: 
Market Income(%) 17.3 10.5 15.0 9.7 9.9 9.6 9.6 12.0 10.8 20.0 10.8 
Total Income(%) 6.9 9.9 8.5 9.6 9.5 9.2 9.1 11.4 10.1 10.6 9.6 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Note: See Appendix Table A5B.l for breakdown into amounts of individual taxes. 
Sources: Summarised from Tables in Section B, Chapter Five. 
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The effective rate of indirect tax is more nearly proportional when 
the basis for the comparison is total income (see bottom row of Table 
58.7). In round terms, most household types paid an average of 9 or 10 
percent of their total income in indirect taxes. The exceptions are 
one-adult, national-superannuitant households, with an estimated average 
effective rate of 6.9 percent and childless three-or-more adult 
households, with 11.4 percent~ 
8.4.b: Taking Account of Economic Effects of Indirect Taxes 
SWF general equilibrium models are eminently suited to analyse the 
economic effects of an indirect tax structure like New Zealand's with all 
of its variety. Most of the components for such analysis (including 
national income accounts, input/output matrices, disaggregated by several 
production and household groups) are specified as the core of SWF 
models. But before these models could be applied to address the issues 
raised in this thesis, further development of the behavioural equations, 
especially where they relate to household behaviour, is required. In the 
absence of these developments, it has been necessary to resort to the 
assumption that indirect taxes are 100 percent shifted to household 
expenditure. So rather than measuri ng the economic incidence of the 
indirect tax structure, this thesis research identifies the expenditure 
base of indirect tax assessments. 
A starting point for analysing the economic effects of indirect 
taxes in New Zealand would be to use the Household Survey data (now 
available for a ten year period) to perform an econometric estimation of 
long-run demand elasticities. To date, the work in this area has been 
largely confined to rough estimates of elasticities for eight main 
commodity classifications which are applied in the Victoria University 
Research Project on Economic Planning Joanna model. 
The conclusion which emerges from the RPEP work (see especially Nana 
and Philpott, 1985, and Wallace and Philpott, 1982) is that indirect 
taxes are not 100 percent shifted to household expenditure. In the 
simplest formulation, indirect taxes also lead to changes in disposable 
incomes. Since indirect taxes are a growing source of government 
revenue, further work to discover their incidence by household type and 
incomes would be valuable. 
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C. THE CO~ANY INCOME TAX 
Companies in New Zealand are taxed in a different way to individual 
taxpayers. The main differences are that: 
a) A company does not get any of the special exemptions or rebates 
which the individual taxpayer may claim. 
b) A company does not get the interest exemptions. 
c) Dividends received by a company incorporated in New Zealand are 
exempt from income tax. 
d) The rate of income tax is different. 
Companies have many advantages (including limited liability) which 
makes them peculiarly suitable for modern forms of economic activity. 
They are able to undertake investment, at less personal risk for the 
shareholders; and they have more power than several unaligned individuals. 
The base of the company tax is generally historical cost profits. 
Taxable income is broadly defined as net operating income? plus the 
increase in the nominal value of stocks, less depreciation (based on the 
historical cost of assets) less nominal interest payments. Capital 
profits are generally excluded from the tax base, necessitating complex 
rules to distinquish between capital and current receipts. Interest on 
debt is a deductible expense. 
A feature of the company income tax legislation in 1981/82 is the 
variability in tax treatment of incorporated entities. Resident New 
Zealand companies pay a different rate of tax from non-resident 
companies. In addition, differing methods of assessment apply to 
overseas shipping companies, life insurance companies and certain types 
of mining companies. Moreover, because of a variety of tax concessions 
(including in some cases the ability to write off capital expenditure 
when it is incurred), the average rates of tax paid by businesses vary 
depending on whether a business is incorporated and depending on whether 
the business operates a farm, a fishing boat, a forest, a factory, or 
something else for which it receives a tax concession. 
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Figure 5.9 records the latest Department of Statistics information 
about company returns. Companies that pay little tax record low amounts 
of assessable income and appear in t.he lower income brackets, even though 
they may have large turnover or assets. For example, 27.9 percent of 
company tax returns reported net losses but this same group received 21.3 
percent of the income from dividends and accounted for 25.1 percent of 
the total depreciation claimed. This suggests this group has substantial 
assets even if it does not pay income tax in the loss year. 
FIGURE 5.9 
et:WANY TAX ~ DISTRIBUTED BY AMJUNT OF 1980/81 AS3ESSA8LE INCa.£ 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Assessable 
Amount of Income 
Assessable Income Returns Before Losses 
Ordinary Divi-
dends Received 
Income Tax 
Assessed 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
% of ($M) % of ($M) % of ($M) % of No. Total Total Total Total 
a - 199 21098 26.1 2.0 0.1 63.4 17.4 0.2 0.0 
200 - 3999 10431 12.9 21.6 1.0 11.2 3.1 6.1 0.8 
4000 - 13999 5284 6.5 47.2 2.2 8.1 2.2 17.4 2.3 
14000 - 79999 5086 6.3 187.1 8.6 21.2 5.8 71.2 9.5 
80000 & Over 2489 3.1 1681.7 76.8 122.3 33.5 653.6 87.4 
Current Net Loss 22589 27.9 77.8 21.3 
Assessable Income 
before Losses 13849 17.2 246.6 11.3 60.8 16.7 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Total 80826 100.0 2186.2 100.0 364.8 100.0 748.5 100.0 
Source: Department of Statistics, /Incomes and Income Tax of Companies, 1980-81 
C.l: The Statutory Incidence of the Comoany Income Tax 
Under the present system, New Zealand companies pay a flat rate of 
45 percent tax on their taxable profits and non-resident companies pay 50 
percent. As discussed in the introduction, a large number of concessions 
and incentives exist, some of which are paid to companies as tax rebates 
(negative company income tax). Because of these concessions, the average 
tax for most companies is below 45 percent. 
The company tax for proprietary companies provides shareholder-
employees with an opportunity to derive an income from salary, dividends, 
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or interest (taxed at a marginal rat1:! up to 6'0 percent) and income from 
the company (taxed at a flat rate of 45 percent). The small business 
taxpayer may choose to split the company income between family, 
shareholders, and into different classes of income to obtain the maximum 
tax benefit. 
Under the 1982 income tax provisions, dividend income derived by 
companies is not liable to income tax. However, some forms of dividend 
income derived by individuals are liable to ordinary income tax, the 
dividends are taxed both as company :income before distribution, and then 
as personal income. A number of means exist to avoid this "double 
taxation", including specified prefe:rence shares and payments of 
dividends to companies rather than individuals, although when the 
companies at some stage declare dividends they will be taxed as personal 
income. Revenue from the tax on dividends for 1981/82 is not high 
because nearly two-thirds of all the dividends distributed are tax free. 
Listed below are other taxes that apply to companies. None are very 
important sources of revenue. 
a) Bonus Issue Tax - is a special t ax of 17.5 cents in the dollar on 
the bonus issues made from income sources and is levied on the 
company. Shareholders receive t hese issues tax-free. 
b) Excess Retention Tax - is payable by privately-controlled New 
Zealand investment companies if the investment company does not pay 
a dividend equal to at least 40 percent of its tax-paid profits and 
100 percent of its dividends from other companies. A refund of 
excess retention tax paid will be made if, in a later year, the 
investment company declares a dividend greater than the amount 
needed for that year. The tax is assessed at a rate of 35 cents in 
the dollar. 
c) Non-Resident Withholding Tax - is assessed on investment income 
earned by non-residents at rates varying according to double-tax 
agreements with other countries. Dividends paid to non-residents 
are subject to a non-resident withholding tax of up to 30 percent of 
the gross income. A withholding tax of up to 15 percent is payable 
on interest, royalties, and "know-how" payments. 
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As the above section has shown, the company income tax is tediously 
complex. Out of this complexity, two main themes may be identified. 
First, as is the case for the personal income tax, it is income, not 
capital, which is taxed. Secondly, the way in which the tax is assessed 
varies considerably depending on the activities a company is involved in. 
C.2: The Incidence of the Company Income Tax 
In New Zealand, (in fact, in most countries) the company income tax 
is not a very large source of government revenue. And yet the general 
equilibrium literature has focused on the company income tax. The share 
of the revenue from this source is in no way commensurate to the 
proportion of general equilibrium research which has been devoted to its 
incidence. 
A reason for the preoccupation of general equilibrium research with 
the company tax is that economists are more divided about its incidence 
than they are about the incidence of other taxes. There is a large 
division as well between the theorists and practitioners. On the one 
hand, the evidence of general equilibrium analysis is that at least some 
company income tax is paid out of profits. On the other hand, a study by 
Catt (1965), found that managers of New Zealand firms maintain that they 
did not pay the tax out of reduced profits. The wording of the four 
possible responses to Catt's questionnaire, however, is not precise 
enough for drawing conclusions about how much company tax is shifted. 
There are differing conclusions from a number of econometric studies 
of company tax incidence and general equilibrium studies, so the issue 
remains controversial. At one extreme, Krzyzaniak and Musgrave (K-M, 
1966) attempt quantitatively to determine the incidence of the 
corporation income tax by focusing upon the influence of the u.s. 
corporation income tax on the rate of return using multiple regression 
techniques and a profit behaviour model for the years 1935 to 1959 
(excluding the war years). Their results indicate that tax shifting was 
more than 100 percent. 
At the other end of the spectrum, Gordon (1967) developed a model of 
company markup pricing behaviour to measure the incidence of the company 
income tax. He concludes "that between 1925 and 1962 companies in the 
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United States suffered the full burden of the company income tax". 
result supports Harberger's (1962) empirical study of US corporate 
in 1953 to 1957 which shows that the corporate sector's burden was 
between 90 and 100 percent of tax. 
247. 
This 
taxes 
In his analysis of the results from the K-M and Gordon studies, Cary 
Brown (1974) argues that the. conclusion probably ~ies between the K-M 
results and Gordon's, suggesting that perhaps Herberger's (1962) 
theoretically determined figure of 50 percent shifting may eventually be 
shown to be correct. The econometric studies do not conclusively disprove 
assumptions by Musgrave et al (1951) about the incidence of the 
corporation income tax. According to Musgrave's standard case, 55 percent 
of company tax is shifted to shareholders, 33 percent to consumers and 12 
percent of company tax is shifted backwards to wage earners. 
New Zealand relies more heavily on trade than the United States and 
the proportion of company tax which is imported and that which is 
exported is likely to be a more significant factor. As McClure Jr (1964) 
concludes: "It can be seen that the tax borne by residents of the taxing 
region equals the amount of tax only where supply is infinitely elastic 
or demand is perfectly inelastic" (p.203)". Nevertheless, because of the 
difficulty of estimating the relative elasticities of supply and demand 
and the quantities bought and sold in each trading market, it is assumed 
in this thesis that the amount of company tax shifted overseas is exactly 
equal to the amount shifted from overseas to New Zealand. 
The company income tax is represented in the HMM and SWF models as a 
tax on the income from capital in each sector or industry. Computational 
techniques of the SWF models enable a number of industries to be 
analysed. Disaggregation by industry provides the ability to evaluate 
specific capital subsidies such as regional development grants and 
subsidies on borrowing to nationalised industries. 
It is usually assumed by the SWF models that no change in corporate 
financial policy is induced by the tax. As is the case with most taxes 
specified by the SWF models (the chief exception being the personal 
income tax), the effective and marginal tax rates are assumed to be 
equal. Some, including Fullerton and Gordon ( 1983) haVe experimented 
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with different average and marginal tax rates because of empirical 
considerations that imply a divergence between average and marginal 
rates, at least in the short run. 
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Different SwF models have elaborated on different aspects of company 
tax incidence. Some have developed dynamic (steady-state) counterparts 
to Harberger's two sector model. More recently, there have been attempts 
to specify a financial sector to examine· the effects of the corporate 
income tax on portfolio allocation and dividend payouts. As Fullerton et 
al (1983, p.4) conclude in their survey of this literature: " the 
results of these studies indicated a substantial range of answers on 
incidence of the corporate income tax ••• ". 
In short, while the recent models have incorporated some significant 
refinements, the question of the incidence of the company income tax 
still remains controversial. To make things more difficult, the 
literature does not focus on the effects of the tax on household incomes 
and the results here are unclear. 
In the absence of conclusive results, this thesis follows the 
technique of other quantitative research and adopts several assumptions 
about company tax incidence. A limitation of this approach (common also 
to most empirical incidence research) is that it treats the company tax 
as though it is homogeneous. This is in contradiction to one of the 
conclusions from the discussion of the statutory effect of the New 
Zealand company tax. It is not a homogeneous tax. 
C.3: Methodology for Imouting Company Income Tax to Households 
The view taken in Stage One is that only direct payments by 
households are measured. Since company taxes are directly assessed by 
the corporate sector and not the household sector, they are ignored in 
the calculations. 
In Stage Two, however, the view that is taken is that the company 
income tax is paid by the household sector, which is ultimately 
responsible for the payment of all taxes. To account for the different 
theoretical incidence results, company tax is imputed to household income 
groups according to six different sets of assumptions. 
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Case 1 : Half distributed by investment income/half by household 
expenditure (this is the Standard Case in this thesis and 
is based on Cary Brown's compromise that 50 percent of the 
company tax is shifted and 50 percent is paid by the 
company); 
Case 2 100 percent distributed by household expenditure (based on 
the K-M results of 100 percent shifting); 
Case 3 A third of the tax distributed by wages and salaries, a 
third by dividend income, and a th±rd by household 
expenditure (this case based on Musgrave's 1951 article); 
Case 4 100 percent distributed by dividend income (this case based 
on Harberger and Gordon results showing 100 percent paid 
out of capital) ; 
Case 5 Half distributed by dividend income and half by investment 
income (this is based on same literature as Case 4 but 
different interpretation of owners of capital); 
Case 6 Half distributed by dividend income/half distributed by 
expenditure income (this based on same conclusions as Case 
1 but different data about the owners of capital). 
Table 5C.l compares distributions based on the different assumptions 
underlying the six cases. 
Table 5C.l 
DISTRIBUTI~ OF C{)tf)ANY TAX BY INca.£ GROUP: 
COM=iARISON OF INCIDENCE ASSUWTIDN 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------1/3 Wages 
& Salary 
1/2 Invt 1/3 Div'd 1/2 Oivnd 1/2 Div' d 
Household Income Income Income & Income & 
Market 1/2 H'hld H'hold 1/3 H'hld Divdnd 1/2 Invt. 1/2 H'hld 
Income Expend. Expend. Expend. Income Income Expend. 
($ p.a.) (Case 1) (Case 2) (Case 3) (Case 4) (Case 5) (Case 6) 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------Percent Distribution (%) 
Less Than $250 2.1 3.9 1.4 0.2 0.3 2.1 
$250-( $3,950) 5.2 4.8 2.5 2.3 4 • .5 3.6 
$3,950-( $9, 750) 9.1 6.5 5.1 6.1 9.6 6.3 
$9,750-($13,450) 6.9 7.4 6.4 5.1 5.9 6.3 
$13,450-($16,900) 8.1 9.0 8.4 7.7 7.4 8.3 
$16,900-($20,250) 8.2 10.4 8.5 4.3 5.4 7.4 
$20,250-($24,200) 8.8 11.1 9.9 5.4 6.1 8.2 
$24,200-($29,200) 10.4 12.7 10.1 2.2 6.0 7.4 
$29,200-($36,650) 12.9 1.5 .4· 14.0 8.0 9.5 11.7 
$36,650 and over 28.3 18.8 33.7 58.7 45.3 38.7 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------Source: See text for derivation. 
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CHART 5.3 
RELATIVE EQUALITY OF THREE CClflANY TAX INCIC€NCE 
ASSUM='TIONS: LORENZ DIAGRAM 1981/82 
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Chart 5.3 is a graphic illustration of the disparity in distribution 
that results from the different incidence assumptions shown by Table 
SC.l. Case 2, where it is assumed that the company income tax is passed 
totally onto the prices of final household expenditures, is closest to 
the line of equality. This means it is the least redistributive case 
because those in the low income groups are assumed to pay a greater share 
of the company tax than they do under the other assumptions that are 
adopted. Case 4, where it is assumed that the company tax is paid out of 
shareholders' funds (it reduces profits by 100 percent), is the least 
equal distribution. It is also a rather "wobbly" distribution reflecting 
the fact that those with company shareholdings (who in turn receive 
dividends) tend to be concentrated both in the highest income group and 
among the more elderly members of the population. The elderly members 
earning dividend income tend to be concentrated in the five lower income 
groups. 
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Table 5C.2 
DISTRIBUTI~ OF CCWANY TAX BY HOUSEHO..D TYPE: 
COWARISON OF SIX INCIDENCE ASSUWTIONS 
Household Type 
1 Adult 2 Adults 2 Adults 
with 
O"lildren 
3 or More 1 Adult All 
Adults with House-
1-busehold 
Market 
Income 
(S p.a.) 
Nat Oth Nat Oth 
Sup Sup 
1 2 3+ No With 
Chil- Chil-
dren dren 
Chld'n holes 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Company Tax Percent Distribution (%) 
(Case 1) 9.2 4.2 18.2 12.8 9. 1 11.1 8.2 14.6 11.1 1.5 100.0 
Household Expend. 
(Case 2) 3.5 5.0 8. 7 16.4 8.1 15.3 11.5 12.9 16.3 2.3 100.0 
l/3 Wages & Salary 
l/3 Div'nd Income 
1/3 H'hold Expend. 
(Case 3) 5.3 4.1 13.2 13.2 11.8 11.6 9.0 16.7 13.9 1.2 100.0 
Dividend Income 
(Case 4) 
Dividend Income & 
Investment Income 
11.6 1.6 27.0 3.2 18.5 5.0 4.0 22.2 6.7 
(Case 5) 13.7 2.7 27.5 7.1 13.1 6.1 4.6 18.4 6.2 
1/2 Div'nd Income 
1/2 Expenditure 
(Case 6) 7.6 3.3 17.8 9.8 13.3 10.1 7.8 17.5 11.5 
0.2 100.0 
!3.6 100.0 
1.3 100.0 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Comparative Distributions 
Households 10.8 8.7 12.4 15.0 7.8 12.6 10.4 8.3 10.3 3.7 100.0 
Occupants 
of 1-buseholds 3.6 2.9 8.3 10.0 7.9 16.9 19.0 9.4 18.7 3.4 100.0 
Scource: Distributions derived based on Department of Statistics 1981/82 
Household Survey information. See text for explanation of six Cases. 
Table 5C.2 compares the distributions of company tax by household 
type based on the six cases applied in this thesis. When analysed by 
household type, there is considerable variation. Chart 5.4 (on the 
following page) graphs the differences in shares for the Standard Case 
(Case 1), and extreme Cases 2 and 4. 
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C .4: Who Pays Comoanv Income Tax in New Zealand'? 
As Table 5C.3 shows, according to the Standard Case (Case 1), the 
upper decile of households pays over 28.3 percent of the company income 
tax. However, the shares of the company tax paid by several of the other 
household income groups are remarkably similar at between 8 and 10 
percent. For the lower income groups, this is partly explained by the 
contribution to the tax made by one- and two-adult national-superannuitant 
households. 
Table SC.3 
OISTRIBUTICtf OF CGFANY TAX PA'nENTS BY PRIVATE HO.JSEH(U)S (CASE l*) 
BY RANGE OF HOUSEHOLD ~ !NCO~ AND HOUSEHOLD TYPE 
f-lousehold Type 
------------------------------------------------------------1 Adult 2 Adults 2 Adults 3 or More 1 Adult All 
with Adults with House-
Household O'lildren O'lld' n holds 
Market --------------~----------------------------------------Income Nat Oth Nat Oth 1 2 3+ No With 
($ pa) Sup Sup Chil- Chil-
dren dren 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------As a Proportion of The Total For All Households (%) 
. 
Less Than S250 0.6 0.1 0.6 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.4 2.1 
$250-( $3,950) 2.0 0.3 2.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 5.2 
$3,950-( $9,750) 2.9 0.9 2.8 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.4 9.1 
$9,750-($13,450) 0.7 0.7 1.9 0.8 0.6 0.7 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.2 6.9 
$13,450-($16,900) 0.6 1.8 0.9 0.8 1.2 0.8 0.4 0.5 8.1 
$16,900-($20,250) 0.7 1.7 1.3 o. 7 1.5 1.1 0.5 0.5 8.2 
$20,250-($24,200) 0.5 1.1 1.5 0.7 1.5 1.6 0.8 1.0 8.8 
$24,200-($29,200) 0.2 0.8 2.6 0.8 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.2 10.4 
$29,200-($36,650) 1.3 2.4 0.6 2.0 0.8 2.6 3.0 12.9 
$36,650 and over 4.0 2.7 4.4 2.4 1.7 8.2 4.2 28.3 
TOTAL 9.2 4.2 18.2 12.8 9.1 11.1 8.2 14.6 11.1 1.5 100.0 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Note: Case 1 is the Standard Case in this thesis. It assumes half of the 
company income taxes distributed by interest income and half distributed by 
the pattern of household expenditure. Sources: Estimated using data from 
the Department of Statistics Household Survey 1981/82, and weighted using 
data from the 1981 Census of Population and Dwellings to represent the 
total population of private households. 
A lesson for policymakers from the discussion in the previous 
section and borne out by Table 5C.3 is that it is not just the 
assumptions about who pays the tax by income that are important. Also 
important are the assumptions about how the tax is distributed by 
household type. 
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Nevertheless, while the six cases far distributing the company tax 
produce different results, the distribution of total payments to 
government is nat very sensitive to these differences. Table 5C.4 
(below) applies the six different company tax assumptions to calculate 
the distribution of total payments to central government. The most 
noticeable difference is far the households in the highest income group. 
Appendix Table A5C.l analyses the company tax assumptions by household 
type, showing that the cases are only significantly different --for 
national-superannuitant households. 
Table 5C.4 
Ct)o.FARING DISTRIBUTICt6 OF TOTAL 1981/82 PAYtJENTS TO GOVERNtENT 
USING SIX CASES FOR COM=IANY TAX 
l/3 Wages 
& Salary 1/2 Div 1/2 Div 
Household 1/3 Div Income & Income & 
Market Company H'hold 1/3 H'hld Div 1/2 Invt. 1/2 H'hold 
Income Tax Expend. Expend. Income Income Expend. 
($ p.a.) (Case 1) (Case 2) (Case 3) (Case 4) (Case 5) (Case 6) 
----------------------------------~-------- ---~--------------------
Percent Distribution (%) 
Less Than $250 1.7 1.8 1. 7· 1.6 1.6 1.7 
$250-( $3,950) 2.7 2.7 2.5 2.5 2.7 2.6 
$3,950-( $9, 750) 4.4 4.2 4.2 4.1 4.4 4.2 
$9,750-($13,450) 5.7 5 .. 7 5.7 5.6 5.6 5.6 
$13,450~($16,900) 7.4 7.5 7.4 7.4 7.3 7.4 
$16,900-($20,250) 9.2 9.4 9.2 8.9 9.0 9.2 
$20,250-($24,200) 10.7 10.8 10.7 10.4 10.5 10.6 
$24,200-($29,200) 13.4 13.5 13.3 12.7 13.0 13.1 
$29,200-($36,650) 16.7 16.9 16.8 16.4 16.5 16.7 
$36,650 and over 28.1 27.5 28.5 30.4 29.4 28.9 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Sources: Far derivation, see text of Chapter Five. 
In conclusion, application of the different assumptions about the 
company income tax in this thesis indicates that there is a range of 
distributions possible based on the vast (but inconclusive) evidence 
about company tax incidence. Despite the range of possible company tax 
distributions, the distribution of total tax payments by household is not 
greatly affected. Therefore, if the focus of tax incidence research is 
the economic effects of taxation in relation to households, further 
refinements of the treatment of company taxes are not likely to make a 
great deal of difference to the results. 
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D. OTHER GOVERNMENT REC=:IPTS: GOVERNMENT PRCPERTY INCOME ANO 
MISCELLANEOUS 
0.1: Statutory Description of Other Government Receiots 
255. 
A source of gpvernment revenue which is as important as the company 
income tax is government property income. In 1981/82, this item was 
equal to $706.3 million and made up 7.4 percent of central government 
receipts. In the main, this receipt item comprises interest charged by 
trading departments for loans to acquire property or new capital 
equipment. In the past, these interest charges have been below average 
market rates. With the more recent government-policy emphasis on setting 
charges consistent with market rates, it is likely that government 
property income will grow much faster than the company income tax in the 
future. 
Other govemnent receipts ( OGRs) also comprise miscellaneous 
receipts of $108.6 million. These receipts include: operating surplus 
($11.6 million); withdrawals from trading accounts ($19.1 million); 
compulsory fees, fines and penalties ($38.0 million); and current 
transfers ($39.9 million). 
D .2: The Incidence of OGRs 
A way of conceptualising OGRs is as the tax equivalent of collective 
goods (similarly, indirect taxes are the tax equivalent of subsidies). 
Collective goods provide a non-excludable benefit to the public. Other 
government payments are a non-excludable source of government revenue. 
Most OGRs come about because a government trading department makes an 
opE!rating surplus from charging users more than the cost of providing the 
seJ~vice or as a statutory requirement imposed on government trading 
entities which results ultimately in the reduction of taxpayers' money 
income. This argument may seem like a rather simplistic approach to 
tre!ating the varied i terns included as other payments to the government, 
bui: it is no more simplistic than treating the company income tax as a 
ta)< on income from capital. Further study is required to analyse the 
economic effects of UGRs. Meantime, the important question is to 
discover how sensitive the results are to different assumptions about the 
incidence of OGRs. 
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Similarly to government collective expenditures, eight different 
cases are applied to analyse the distribution of OGRs. Table 68.1 (page 
287) reports the eight assumptions and the resulting distribution by 
income group. Pages 286 to 292 spell out the rationale for each of these 
assumptions in some detail. The cases are as follows: 
Case 1: Households consume government traded goods (and thus pay 
OGRs) in the same proportion as they spend their income on 
other private goods (this is the Standard Case); 
Case 2: OGR payments are related to household disposable income; 
Case 3: Households' OGR payments are related to their market income; 
Case 4: Households pay OGRs in relation to their total income; 
Case 5: Households' burden of OGRs is related to their capital, 
income - in the absence of information about households 
ownership of capital, property rates are used as a proxy 
for this; 
Case 6: OGRs are distributed in relation to the personal income tax; 
Case 7: The share of OGRs is directly related to the share of 
households in each income group or in other words each 
household pays the same amount of OGR; and, 
Case 8: Each person pays the same amount of OGR. 
D .3: I!J!)Uting the Money-Income Value of OGRs to Households 
OGRs are not included in the income measure adopted for Stage One. 
This is because, with the possible exception of some fees, fines and 
penalties, households are not directly liable to pay them. OGRs are 
included in Stage Two on the assumption that households eventually pay 
for the operation of central government, even if the legal base for the 
payment is some other corporate or trading entity. 
It is by no means a straightforward exercise to identify which 
households pay OGRs or the money-income value of their payments. The 
Standard Case assumes that households consume government traded goods in 
the same proportion as they spend their income on other private goods. 
According to this case, 95 percent of the value of government property 
income and miscellaneous receipts is imputed to households in accordance 
with the proportion of private expenditure in each household group 
classified by income and household type. 
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D.4: Conclusion: The Distribution of OGRs and the Sensitivity of Results 
On average, $750 was paid per household in OGRs in 1981/82, accord-
ing to the Standard Case (see Appendix Table A5D.l). In all eight cases, 
the average amount paid per household tends to increase with income. 
Table 50.1 
CCJ.FARING OIF'F'ERENT ASSlJ.fiTict6: On£R GOVERt+ENT RECEIPTS 
Household 
Market Income 
($ p.a.) 
Less Than $250 
$250-( $3,950) 
$3,950-( $9,750) 
$9,750-($13,450) 
$13,450-($16,900) 
$16,900-($20,250) 
$20,250-($24,200) 
$24,200-($29,200) 
$29,200-($36,650) 
$36,650 and over 
Total 
Assumption Most Beneficial 
to Low-Income Groups 
(Case 6: Personal Income Tax) 
A 
Oth 
Govt 
Recpt 
$M 
7 
12 
22 
36 
51 
67 
83 
108 
139 
249 
774 
8 c 
Other Total 
Govt Govt 
Revnu Revnu 
$M 
130 
214 
352 
462 
656 
762 
882 
1113 
1402 
2386 
$M 
137 
226 
374 
498 
656 
829 
965 
1221 
1541 
2635 
D 
Distri-
bution 
1.5 
2.5 
4.1 
5.5 
7.2 
9.1 
10.6 
13.5 
17.0 
29.0 
8308 9082 100.0 
Assumption Most Beneficial 
to High-Income Groups 
(Case 7: No. of H'holds) 
E 
Oth 
Govt 
Recpt 
$M 
77 
78 
77 
77 
77 
78 
77 
78 
78 
77 
774 
F G 
Other Total 
Govt Govt 
Revnu Revnu 
$M 
130 
214 
352 
462 
605 
762 
882 
1113 
1402 
2386 
$M 
207 
292 
429 
539 
682 
840 
959 
1191 
1480 
2463 
H 
% 
Distri-
bution 
2.3 
3.2 
4.7 
5.9 
7.5 
9.2 
10.6 
13.1 
16.3 
27.1 
8308 9082 100.0 
Sources: Columns A and E based on Table 68.1. Derivation of Columns 8 and F 
from r.esults in Chapter Five (the Section E of this Chapter). Columns C and 
G are calculted by adding together the two previous Columns and D and H are 
the precentage distributions of C and G respectively. 
Table 50.1 compares the effect of the two extreme assumptions about 
OGRs (Case 6 and Case 7) on the distribution of total government 
receipts. A comparison of Columns 0 and H shows very little variation in 
the distribution of total payments. In both cases, the distribution of 
total government revenue turns out to be fairly progressive with those in 
the highest income decile paying by far the largest share. 
In summary, very little is known about the money-income value of 
households' payments for OGRs. To include them in this thesis, several 
assumptions were tested and it was found that the final distribution of 
total payments was not particularly sensitive to the different assumptions. 
CHAPTER FIVE - PA'ft.ENTS TO CENTRAL GOVERNENT 258. 
E. CONCLUSION: THE DISTRIBUTION OF PAYM5~TS TO GOVERNMENT BY HOUSEHOLD 
INCOME GROUP 
The section briefly summarises the distribution of payments to the 
government. First, it considers the quantitative results. Then it 
concludes with a brief discussion of how these compare with other 
relevant literature. 
E.l: Quantitative Results : Stages One and Two 
Quantitative results are derived based on both the Stage One and 
Stage Two approaches. Stage One is designed to evaluate the distribution 
of taxes paid directly by households. It is an accounting approach and 
does not concern itself with questions such as possible economic effects 
which lead households to change their behaviour. Table 5E.l shows the 
distribution of Stage One payments by income group •. 
Table SE.l 
STAGE 0~ : 1981/82 GOVERNENT DIRECT PAYlENTS BY I-O.JSEl-0-0 INCQ.£ GROUP 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Household 
Market Income 
($ p.a.) 
Less Than $250 
$250-( $3,950) 
$3,950-( $9,750) 
$9,750-($13,450) 
$13,450-($16,900) 
$16,900-($20,250) 
$20,250-($24,200) 
$24,200-($29,200) 
$29,200-($36,650) 
$36,650 and aver 
Personal 
Income 
Taxes 
50 
89 
156 
255 
366 
483 
594 
777 
994 
1788 
"Direct" 
Indirect 
Taxes 
$ Million 
34 
50 
82 
100 
lll 
138 
137 
162 
195 
255 
Total 
84 
139 
238 
355 
477 
621 
731 
939 
1189 
2043 
% of 
Total 
Stage One 
Taxes 
1.2 
2.0 
3.5 
5.2 
7.0 
9.1 
10.7 
13.8 
17.4 
30.0 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------TOTAL 5552 1264 6816 100.0 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Source: Estimated based on the 1981/82 Household Survey aggregated to the 
private household papulation based on the 1981 Census. 
Stage Twa adapts assumptions about the economic effects of payments 
to the government from the tax incidence literature. The standard 
assumptions applied are as fallows: 
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A) The personal income tax: This tax is assumed to be borne by 
the individual legally liable for the tax; 
8) Indirect taxes: 
1) "Direct" indirect taxes are assumed to be 100 percent 
shifted to households as the final consumers of taxed goods 
and services and are imputed based on the Household Survey 
information about their expenditures; 
2) "Intermediate" indirect taxes are assumed to be shifted to 
households in relation to their total expenditure; 
C) The c~any income tax: The Standard Case assumes that SO 
percent of the company income tax is shifted to consumption 
and paid oy households in relation to their total expenditure 
and the remaining SO percent is paid by debenture holders and 
shareholders of companie~; 
D) Other goverrvnent receipts: The Standard Case assumes that 
housheolds pay these taxes in relation to their expenditure on 
final goods and serivces. · 
Table SE.2 below shows the amounts of 1981/82 payments to central 
government by household income group. Column F is the distribution of 
total payments to households by household market-income decile. 
Table SE.2 
STAGE T\10: EliSTRI8UTID'4 OF TOTAL GOVERNENT PA'nENTS 
BY HOUSEHOLD INCO~ GROUP IN 1981/82 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------A 8 c D E 
Household Personal Indirect Company Other (A+B+C+O) F 
Market Income Income Tax Income Govt. Total % of 
($ p.a.) Tax Payments Tax Receipts Payments Total E 
(Case 1) (Case l) 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------$ Million 
Less Than $250 so 66 14 30 160 1.8 
$250-( $3, 950) 89 90 35 37 251 2.8 
$3,950-( $9,750) 156 135 61 51 403 4.4 
$9,750-($13,450) 255 161 46 55 520 5.7 
$13,450-($16,900) 366 185 54 69 674 7.4 
$16,900-($20,250) 483 225 55 81 844 9.3 
$20,250-( $24,200) 594 229 59 86 967 10.7 
$24,200-($29,200) 777 266 70 98 1211 13.3 
$29,200-($36,650) 994 321 86 119 1520 16.7 
$36,650 and over 1788 409 189 145 2531 28.1 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Total 5552 2087 668 774 9082 100.0 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Sources: Estimated based on the Department of Statistics 1981/82 Household 
Survey aggregated to the private household population based on the 1981 
Census of Population of Dwellings. See earlier Sections in Chapter Five for 
derivation of each tax distribution. Appendix Table A7.4 shows the 
percentage distribution of payments. 
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CHART 5.5 
GOVERNENT PAYM::NT SHARES BY HOUSEHCLD INCCM: OECILES: 
STAGES ONE AND TWO COt-PARED 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Share 30 (%) -r---------------------. Stage 1 Stage 2 
25 
zo 
15 
10 
5 Source: Tables SE.2,SE.3 
l z 3 4 s 6 7 8 9 10 
Household Marice~ Income Groups 
(Arranged in Deciles ·Going From Lowes~ .Market Income to Highest) 
.~s Chart 5.5 shows, the different approaches adopted by Stage One 
and Stage Two do not result in . any significant variation in the 
distribution of total payments to the government. Chart 5.6 shows that 
there is more variation in the distributions of individual payments. 
CHART 5.6 
1.981/82 PAyt.ENTS TO THE GOVERNENT: 
Tt£ SHARES OF FOUR MAIN ITEMS BY HOUSEHOLD !NCO~ CECILES COM='ARED 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Share 35 
(%) 
30 Personal Income Tax 
Company Tax 
25 
Other Receipts 
20 Indirect Ta."<es 
15 
10 
5 
l z 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
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CHART 5.7 
EFFECTIVE RATES FOR TOTAL 
PAYMENTS TO THE CENTRAL GOVERNM5~T IN 1981/82 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Effecdve 70 r---------------------, 
Rate· (\) 
---
---
_, 
--
--
--
- _, 
-
Source: Tables W,.SE.J 
l 2 3 ~ s 6 7 8 9 10 
Household Market Income GroUD 
Total Income 
Adjusted G.D.P. 
(Stage 3) 
(Arranged in Oec:iles Goins Frca Lowest Market Income to Hi&hest) 
When the effective payment rate is calculated, total payments aopear 
to be roughly proportional. Chart 5.7 illustrates the effective rates 
using total income and adjusted gross domestic product (see Chapter Three 
for derivation) as the bases for effective rate calculations. If total 
income is the base, the effective rates are also fairly proportional by 
household type (see Chart 5.8 an the next page). Not unexpectedly there 
is more variability in the effective rates when the base is market income. 
E.2: Comparison of Results With Other Research 
A comparison of the New Zealand results of ather research shows a 
remarkable similarity in the distribution of tax payments by household. 
Two common patterns emerge in the,t results of Gillespie (1965, 1966), 
Musgrave et al (1974), O'Higgins and Ruggles (1981 June and September), 
Pechman and Okner (1974) and Reynolds and Smolensky (1977). They are: 
1) the share of payments to the government increase with income (with the 
highest income group paying by far the largest share); and 2) taking 
total payments as a proportion of total income, results in a roughly 
proportional effective rate across income groups. The quantitative 
results for New Zealand discussed differ from the results of the above 
overseas studies in two main ways. First, the share of central 
government revenue contributed by the upper income is greater than 
overseas. Secondly, the effective rates of payment increase more sharply 
with income. 
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a-lART 5.8 
~T OF C~T GOVERt+ENT PA~NTS 
BY HOUSEHOLD TYPE IN 1981182 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------SMillian 
~General Govt.Receipts 
~ (Case 1) 
Company Income Ta.."t 
1,-+00 
.Indirect Tax 
Tax 
1,200 
1,000 
800 
600 
Source: Table SE.4 
400 
200 
a_.~... _____ _ 
1 Adult 2 Adults 
N. Sup. Other N. Sup. Other 
Z Adu1 ts \rl th 
Children 
3 or more 1 Adult 
Adlll ts w1. ~:. 
Chld.n 
1 Z 3• No With 
Qlldn Olldn 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Total Payments as % of: 95.0 44.2 71.8 42.4 46.1 45.1 44.7 46.6 43.2 .53.6 
Market Income 
Total Income 38.0 41.4 40.5 41.9 44.4 43.4 42.4 40.1 40.4 30.0 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Source: See text Chapter Five for derivation. Amounts of total payments 
• 
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CHAPTER SIX 
GOVERN-ENT 9JENOI~ BY HOUSEHOLD INCO~ ~OUP 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chapter Six analyses the size distribution of government spending. 
It discusses the attribution of the money-income value of 
government-provided goods and services to households and the empirical 
measurement of expenditure incidence. The main sections of the Chapter 
are devoted to an estimation of the money-income value of central 
government current non-market expenditures in 1981/82 by household income 
groups and household types. 
Major central government non-market expenditure functions are 
expenditure on social welfare benefits (including national 
superannuation), general expenditures, education, health, interest and 
debt, and subsidies. Expenditures which can be directly allocated, 
mainly social welfare, health and education, account for nearly 60 
percent of total 1981/82 non-market spending by the central government. 
Figure 6.~ below lists the main subtotals of government expenditure 
ranked by percentage contribution to total expenditure. 
FIQ.RE 6.1: 
TOTAL CENTRAL GOVERNENT f\()N-Wl.RJ<ET ~I~ IN 1981/82 
( OJrrent Gavetllllf!llt Outlays as Measured By NZSNA Classi fled by Function) 
Amount % of Total 
($M) 
A. Social Welfare cash Benefits 2,853.9 29.9 
B. General Expenditures 1,775.3 18.6 
c. realth 1,436.3 15.0 
D. Education 1,364.5 14.3 
E. Interest (less concessions) 1 ,261. 8 13.2 
F. Subsidies & Miscellaneous 
Subsidies 575.1 6.0 
Miscellaneous 293.6 3.1 
Total Non-Market Expenditure 9z560.5 100.0 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------Source: Table 4C.2, Chapter 4. 
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This introductory section discusses the theoretical and empirical 
literature on the incidence of government expenditure. Then Sections A 
through F estimate the household money-income value of central government 
expenditures by household market-income group and household type. 
Government expenditures are classified according to six main functions: 
expenditure on social welfare, general (indivisible) government 
expenditures, health, education, debt financing, and subsidies and 
miscellaneous. Section G, the concluding section, looks at the 
distribution of total expenditures by household income group. It 
discusses the results in relation to Stages One through Four as set out 
in 01apter Cne. 
1: HMM and SWF Treatment of Government Expenditure 
It is unquestionable that there is a need for an analysis of 
expenditure incidence. In some cases (such as social welfare spending), 
distributional considerations are an important motivation underlying 
decisions to appropriate funds for particular government expenditures. 
In others, such as health expenditure, there may be no explicit 
recognition of the distributional implications of the appropriation 
decision, but the policy choice will have an effect on income . 
distribution nonetheless. Only· by knowing how public spending affects 
private incomes will policymakers be in a position to design expenditure 
programmes to meet distributional goals. Ideally, an economic model of 
these effects would also be constructed so that the costs of expenditure 
programmes in terms of the economic inefficiency of achieving 
distributional objectives could be assessed. 
To date, HMM (Harberger, Mieszkowski, McLure) and SWF (Shaven, 
Whalley, Fullerton) studies have given credence to the above view, but 
have given only slight attention to modelling government expenditure 
behaviour. McLure (l972a, l974b), who has written more than most on the 
theory and methodology of estimating expenditure incidence, cautioned 
those undertaking further developments (1974b, p .44).: 
" ••• estimating the distributional impact of 
government spending is inherently an extremely 
complicated undertaking. To be done correctly, it 
must be based upon detailed analysis of input 
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requirements for the public provision of services, 
conditions of private demand (including 
complementarity and substitution between public and 
private goods) and conditions of supply (including 
factor mobility, intensity and substitution) as well 
as the distribution of benefits. This implies that 
the greatest payoff is likely to come from analysis 
of particular programs and that broacbrush treatment 
of the distributional impacts of all programs is 
likely to result in gross (broad-brush?) 
oversimplification." 
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The SWF response is to treat government as one of several indust=ies 
in the economy which vies with the private sector industries for 
resources (factors) to provide the same goods and services as the private 
sector. Fullerton et al (1978) treat the government sector in some 
detail, using a multi-sector model • . Government purchases of inputs are 
derived from a Cobb-Douglas demand function, defined over producer goods, 
which holds expenditure shares constant across these items. Since the 
general equilibrium approach requires that the government budget be 
balanced, government real expenditures are assumed to equal tax receipts 
plus government net borrowings less transfers (see Fullerton et al, 1978, 
p .30). 
By treating government-provided goods (and services) as though the 
same goods would otherNise be privately supplied, the market allocation 
of the goods does not change with the government's provision of them. 
Thus, the effect of the existence of government-provided goods on the 
sources of income side of the equation can be ignored. This assumption 
is relaxed for transfer payments, however, which are treated like 
negative taxes. 
I 
While the Fullerton approach meets with Mclure's requirements of a 
detailed analysis of inputs for the public provision of services, it 
disregards some of the most important characteristics of 
government-provided goods. In particular, a feature of some government 
goods is that they are not traded in the private market place and so 
Fullerton's definition of government as just another enterprise does not 
do full justice to the government's non-market activities. It does not 
adequately capture the demand for public goods, nor does it capture the 
value of the non-Private component of government-provided goods. Another 
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limitation which the Fullerton approach holds in common with the other 
SWF models is tnat it does not specify implicit marginal tax rates which 
are a feature of many income transfer programmes. 
The next two sections further observe the complexity of assessing 
the distributional effects of government spending, even given the 
less-theoretically ambitious approach adopted for this thesis. Section 2 
discusses the methodology for estimating the money-income value of 
individual government expenditures. Section 3 explores adjustments to 
available government expenditure data required to evaluate the economic 
concepts and definitions appropriate to a study of expenditure 
incidence. Finally, Section 4 outlines the approach for imputing a value 
for expenditures to private household groups. 
2: Valuation of Money-Income Effects 
There are fundamental difficulties involved in the valuation of the 
direct money-income effect of a government budget transaction. 1his 
chapter follows Meerman (1978) and calculates the money-income ·value in 
terms of the cost of providing the government good or service. 
Acceptance of the Meerman (1978) argument that benefits be valued in 
terms of their actual monetary cost to the community, is consistent with 
the approach taken to value the cost of tax to households in money-income 
terms. It overcomes many of the difficulties associated with taking 
tastes into account and the valuation problems which arise when 
preferences for (government-Provided) goods are expressed through the 
political system instead of through the price mechanism. 
However, this approach to estimate the distribution of the money 
income--value of government expenditures fails to take explicit account of 
three other potentially important effects. 1hese effects are 
extemali ties, excess burden and the incane elasticity of marginal 
utility of income. 
Externalities arise when the production or consumption activities 
of one party (such as the government) are intended to affect another 
party (the user of health services), but also affect the production or 
utility function of a third party. For example, a firm's productivity is 
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·enhanced because of the government-provided medical treatment for a sick 
employee. When the utility of the third party increases as a result of 
the externality (in the example the firm's productivity increases), then 
an external benefit or economy is said to exist. If the utility of the 
third party falls, an external cost (or diseconomy) exists. 
Externalities present massive measurement problems and cannot be 
easily incorporated in quantification exercises. First, the process of 
identification of externalities is imprecise (intelligent children may 
benefit more from social contact at school than from individual teaching 
attention, but may think otherwise). Secondly, once the externality has 
been identified, it is difficult to assign it a money-income value. 
Despite problems like these, a research project could be undertaken based 
on a survey of externalities identified by taxpayers and the results 
linked with the research in this thesis. 
Excess burden is the difference between the value to the recipient 
of a government-provided good or service and the cost to government of 
supplying it. This concept has already been discussed in relation to tax 
but it has some different features when related to gov~rnment 
expenditures. An excess burden exists for a government expenditure when 
the cost to the government of providing goods and services or subsidising 
prices is greater than the value of the service or the subsidy to the 
recipient. 
In assessing excess burdens, it must be taken into account that if 
the government-provided good was instead brought in the private market 
place, it would be obtained out of tax-paid income. Thus, its value to 
the recipient would be its cost of production in the private market place 
as well as tax foregone. This value will rise with income because of 
rises in marginal rates of personal income tax. 
A strength of the Shaven, Whalley, Fullerton (SWF) general 
equilibrium models is that they can be designed to measure both excess 
burden and economic incidence effects. Piggott and Whalley, amongst 
others, have measured the excess burden of subsidies. A difficulty with 
designing models to focus on the excess burden of government-provided 
goods, such as social welfare benefits, is that there may be no 
private-good equivalent provided by the market place. 
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·The third important effect which is excluded when the money-income 
value of government expenditure is calculated at cast, is the income 
elasticity of the marginal utility of income. Aaron and McGuire (1970) 
found that incidence results crucially depend an assumptions made 
concerning the individual utility functions which are chosen. D1 most 
cases, including this study, the underlying assumption about individual 
utility is implicit rather than explicit. When benefits are valued at 
the cost to government of providing the good, it is implicitly assumed 
that the marginal utility of income is constant across income classes 
(and household types). 
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Maital (1973) addresses the question of whether there is evidence in 
support of a particular index of the income elasticity of marginal 
utility and finds that the elasticity of marginal utility with respect to 
income in twelve developed countries ranged from a low of 1.04 (in the 
United Kingdom) to a high of 3.84 (in the Netherlands). If the 
elasticity of marginal utility with respect to income is greater than 
1.0, then it may be inferred that the marginal utility of income declines 
more than proportionately with income. Furthermore, it can be inferred 
from this that the dollar value of benefits from a given public outlay 
must rise more than proportionately with income. Although it is clear 
from the above that the elasticity of the marginal utility of income with 
respect to income is unlikely to be constant (1), it is not clear what 
the approximate value is for New Zealand. Again, this would make an 
interesting research exercise to conduct in relation to the taxonomy 
developed in this study. 
For reasons spelled out in Chapter Three, this thesis evaluates the 
effects of the government budget in terms of household money income. 
This choice is made on the assumption that money income is a measure 
which reflects households' relative economic positions, taking account of 
welfare considerations and the policy aim of maintaining current 
incomes. Evaluating expenditures in terms of the cost of providing them 
is consistent with this approach. If at some later stage a means of 
evaluating the externalities, significant money-income effects, excess 
burden and/or marginal income utilities is developed, these values could 
be integrated into the research framework at the base of this thesis. 
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3: Classifyino Government Exoenditures 
Valuing government-provided goods and services at the cost to the 
government of providing them still leaves the major tasks of identifying 
the households who consume the gooas and the determination of the 
money-income value of the goods consumed by the households. The 
published SWF literature, which has not specifically addressed the 
question of the effects of government expenditures on household income 
distribution, is not very helpful in resolving problems. Quantitative 
studies, such as those by Gillespie (1965, 1966), Musgrave et al (1974) 
and so on have treated the government-expenditure side of the budget in a 
cursory fashion because of lack of data. Hence, the analysis of the 
incidence of government expenditures lacks the conventionally accepted 
incidence assumptions (such as those trotted out on occasions when the 
incidence of the tax side of the budget is under consideration). For 
this reason, this Chapter goes into some detail about the assumptions 
used to impute money-income values for government expenditures to 
households. 
Shoup (1969) remains one of the fullest expositions of the types of 
government expenditures. He classifies government outlays as either 
explicit or imputed. Explicit government outlays are transfer payments 
and payments for goods and services. Transfer payments can be further 
classified as either unrequited (payments involving no quid pro quo; for 
example, welfare payments) or as payments, representing asset 
transactions (for example, purchases of existing real assets, chiefly 
land and buildings, or purchases of financial instruments, as in open 
market operations). An imputed government outlay is an expense that does 
not give rise to a money transfer. For example, an annual depreciation 
charge for a building owned and used by the government is an imputed 
outlay. This form of spending is not considered in this thesis which is 
concerned with current goverment outlays as defined by the New Zealand 
System of National Accounts (NZSNA). 
While Shoup's exposition distinguishes a number of government 
outlays by defining their differing economic effects, published data are 
not detailed in a similar manner. To get the most mileage from available 
data, much rougher classifications are required. 
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For the purpose of incidence analysis, government current 
expenditures can be broadly classified according to four specific (and 
different) economic functions: 
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1) Transfers: direct money-income benefits to households such as 
national superannuation, the unemployment benefit and income-support 
to farmers. The money-income value of transfers is the analog of 
income taxes, mainl~_ affecting the sources of income. 
2) Collective or public goods: government-provided goods and 
services which are non-excludable and which have an indivisible 
benefit. Also included in this group are government expenditures 
(such as general subsidies and current transfers) which may have 
specific beneficiaries who cannot be identified because of lack of 
information. 
3) Specific or private goods: goods and services which are 
excludable and which have a specific beneficiary. lhe money-income 
value of the5e is allocated to households assuming that the costs 
~curred are an adequate basis for valuing the benefits received by 
those who consume the goods and services. In the case of a specific 
good provided both by the government and by the private sector, the 
money-income value is the good's market price. 
4) Subsidies: are current grants made by the government to ensure a 
guaranteeed price or to hold a market price below the cost of 
production. lhe money-income value of subsidies is the analog of 
indirect taxes, mainly affecting the uses of income. When the 
households which consume subsidised goods can be identified, the 
subsidies are defined as "direct" in this thesis. Otherwise, they 
are classified as "general" and grouped with collective goods. 
Of the above four functions, transfer payments can be most easily 
identified from published accounts such as the New Zealand System of 
National Account (NZSNA) or the Public Account. In contrast, . 
government-financed goods and services are not classified as specific or 
collective in any of the information published about the central 
government. 
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The PUblic Account broadly defines government expenditures by 
programme or function. The NZSNA account distinguishes between 
government market and non~~arket activities. Non-market activities are 
further identified by expenditure function and ownership. In Figure 6.1, 
on the first page of this Chapter, central government outlays are 
classified by expenditure function. These functional classifications can 
be roughly re-classified by economic function into transfers, collective 
goods, specific goods and subsidies, as in Figure 6.2 below. 
FIQ.RE 6.2 
AN ECONJ4IC a..ASSIFICATI~ OF TOTAL CENTRAL 
GOVERNteiT ~ E'<PEND~ IN 1981/82 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
Transfers: Monetary Benefits 
Income Support 
National Superannuation 
Social Welfare Qash Benefits 
Supplementary Minimum Prices 
Total Monetary Benefits 
Collective Goods 
General Expenditures 
Current Transfers 
958.1 
1,895.8 
External Payments (Overseas Debt Servicing) 
General Subsidies 
Total Collective Goods 
Specific or Private Goods 
realth 
Education 
Internal Interest Payments 
Less Savings 
Interest/Savings 
Agriculture & Fisheries 
rousing 
Maori Affairs 
Total Other 
Total Specific or Private Goods 
Subsidies 
Farm, Employment, Milk, Public Transport 
845.4 (402.1) 
170.9 
74.8 
21.5 
Total Central Government Non~~arket Expenditure 
$M 
-
2,853.9 
217.0 
3,070. 9 
1,775.3 
428.5 
416.3 . 
103.9 
2,723.8 
1,436.3 
1,364.5 
443.4 
267.2 
3. 511.4 
254.4 
9.560. 5 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------Source: Figure derived from Department of Statistics NZSNA accounts. 
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After classifying government expenditures by economic function, the 
next step is to identify the households which consume these 
expenditures. Musgrave, case and Leonard (1974) made innovative use of 
available data to distribute the benefits of government-financed private 
goods. For example, the benefits from (private-good) education are 
allocated among households by the distribution of household occupants 
identified as students. In the case of highways, expenditures are 
divided in line ·.vith consumer and __ business use of the facilities. The 
amount distributed among households is determined according to consumer 
expenditures on automotive products. The amount distriouted to 
businesses is according to total consumption expenditure based on the 
assumption that business-automotive costs are passed forward in prices of 
finished goods. Interest payments are imputed to the holders of public 
debt, with payments to banks imputed to the holders of bank shares. The 
value of these specific goods for each household is found by dividing the 
total number of users into the total cost (as recorded by the budget) of 
each service. 
Several of those researching the expenditure side of the gcvernment 
budget, including Musgrave, case and Leonard (1974), note difficulties in 
allocating coliective goods to household income groups. It is not always 
clear who derives a benefit from indivisible expenditures and it is 
particularly difficult to arrive at a specific valuation of the benefit 
for individuals. 
Early empirical studies avoided this problem by excluding collective 
goods. Conclusions based on this practice, however, are likelY .. to be 
seriously misleading. For example, if the government increases transfer 
payments to lower-income households, the decision to finance them by 
either a cut in expenditure for a government-provided public good (such 
as defence) or a government-provided private good (such as education for 
the children of those on lower incomes), will clearly affect the welfare 
of different income groups. If defence expenditure is ignored because of 
the difficulty of attributing the benefits of an indivisible public good 
to households, it is the same thing as treating that expenditure as 
neutral. Yet, the decision between cutting a defence measure or an 
education measure may not be "neutral" as far as most households are 
concerned. 
CHAPTER SIX GOVERNENT SPeDII'G BY HO.JSEl-O.D INCI>E GROlP 273 . 
Indivisible expenditures (expenditures on collective goods) present 
further difficulties because, although they are intended to be equally 
available for consumption by all, it is not clear how this intention 
translates into the money-income values by household income and household 
type. The general equilibrium literature tends to treat collective goods 
in aggregate and does not provide any conclusive insight into their 
distribution. So quantitative researchers have instead attempted to test 
results using different assumptions. This is discussed further in 
Section B of this Chapter, which is devoted to collective government goods. 
Many government spending measures have both private good and public 
good characteristics and it is not possible to be exacting when trying to 
separate the two. For example, spending on education provides specific 
benefits to the recipients of education, to children in primary schools 
and colleges, to university students and returning adult students. 
Educational spending also provides public benefits (not to mention 
externalities). Public benefits are produced by such things as by public 
lectures and, more indirectly perhaps, through the advice academics might 
provide to policymakers. Externalities arise because, for example, 
everyone in the population benefits from a better educated workforce. 
Meerman's approach to valuing government spending at taxpayer cost is 
useful because it enables the public benefit and externalities from 
education to be ignored in a consistent fashion. Further study is 
required to show whether the public-good characteristics of government 
expenditures have significant redistributive influence. 
Once the private-good-type benefits of government expenditures are 
identified, the next problem is to find suitable data. Private-goods' 
benefits may be split between several beneficiaries or factors of 
production and there are often insufficient data measuring the 
money-income gain to all these groups. 
The government also makes factor payments, such as the salaries paid 
to teachers, post office employees and police officers. TI1ese are 
entered in the national accounts as personal income. 
Although the change in factor payments as a result of government 
exenditure is properly an expenditure incidence consideration, it is not 
treated explicitly by the Stage One and Two approaches in this thesis. 
CHAPTER SIX : GOVERNENT SPei)ING BY HaJSEHl.D INCGE GROUP 274. 
These approaches focus on the consumption of government-provided goods by 
household, not the effects on households because of the manner in which 
governments choose to produce the goods. 
A reasonable incidence assumption is that those who directly consume 
government-provided goods are likely to be the major beneficiaries, at 
least in the short term. However, even with this simplifying assumption, 
there are still substantial data problems. For example, although New 
Zealand data about the users of health services are quite detailed, 
information about the incomes of the users is not collected. Thus, the 
age, sex and geographical characteristics of health consumers can be 
identified, but not their incomes (and certainly not their household 
incomes). Nevertheless, using Census and Household Survey data of the 
age distribution of household occupants by range of income as a 
distributor, it is possible to estimate the distribution of 
hospitalization and other health expenditures by household type and 
income. Using age as the distributor implies that age is the main 
determinant of hospitalization use, rather than income. 
The above discussion highlights a number of major qualifications, 
any one of which could have a significant effect on the results of a 
study aimed at assessing the distribution of government expenditures. 
unfortunately, it is necessary to adopt some restrictive assumptions in 
order to carry out a study of this breaath. Despite this, a nurnoer of 
interesting results emerge, even when they mainly highlight what is not 
known. 
4: Imouting the Money-Income Value of New Zealand Expenditures to 
Private Household ,rncome Groups 
The main Sections of this Chapter use available data to attempt to 
identify the consumers of government goods and services. The Household 
Survey is then used to estimate the distribution of these consumers by 
income groups and household type and the 1981 Census is used to aggregate 
this distribution for the entire population of private households. Based 
on this distribution, a money-income value of specific central government 
outlays in 1981/82 is imputed. 
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Figure 6.3 below summarises the adjustments to the NZSNA figures so 
that they represent the private-household population. Basically, all 
NZSNA expenditures are assumed to be consumed by the estimated 95 percent 
of the population living in private households. Further adjustments are 
then made to reflect views about particular expenditure items. For 
example national superannuation and health expenditures are adjusted 
downwards more than the others.· In the case of national superannuation 
and health expenditures, it is assumed that a larger proportion of those 
over 60 live in institutions and only 87.5 percent of the costs of 
providing these is allocated to private housenolds. In the case of 
subsidies, the direct subsidies and supplement minimum payments to 
farmers (SMPs) are allocated in total to private housenolds but only 95 
percent of general subsidies are allocated. The following sections of 
this Chapter are based on the data as set aut in Figure 6.3. 
FIG.RE 6.3 
APPROXIMATE VALLE OF GOVERNENT EXPEMJITI..f£ 
CtJ6JED BY PRIVATE lilJSEHl..DS 
~---------------------------------------~----------------------------Adjustment 
to Derive 
Expenditure Amount 
NZSNA Consumed Consumed 
Amount By Private By Private 
in Fi$Mre 6.1 1-buseholds 1-buseholds $M 
Social Welfare Benefits 
National Superannuation 1,895.8 87.5% 1,659 
Other cash Benefits 958.1 97.~ 927a 
2.853.9 2.586 
COllective Goods 
General Expenditures 1 '775.3 95.(J!6 1,687 
Collective Goods n.e.i.b 111 
I 1 775.3 95. rn; ! 1798 
realth ! 1A'36.'3 87.5% !,257 Education 1 1 ~6A. 5 94. rn;c 1;293 Interest (less concessions) 1.261.8 95.(](1 " 1;199 
Subsidies & Miscellaneous 
Subsidies 575.1 (99.~) 572d 
Miscellaneous 293.6 95.(J!6 279 
Grand Total 9;~60.5 (94. QY;) 8.984 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------Notes: a) Includes all family beneficiaries in private households. 
Since the age distribution of occupants in private households is known, 
this weights up to slightly more than 95 percent. b) n.e.i. means not 
elsewhere included. c) This adjusts up to 95 percent when expenditure 
for agriculture and Maori education (classified in miscellaneous) is 
included. d) It is assumed that ·almost all subsidies are consumed by 
private households. Sources: Figure 6.1 adjusted as explained in text. 
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A. SOCIAL WELFARE BENEFITS 
Section A is devotee to a discussion of central government 
expenditure on social ·,o~el fare cash benefits, which totalled $2,853.9 
million or about JO percent of total government outlays in 1981/82. 
Another $458.9 million, or 4.8 percent of total central government 
outlays, was spent on health benefits, education supports and home 
ownership grants. These three suppo-rt schemes are discussed under the 
appropriate section headings, later in the Chapter. 
Figure 6.4 shows the NZSNA classification of social assistance 
grants in 1981/82 and the years immediately before and after. 
FI~ 6.4 
SOCIAL ASSISTAN:E GRANTS ANALYSED BY ~OSE 
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-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Year Ended 31 March 
-~-------- -----------------------($ Million) 1980/81 Change % 1981/82 Change % 1982/83 
--- .. ·----·----------------·--------·-----------·------------------ ------ - ------Support for -
realth a 
Education b 
f-b me Ownership c 
Sub-total: Support Schemes 
Income Support to -
National Superannuitants 
Unemployment, Widows 
and Families 
Sickness, Invalids and 
War Pensions 
Miscellaneous d 
Sub-total: Social 
Welfare Monetary 
(cash) Benefits 
272.1 
91.6 
33.9 
397.6 
1,556.8 
672.0 
165.3 
19.4 
2,413.5 
15.5 . 
14.1 
18.0 
15.4 
21.8 
12.3 
10.5 
7.2 
18.2 
314.4 
104.5 
40.0 
458.9 
1,895.8 
754.6 
182.7 
20.8 
2,853.9 
61.3 
-10.3 
-17.3 
3.0 
27.6 
14.1 
18.6 
76.0 
23.8 
345.9 
93.7 
33.1 
472.7 
2,418. 9 
861.1 
216.6 
36.6 
3,533.2 
------------------------------------------~---------------------------------TOTAL 2,810. 7 17.9 3,312.8 20.9 4,005.9 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------a) Health support includes the government subsidy paid to private hospitals on . 
behalf of patients; pharmaceutical benefits; general practitioners, 
maternity and specialist subsidies and payments for dental and laboratory 
services. b) Education support includes government subsidies to private 
schools, boarding allowances and tertiary bursaries. c) Home ownership 
support includes: 1) the rates rebate scheme; 2) interest subsidies to 
Housing Corporation for low-interest housing loans. d) Miscellaneous is a 
residual figure which includes: telephone rental and television licence 
subsidies, apprentices lodging and travel allowances, and government 
employee bursaries. Source: Department of Statistics. 
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A.l The Distribution of National Suoerannuation Payments 
By far the largest single government outlay is the grant for 
national superannuation. In 1981/82, it accounted for about two-thirds 
of all social welfare cash benefits and nearly a fifth of total 
government outlays. 
The percentage distribution of national superannuation payments by 
household income and type is illustrated by Table 6A.l. About 70 percent 
of national superannuation payments are distributed to the lower 30 
percent of households, households with market incomes under $9,750. By 
far the majority of national superannuitants live in one-adult or 
two-adult households. Only 11.4 percent of national superannuation 
payments are received by households with three-or-more adult occupants. 
Table 6A.l 
ESTIMATED OISTRIBUTI~ CF NATitt4AL SLFERA~TI~ m:tlE 
PAID TO PRIVAlc: KlJSEH10S IN 1981/82 
BY RAta (F HCl.ISEHl..D MARKET INDE AN) I-O..ISEHl..O TYPE 
----------------------- -------~-----------------------------1-i:Jusehold Type 
1 Adult 2 Adults 2 Adults 3 or More 1 Adult All 
with Adults with H:Juse-
1-busehold O'lildren 0'1ld' n holds 
Market ------------···-----------~--~------------------------Income Nat Oth Nat Oth 1 2 3+ No With ($ p.a.) Sup Sup Chil- O'lil-
dren dren 
-------------------------------------------------.--------Proportion of Total (%) 
Less Than $250 12.0 0.0 11.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 o.a 0.1 24.2 
$250-( $3,950) 12.1 o.o 15.6 o.o 0.3 0.2 0.0 o.o 28.6 
S3,950-( $9, 750) 5.0 o.o 10.1 o.o 0.1 0.1 o.o 1.3 0.2 0.1 16.7 $9,750-($13,450) 1.2 0.0 5.5 o.o 0.1 o.o 0.0 0.7 0.3 o.o 7.7 
$13,450-($16,900) 0.0 3.6 0.0 0.1 0.2 o.o 1.1 0.1 5.8 
$16, 900-( $20, 250) o.o 3.0 o.o 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.1 0.6 4.8 $20,250-( $24,200) 0.0 1.5 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.4 2.2 $24,200-($29,200) o.o 1.7 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.6 3.2 
$29,200-($36,650) 1.7 0.0 0.2 0.1 o.o 1.4 0.4 3.7 
$36,650 and over 1.2 0.0 o.o o.o o.o 1.0 0.7 3.0 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Total (%) 31.9 o.o 55.0 o.o 0.9 0.7 0.0 7.7 3.7 0.2 100.0 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Sources: Estimated using data from the Department of Statistics Household 
Survey 1981/82, and weighted using data from the 1981 Census of Fbpulation 
and Dwellings to represent the total population of private households. 
Cells with too few observations designated(-). 
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A.2: Social Welfare Lncome Support 
Besides national superannuation, income support is provided through 
the Department of Social Welfare in the farm of the family benefit, as 
well as the unemployment benefit, the domestic purposes benefit, the 
widows benefit, the sickness benefit, benefits far invalids and orphans 
and war pensions. In addition, there are a number of miscellaneous cash 
benefits to cover such things as accommodation and telephone rental. As 
the next tables shaw, the family benefit is mainly distributed to 
middle-income households and above, while ather social welfare benefits 
are largely consumed by law-income households. 
A.2.a: Family Benefit Recioients 
Family benefit is normally paid to the mother of the child, unless 
someone else is deemed to be the legal guardian. 1he family benefit 
payment. is payable if the child is: 
(i) Aged under 16, 
(ii) Aged under 18, and still attending school; or, 
(iii) Aged 18, turned 18 in current December year, and still 
attending school. 
The Household Survey does not specifically identify recipients of 
the family benefit, although information on payments received is 
collected. For this study, eligibility for the family benefit is 
determined according to the above criteria, information which is 
available from the Household Survey. However, date of birth is not 
collected, so it is not possible to know whether a person turned 18 in 
the current December year. For the purpose of this research, all 18 year 
olds still attending school are assumed to qualify for a full year. 
Once the qualifying individuals are identified, this information is 
used to calculate the proportion of family beneficiaries by income groups 
and household types. These proportions are then applieo to total 
spending an family benefit far private households in 1981/82 ($297.7 
million) to impute a money-income value for each income group and 
household type. 
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Table 6A.2 
DISTRIBUTICt-4 OF CHILDREN 
BY RANGE OF HOUSEHOLD ~ INCOME AND HOUSEHOLD TYPE 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------·-·---
f-busehold Type 
------------------------------------------------------------f-busehold 2 Adults With Children 3 or More Adults 1 Adult All 
Market Income 
($ p.a.) 1 2 3 or More With Child(ren) With I-Ouse-Child Children Children Child(ren) holds 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Proportion of Total (%) 
Less Than $250 0.3 0.4 1.0 3.1 5.1 
$250-( $3,950) 0.3 0.4 0.7 1.3 2.8 
$3,950-( $9,750) 0.8 1.9 3.1 0.9 1.0 7.6 
$9, 750-($13,450) 1.3 3.0 4.1 0.9 0.5 9.8 
$13,450-($16,900) 1.2 4.3 5.9 1.6 13.2 
$16,900-($20,250) 1.2 3.9 6.1 1.6 13.0 
$20, 250-( $24, 200) 1.1 4.6 5.7 2.5 14.2 
$24,200-($29,200) 0.8 3.0 4.2 3.6 11.7 
$29,200-($36,650) 0.8 2.9 3.0 3.6 10~2 
$36,650 and over 0.5 2.0 3.7 6.0 12.2 
------- -
. 
_____ _._.._... ___ 
------------------------·----Total (%) 8.2 26.3 37.5 21.3 6.8 100.0 
---------------------------··-----------------------------...... -Sources: Estimated distribution based on data from Department of Statistics 
Household Survey 1981/82, and weighted using data from the 1981 Census of . 
Pbpulation and Dwellings to represent the total population of private 
households. Cells with insufficient observations designated (-). 
The distribution of children eligible for the family benefit, which 
is also the distribution of the money-income value of the family benefit, 
is shown by Table 6A.2 above. Looking at the final column of Table 6A.2, 
less than 10 percent of children reside in households in each of the 
lowest four income deciles. Since middle-income households account for 
the greatest proportion of children, they consume the greatest 
money-income share of the family benefit. 
A.2.b: The Distribution of Social Income Suoport 
. Social welfare income support refers to the family benefit, war 
pensions, the unemployment benefit, the DPB, the sickness benefit, and 
benefits for widows, invalids and orphans (national superannuation is 
excluded). When these are identified from f-busehold Survey data, the 
largest share goes to the lowest household income decile. 
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As Table 6A.3 shows below, the distribution of social welfare income 
support by household income group for all households (see final Column) 
is a skewed one. Those in the top income decile receive a larger share 
than all except the bottom three deciles. This is largely explained by 
the distribution of the money-income value of the family benefit (see 
Table 6A .2) . 
When the distribution of social welfare income support is analysed 
by household type (see "Total" row of Table 6A.3), the largest share of 
23.3 percent of income support goes to three-or-more-adult households 
with children. The second largest share of 14.1 percent goes to 
one-adult households with children. 
Table 6A.3 
Tl£ PERCENTAGE OISTRIBUTI(lll OF 
SOCIAL WB..FARE INCOt-E St.FPORT PAID TO PRIVATE HJUSEHOLDS 1981/82 
BY IWG: OF HlJSEI-0...0 MARKET INCaE ANl Hl.JSEf-0..0 TYPE 
......_~--------------------------.-...--------. . ----------------....--------------------
Household 
Market 
Income 
($ p.a.) 
1-busehold Type 
-----·------------------------------ -- -~---~---1 Adult 2 Adults 
Nat Oth Nat Oth ·· l 
Sup Sup 
2 Adults 
with 
D"lildren 
3 or More 1 Adult All 
Adults with House-
2 3+ No With 
Chil- Chil-
dren dren 
O"lld ' n holds 
------------------------------------------------------------···----------------Proportion of Total (%) 
Less Than $250 0.1 3.7 0.3 3.0 1.4 1.3 1.3 13.9 26.5 
$250-( $3,950) 0.1 4.0 0.7 1.5 0.2 0.1 0.8 4.8 13.1 
S3,950-( $9, 750) 0.6 0.7 0.3 1.0 1.4 1.6 l.l 0.4 1.3 1.7 10.0 
$9,750-($13,450) o.o 0.1 0.5 0.5 0.8 1.5 1.4 0.2 1.5 0.4 6.9 
$13,450-($16,900) 0.0 o.o 0.5 0.8 1.8 2.0 0.2 2.0 7.6 
$16,900-($20,250) 0.0 o.o 0.1 0.6 1.3 2.0 0.3 2.6 7.0 
$20,250-( $24,200) 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.4 1.6 1.9 0.8 2.1 
-
7.1 
$24,200-($29,200) o.o 0.2 0.0 0.3 l.O 1.4 o.s 3.7 -. 7.1 $29,200-($36,650) 0.0 0.1 0.3 1.0 l.O 0.2 3.2 5.7 $36,650 and over o.o 0.1 0.2 0.6 1.3 1.8 4.9 9.0 
----------------------------------------------------------------------~------ -Total (%) 0.8 8.6 2.3 7.0 6.3 11.9 14.1 4.7 23.3 21.1 100.0 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Sources: Estimated using data from the Department of Statistics Household 
Survey 1981/82, and weighted using data from the 1981 Census of POpulation 
and Dwellings to represent the total population of private households. 
Cells with insufficient observations designated(-). Weighted up for 
individual components of social welfare support. 
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A.3: The Household Income Distribution of Social Welfare Benefits 
Table 6A.4 compares the distribution of all direct monetary benefits 
(transfers) by income deciles. S~Ps (discussed in greater depth in 
Section F) are the only cash transfers which are not distributed in 
favour of the two lower income groups. Note that the total amount for 
each transfer has been adjusted in different ways to represent the 
proportion of recipients who are occupants of private households (see 
F:gure 6. 3). 
Table 6A.4 
~ARY BENEFITS (CASH TRANSFERS) BY HOUSEHOLD 
INCOtJ£ GROUP IN 1981/82 (STAGE ONE AND STAGE TWO DEFINITIONS) 
Household 
Market Income 
(S p.a.) 
A 
Social 
Welfare 
Income 
Support 
( $M) % 
B 
National 
Super-
annuation 
($M) % 
c (A+B) 
Social 
Welfare 
Benefits 
( $.\1) % 
D 
(E-C) 
SM=IS 
($M) % 
E 
Total 
Monetary 
Benefits 
($M) % 
------------------------------------------~-----------------------------------
Less rnan $250 
$250-( $3,950) 
$3,950-( $9,750) 
$9,750-($13,450) 
' $13,450-($16,900) 
$16,900-($20,250) 
$20,250-($24,200) 
$24,200-($29,200) 
$29,200-($36,650) 
$36,650 and over 
Total 
246 26.5 
121 13.1 
93 10.0 
64 6.9 
71 7.6 
65 7.0 
65 7.0 
66 7.1 
53 5.7 
84 9.1 
402 24.2 
475 28.6 
278 16.8 
128 7.7 
97 5.8 
79 4.8 
37 2.2 
52 3.2 
61 3.7 
50 3.0 
927 100.0 1659 100.0 
Sources: Table 6A.l, Table 6A.3, Table 6F.l. 
648 25.1 
596 23.0 
371 14.3 
192 7.4 
167 6.5 
144 5.6 
102 3.9 
118 4.6 
114 4.4 
134 5.2 
6 2.8 
6 2.8 
39 18.0 
22 10.1 
27 12.4 
18 8.3 
21 9. 6 
31 14.3 
19 8.8 
28 12.9 
654 23.3 
602 21.5 
410 14.6 
214 7.6 
194 6.9 
162 5.8 
123 4.4 
149 5.3 
133 4.8 
162 5.8 
2586 100.0 217 100.0 2803 100.0 
A surprising observation from Table 6A.4 is the size of the various 
shares of monetary benefits consumed by the 60 percent of households 
earning above the average wage in 1981/82 (those households with incomes 
above $13,450). The upper 60 percent of households are estimated to 
receive 43.4 percent of social welfare income support, 22.7 percent of 
national superannuation and 66.3 percent of SMPS. The share of total 
monetary benefits for the upper 60 percent of households was 33.0 
percent. There has been considerable debate about whether national 
superannuation succeeds in assisting those on low incomes. The 
observations above suggest that the scope of such an analysis should be 
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Chart 6.1 is a graphic illustration of the redistributive effect of 
national superannuation. The Lorenz curve for national-superannuation-
money-income shares by household is concave to the line of equality and 
the Gini coefficient is .48. This shows that national superannuation is 
"unequally" distributed in favour of households with low market incomes, 
reflecting the fact that a majority of national superannuitants have 
household incomes in the lowest 30 percent of market income. Note that 
these figures are for pre-tax national superannuation income. The 
distribution of post-tax national superannuation would favour 
low-market-income householders even more. 
The Lorenz curve for social welfare income support is also concave, 
but it is closer to the line of equality. Tnis shows that social '"'elfare 
benefits are less redistributive than national superannuation. 
OiART 6.1 
NATI(JW. Sl.FEJWHJATia., n£ FAMILY sa.EFIT ANl TOTAL 
SOCIAL WEI..FARE s:e~JIN;: C()M)AR~ tf" RELATIVE ~TY 
Per Cen1:lOO 
Share of 
Money-
90 Income 
Value of 
Expendi- 80 
ture 
(Cumula1:i ve) 
70 
60 
50 
40 
30 
zo 
10 
0 
0 
... 
.. . 
Sources: Tables 6A.l,fiA.Z,aA.4 
*Includes Family Benefit 
10 zo 30 40 so 60 70 80 90 100 (%) 
Percent of Households By Harket Incoi".e (Cur.!U.lative) 
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In comparison to other social welfare monetary benefits, tne family 
benefit is more equally distributed to households. Its Lorenz curve is 
closer to the line of equality in Chart 6.1. Also, it is convex, showing 
that the share of family benefit going to higher income households is 
greater than the share going to low income households. 1his result is 
consistent with the fact that the average number of children per 
household increases as household income rises. 
Table 6A.5 illustrates the distribution of monetary benefits by 
household type. Note that the Stage One and Stage Two definitions of 
monetary benefits are the same. 
Table 6A.5 
~ARY BElEFITS FOR 1981/82 BY I-OJSEHLD TYPE 
(STAGE CH: ANJ STAGE TWO CEFINITIONS) 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------1-busehold Type 
---...-.~-------------... ------------···--------1 Adult 2 Adults 2 Adults 
with 
Children 
3 or More 1 Aoult All 
Adults with House-
O'lld'n holds 
-------------------------------------------------------
Nat Oth Nat Oth 1 2 3+ No With 
Sup Sup 0'1il- 0'1il-
dren dren 
~~-------------------------------·----------------------------------------(A) In come Support 
Amount ($M) 7 79 21 65 58 110 131 44 216 196 927 
% Distrib. 0.8 8.5 2.3 7.0 6.3 11.9 14.1 4.7 23.3 21.1 100.0 
(B) National Superannuation Income 
Amount ($M) 529 912 14 12 1 128 61 2 1659 
% Distrib. 31.9 
-
55.0 0.9 0.7 0.1 7.7 3.7 0.1 100.0 
(C) Social Welfare Benefits (A + B) 
Amount ($M) 535 79 933 65 73 122 132 172 277 198 2586 
% Distrib. 20.7 3.1 36.1 2.5 2.8 4.7 5.1 6.6 10.7 7.7 100.0 
(D) SWS ($M) 4 6 10 27 15 28 45 32 49 1 217 
% 1.8 2.8 4.6 12.4 6.9 12.9 20.7 14.7 22.6 0.5 100.0 
(E) Total Monetary Benefits (C + D) 
($M) 540 86 943 92 87 150 ln 203 326 199 2803 
% 19.3 3.1 33.6 3.3 3.1 5.4 6.3 7.2 11.6 7.1 100.0 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Sources: Table 6A.l, Table 6A.3, Table €F .10 
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Not unexpectedly, the largest proportion of the total money-income 
value of monetary benefits, is estimated to accrue to 
national-superannuitant households. As shown by the last line of Table 
6A.5, two-adult, national-superannuitant households received 33.6 percent 
of total monetary benefits and one-adult national superannuitant 
households received 19.3 percent. These two household types accounted 
for 23.2 percent of total households and only 11.9 percent of the total 
occupants of private households. 
Chart 6.2 pictures the significance of National Superannuation in 
relation to other monetary benefits. 
CHART 6.2 
VALLE CF DIRECT MONETARY BENEFITS IN 1981/82 BY 1-DJSEHa..D TYPE 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sourc:e: Table 6A.S 
S.M.P • .s 
National Superannuation 
sao -·=·=·=··=·=·=·=·=·• 
As Chart 6.2 shows, national superannuitants are the largest 
consumers of social welfare spending. Since they tend to be concentrated 
in the lower market income brackets, the overall conclusion which emerges 
is that monetary benefits are largely consumed by households in the three 
lowest income deciles. 
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B. DISTRIBUTION OF COLLECTIVE GOODS 
Collective goads are those which have the characteristic of 
non-excludability. Two types of government expenditures classified as 
collective goods are general expenditures and other collective 
285. 
goods. General expenditures cover the costs of administering the 
government-provision ~f goods and services. Other collective goods 
include some government-provided goods which have private good 
characteristics but where the consumers of the goods cannot be directly 
identified. Government spending on general administration is an example 
of a general expenditure. Overseas debt servicing is a collective good. 
In total, these goods account for 30.5 percent of 1981/82 central 
government non-market expenditure. 
In· 1981/82, $1,775.3 million or 18.6 percent of central government 
outlays were for general expenditures including general administration, 
defence and so on. Another $948.5 million or 9.9 percent of central 
government outlays are expenditures on-othe~collactive goods, 
including overseas debt servicing, current transfers and subsidies. 
Figure 6.5 below lists the main government outlays classified as 
collective goods for the analysis in this thesis. 
FIGURE 6.5 
Cl.ASSIFICATION OF COLLECTIVE GOODS 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Expenditure 
General Administration 
Defence 
Social, Recreation and Research Services 
Industries, Royalties and Patents 
National Library 
General Expendi tuxes 
External Payments (D_verseas Debt Servicing) 
Current Transfers 
General Subsidies 
Total Other Collective Goods 
Total Collective Goods 
NZSNA Amount in 1981/82 
$ Million 
861.5 
587.3 
219.4 
97.5 
9.6 
1,ns.J 
416.3 
428.5 
103.7 
948.5 
2,723.8 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Note: Adjusted so 95% x $2,723.8 million= $2,587.6 million consumed by 
private households. Source: Department of Statistics, NZSNA data. 
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As noted in the introduction, many early quantitative studies of the 
distribution of the benefits of government expenditures ignored 
government collective goods altogether because of the difficulty in 
identifying the beneficiaries of indivisible expenditures This practice 
is tantamount to assuming that the money-income benefits of government 
collective goods are distributed equally to each household. Later 
studies have attempted to generate different assumptions about the 
distribution of indivisible government expenditures. It would be 
difficult to test the reality of many of these assumptions. Instead, 
different assumptions about the distribution of collective goods are 
tested. At issue is whether the overall expenditure incidence results 
are sensitive to differing assumptions. If they are, it may be 
worthwhile to engage additional research resources to discover more about 
the consumers of government-provided collective goods 
Gillespie (1965) tested the sensitivity of his results to four 
assumptions about the beneficiaries of non-specific (or indivisible) 
expenditures. Gillespie allocated indivisible expenditure benefits: 
a) Equally per family (like Case 7 in this thesis). 
b) Similarly as (the broad measure of) income (Case 4). 
c) Similarly as capital income (Case 5). 
d) Similarly as disposable income (Case 2). 
Gillespie's results were very sensitive to the above assumptions 
with assumption (a) distributing general-government expenditures most in 
favour of low income households and assumption (b) distributing 
expenditures most in favour of those on ~igher incomes. 
Musgrave, Case and Leonard (1974) develop three different methods of 
distributing the income-value of benefits among income groups: 
a) In proportion to total income (most like Case 4); 
b) In proportion to tax burdens (Case 6); and 
c) On a per capita basis (Case 8). 
This thesis considers eight assumptions about the distribution of 
collective goods. Seven of these are based on the Gillespie and Musgrave 
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assumptions as noted above. The new assumption, case 1, assumes that 
consumption of government goads and services is distributed in a similar 
pattern to consumption of privately-produced goods and services. 
Table 68.1 
ASSl.JoPTICH5 FOR DISTRIBUTING T1-E MOt£Y INCD£ VALLE 
OF GOVEFNENT CO I ECTIVE GOOOS 
Eight cases Compared 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------t-buse- Dispo- Total Pro- Personal Persons 
t-busehold hold saole Market (Gross) pertyb Income t-buse- in 
Market Income Exeend. Income Income Income Rates Tax holds H'holds 
($ p.a.) Case case case case case Case case Case (l)a (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------Percentage Distribution (%) 
Less Than $250 3.9 3.3 -0.1 2.7 5.7 0.9 10.0 6.2 
$250-( $3950) 4.8 4.1 0.9 3.5 9.6 1.6 10.0 5.8 
$3950-( $9750) 6.5 5.8 3.8 5.0 8.0 2.8 10.0 8.1 
$9 750-( $13450) 7.4 7.1 6.3 6.4 8.1 4.6 10.0 9.2 
$13450-($16900) 9.0 8.4 8.1 8.0 9.3 6.6 10.0 10.8 
$16900-($20250) 10.4 9.7 10.0 9.5 10.5 8.7 10.0 11.0 
$20250-($24200) ll.l 11.0 11.9 ll.O 11.0 10.7 10.0 11.8 
$24200-($29200) 12~7 13.0 14.4 . 13.3 11.1 14.0 10.0 11.4 
$29200-( $36650) 15.4 15.4- 17.6 16.1 12.5 17.9 10.0 11.7 
$36650 and over 18. 7 22.0 27.1 24.6 14.1 32.2 10.0 14.0 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
----------·--------------------------------------------------------Notes: a) Standard case. b) Proxy for capital income. Sources: Estimated 
distributions based on data from the Department of Statistics Household 
Survey 1981/82, and weighted up using data from the 1981 Census of Population 
and Dwellings to represent the total population of private households. case 
6 based on ASSET model. 
Table 68.1 compares eight distributions of the money-income value of 
collective government expenditures by household market income groups. 
case l is discussed in the preceeding paragraph. Case 2 implies a 
declining marginal utility of income as income rises, a proposition 
discussed in the introductory section of this Chapter. Gillespie (1966) 
supports this assumption as relating to the derived demand for "general" 
government expenditures which arises from the uses to which personal 
income is put as determined by disposable income. 
Case 3 assumes that households consume government-provided goods in 
relation to their market income or in other words, income-earning 
potential not only increases market-spending power, it also increases 
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political voting power. In addition, it reflects the view presented by 
Aaron and McGuire (1970) that the marginal utility of income declines as 
income rises and, in turn, the relative utility of public goods rises. 
case 4 assumes that total income is the important determinant of voting 
power and the marginal utility of public goods, whether the income is 
earned in the market place or not. 
Another plausible assumption is that property ownership is the most 
significant determinant of the consumption of government indivisible 
expenditure. For example, a property owner's benefit from the judiciary 
and from defence and police expenditures may be an increasing function of 
the value of the property. There are no data available which specify the 
value of property owned in New Zealand. ihe Household Survey does 
collect information about property rates paid and this is the distributor 
for case 5, based on the assumption that property rates reflect the 
relative difference in property values. This distribution is extremely 
limited, however, since property rates differ for each rateable 
jurisdiction. 
case 6 assumes that government collective goods are consumed by 
households in relation to the amount of income tax they pay. According 
to this assumption, the highest two income groups benefit far more than 
the others - the top 20 percent of households would receive over 50 
percent of the benefits from general government. 
Finally, cases 7 and 8 reflect two interpretations of the view that 
all members of the population benefit from collective goods. case 7 
represents the distribution if the benefit from collective goods relates 
to households. case 8 is the distribution if all members of the 
population are assumed to benefit equally from collective goods. 
A comparison of Oases 7 and 8 indicates that (because the number of 
occupants per household tends to be an increasing function of income), 
the results would differ, whether it is assumed that the money-income 
benefits are spread equally per household or equally per person. 1he 
annoying reality (annoying because it is yet another complexity!) is that 
some collective goods are probably consumed equally by households (postal 
delivery) while others are consumed equally per person (national 
CHAPTER SIX : GOVERNENT SPelliNG BY HlJSEHl_Q INCG£ GROUP 289. 
defence). Further, there may also be some public goods which mainly 
benefit adults (that is, those individuals old enough to vote). There is 
a lot to learn about consumer preferences for public goods. 
Of the assumptions displayed by Table 68.1, the one most beneficial 
to high income households is Case 6 (personal income tax) and the one 
most beneficial to low income households is Case 7 (distribution of 
households). Of the plausible assumptions (ruling out Case 2, which may 
explain demand for private goods, but does not seem to be a plausible 
explanation of demand for collective goods), distributing the 
money-income value of general government expenditures in relation to 
household expenditure is the least extreme. 1his is the standard case 
used throughout this thesis. Chart 6.3 below uses Lorenz curves to show 
that the distributions of collective government expenditures by case l, 
Case 6 and Case 7 are all quite different. 
01ART 6.3 
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Table 68.2 
COWARING Tr£ EFFECT OF EXTRa£ ASSlJ.PTIONS ABOUT COLLECTIVE GOVERNt-E:NT 
BENEFITS ON THE DISTRIBUTION OF TOTAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Assumption Most Beneficial 
to High Income Groups 
(Case 6, Personal Income Tax) 
Assumption Most Beneficial 
to Low Income Groups 
(Case 7, Number of Households) 
------------------------------ -------------------------------A B c 
Total 
Govern. 
Expend. 
D E 
Collctv 
Govern. 
F G H 
Household 
Market Income 
($ p.a.) 
Collctv Other 
C--avern. Govern. 
Other Total % 
Goods Expend. 
of 
Total Goods 
Govern. Govern. of 
Expend. Expend. Total 
(Case 6) 
$M $M $M Qf 10 
(Case 7) 
$M $M $M 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Less Than $250 24 
$250-( $3950) 41 
$3950-( $9750) 73 
$9750-($13450) 119 
$13450-(Sl6900) 171 
$16900-($20250) 225 
$20250-($24200) 277 
$24200-($29200) 362 
$29200-($36650) 463 
$36650 and over 832 
886 
828 
738 
507 
547 
533 
516 
556 
554 
732 
910 
869 
811 
626 
718 
758 
793 
918 
1017 
1564 
10.1 
9.7 
9.0 
7.0 
8.0 
8.4 
8.8 
10.2 
11.3 
17.4 
259 
259 
259 
259 
259 
259 
259 
259 
259 
258 
886 
828 
738 
507 
547 
533 
516 
556 
554 
732 
1145 
1087 
997 
766 
806 
792 
775 
816 
813 
990 
12.7 
12.1 
11.1 
8.5 
9.0 
8.8 
8.6 
9.1 
9.0 
- 11.0 
Total 2587 6397 8984 100.0 2587 6397 8984 100.0 
Sources: Columns A and E based on Table 68.1. Derivation of distribution of 
Columns B and C from results in following Sections and summarised in 
Section G. 
Table 68.2 compares the effect of the two extreme assumptions (Case 
6 and Case 7) on the distribution of total government expenditure 
(standard case). A comparison of Columns 0 and H in Table 68.2 shows 
that in both cases, the distribution of total government expenditures 
turns out to be slightly U-shaped, with the bottom and upper income 
deciles benefitting more from government spending then the middle income 
deci1es. 
The two extreme assumptions make the most difference to the 
upper-income decile's share of the money-income value of government 
expenditures. The upper income decile benefits substantially more under 
the Case 6 conditions where it is assumed that general expenditures 
benefit households in relation to how much they pay (for government) in 
personal income taxes. 
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Applying the case 6 distributor results in 17.4 percent of the 
money-income value of total government spenaing accruing to the 10 
percent of households in the top income bracket. Applying the Case 7 
distribution results in only 11.0 percent of total government expenditure 
accruing to the top 10 percent of households. 
Chart 6.4 compares the distribution of the money-income value of 
total government expenditure based on the case 1 (government expenditure 
is distributed in the same way as household expenditure), Case 6 
(personal income tax) and Case 7 (households) assumptions about the 
consumption of collective goods by market-income group. Although the 
patterns of distribution are different, they are only significantly 
different for the very highest household-market-income group. 
OiART 6.4 
aJ.PARISON OF ll£ PATIERN OF CtJNSU.pTI~ OF ll£ MOI'EY-INCG£ 
VALLE CF TOTAL GOVERtfENT E)(fENJil't.J£ BASED ON THREE 
ASSl.WTI(JIS ABlJT T1£ CON:SltPTitta OF COl I ECTIVE GOOOS 
---------------··-·----------------------~-------------------------------
Share (%) 20 
....... 
Source: ·!able 6B.2,6G.2 
l 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 10 
(Case 6) 
(Case 1) 
(Case 7) 
Household Ha.rket Inc0112 Groups 
(Arranged in Deciles Going From Lowest Ua.rket Income to Highest) 
Case 1, where government collective expenditures are assumed to be 
allocated in the same pattern as household expenditure, is selected as 
the standard case for this thesis. However, it is not selected as the 
standard assumption for the thesis because it is necessarily more 
probable. Case 1 is selected because the resulting distribution lies 
somewhere between the most extreme assumptions. 
Both Gillespie (1965,1966) and Musgrave et al (1974) choose a 
concept similar to total income 1 as the standard case. They reason 
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that there is a higher probability that this alternative reflects what is 
really human behaviour. The personal income tax distribution is similar 
to the distribution of total income (see Table 68.1). Hence, if a 
similar assumption was adopted in this thesis, it would create a 
distribution of total government expenditure more akin to the case 6 
illustrated by Chart 6.4. 
Reynolds and Smolensky (1977) believe that households benefit from 
government collective expenditures on some egalitarian basis, as well as 
in proportion to income. They adopt the novel assumption that collective 
expenditures are "arbitrarily distributed, one-half by the distribution 
of households and one-half by share of initial income". If a similar 
assumption was adoptee in this thesis, it would result in a distribution 
of shares of total government expenditure more akin to Case 7 in Chart 
6.4. 
Table 68.3 on the next page displays the distribution of the 
money-income values of collective government expenditures based on the 
standard (Case 1) assumption by market income group and household type. 
Turning ·to the distribution of collective expenditures by household type 
(see Total% row, Table 68.3), the assumption that collective 
expenditures are distributed in relation to household expenditure results 
in a distribution that favours two-adult, non-national-superannuitant 
households. These households are estimated to consume 16.4 percent of 
collective benefits, but they account for only 15.0 percent of households 
and 10.0 percent of persons occupying private households. Similarly, 
childless three-or-more-adult households are estimated to consume 12.9 
percent of collective expenditures but they only account for 8.3 percent 
. j 
of households and 9.4 percent of the occupants. rn ·contrast, 
national-superannuitant households' share is nearly the same as their 
share of the private-household population. 
1. In fact, it is similar to the concept of Stage Three pre-budget 
income adopted in this thesis. Musgrave et al define "total income" 
to include money income (market income plus transfer payments) as 
well as certain items such as corporate source income other than 
dividends (that is, corporation tax and retained earnings), other 
capital gains, imputed rent and so forth. Gillespie defines "broad 
income" as personal market income, various kinds of imputed income (capital gains, retained earnings and so on) and non-money income 
(food grown and consumed on the farm, net rental value of 
owner-occupied farms and so on). Transfers are also included. 
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Table 68.3 
Tl-£ MOfEY-INCQt.£ VALLE OF COLLECTIVE GOODS 
ALLOCATED IN PROPORTION TO HJUSEHOLD EXPENDITURE (CASE ON::) 
BY HJJSEKLD INCD£ GRa.JP ANJ BY HOUSEHa..D TYPE 
1-tlusehold 
Market 
Income 
($ p.a.) 
1-busehold Type 
1 Adult 2 Adults · 2 Adults 3 crr More 1 Adult All 
Nat Oth Nat Oth 1 
Sup Sup 
with 
Children 
Adults with House-
2 3+ No With 
Chil- Chil-
dren dren 
Chld'n holds 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Total Amount Per Group ($ Million) 
Less Than $250 26 5 26 5 3 3 5 21 101 
$250-( $3, 950) 34 8 47 8 5 5 3 10 124 
$3,950-( $9, 750) 21 21 36 16 18 21 16 8 8 10 168 
$9,750-($13,450) 5 28 26 26 26 31 23 10 16 5 192 
$13,450-($16,900) 23 23 31 28 52 36 8 21 233 
$16,900-($20,250) 21 21 49 28 54 49 21 23 269 
$20 ,250-( $24,200) 10 18 60 28 65 44 23 36 287 
$24,200-($29,200) 8 10 88 23 49 44 41 57 329 
$29 ,200-( $3 6, 650) 8 83 26 75 31 78 93 398 
$36,650 and over 13 60 21 44 44 140 163 484 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Total 91 129 225 424 210 396 297 334 423 59 2588 
------------------------------------------------------------·------------------
Percentage Distribution (%) 
Less Than $250 1.0 0.2 1.0 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.8 3.9 
$250-( $3,950) 1.3 0.3 1.8 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.1 
-
0.4 4.8 
$3,950-( $9,750) 0.8 0.8 1.4 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.6 0.3 0.3 0.4 6.5 
$9,750-($13,450) 0.2 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.2 0.9 0.4 0.6 0.2 7.5 $13,450-($16,900) 0.9 0.9 1.2 1.1 2.0 1.4 0.3 0.8 9.0 
$16,900-($20,250) 0.8 0.8 1.9 1.1 2.1 1.9 0.8 0.9 10.4 
$20,250-( $24,200) 0.4 0.7 2.3 1.1 2.5 1.7 0.9 1.4 11.1 
$24,200-($29,200) 0.3 0.4 3.4 0.9 1.9 1.7 1.6 2.2 12.7 
$29,200-($36,650) 0.3 3.2 1.0 2.9 1.2 3.0 3.6 15.4 
$36,650 and over 0.5 2.3 0.8 1.7 1.7 5.4 6.3 18.7 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Total 3.5 5.0 8. 7 16.4 8.1 15.3 11.5 12.9 16.3 2.3 100.0 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
H'ho1ds 
Persons 
Com8arative Fi~res - Percentage Distribution of: 
10.8 8.7 12.4 15.0 7.8 12.6 10.4 8.3 10.3 
3.6 2.9 8.3 10.0 7.9 16.9 19.0 9.4 18.7 
3. 7 100.0 
3.4 100.0 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Sources: Estimated using data from the Department of Statistics Household 
Survey 1981/82, and weighted using data from the 1981 Census of Population 
and Dwellings to represent the total population of private householas. 
Cells with insufficient observations designated(-). 
-
~----------------
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C. DISTRIBUTION OF MJNEY-INCOME BENEFITS FROM HEALTH EXPENDITURE 
The distribution of government-provided health services is analysed 
by dividing health expenditure into two main groups - hospitalization and 
other health care. In 1981/82, of health expenditure ($1,436.3 million), 
just over 75 percent was spent for hospitals ($1,083.1 million) and the 
remaining amount was spent on non-hospital services ($353.2 million) and 
mainly consists of medical benefits ($269.2 million). Figure 6.6 
displays information about central government health (non-market ano 
non-capital) expenditures in 1981/82. 
FIG.~£ 6.6 
HEALTH EXPEMliTLRE, 1981/82 
(CENTRAL GOVEJH.£NT ~ EXPENDITURE ON t-EAL TH) 
Health Outlays (NZSNA) 
Final COnsumption Expenditure 
Social Assistance Grants 
Total Health Outlay 
Health Outlays Divided Between Hospital and Non-hospital 
Expenditure on Hospitals 
Non-hospital Expenditure 
1,083.1 
353.2. 
Health Outlays Distributed to Private Households 
$Million 
1' 121.9 
314.4 
1,436.3 
1,436.3 
Assuming 12.~ of those utilizing health are resident 
permanently in institutions: (87.5%)($1,083.lM) = 947.7 
(87. ~)($ 353 .2M) = 309.1 
$1,256.8 
---~----------------~---------------------------------------------- ------Source: Department of Statistics, NZSNA data. 
In the Estimates, information about expenditure by the Department of 
Health is broken into eight sub-Programmes. To impute a household 
distribution for each one, an estimate is made of non-capital-Per-head 
expenditure by broad age groups. This is done by assuming that age and 
sex-specific levels of service (as indicated by the 1981 National Health 
Statistic Centre's census of hospitals) are constant to the levels 
experienced in March year 1982 (the base year of this thesis). 
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To derive the appropriate utillisatian rates far 1981/82, the 1981 
estimates of per head health expenditure are multiplied by the age 
distribution in 1981/82. The estimated age distribution of the 
population, by both narrow and broad age bands, is given in Figure 6. 7 
below. 
FIGH: 6.7 
ESTIMATED MEAN AGE DISTRIBUTION OF NZ POPtJ..ATICt4 
FOR 1l£ YEAR ENJED 31/3/82 
, 
295. 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Age Group Male Female 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------0-4 
5-9 
10-14 
15-19 
20-24 
25-29 
30-34 
35-39 
40-44 
45-49 
50-54 
55-59 
60~4 
65~9 
70-74 
75-79 
80-84 
85-89 
90-94 
95-99 
100+ 
127,840 
145,270 
156,530 
155,680 
139,540 
121 '030 
119,550 
98,810 
87,020 
75,240 
78,570 
73,450 
60,430 
52,560 
39,000 
23,740 
11,670 
4,180 
1,320 
250 
50 
Summary Age Groupings 
Births 
0-14 
15-64 
65+ 
50,025 
840,880 
2,006,990 
313,980 
122,490 
139,080 
149,630 
148,870 
135,240 
122,380 
119,550 
98,140 
85,990 
72,430 
74,400 
73,440 
67,230 
60, 700 
48,930 
34,750 
21,320 
10,580 
3,930 
880 
120 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------Source: Department of Statistics. 
For the sub-programmes concerned with expenditure by hospital 
boards, private hospitals and Lake Alice Mental Hospital, it is possible 
to derive estimates for each of the age groups listed in Figure 6. 7, as 
well as maternity. For the other seven sub-programmes, estimates are 
made in broader summary age groupings in Figure 6.7 and maternity. This 
latter procedure implies that per capita expenditure within these broad 
age bands is the same. For example, per capita expenditure on the age 
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group 15-19 is assumed ta be the same as per capita expenditure far the 
15-64 group. 
The Household Survey does not specifically identify maternity 
cases. These costs are estimated separately and imputed to individuals 
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of age 0 on the basis that these babies would reside in households where 
the maternity services were consumed. 
C.l: Hospital Expenditure 
Central government appropriations to hospital boards are voted by 
Parliament based on estimates of expected usage for each hospital. 
Expected usage is primarily a function of the population base served by 
each hospital board. To project hospital usage for different population 
bases, Sutton (1984) calculates weightings by age and sex which 
approximate the proportion of hospital expenditure devoted to these 
groupings by diagnosis according to the Census taken in 1981. For this 
thesis, these weightings are further adjusted for the mean age 
distribution of the population in March year 1982 and used to impute the 
money-income value of hospital expenditure by household inc~me and 
household type. 
C.l.a: The Derivation of Hospital Utilsation Rates By Age 
The cost of hospital treatment varies according to diagnosis (D). 
There are no specific data on the cost of treatments by age, sex or 
income. Lacking this data, Sutton applies rough assumptions about the 
relative costs of the main types of hospital care. For each of the kinds 
of bed days in the above classifications, relative costs as follows were 
used: 
Dl: general short stay days (surgery) 1.00 
02: general lon9 stay days (long-stay geriatric) 0.31 
03: days spent ln mental hospital 0.31 
04: obstetric days 1.00 
General short-stay days refer to diagnosis for non-obstetric, 
non-mental surgery where the time spent in hospital by Census night was 
less than or equal to 29 days. General long-stay days refers to those 
who on Census night had been in hospital for a period greater than or 
equal to 30 days. The other two classifications, days spent in a mental 
hn~ni+~1 ~nrl nh~~~ric davs. are self exolanatorv. 
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Table 6C.l shows the per head hospital-stay figures which were 
derived when the relative diagnosis costs were applied to the 1981/82 
population. Note that the users of public and private hospitals are not 
specifically identified in the Household Expenditure Survey. So although 
the logic of Sutton's approach would treat these population groupings 
separately, this has not been done. Thus, in essence, the figures for 
private hospitals indicate public support for them rather than individual 
consumption of their services. In other words, it is considered that the 
fact private hospitals are there for emergencies makes them a 
government-provided service, even for those who never use private 
hospitals. 
Table 6C.l 
Age Group 
l-llSPITAL UTILISATION RATES 
(Weighted Days per Head per Year) 
R.Jt:ilic H::lspitals 
M F 
Private Hospitals 
M F 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
0-4 0.775 0.650 0.014 0.004 
5-9 0.500 0.365 0.018 0.027 
10-14 0.543 0.356 0.024 0.014 
15-19 0.755 0.598 0.016 0.041 
20-24 0.924 o. 707 0.041 0.037 
25-29 0.839 0.873 0.036 0.071 
30-34 0.783 0.918 0.054 0.067 
35-39 0.801 0.868 0.040 0.130 
40-44 0.817 0.914 0.073 0.147 
45-49 1.132 1.149 0.088 0.223 
50-54 1.401 1.231 0.141 0.144 
55-59 1.929 1.517 0.152 0.178 
60-64 2.399 1.678 0.178 0.165 
65-69 3.499 2.369 0.264 0.387 
70-74 4.088 3.151 0.539 0.745 
75-79 5.529 5.009 1.190 1.915 
80-84 7.547 7.842 2.510 4.588 
85-89 10.551 10.824 5.112 9.513 
90-94 15.535 13.899 8.984 16.4 71 
95+ 18.700 14.337 13.834 28.342 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Sources: Weightings based on Tables Cl and Al from Projections of Hos~ita1 
Usase 1983-2016, Department of Health. Table derived tor 1981782 da a by 
Bac~ca, Department of Statistics. 
One difficulty with imputing the money-income value of hospital 
usage to private households using the utilisation rates above is that a 
larger than average proportion of those receiving hospital care will be 
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defined as residents of institutions (hospitals) rather than residents of 
private households on Census night. Further, it is likely that a major 
proportion of those resident in hospital will be the elderly. 
This thesis adjusts for the first problem by allocating 87.5 
percent, instead of 95 percent, of central government hospital spending 
to private households. This still leaves the question of how to deal 
with the increasing propensity of the elderly to reside in hospitals or 
other institutions. The hospital utilisation rates in Table 6C.l may 
overstate consumption by those over sixty who are usually resident in 
private households. If a major proportion of those who are elderly and 
ill actually are resident in institutions, it could be argued that those 
remaining in private households will be healthier on average. In 
addition, the hospital utilisation rates could overstate the money-income 
value of hospital care to the elderly. This is because, as their 
hospital stay lengthens, geriatric patients may require even more 
custodial care and even less costly medical attention than reflected in 
the diagnostic weightings used to derive Table 6C.l. 
Lacking data which deals precisely with these questions, the method 
adopted in this thesis is to see how sensitive the results are to 
different assumptions. The different assumptions are as follows:-
case 1 
case 2 
case 3 
Assumes that the hospital utilisation ratios in Table 6C.l 
properly reflect the distribution of the money-income value of 
hospital expenditure by age; 
Assumes that the propensity to reside in hospitals is greater 
for those over sixty. To adjust for the lower propensity of 
the non-healthy over 60 to reside in private households and 
the likely reduction in medical costs (greater propensity of 
those over 60 to require largely custodial care), hospital 
utilisation rates in Table 6C.l are multiplied by 0.80. This 
weighting was arrived at through rough calculations by Sutton. 
Assumes that the proportion of those resident in hospitals 
instead of private households is an increasing function of age 
and that the hospital utilisation rates overstate the 
money-income value of hospitalisation to those over sixty in 
private households. To adjust for this, weights for those 
over sixty are adjusted in a linear fashion. In other words, 
the hospital utilisation rates in Table 6C.l for the 60-64 age 
group were divided by 1.125, weights for the 65-69 were 
divided by 1.250, weights for 75-79 were divided by 1.500 and 
so on up to those over 95 whose weights were divided by 2.000. 
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CHART 6.5 
EQUALITY OF DISTRIBUTION OF HOSPITAL EXP5~ITURE BETWEEN 
CASES 1 AND 2 : LORENZ DIAGRAM OF RELATIVE EQUALITY 
Percent of 100 
Money· 
Income Share 90 of Hospital 
Expenditure 
(Cumulative) 80 
70 
60 
so 
40 
30 
zo 
10 
0 
10 zo 30 40 so 6C 
Case 1 
Case Z 
70 80 . 90 100 
Percent of Households by Harket Income (Cumulative) 
C.l.b: Hospital Expenditure by Household Type and Income Group 
The above assumptions make very little difference to the results. 
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Chart 6.5 shows that in either of the extreme cases cease 1 and case 2), 
the consumption of hospital services is relatively equal with 10 percent 
of households in each market income group consuming about 10 percent of 
hospital expenditure. As summarised by Table 6C.2 on the next page, 
however, hospital expenditure is heavily distributed in favour of 
national-superannuitant households in all three cases. 
The average annual money-income value of hospital expenditure for 
occupants of a one-adult, national-superannuitant household is $1100, 
based on Case 1 assumptions. This compares with an average money-income 
value of $180 per occupant of one-adult households with children. 
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Table 6C.2 
t-OSPITAL EXPEl'VITLRE BY DIFFERENT HOUSEJ-0..0 TYPES: 
f-busehold 
Market 
Income 
($ p.a.) 
THREE CASES COMPARED USING 1981/82 DATA 
1 Adult 2 Adults 
f-busehold Type 
2 Adults 
with 
01ildren 
3 or More 1 Adult All 
Adults with House-
01ld'n holds 
------------------------------------------------------------Nat Dth Nat Oth 
Sup Sup 
1 2 3+ No With 
Chil- 01il-
dren dren 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------~~-Block A: Average f-bs~ital Ex~enditure Per Household ($s per year) 
case 1 llDO 320 1500 510 860 850 960 1100 1200 500 920 
case 2 960 330 1300 540 920 920 1000 1100 1300 530 920 
case 3 970 330 1400 540 910 910 1000 1100 1300 520 920 
Block B: Average f-bs~ital Expenditure Per Person ($s per year) 
case 1 1100 320 760 260 290 210 180 310 220 180 310 
case 2 960 330 670 270 310 230 190 320 230 190 310 
case 3 970 330 690 270 300 230 190 320 230 190 310 
Block C: Total f-bspital Expenditure Per Income Group ($M) 
case 1 124 29 194 79 69 111 104 91 128 19 948 
case 2 107 30 171 84 75 120 112 92 136 20 948 
case 3 108 30 176 84 74 119 111 92 135 20 948 
Block D: Percentage Distribution of Hospital Ex~enditure by HOusehold Type (%) 
case 1 
case 2 
case 3 
13.0 3.1 20.5 8.4 7.3 11.7 10.9 9.6 13.5 
11.3 3.118.1 8.9 7.9 12.7 11.9 9.7 14.3 
11.4 3.1 18.6 8.8 7.8 12.6 11.7 9.7 14.2 
2.0 100.0 
2.1 100.0 
2.1 100.0 
Block E: Comparative Figures - Percentaoe Distribution of: 
H'holds 
Persons 
10.8 8.7 12.4 15.0 7.8 12.6 10.4 8.3 10.3 
3.6 2.9 8.3 10.0 7.9 16.9 19.0 9.4 18.7 
3.7 100.0 
3.4 100.0 -· 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Source: See text for discussion of the derivation of this table. 
Block D of Table 6C.2 shows the percentage distribution of hospital 
expenditure by household type. The greatest share goes to two-adult 
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national-superannuitant households who make up 12.4 percent of households 
but are estimated to consume 20.5 percent of central government hospital 
expenditure in 1981/82. On the other hand, one-adult households with 
children who are estimated to consume 2.0 percent of hospital 
expenditures represent 3.7 percent of households. 
Table 6C.3 
DISTRIBUTI~ OF l-llSPITAL EXPEMlillft: BY HOUSaOJ) MARKET INCCJ.E RANGE: 
THREE CASES COMPARED USING 1981/92 DATA 
CASE 1 CASE 2 CASE 3 
f-busehold Amount Total Amount Total Amount Total 
Market Income per per % of per per % of per per % of 
($ p.a.) H'hold Group Total H'hold Group Total H'hold Group Total 
$ p.a. $M $ p.a. $M $ p.a. $M 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------Less Than $250 1200 124 13.1 1100 113 11.9 1100 113 11.9 
$250-( $3,950) 1100 119 12.5 1000 106 11.2 1000 107 11.3 
$3,950-( $9,750) 1000 103 10.9 950 99 10.4 960 99 10.5 
$9,750-($13,450) 820 84 8.9 840 86 9.1 840 87 9.1 
$13,450-($16,900) 870 90 9.5 890 92 9.7 890 92 9.7 
$16,900-($20,250) 830 86 9.0 860 89 9.4 860 89 9.4 
$20 ,250-( $24 ,200) 800 82 8.7 850 88 9.3 840 87 9.2 
$24,200-($29,200) 760 79 8.3 800 83 _8.8 800 83 8.8 
$29,200-( $36,650) 770 80 8.4 810 84 8.9 ·810 84 8.9 $36,650 and over 980 101 10. 7 1000 108 11.3 1000 107 11.3 
920 948 100.0 920 948 100.0 920 948 100.0 
Note: Case One is the Standard Case in this thesis. Source: See text for a 
discussion of the derivation of this table. 
When the information about hospital expenditure is tabulated by 
household income group (see Table 6C.3), there is a tendency for the 
share of expenditure to reduce as household income increases. This 
tendency is borne out in all three cases. The existence of 
national-superannuitant households in the lowest income group causes the 
share of expenditure to be greatest for these groups. The share of 
hospital expenditure estimated to be consumed by the upper 10 percent of 
households is also greater than 10 percent, but this reflects the greater 
number of occupants in these households. Although the average 
money-income value of hospital expenditure per high-income household is 
as high or higher than the average far the other income groups, the 
average per occupant is similar. 
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CHART 6.6 
Share 
(%) 
HOSPITAL EXPEKliTlRE SHARES (CASES 1 ANJ 2) CtM'ARED WITH 
SHARES OF COLLECTIVE EXPENDITURES AAO tJG.ETARY BENEFITS FOR 
1981/82 BY HCl.JSEHl.D MARKET INCOtoE DECILE 
25 
20 
15 
10 . 
s 
0 
~~~~~~-~-·· 
Source: Tables 6C.3,6A.4,6B.3 
Collective Expenditure 
(Case 1) 
Case 2: Hospital Expend . 
• • Case 1: Hospital Expend. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 . 7 8 9 10 
Household ~ifarket Income Group 
(Arranged in Deciles Going From Lowest Market Income to. Highest) 
The shares of hospital expenditure by household market income group 
are remarkably equal under both Case 1 and Case 2 conditions, as can be 
seen from Chart 6.6. The estimated distribution of hospital expenditures 
is certainly more equal than the estimated distribution of collective 
expenditures and monetary benefits. 
Gillespie (1966) derives similar .results for Canada, but that is 
because, in the absence of data showing the distribution of hospital 
patients by income class, he assumes that hospital care costs are 
"randomly" distributed by household income class. In contrast, Musgrave 
et al (1974) use patient data for the United States and find the majority 
of government-provided hospital services are consumed by the lower income 
groups. 
C.2: Non-hospital Health Services 
Central government expenditures on health services other than 
hospitals are also detailed in the Estimates. However, there are little 
data available about the consumers of non-hospital health services. To 
begin with, there are no data equivalent to the National Health Census. 
Sutton (1984) estimates age-specific per capita expenditure on each 
sub-programme of Vote Health 1979/80 for the broad age groups 0-14, 
15-64, 65 and older, and for maternity (obstetric). These are then 
applied as relative expenditures, and similar equations to those in 
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Section C.l.a above are applied to get per capita esti mates for 1981/82 
for the broaa age groups. Table 6C.4 shows the results. 
Table 6C.4 
PER CAPITA VOTE HEALTH EXPeDI~ IN 1981/82 BY AGE 
(Excluding Hospital Services and capital) 
Birth 0-14 15-64 65+ 
$ Per Person Per Year 
Progranme I : Administrative Services 
Administration 14.656 1.935 
Research & Planning 2.139 0.284 
Progranme II : Dental Services 
Administration 
Dental Benefitsa 
Dental Nurse 
School Dental 
Progranme IV : Welfare Services 
Welfare 
Progranlne V : Medical Research 
Medical Research 
0.239 
3.826 
2. 719 
25.539 
2.125 
2.342 
0.342 
0.016 
2.691 
2.123 
. Progranme VI : Medical & Pharmaceutical Services 
Administration 0.951 0.360 0.371 
Medical BenefitsS 172.531 65.038 67.120 
Postgrad 0.670 0.670 
10.549 
1.540 
3.907 
_2.126 
1.249 
226.639 
0.670 
Prograame VII : Public Health & Environmental Protection 
Administration 0.634 0.263 0.253 
Disease Prevention 0.778 0.311 0.313 
Environmental Health 1.269 1.269 1.269 
Family Health 14.648 0.803 
Food/Nutrition 0.440 0.440 
Health Education 0.321 0.321 
Occupational Health 0.021 0.462 
Public Health Nursing 8.014 1.385 
Scientific Services 1.082 1.082 
Programne VIII : Data Processing Services 
Administration 4.475 0.325 
Computer Centres 2.905 0.210 
Terminal Networks 1.122 0.081 
0.574 
0.372 
0.142 
0.456 
0.320 
0.023 
2.012 
1.083 
2.651 
1. 716 
0.660 
TOTAL (Non-Hospital) 198.779 130.557 83.099 257.436 
303 . 
Notes: a) Social Assistance Grants. This table is consistent with the 
Central Government current income and outlay account. Sources: · 
Information about government non-hospital spending from The Estimates 
of Expenditures (1983). Per capita figures based on Sutton (1984). 
Bacica of the Department of Statistics adjusted the figures for 1981/82 
data. 
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Table 6C.5 
1981/82 CENTRAL GOVERI'IE:NT NON-1-DSPITAL HEALTH SERVICES 
F~ PRIVATE HOUSEHOLDS BY RANGE OF 
HousaD_D MARKET INC()oo£ ANl I-O.JSEI-0..0 TYPE 
rbusehold Type 
1 Adult 2 Adults 2 Adults 
with 
O"lildren 
3 or Mare 1 Adult All 
Adults with House-
Household 
Market 
Income 
($ p.a.) 
O"lld'n holds 
Less than $250 
$250-( $3,950) 
$3,950-( $9,750) 
$9, 750-($13,450) 
$13,450-($16,900) 
$16,900-($20,250) 
$20 ,250-( $24 ,200) 
$24,900-($29,200) 
$29 ,200-( $36,650) 
$36,650 or Over 
Nat Oth Nat Oth 
Sup Sup 
1 2 3+ No With 
Chi!- Chil-
dren dren 
As a Proportion of the Total far all Cells (%) 
2.7 0.3 2.8 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.5 
-
1.6 
2.7 0.3 3.8 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 
-
0.6 
1.1 0.4 2.4 0.4 0.8 1.3 1.5 0.4 0.6 0.5 
-0.2 0.5 1.3 0.6 1.2 1.9 2.1 0.4 o. 7 0.3 
-
0.3 0.8 0.7 1.1 2.8 2.9 0.4 1.1 
-
0.2 0.6 0.9 1.1 2.4 3.1 0.7 1.2 
-
0.1 0.3 1.1 0.9 2.8 3.0 0.6 1.9 
-
0.1 0~3 1.4 o. 7 1.8 2.1 0.8 2.7 
-
0.3 1.2 0.7 1.7 1.4 1.6 3.0 
0.3 0.7 0.5 1.2 1.8 2.5 5.0 
9.1 
8.7 
9.3 
9.1 
10.4 
10.4 
10.8 
10.1 
10.0 
12.0 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Distribution by 
Household Type 7.0 2.3 13.0 7.5 7.6 16.4 18.9 7.6 16.5 3.4 100.0 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Sources: Derived by Bacica based an Sutton (1984) using the 1981 National 
Health Statistics Centre's Census of Hospitals, mean population estimates, 
data from the Department of Statistics rbusehold Survey 1981/82, and 
weighted using data from the 1981 Census of Population and Dwellings to 
represent the total population of private households. Cells with 
insufficient observations designated(-). 
Table 6C.5 tabulates the distribution of non-hospital health 
expenditures using the information of per capita expenditure by age 
derived in Table 6C.4. A comparison of Table 6C.5 with Table 6C.2 
(Block D), shows that households with children are bigger consumers of 
non-hospital health care than of hospital services. One-adult and 
'two-adult national-superannuitant households also receive a greater share 
of non-hospital health expenditure than their share of the population. 
!hey are estimated to receive 20.0 percent of the money-income value of 
non-hospital health expenditure, while accounting for 11.9 percent of 
total persons. 
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Two-adult households with three or more children are estimated to 
consume the largest share of non-hospital health expenaiture. Their 
share is 18.9 percent, according to the bottom row of Table 6C.5. This 
share does not look so large when it is recognised that two-adult 
households with three or more children contain 19.0 percent of the 
population of occupants of private households. 
Turning to the distribution of central government non-hospital 
health spending by household-market-income group (see final Column of 
Table 6C.5), it looks fairly even at first sight. All except the upper 
household-market-income decile (which receives the largest share of 12.0 
percent) are estimated to receive roughly 9 or 10 percent of the 
money-income value of this type of expenditure. 
As Table 6C.6 shows, ~he picture changes when the distribution of 
non-hospital-health spending (Column A) is compared with the proportion 
Table 6C.6 
I'()N..K)Sp!TAL HEALTH SERVICES FOR PRIVATE I-O.JSEJ-O...OS BY RANGE OF 
Hl.JSEH(lJ) MARKET !NOH: : satE SELECTED COM=»ARATIVE DATA F«:R 1981/82 · 
HJusehold 
Market 
Inccme 
($ p.a.) 
Money-income Value of Non-Hosp. Health 
--------------------------------------
The Distribution of: As a Percentage of: 
Average Dollars 
Per Year Per: 
-------------------- .-------------------Non- Hs e- Per-
Hasp Holds sons 
Market Total Expend- Per- rouse-
Income Income iture son hold 
------------------------------------------------------------A 8 c D E F G H 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Less Than $250 
$250-( $3, 950) 
$3,950-( $9,750) 
$9,750-($13,450) 
$13,450-($16,900) 
$16,900-($20,250) 
$20,250-( $24,200) 
$24,200-($29,200) 
$29,200-($36,650) 
$36,650 and over 
9.1 
8.7 
9.3 
9.1 
10.4 
10.4 
10.8 
10.1 
10.0 
12.0 
As a Proportion of the Total 
10.0 6.2 4.8 
10.0 5.8 16.0 3.6 
10.0 8.1 3.9 2.7 
10.0 9.2 2.3 2.0 
10.0 10.8 2.1 1.9 
10.0 11.0 1.7 1.6 
10.0 11.8 1.5 1.4 
10.0 11.4 1.1 1.1 
10.0 11.7 0.9 0.9 
10.0 14.0 0.7 0.9 
(%) 
4.3 
3.4 
2.6 
2.3 
2.2 
1.8 
1.8 
1.5 
1.2 
1.2 
$ Per Year 
150 270 
150 260 
110 280 
99 270 
97 310 
94 310 
91 320 
88 300 
85 300 
86 360 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Total. 100.0 100.0 100.0 1. 6 1.4 1.9 100 300 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Sources: Derived by Bacica based on Sutton (1984) using the 1981 Census of 
Health, mean population estimates, the Department of Statistics Household 
Survey 1981/82, and weighted using data from the 1981 Census of Population 
and Dwellings to represent the total population of private households. 
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of persons in each income group (Column C). Only the bottom three 
household-market-income brackets consume a share of non-hospital health 
greater than their share of occupants, according to Table 6C.6. For 
example, the lowest-income group includes 6.2 percent of total persons 
who consume an estimated 9.1 percent of the money-income value of 
non-hospital health expenditure. In comparison, the highest income 
bracket only consumes an estimated 12.0 percent of this form of health 
expenditure but contains 14.0 percent of the persons resident in private 
households in 1981/82. The differences between the household and 
personal distribution of non-hospital health services are compared by 
Columns G and H of Table 6C.6. 
C.3: The Distribution of Total Health Expenditure: Conclusion 
Government-provided health services appear to be the most evenly 
distributed of all of government's major expenditure functions. Table 
6C.7 below combines the results derived in Section C.l for hospitals with 
the results in Section C.2 for non-hospital health expenditure to derive 
the distribution of the money-income value of total current central 
government health expenditure by household market-income decile in 
1981/82. 
Table 6C. 7 
CENTRAL GOVERNENT l-EAL TH EXPelli~ CONSUEO BY PRIVATE HClJSEHl..OS: 
TIE ESTIMATED DISTRIBUTION AND AVERAGE MONEY-INCOt-£ VALUE 
BY RAJG:: OF t-OJSEHLD MARKET I~ IN 1981/82 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------Percentage Distribution of Average Health Consumption 
H:lusehold Total Health Consumption Per 1-busehold per Annum 
Market 
-------------------------- --------------------------Income case 1 case 2 case 3 case l Case 2 Case 3 
$ pa (%) (%) (%) ($) ($) ($) 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------Less than $250 12.1 11.2 11.2 1500 1400 1400 
$250-( $3,950) 11.6 10.6 10.7 1400 1300 1300 
$3,950-( $9, 750) 10.5 10.2 10.2 1300 1200 1200 
$9,750-($13,450) 9.0 9.1 9.1 1100 1100 1100 
$13,450-($16,900) 9.7 9.9 9.9 1200 1200 1200 
$16,900-($20,250) 9.4 9.6 9.6 1100 1200 1200 
$20,250-($24,200) 9.2 9.7 9.6 1100 1200 1200 
$24,900-($29,200) 8.7 9.1 9.1 1100 1100 1100 $29,200-($36,650) 8.8 9.2 9.1 1100 1100 1100 
$3 6, 650 or Over 11.0 11.5 11.4 1300 1400 1400 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 1200 1200 1200 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------Sources: COmbines Tables 6C.3 and 6C.6. See text for explanation. 
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Table 6C.7 displays the results derived according to the three cases 
far allocating hospital expenditure (see Section C.l.a. far 
assumptions). The distribution in all three cases is slightly U-shaped, 
with the largest shares going to the two bottom-most and the upper-most 
deciles of households. The difference between the highest average health 
expenditure per household per year ($1,500) and the lowest ($1,100) is 
just over a third. 
When the distribution of the money-income value of health 
expenditure is analysed in relation to the distribution of persons 
occupying private households, it appears to be more heavily distributed 
in favour of the three low income groups. COlumns A and 8 of Table 6C.8 
compare the distribution of persons with the distribution of total health 
expenditure in case 1. 
Table 6C.8 
CENTRAL GOVERNENT rEAL 1H EXPeDI~ (CASE 1) 
CCtB.Jw£0 BY PRIVATE I-OJSEHOLDS BY RAta: OF 1-D.JSEHOLD MARKET INCOME 
IN 1981/82 : SDE SELECTED CCWARISONS 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------Money-Income Value of Health Services 
Average Value 
Distribution of: As a Percentage of: Per Person p. a. 
---------------- ------------------- -----------------1-busehald Total Persons Market Total H'hold 
Market Health in Privt Income Income Expend-
Income (Case 1) H'holds iture 
($ p.a.) A 8 c 0 E F 
-------------------------------------------------------% % % % % $ 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------Less than $250 12.1 6.2 a 26. 0 23.0 790 
$250-( $3,950) 11.6 5.8 86.0 19.0 18.0 810 
$3,950-( $9, 750) 10.5 8.1 18.0 12.0 12.0 520 
$9,750-($13,450) 9.0 9.2 9.3 8.1 9.1 400 
$13,450-($16,900) 9.7 10.8 7.8 7.1 8.2 370 
$16,900-($20,250) 9.4 11.0 6.1 5.7 6.8 340 
$20,250-($24,200) 9.2 11.8 5.1 4.9 6.3 320 
$24,900-($29,200) 8.7 11.4 4.0 3.8 5.2 310 
$29,200-($36,650) 8.8 11.7 3.3 3.2 4.3 300 
$36,650 or Over 11.0 14.0 2.7 2.6 4.4 320 
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 6.5 5.8 7.5 400 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------Note: a) Market income is negative for this group because of losses. 
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According to Table 6C.8, none of the upper seven household-income 
deciles is estimated to consume a share of government-provided health as 
great as the share of people in that decile. This result is particularly 
interesting, given that the method of imputing health consumption is by 
household occupants according to age (not by income). Since the 
population of persons is larger for the upper income groups, it is 
surprising that their share of health expenditure is not larger. 
The val~e of health services consumed by low-income households seems 
even more pronounced when seen in relation to other income and 
consumption patterns. As Columns C through E of Table 6C.8 indicate, the 
money-income value of government-provided health is a substantially 
larger proportion of market income, total income and household 
expenditure for the three lowest income groups than it is for the other 
seven groups. The final Column of Table 6C.8, Column F, shows that the 
average money-income value of government-provided health per person tends 
to decline as household income increases. 
C.3.a: Total Health Distributed By Income Group Conclusion 
Compared with the distribution of social welfare expenditures and 
collective goods, the distribution of the money-income value of health 
expenditure is more evenly spread among household income groups. The 
conclusion of the approach outlined in this section, however, is that the 
impact effect of central government health spending is to redistribute 
resources to the bottom income groups. This result emerges when health 
consumption is analysed per person. There are fewer occupants, on· 
average, in the households in the lower income groups. 
The main factor shaping the distribution of health spending is the 
large proportion of national superannuitants in the lower 
household-income deciles. The majority of health spending is for 
hospital services and those over 60 take up a large proportion of 
bed-days in hospital. About 70 percent of private-household occupants 
aged 60 or over are in the three lowest household-market-income deciles. 
Nearly 60 percent of the households in the three lowest 
household-market-income deciles are either one-adult or two-adult 
national-superannuitant households. 
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C.3.b: Health Consumption By Household Type 
The proportion of health services estimated to be consumed by 
national-superannuitant households is very high in relation to their 
share of the population. This is shown by Table 6C.9 below (see 
especially Block D and Block E, "Persons"). 
Table 6C.9 
CENTRAL GOVERNENT HEALTH EXPENJITl.RE BY DIFFERENT HWSEHLD TYPES 
IN 1981/82 : TI-REE CASES COKlARED 
Household Type 
1 Adult 2 Adults 2 Adults 
with 
0'1ildren 
3 or More 1 Adult Al l 
Household 
Market 
In cane 
($ p.a.) 
Nat Oth Nat Oth 
Sup Sup 
1 
Adults with Hbuse-
2 3+ No With 
Chil- Chil-
dren dren 
0'1ld ' n holds 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Block A: Average Health Expenditure Per Household ($s per ~ear) 
case 1 1300 400 1800 660 1100 1200 1500 1300 1700 770 1200 
case 2 1200 410 1600 690 1200 1300 1600 1300 1700 810 1200 
case 3 1200 410 1700 690 1200 1300 1600 1300 1700 800 1200 
Block B: Average Health Expenditure Per Person ($s per year) 
case 1 1300 400 900 328 383 310 276 390 310 276 406 
case 2 1200 410 800 344 403 327 291 397 324 295 406 
case 3 1200 410 750 344 399 325 287 397 322 286 406 
Block C: Total Health Expenditure For All Households By Household Type ($M) 
case 1 
case 2 
case 3 
145 
129 
130 
36 234 103 
37 211 107 
37 216 107 
93 162 
98 171 
97 170 
162 114 
171 116 
169 116 
179 
187 
186 
29 
31 
30 
1257 
1257 
1257 
Block D: Percentage Distribution of Health Expenditure (%) 
case 1 
case 2 
case 3 
H'holds 
Persons 
11.6 2.9 18.6 8.1 7.4 12.9 12.9 9.1 14.2 
10.3 2.9 16.8 8.5 7.8 13.6 13.6 9.2 14.8 
10.3 2.9 17.2 8.5 7.7 13.5 13.5 9.2 14.8 
Block E: Percentage Distribution of: (%) 
10.8 8.7 12.4 15.0 7.8 12.6 10.4 8.3 10.3 
3.6 2.9 8.3 10.0 7.9 16.9 19.0 9.4 18.7 
2.3 .100.0 
2.4 100.0 
2.4 100.0 
3. 7 100.0 
3.4 100.0 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Sources: Combines Tables 6C.2 and 6C.5. See text for derivation. 
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One-adult and two-adult national superannuitant households only 
account for 11.9 percent of the occupants of private households in 
1981/82, but it is estimated that they consume 30.2 percent of 
government-provided health services, given the case 1 conditions (see 
Block D, Table 6C.9). The Case 1 money-income value of the 
average-single-adult, national-superannuitant's health consumption is 
$1,300 a year, over three times that of occupants of other 
non-national-superannuitant household types. COntrasted with this are 
one-adult households with children who are estimated to consume an 
average of under $300 per occupant. This group received a 2.3 or 2.4 
percent share of health expenditure according to block D, but contains 
3.4 percent of persons in private households. 
Clearly, the results suggest that the consumption of government 
health services by national-superannuitant households is considerable. 
It is possible, however, that their consumption is even greater than 
suggested by the results of the approach followed in this section. 
Different assumptions have been tested to ensure that the value of 
hospitalisation consumed oy those over 60 is not over-stated. 
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As highlighted by these results, an important area of further 
research is the cost of providing hospital care to the elderly. It is 
known from the Census and Household Survey data report that the majority 
of those over 60 are in the lower market income groups. An important 
area of research is to determine if the assumptions of relative costs, 
where long stay costs are assumed to be about 31 percent of general 
hospitalisation costs (see Section 6.C.l.a), are realistic. 
Further research about the consumption of health is required because 
the implications for income redistributive policy are great. The results 
in this thesis suggest that health expenditure is less redistributive 
than social welfare policies, where the goal is to achieve a more equal 
distribution of household incomes by concentrating government expenditure 
on the lower household-market-income groups. Even so, the share of 
health expenditures consumed by the lower income groups is higher than 
the share of most other expenditures. Furthermore, one aim of 
redistributive policy is to assist those over 60 and it appears that 
health expenditure is a candidate for assisting in the achievement of 
that aim. 
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D. EDUCATION EXPENDITURE 
This section is devoted to an assessment of the distribution of the 
money-income value of direct educational expenditures by households. 
Direct (specific or private) benefits from education are defined as the 
value to the student of attending a government-funded educational 
institution. In 1981/82, government current expenditure on education 
amounted to $1,364.5 million, 14.3 percent of total central government 
non-market outlays. 
Not considered in this section is the tax expenditure for education 
provided by the personal income tax. 1he contribution of funds for 
schools is encouraged by a tax deduction for school fees and donations. 
1his deduction is taken into account when deriving the distribution of 
personal income tax payments in Chapter Five. 
In 1981/82, the New Zealand government had direct control, as the 
sole or main supplier of funds, of over 90 percent of all primary 
schools, 72 percent of all secondary schools and more than 90 percent of 
tertiary edu~ational establishments as well as pre-schools. It also 
directly funds private schools operated through the catholic Church 
educational system and other approved independent schools. 
Education is also provided to the agricultural sector through vote 
Agriculture and Fisheries. 1his may also provide indirect economic 
benefits to the population as a whole. However, the direct benefits to 
the farmer come in the form of increased income. In NZSNA terms the 
educational expenditure on the farm sector was $1.5 million in 1981/82. 
This is distributed among households whose occupants list1farming as 
their chief occupation and is included in the discussion in Section F of 
the Chapter. 
1he Maori population receives the direct benefit of vocational 
training administered by the Department of Maori Affairs. In 1981/82, 
total expenditure for this was $3.4 million. The Census provides 
information about ethnic affiliation and this expenditure is distributed 
to non-family benefit individuals over 15 who are not fully employed. 
CHAPTER SIX : GOVERNENT SPENDING BY HOJSEHl..D INC().£ GROUP 
0.1: Distribution of Educational Expenditures by Household Income Group 
It is assumed that educational expenditures are consumed by the 
students being educated. The money-income value of education is 
allocated to students, depending on their stage of schooling, as 
determined by their age. 
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The 1981 Oensus surveyed attendance at educational institutions, as 
well as the income of students. Unfortunately, this information could 
not be easily linked with the 1982 Household Survey data, which are the 
basis of most of the derivations of the money-income value of central 
government income and outlays in this thesis. There were three main 
reasons for this: 
1) the income information in the census was not collated into 
household units; 
2) 1981/82 household incomes were higher than in 1981 when the 
Oensus was taken; and 
3) with changes in the aqe distribution over the year, students 
would have moved ahead at school. 
Lacking the precise information needed to identify the v~lue of 
education consumed by household income group, age is the proxy used to 
impute the money-income value of education to the consumers of 
education. As a first step, education expenditure is classified by the 
level of schooling. This is achieved using the information included in 
the Estimates vote Summary for the Department of Education. 
Figure 6.8 classifies educational expenditures by programme as 
listed by the Vbte, Department of Education. It shows the adjustments 
necessary to make the information consistent with the NZSNA definitions 
of education outlay. Capital is excluded from the current outlay 
account, as are receipts. The relevant figures for this thesis are from 
COlumn D of Figure 6.8 and are an account of net non-capital government 
education expenditure. 
About 85 percent of education (non-capital) expenditure can be 
attributed to specific consumers (students) and thus fits with the 
definition of private benefit. · The rest is distributed in proportion to 
the consumers who are specifically identified. 
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FIGURE 6.8 
EXPEN)ITLRE UNDER VOTE EDUCATI~ IN 1981/82 
(Adjustments to the Estimates to Exclude capital and 
to Make Consistent with NZSNA ($ Million]) 
313. 
Current capital Receipts Net Non- Total 
(A) (B) (C) Cptl (0) (B+C+O) 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------~---Progranlne I : Administration and General 
Administration 19.7 .4 
Examinations/Research 4.7 
24.5 .4 6.5 18.0 24.9 
ProgranJne 2 : Pre-school 
Administration .8 
Kindergartens 17.8 .8 
Playcentres & Oth Pre-School 1.1 .4 
20.2 1.2 
ProgranJne 3 : Edu:ation Support Services 
neg 20.2 21.4 
Administration 2.3 
School Inspection 6.3 
Guidance 18.4 
CUrriculum Development 5.0 .1 
Transport 36.8 .8 
Recruitment of Teachers .2 
68.9 .9 .1 68.8 69.8 
Progranwne 4 : Operation of Schools 
State Primary 447.7 4.4 447.7 
State Secondary 331.5 2.7 331.5 
Private 55.2 .6 55.2 
Special & Correspondence 37.1 .2 2.4 34.6 
School Buildings 76. 7 
871.4 84.6 2.4 869.0 956.0 
Progranme 5 : Teacher Education 
Administration/Building .2 2.3 
Pr e-Serv ice 56.7 .2 
In-Service 3.7 2.3 
60.7 2.5 .8 59.9 63.2 
Progranme 6 : Senior Technical and ConmJnity Education 
Administration/Building .9 14.6 
Technical Ihsti tute s 87.0 3.2 
Student Assistance 7.3 
COntinuing Education 9.0 
104.2 17.8 .7 103.6 122.1 
Programme 7 : University Education 
Administration/Building 182.1 23.9 
Student Assistance 30.1 
212.2 23.9 212.2 236.1 
Sub-Total 1,362.2 
Progranme 8 : National Library 9.6 .7 .2 9.5 10.4 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------TOTAL 1,371.8 132.0 10.7 1361.2 1,503.8 
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Figure 6.9. summarises the information from Figure 6.8 and lists the 
assumptions made for allocating the education expenditures to households. 
Programme 1 (Administration and General), Programme 3 (Education 
Support Services), Special and Correspondence under Programme 4 and 
Programme 5 (Teacher Education) are assumed to be of collective benefit 
to the consumers of education and are distributed to those consuming 
education in relation to the amount of education they consume. Programme 
8, the National Library, is consiaered to be a collective good and as 
such has been already imputed to household income groups in Section B of 
this O"'apter. 
FI~ 6.9 
a:u:ATI£».1 EXPEN)!TlJ£5 BY LEVEL OF EDLCATION IN 1981/82 
Amount in Estimates f-bw Allocated 
Pre-School 
State Primary 
State Secondary 
Private 
Technical Educationa 
University EducationP 
General Education - Prog 1 
Consumption - Prog 3 
- Spec & Cor 
- Prog 5 
National Ubrary 
$ Million 
103.6 
212.2 
18.1 
68.6 
34.6 
59.8 
-
20.2 Children 3 or older but 
less than 5; 
447.7 Children 5 or older but 
less than 13; 
331.5 Children 13 or older but 
less than 18; 
55.2 Private school students, 
identified in Household 
• 
Survey; 
) Those listing themselves 
315.8 ) as students in 1981 
Census; 
) Distributed in relation 
) to distribution of other 
) educational expenditures 
181.4 ) 
9.5 Collective good (see 
1,361.2 Section B, Chapter Six) 
(l,374.l)c 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------Notes: a) $7.3 million technical schools bursaries. b) $30.1 million 
university bursaries. Total bursaries in 1981/82 were $37.4 million. 
c) difference between NZSNA definition explained by Health $0.4 
million; Maori Affairs $3.5 million; Ag & Fish $1.5 million. Sources: 
1983 Estimates and Figure 6.8. 
CHAPTER SIX : GOVERNENT SPelliNG BY I-O.JSEJ-O..D INCCM: GROUP 
FIGURE 6.10 
Age 
ATlB()At>CE AT A TERTIARY INSTITUTION 
BY A~ GROUPS ANJ SEX IN 1981 CENSUS 
Male Female 
315. 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------(A) (B) Ratio (C) (D) Ratio 
Attending Tot. Pop A/B Attending Tot. Pop C/D 
--------- --------
-----
--------- --------
15 135 (30192) .0045 180 (28800) .0063 
16 1398 (30978 .0451 1458 (29400) .0496 
17 4917 (31731) .1550 4971 (30354) .1638 
18 9516 (32205) .2955 7530 (30984) .2430 
19 9144 (31713) .2883 7110 (30279) .2348 
20-24 23388 (137421) .1702 15747 (132216) .1191 
25-44 21291 (418254) .0509 18741 (418161) .0448 
45-59 2829 (227322) .0124 3729 (220554) .0169 
60+ 1050 (19052) .0551 1161 (245619) .0047 
73668 60627 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------Note: Total students equalled 134,295. Sources: Department of 
Statistics: 1981 Census, Volume 6, Table 7; Volume 2, Table 4. 
To distribute the money-income va~ue of tertiary education, 1981 
Census information is used to calculate the ratio of the number of 
students to the population of all those of the same age and sex. These 
are recorded in Figure 6.10 above. These.ratios are then applied to the 
age population derived for the 1982 year at the base of this thesis (see 
Figure 6.6). 
Note that the above data cannot to be directly related to household 
income. This means it is not possible to analyse questions such as 
whether tertiary education is consumed in greater amounts by students 
from households with above-average income. 
The estimated distribution of total education consumption is shown 
by Table 60.1. Because the number of children is an increasing function 
of income (see Table 6A.2), it is predictable that the share of education 
is an increasing function of income. Another factor here is the 
likelihood that the average age of children will rise as household 
incomes increase. Since the provision of education becomes costlier at 
each higher level of education, the money-income value imputed increases 
with the age of the student. 
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Table 60.1 
ESTIMATED DISTRIBUTION OF EDUCATION CONSUMPTION IN 1981/82 
BY RANGE OF I-OJSEHOLD ~ INCQt.£ AND HOUSEHOLD TYPE 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------f-busehold Type 
------------------------------------------------------------1 Adult 2 Adults 2 Adults 
with 
O"lildren 
3 or More 1 Adult All 
Adults with f-buse-
Household 
Market 
Income ($ p.a.) 
O'lld'n holds 
Nat Oth Nat Oth 1 
Sup Sup 
2 3+ No With 
Chil- O'lil-
dren dren 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------As a Proportion of the Total for All Households (%) 
Less than .$250 a.a a. a 0.1 a. a 0.2 0.4 0.6 
-
2.4 4.0 
$250-( $3,950) 0.1 a. 1 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.5 - 1.2 2.9 
$3,950-( $9, 750) 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.5 0.9 2.4 0.5 1.0 0.9 6.9 
$9,750-($13,450) 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.3 0.7 1.7 3.0 0.4 0.9 0.5 7.8 
$13,450-($16,900) 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.7 2.6 3.9 0.4 1.8 10.3 
$16,900-(.$20,250) 
-
0.2 0.1 0.5 0.7 3.3 5.1 0.7 1.6 12.3 
$20 ,250-( .$24 ,200) 0. 1 a.o 0.6 0.8 3.5 4.5 0.6 2.7 13.1 
$24,900-($29,200) 
-
a.o 0.0 0.9 0.7 2.5 3.9 0.8 4.0 13.0 
$29,200-( $36,650) o.o 0.8 0.6 2.6 2.9 1.5 5.2 13.6 
$36,650 or Over 0.0 0.3 0.4 1.7 3.1 2.3 8.4 16.2 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------TOTAL 0.2 1.0 0.6 4.4 5.5 19.4 29.9 7.2 26.0 5.8 100.0 
Sources: Estimated using data from the Oepqrtment of Statistics Household 
Survey 1981/82, and weighted using data from the 1981 Census of POpulation 
and Dwellings to represent the total population of private households. 
Cells with insufficent observations designated(-). 
These results illustrated as Table 60.1, differ markedly from those 
of Gillespie (1965, 1966) and those of Musgrave et al (1973, 1974). 
Gillespie finds that in canada, the lower income groups consume the 
greater share of education expenditures, while Musgrave et al find that 
in the United. States, it is the middle income groups which consume the 
largest shares. All these studies assume (as this one does) that 
education consumption should be allocated to households by the 
distribution of students. This suggests that the distribution of 
students differs in canada, the United States and New Zealand. In 
particular, it appears that the average number of children per household 
is not an increasing function of income in the former two countries. 
It is not surprising, given the approach used to impute education to 
households, that households with children, especially those with two or 
more, account for by far the largest share of education expenditure. 
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more, account for by far the largest share of education expenditure. 
What is surprising is the share of education consumed by one-adult 
households with children. Education is one of the few expenditures 
(besides the domestic purposes benefit) which is shown to be distributed 
in favour of this group, based an the approach adapted in this thesis. 
Sola parent households account for 3.7 percent of households and 3.4 
percent of persons and are estimated to receive 5.8 percent of the 
money-income value from 1981/82 educational expenditure. 
In evaluating the results in this thesis, it must be recognised that 
the value of educat~on per student depends an many things which may not 
be reflected simply by data about the cost of education at different 
levels. For example, an issue which has concerned New Zealand 
educationalists is who benefits from tertiary education and who should 
pay for it. Figure 6.10 shows that about a quarter of 18 and 19 year 
olds attend tertiary institutions. Although it is commonly believed that 
these students are likely to come from high income households, the 
research in this thesis has not covered this issue since age rather 
than income is the distributor. 
~nether issue related to the distribution of education concerns the 
delivery of education to those in rural areas: 
"An inescapable consequence of population 
distribution is that educational administrators find 
it easier to assemble classes, to supply teachers, 
and to provide facilities and supportive services in 
centres where population density is relatively 
high •.. from the earliest days of colonial 
education, rural parents have felt that the 
schooling available in country districts was 
inferior and have suffered from an ..• anxiety lest 
their children should be educationally 
disadvantaged". (Educational Development 
COnference, 1974, p. 209). 
Besides the location of the school, other important determinants of 
the value of education consumed by students include the types of courses 
offered at the school (science, agriculture, arts, typing), the number of 
students per teacher, whether the school is a model or normal school and, 
indeed, whether the school is in a low-income or high-income 
neighbourhood. 1hese are areas for further research. 
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E. INTEREST PAID BY GOVERNMENT TO HOUSEHOLDS 
A central government outlay of growing importance is interest 
payments. In 1981/82, internal and external interest payments accounted 
for 13.2 percent of total government outlays. Internal and external 
interest payments combine to make up the fifth largest expenditure item 
in that year. In more recent years, the central government expenditure 
on interest has exceeded its outlays for health and education. Figure 
6.11 below displays figures for interest concessions and savings, as well 
as internal and external payments in 1981/82. 
FIG-RE 6.11 
1981/82 CEN1'RAL GOVERNENT INTEREST PA'ft.ENTS ANALYSED BY 
FUNCTION AN) ASSlJMJTIONS FOR IM=IUTATION 
Amount 
Function ($ Million) f-bw Allocated (Chapter Section in Brackets) 
Interest Concessions 
Ag and Fish (Rural Bank) 
f-busing 
Maori Affairs 
Miscellaneous 
Savings 
Interest 
Internal Payments 
NZ Debt Services 787.7 
Share acquisitions etc 
in ADS and IBRD 2.6 
Security encashment IMF 55.0 
International Finance 
15.5 
34.8 
4.0 
10.0 64.3 
(402.1) 
Agreement 1.2 845.5 
External Payments (Overseas 
Debt Services) 416.3 
1.261.8 
Farmers (Section F) 
First home buyers (F) 
Maoris (F) 
General good (B) 
Household savings (E) 
Savings (E) 
General Benefit (B) 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------Amount Allocated in Table 6E.l is 95% of internal payments less savings = 
$845.5M - $402.1M = $443.4M x 95% = $421.3M (M = Million). Source: 
1981/82 Department of Statistics NZSNA Central Government Income and 
Outlay Account. 
This section examines the distribution of interest payments by 
households in a very approximate manner. Given the importance of the 
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government's choice of debt servicing as part of its monetary policy and 
the rise in interest outlays in recent years, this is an area requiring 
further research. In particular, the recognition that the beneficiaries 
of debt policies may vary depending on the stance of monetary policy 
merits further investigation. For example, if the effect of fully 
funding government expenditure (that is, by borrowing internally to 
finance the difference between central government i~come and outlay) is 
to reduce inflation, than it would be important to determine the relative 
money-income value of this to households. 
Meantime, the view taken in this thesis is that the primary aim of 
redistributive policies is to meet shortcomings in current household 
money income. To complete the analysis of the distribution of central 
government outlays, it is necessary to attribute the distribution of 
interest payments to those households who receive a money-income value 
from these payments in the current year. 
The procedure involves three distinct steps. First, it is necessary 
to distinguish the different type of debt issued by the government. 
Then, an amount of interest paid to each class of holder of public debt 
must be estimated. Finally, consideration must be given to the 
possibility of shifting such payments to individuals other than the 
holders of the debt. 
Figure 6.10 distinguishes the different types of interest payments 
and concessions financed by government spending. Interest concessions 
are intended to provide a lower rate of interest to specified 
individuals. As such, they are private goods and have been treated under 
miscellaneous in Section F of this Chapter. 
Savings, the residual in the NZSNA central government income and 
outlay account, is distributed to households based on information about 
their savings recorded by the Household Survey. In 1981/82, savings is a 
negative item; government current income was greater than its outlays by 
this amount. Savings would go towards the financing of capital 
expenditure. The model at the base of the approach in this thesis is 
myopic with no RPTO effects. So savings could be seen as the household's 
contribution for public assets it consumes in the current year. 
Similarly with internal interest payments, it is assumed that households 
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benefit in relation to their savings patterns as indicated by the 
Household Survey. 
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Finally, external payments (interest payments on overseas debt) do 
not directly accrue to New Zealand households. For the purpose of this 
thesis, it is assumed that these payments are financing capital which 
provides a collective benefit in the current year. These external 
payments have been grouped with collective expenditures in Section B of 
this Chapter. Since capital expenditure in other areas (such as 
education and health) has been excluded, another way of treating external 
payments might be to exclude them altogether. However, most current 
expenditure items include maintenance and other amounts which cover the 
current use of capital. Because such amounts are not specified for 
externally-financed capital, then the annual interest payments could be 
seen as a proxy for current consumption. 
A point to be made here is that those holding public debt do receive 
a money-income return from the interest payments. In the case of 
internal debt, the value of the return is direct. When evaluating the 
future taxpayer cost of repaying internal debt, some consideration should 
be given to the amount some taxpayers have received in interest over the 
life of the debt. This longer term consideration is not the focus of 
this thesis. In any given year, however, there will be some taxpayers 
paying for debt and some receiving interest from the debt. The problem 
is to translate those flows into household money-income terms in order to 
evaluate what the net position is for households at different income 
levels. 
While internal debt interest has a more direct money-income effect, 
the application of household savings as the distributor may give the 
impression that the relationship is more direct than it actually is. 
Nearly three-quarters of public debt holdings in 1981/82 were owned by 
financial institutions, including the Post Office Savings Bank, Trading 
Banks, the Reserve Bank, Life Insurance Companies and so on. Only about 
7 percent of the internal public debt could be said to be owned by the 
public and this is in the form of inflation-adjusted savings bonds. The 
remainder is owned by central government trading enterprises, Local 
Authorities and FUblic Administrative organisations. 
CHAPTffi SIX : GOVERtiENT SPelliNG BY HOJSEHJLD INCQt.E GROUP 
Interest on debt owned by the central government, the Reserve Bank 
and other central government enterprises is another special case again. 
321. 
Depending on statute, proportions of the surplus of these enterprises are 
paid into the consolidated account of the Public Account. Here, the 
interest on debt for all intents and purposes becomes an alternative 
source of tax revenue. So by imputing a money-income value of this 
interest payment in relation to household savings, it is inferred that 
these households gain a money-income value because of what they save in 
taxes. 
For the public debt held by private financial institutions, the 
procedure carried out here implies that these organisations pass on all 
of the money-income value of the interest they receive each year to their 
customers and this in turn enhances the money-income position of their 
customers' households. Whether there was a net income gain to households 
in 1981/82 is a debatable point since the financial sector was highly 
regulated, many institutions being required to hold government securities 
yielding below market-level interest. Thus, if anything, the household 
sector may have sustained a net loss from its dealings with private 
financial institutions. On th~ other hand, the more immediate effect of 
the regulations affecting the financial sector was to constrain interest 
rates on lending so that those households which lost out because of low 
yields on their savings may have gained through lower interest rates on 
their borrowing. An interesting research exercise would be to analyse 
net savings by different household types and income levels to discover if 
there are any systematic patterns. 
The Household Survey collects information about income from savings 
and expenditure financed by borrowing which would assist in throwing 
light on some of these issues. This broader study did not go into such 
detail, since interest payments are only the fifth largest central 
government expenditure item for 1981/82, the year chosen as the base of 
the study. 
The distributor used to impute the money-income value of central 
government's net-interest outlays in 1981/82 by household income and type 
is a sub-group of income surveyed by the Household Survey. This 
sub-group includes interest received from the Post Office, trustee and 
savings banks, building societies and mortgages guaranteed by the Housing 
Corporation, as well as interest from other sources. 
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Table 6E.l shows the distribution of net interest to households by 
market income. The top 10 percent of households receives over a quarter 
of the money-income return from government (net) internal interest 
payments. An important assumption underlying this approach is that 
households own government securities in the same proportion as they own 
other debt. 
Looking at the bottom row of Table 6E.l, it appears that the 
distribution of government-net-interest by household type is a function 
of the number of adults in childless households. National 
superannuitants are important recipients of central government interest 
income, which is a factor leading to a relatively larger share going to 
the third-lowest household market-income decile. 
Table 6E.l 
DISTRIBUTICJ.I OF GOVERNENT t£f INTEREST IN 1981/82 . BY PRIVATE 
HJUSEHOLD BY RAta OF HJUSEHOLD ~T INCOt-E AND I-O.JSEHOLD TYPE 
Household Type 
322. 
1 Adult 2 Adults 2 Adults-
with 
Oiildren 
3 or More 1 Adult All 
Household 
Market 
In cane 
($ p.a.) 
Adults with House-
Chld 'n holds 
------------------------------------------------------------· Nat Oth Nat Oth 
Sup Sup 
1 2 · 3+ No With 
Chil- Oiil-
dren dren 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------As a Proportion of Total for Each Group 
Less Than $250 0.6 0.1 0.6 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.4 2.2 
$250-~ $3,950) 2.0 0.3 2.1 0.2 0.1 o. 1 0.1 0.2 5.2 $3,950- $9, 750) 2.8 0.9 2.8 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.4 9.0 
$9,750-($13,450) 0. 7 0.8 1.9 o. 8 0.6 0.7 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.2 6.9 
$13,450-($16,900) 0.6 1.8 0.9 0.8 1.2 0.8 0.4 0.5 8.1 
$16,900-($20,250) 0.7 1.7 1.4 0.7 1.6 1.1 0.6 0.5 8.3 
$20,250-($24,200) 0.5 1.1 1.5 0.7 1.5 1.6 0.8 1.0 8.9 
$24,200-($29,200) 0.2 0.8 2.7 0.8 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.3 10.5 
$29 ,200-( $36,650) 1.3 2.4 0.6 2.1 0.8 2.6 3.0 13.0 
$36,650 and over 3.8 2.6 4.2 2.4 1.7 8.1 4.3 27.9 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Total (%) 9.0 4.2 17.8 13.0 9.1 11.2 8.3 14.5 11.3 1.6 100.00 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Sources: Estimated using data from the Department of Statistics Household 
Survey 1981/82, and weighted using data from the 1981 Census of POpulation 
and Dwellings to represent the total population of private households. 
Cells with insufficient observations designated(-). 
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Gillespie (1966) considers the question of the degree of 
redistribution which comes about because of the existence of public debt 
by distributing the tax payments for the public debt in the same way as 
average tax payments. Then the average tax payments made by households 
are subtracted from the interest payments received by households. Table 
6E.2 sets forth a similar procedure based on the data in Table 6E.l for 
New Zealand households. 1he net gain is not great for any income group 
other than the third decile. Nevertheless, the results shown in Column C 
do suggest that the government's internal interest payment may have a 
redistributive effect. Gillespie (1966, p.l36) found that for canada, 
the lower income earners and the upper income earners were the net 
gainers. 
Table 6E.2 
REDISTRIBUTION OF MOrEY INCtJo£ JJIA 
Tru<ES AN) INTEREST PAY~ ON PUBLIC DEBT 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------Personal Redistribution 
Income Tax Interest 
-------------------------Payments Payments AmoLnt As a % of 
A B C = (8-A) Total ·rncome 
--------------------------------------------------------$ Million $ Million $ Million % 
Less Than $250 3.8 9.3 5.5 0.9 
$250-( $3,950) 6. 7 21.9 15.2 2.0 
$3,950-( $9,750) 11.8 37.9 26.1 2.4 
$9, 750-($13, 450) 19.4 29.1 9.7 0.7 
$13,450-($16,900) 27.8 34.1 6.3 0.4 
$16,900-($20,250) 36.6 35.0 -1.6 -0.1 
$20,250-( $24,200) 45.1 37.5 -7.6 -0.3 
$24, 200-( $29, 200) 59.0 44.2 -14.8 -0.5 
$29 ,200-( $36, 650) 75.4 54.8 -20.6 -0.6 
$36,650 and over 135.7 117.5 -18.12 -0.3 
TOTAL 421.3 421.3 o.o 0.0 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------Sources: Tables 6E.1, 6B.1 (case 6), Figure 6.10. See text for 
derivation. 
One final note relates to interest payments. In 1981/82, the first 
$200 of income from interest and dividends was exempt from taxation. 
This "tax expenditure" is likely to have consequences for income 
distribution. 1hese are not covered in the above treatment. It is 
another area for further research. 
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F. HOUSEHOLD CONSUMPTION OF SUBSIDIES AND MISCELLANEOUS 
This section tidies up some of the loose ends of the central 
government outlay account. In conceptual terms, the most important item 
covered in this section is subsidies, which also happens to be the last 
remaining large item of expenditure, representing 6.0 percent of toal 
spending. Miscellaneous mainly consists of some previously identified 
private goods, including expenditures by the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Fisheries, the Department of Maori Affairs and the Housing Corporation. 
F.l: Subsidies 
Although total expenditure on subsidies is not particularly great, 
the number of different types of subsidies is considerable. 
A subsidy is a current grant made by either central or local 
government to private and public enterprises and producer boards. 
Subsidies include payments to ensure a guaranteed price or to enable 
market prices of goods and services to be held below the costs of 
production. Under NZSNA definition, only current grants made by the 
government to industries are considered to be subsidies. CUrrent grants 
made by the government to households are considered to be transfer 
payments. 
According to the NZSNA classification, subsidies made by central 
government fall into three categories: 
a) Current transfers to private industries to produce goods and 
services are subsidies. Transfers for investment purposes or to 
cover damage or loss of capital, interest foregone by the government 
on loans at below market interest rates or interest-free and special 
taxation incentives or allowances, are not regarded as subsidies for 
NZSNA purposes. 
b) Transfers made to government trading establishments which are 
formally voted as a subsidy payment. These have tended to go to 
public trading departments or corporations, the Railways and the 
State Coal Mines, which operate at a loss as a consequence of 
government policies to keep prices below the cost of production2; 
and, 
2. Grants made to government industries to compensate for losses in the 
current year are regarded as subsidies, but those to compensate for 
past losses are not. 
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c) Imputed subsidies, which are transfers made to government industries 
to compensate for deliberately incurred losses, but which are not 
formally voted by Parliament. These are classed as subsidies, even 
though they are not explicitly voted as such. This is because a 
transfer is in fact made to these industries when their deficits are 
absorbed into the Public Account. 
Figure 6.12 illustrates the variety of subsidies which are included 
in the public account. 
FIQ.RE 6.12 
SL5SIDIES BY NZSNA CATEGCRY IN 1979/80, 1980/81, 1981/82, 1982/83 
Year Ending 31 March 1980 % 
$M 0'1ange 
1981 % 1982 
$M 0'1ange $M 
% 
0'1ange 
1983 
$M 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Subsidies Paid by Central Government 
Assistance for oil exploration 
Control of animal diseases 
4.1 163.4 10.8 164.8 28.6 -32.2 19.4 
& noxious weeds 11 .8 
Dairy Industry Schemes 15.8 
Fertiliser & Lime Topdressing Bounty 2.4 
Fertiliser Price 40.6 
Fertiliser & Lime Transport 28.8 
Grants to research organisations 6.1 
Grants to Wool Board 2.0 
Island & coastal shipping services 7.4 
Meat & Wool Income Stabilisat'ion 
Contribution (SMPs) 
Private sector employment 
& training incentives 
Public sector employment schemes 
Regional Development Assistance 
Price Stabilisation - Butter 
Milk 
Special Payment for sheep & cattle 
Stabilisation - Gas Industry 
Railways 
Stock Retention & 
Livestock Incentives schemes 
11.5 
32.3 
2.6 
12.4 
37.0 
0.1 
2.5 
97.7 
7.1 
-1.7 11.6 
-16.7 
-24.1 
-12.2 
13.1 
2.0 
30.8 
25.3 
6.9 
20.7 14.0 -11.4 12.4 
-15.0 
-8.4 
-4.7 
33.3 
1.7 
28.2 
24.1 
9.2 
-17. 6 
-'~· 6 
-10.8 
-39.1 
1.4 
26.9 
21.5 
5.6 
32.4 9.8 -18.4 6.5 21.5 7.9 
-7.8 
-15.2 
3.8 
56.5 
-4.9 
10.6 
27.4 
2.7 
19.4 
35.2 
o.o 2.5 
-8.1 89.8 
64.3 11.5 
- 217.0 81.6 394.0 
43.3 15.2 -5.9 14.3 
-13.5 23.7 -9.7 21.4 
122.2 8.7 -70.1 2.6 
-15.6 29 . 7 -25.3 22.2 
-4.0 2.4 -75.0 0.6 
4.9 94.1 1.2 95.2 
66.1 19.1 -4.2 18.3 
othera 17.4 124.7 39.1 35.3 52.9 40.5 74.3 
Total Central Government Subsidies 341.8 -1.9 335.4 71.5 575.1 28.3 738.o ·· 
Local Authority Rate 
Appropriations 23.2 8.6 25.2 27.0 32.0 -3.1 31.0 
Total Subsidies 365.0 -1.2 360.6 68.4 607.1 26.7 769.0 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------Note: a) In 1982, Other includes: $12.9 million Urban Passenger Transport 
Subsidies. Source: Department of Statistics. 
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Special or temporary employment schemes, established by the 
government to provide employment for those who would otherwise have been 
unemployed, are only regarded as subsidies where the special work has 
been done in a market production group. Where the work is on the 
provision of nan-market government or non-profit services, the 
reimbursement is treated as a current transfer from the government (and 
recorded as a transfer in the income and outlay account of the 
recipient). It is not classified as a subsidy because, by definition, 
non-market producers cannot receive subsidies3. 
Another form of subsidy nat included in the Public Accounts is the 
implicit subsidy provided by the Housing COrporation when it provides 
mortgages to qualified applicants at below-market-interest rates. 
F .La: Imputing Subsidies to Household Income Groups 
For the purposes of this research, subsidies are divided into three 
main groups, SMPs (supplementary minimum prices to farmers), direct 
subsidies and general subsidies. SMPs are discussed in this section 
because they are paid to the farm industry and for this reason the NZSNA 
system classifies them as subsidies. However, far this thesis SMPs are 
treated as current grants to farm households, similar to transfer 
payments, and grouped with monetary benefits. 
Direct subsidies are those far which a specific consumer can be 
identified. Far example, the Milk Price Stabilisation Scheme (Milk 
Subsidy) accrues to dairy farmers. An intended effect of the scheme is 
to reduce the price of milk to those consuming it. Hence, the .. 
money-income value of the milk subsidy is assumed to be distributed in 
relation to the consumption of milk as reported by the Household Survey. 
Other direct subsidies include those which enhance the incomes of 
farmers, private sector employment schemes and subsidies on passenger 
travel. 
3. Those (market and non-market) employers who qualify under the 
employment schemes are reimbursed in part far the wages paid to 
their additional staff. The full amount of these wages (subsidised 
and non-subsidised) is included in the compensation of employees in 
the production group concerned. 
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General subsidies are those for which no specific consumer can be 
identified or which have a collective benefit. In 1981/82, the largest 
general subsidy was $29.7 million spent for oil exploration. 4 Other 
general subsidies include export programme grants ($14.6 million) gas 
reticulation ($4.6 million), regional development ($3.7 million), gas 
industry stabilisation ($2.4 million) and so on. Another subsidy treated 
under the heading of general subsidy is the concession for South Island 
electricity. Since the Household Survey infoTmation is not broken down 
by the North and South Island, it was not possible to distinguish 
households in these two geographical regions. 
Figure 6.13 summarises the method used to allocate central 
government subsidies by income and household type. 
FIGJRE 6.13 
t£T'HD FCR I~UTIN:; SWSIDIES BY HOUSEHJLD INCCM: GROUP 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
SMPs 
Direct Subsidies 
Farm Subsidies 
Employment 
Milk 
Travel 
Long-distance 
Urban 
General Subsidies 
Amount Method Subsidy Imputed to House-
NZSNA Allocated hold Market Income Groups 
($ Million)($ Million) · 
217 . 
256 
88 
39 
30 
65 
34 
217 
256 
88 Allocated by persons reporting 
farming as their occupation 
39 Allocated by Age/Sex probability 
of being in a Private Sector 
Employment Schemea 
30 Allocated by household's 
expenditure on milk from the 
Household Survey 
99 
Allocated based on Census inform-
ation of means of travel to work. 
(104) x (95%) 99 Discussed in Section B 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------a) Source of this information is Labour Department: Review of Private 
Sector Employment Schemes, (March 1984). 
4. Note that this subsidy refers to actual expenditure by the 
government and does not include tax allowances for oil exploration, 
i.e. "tax expenditures". 
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F .l.b: Who Benefits from Subsidies? 
As Table 6F.l oelow illustrates, the money-income benefit from 
subsidies is greatest for the 10 percent of households in the top income 
group. As Column H shows, the highest-income group is estimated to 
consume over 16.2 percent of the money-income value of total subsidies in 
1981/82. 
Table 6F.l 
SLBSIDIES : ESTIMATED DISTRIBUTI~ IN 1981/82 BY INCG£ GROUP 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Total Average 
Direct General Subsidies Amount Per 
Household S L.tlsidies SWs Subsidies (A+C+E) H'hold Per 
Market Income 
----------- ----------- ---------- -----------
Year 
($ pa) Amnt Dist Amnt Dist Amnt Dist Amnt Dist 
A 8 c D E F G H I 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------$M % $M % $M % $M % $ 
Less Than $250 6 2.3 6 2.8 4 3.9 16 2.8 160 
$250-( $3,950) 7 2.7 6 2.8 5 4.8 18 3.1 170 
$3,950-( $9,750) 26 10.1 39 18.0 6 6.5 71 12.4 690 
$9,750-($13,450) 20 7.8 22 10.1 7 7.4 49 8.6 480 
$13,450-($16,900) 24 9.4 27 12.4 9 9.0 60 10.5 580 
$16,900-($20,250) 25 9.8 18 8.3 10 10.4 53 9.3 520 
$20,2 SO-( $24,200) 31 12.1 21 9.7 11 11.1 63 11.0 620 $24,200-($29,200) 37 14.5 31 14.3 13 12.7 81 14.2 770 
$29,200-($36,650) 34 13.3 19 8.7 15 15.4 68 11.9 660 
$36,650 and over 46 18.0 28 12.9 19 18.7 93 16.2 910 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Total 256 100.0 217 100.0 99 100.0 572 100.0 560 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Note: a) Distribution of general subsidies same as the distribution COllec-
tive Expenditures (Case 1). Rounding causes descrepancies between amount of 
the general subsidy and its percentage distribution. Sources: See Figure 
6.12. The distribution of subsidies is estimated using 1981782 Household 
Survey information, aggregated to the population of private households using 
the 1981 Census of Population and Dwellings. 
The popular belief about subsidies is that they assist low-income 
households. Contrary to this belief, Table 6F.l shows they are not 
redistributive to the lower-income groups. Although general subsidies 
seem to be consumed in greater proportion by low-income households than 
the other subsidies, the lowest 20 percent of household's share of 
general subsidies is only 8.7 percent. 
ihe distribution of subsidies by household type is shown by Table 
6F.2. Direct subsidies are distributed in favour of three-or-more-adult 
households, particularly those with children. ihe three-or-more-adult 
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household type receives an estimated 25.0 percent of direct subsidies, 
but only represents 10.3 percent of private households and 18.7 percent 
of the occupants of private households. At the other extreme, one-adult, 
national-superannuitant households represent 10.8 percent of households 
and 3.6 percent of the occupants of private households, but are estimated 
to receive only 1.4 percent of the money-income value of direct subsidies. 
-According to Table 6F.2, total subsidies (general subsidies and 
SMPs, as well as direct subsidies) are distributed similarly to direct 
subsidies. Under the wider definition of subsidies, three-or-more adult 
households with children still receive the largest share (22.5 percent) 
but two-adult households with-three-or-more children are estimated to 
receive the second largest share of total subsidies (16.6 percent). 
Table f!F .2 
SlBSIDIES : ESTIMATED STAGE Ot£a ANJ STAGE rwob DISTRIBUTICI6 
BY I-O.JS8«..D TYPE IN 1981/82 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SMPs 
Direct Subsidies 
General Subsidies 
t-busehold Type 
------------------------------------------------------------1 Adult 2 Adults 
Nat Oth Nat Oth 1 
Sup Sup 
2 Adults 
with 
Olildren 
3 or More 1 Adult All 
Adults with House-
2 3+ No With 
Olil- Olil-
dren dren 
Olld'n holds 
Money-Income Amount : $Million 
5 6 10 27 15 28 46 30 49 1 217 
3 8 10 38 18 31 38 41 64 5 256 
4 5 9 16 8 15 11 13 16 2 99 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Total (Stage Two) 
SMPs 
Direct Subsidies 
General Subsidies 
12 19 29 81 41 74 95 84 129 
Percentage Distribution of: 
2.3 2.8 4.6 12.4 6.9 12.9 21.2 13.8 22.6 
1.1 3.1 3.9 14.9 7.0 12.1 14.9 16.0 25.0 
3.5 5.0 8.7 16.4 8.1 15.3 11.5 12.9 16.3 
Total Stage Two(%) 2.1 3.3 5.1 14.2 7.2 12.9 16.6 14.7 22.5 
8 572 
o. 5 100.0 --
2.0 100.0 
2.3 100.0 
1.4 100.0 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Notes: a) Stage One subsidies include direct subsidies of SMPs. b) The 
Stage Two concept is broader and includes general subsidies. Sources: See 
Figure 6.12. The distribution of subsidies is estimated using 1981/82 
Household Survey information, aggregated to the population of private 
households using the 1981 Census of Population and Dwellings. 
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F.l.c: Incidence of Subsidies 
There is more literature on the economic affects of subsidies than 
there is for most other government expenditures. Subsidies are usually 
treated as the analog of ''indirect" taxes on consumer goods. The results 
of general equilibrium studies suggest that the subsidy will be shared 
between producers and consumers, depending on the elasticities of 
substitution in demand and production. The treatment of subsidies in the 
previous section is very rough. For example, the milk subsidy is assumed 
to be fully consumed by those households consuming milk. An assessment 
of the economic effects, however, is likely to show that the farmer also 
benefits through a higher volume of milk sales, that producers using milk 
as an ingredient benefit and those producing milk substitutes will also 
be affected. 
The research on subsidies suggests that there may be large excess 
burden effects from subsidies. Syntec (1984) found that forms of 
industrial assistance in New Zealand, such as subsidies, introduce 
substantial distortions in resource use by industry. SWF 
general-equilibrium models can measure both the excess burden effects and 
the distributional effects of subsidies. Piggott and Whalley (1985) 
analyse the excess burden and distributive effects of all major U.K. 
subsidies, including housing and agricultural subsidies. A major finding 
is that subsidies to local authority housing are a significant source of 
welfare loss. 
F.2: Miscellaneous Government Expenditure 
Miscellaneous government expenditure mainly consists of 
government-provided private goods including expenditures by the Ministry 
of Agriculture and Fisheries, the Department of Maori Affairs and by the 
Housing Corporation. Data constraints are such that the estimated 
distribution of miscellaneous expenditures is more subject to error than 
the estimated distributions of government expenditures covered in the 
earlier sections of this Chapter. Expenditures by the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Fisheries are assumed to be directly consumed by 
farmers. The distributor for this is the farming occupation group as 
specified for the ASSET model. Housing consists of housing grants and 
housing assistance provided through the Housing Corporation. It is 
CHAPTER SIX GOVERNoENT SPENDING BY HClJSEHJLO INCOM:: GROUP 331. 
imputed to households using the Housing Corporation eligibility rules as 
a guide. Census data on race provide a rough guide as to the pattern of 
consumption of special Maori programmes, which are mainly administered by 
the Department of Maori Affairs. 
Table 6F.3 below illustrates the estimated distribution of 
miscellaneous government expenditures. 
Table €F .3 
ESTIMATED DISTRIBUTI{)Ij OF MISCELLANEOUS GOVERNt-E:NT EXPENDITURES 
IN 1981/82 
Farm Exp: Maori Affairs 
Household Ag. and Fish. & Housinga Total 
Market Income 
------------- ------------- -----------------($p.a.) ($M) % ($M) % ($M) % 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------Less Than $250 4.6 2.7 3.8 3.9 8.4 3.1 
$250-( $3,950) 5.0 2.9 4.6 4.8 9. 6 3.6 
$3,950-( $9, 750) 30.8 18.0 6.3 6.5 37.1 13.9 
$9,750-($13,450) 17.3 10.1 7.1 7. 4 24.4 9. 1 
$13,450-($16,900) 21.4 12.5 8.7 9.0 30.1 11.3 
$16,900-($20,250) -13.8 8.1 10.0 10.4 23.8 8.9 
$20,250-($24,200) 16.9 9.9 10.7 11.1 27.6 10.3 
$24,200-($29,200) 24.1 14.1 12.3 12.7 36.4 13.6 
$29,200-($36,650) 15.0 8.8 14.8 15.4 29.8 11.2 
$36,650 and over 22.0 12.9 18.0 18.7 40.0 15.0 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------Total 170.9 100.0 96.3 100.0 267.2b 100.0 
Notes: a) Direct expenditures by Maori Affairs total $21.5 million and 
housing expenditures total $74.8 million. b) Total miscellaneous is 
$293.6 million and 95 percent of this ($279 million) is allocated. 
The $11.8 million not covered here is considered to be a general 
expenditure item. Sources: ASSET, 1981/82 Household Survey data 
aggregated to the total private household population based on the 1981 
Census. 
The estimated distribution of miscellaneous government expenditures 
is quite different from the distribution of the major expenditures 
analysed in other sections of this Chapter. It appears that the share of 
these expenditures consumed by low-income households are very small. 
This result is not surprising since expenditures on housing assistance, 
for example, are not targetted to low incomes. This justifies a more 
rigorous analysis of miscellaneous expenditures at some future date. 
CHAPTER SIX GOVERNMENT SPENDING BY HOUSEHOLD INCOME GROUP 332. 
G. CONCLUSION PRIVATE HOUSEHOLD CONSUMPTION OF GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES 
Three major conclusions stand out when the expenditure side of the 
budget is analysed in the context of Stages One and Two. They are: 
1) The money-income shares of total central government non-market 
expenditures are distributed in a U-shaped pattern, with household 
income deciles at the top and bottom ends consuming the larger 
shares. 
2) The share attributed to national-superannuitant households is 
markedly greater than their share of either households or of the 
population of private household occupants. One-adult and two-adult 
national-superannuitant households are estimated to consume 26.1 
percent of actual government current expenditure but only represent 
11.9 percent of the total population occupying private households. 
3) When generalised over the entire population of private households, 
the pattern that emerges is that any redistribution which takes 
place when government spending is taken into account is from 
households with children to childless households •. 
The Stage One and Stage Two results are analysed further in Section 
G.l below. Section G.2 discusses how they might differ if a Stage Three 
or Stage Four general equilibrium approach to assess incidence was 
adopted and if other refinements were made. Section G.3 compares the 
results with overseas studies. 
G.l: Results of Stages One and Two 
This section summarises the distribution of government expenditures 
based on the Stage One and Stage Two approaches. Recall that, according 
to the Stage One approach, only government expenditures which appeared to 
affect households directly are included. The Stage Two approach attempts 
to allocate all central government current non-market expenditure to the 
New Zealand population which is resident in private households. 
The main contribution of these approaches is that household 
consumption of government-provided goods is estimated, based on the 
relevant data. Unlike the treatment of payments to central government in 
Chapter Five, the approach in Chapter Six does not consider the extent to 
which the economic effect of a government expenditure transaction is 
different from its impact effect. 
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G.l.a: Share of Direct Government Expenditure Consumed By Household 
In come Group 
Table 6G.l summarises the distribution of government direct (Stage 
One) expenditures, tabulated by market-income groups. Column H shows the 
shareof total direct government expenditures consumed by households in 
each income group. 1his is compared with the share of households in each 
income group (Column I) and the distribution of the occupants of private 
households (COlumn J). 
Table 6G.l 
STAGE Ot£ : TI£ ESTIMATED DISTRIBUTI~ OF TI-E MOf'.EY-UCG£ VALUE 
OF GOVERN£NT DIRECT EXPEN)!1l.ft: IN 1981/82 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------~------Stage One Government Expenditure Comparative Fi gures 
Household 
Market 
Income 
($ p. a.) 
Direct Govnt Distri- Private 
Monetary Direct Private Total Govnt bution of H'hold 
Benefits Subsidy Goods Direct Expend H'holds Occupant 
Amnt Dist Amnt Dist Amnt Dist Amnt Dist 
A 8 C 0 E . F G H I J 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------$M % $M % $M % $M % % % 
Less 1han $250 654 23.3 6 2.3 194 7.4 854 15.0 10.0 6.2 
$250-( $3,950) 602 21.5 7 2.7 183 6.9 792 13.9 10.0 5.8 $3,950-( $9,750) 410 14.6 26 10.1 236 9.0 672 11.8 10.0 . 8.1 
$9,750-($13,450) 213 7.6 20 7.8 219 8.3 452 7.9 10.0 9.2 
$13,450-($16,900) 194 6.9 24 9.4 260 9.9 478 8.4 10.0 10.8 
$16,900-($20,250) 162 5.8 25 9.8 274 10.4 461 8.1 10.0 11.1 
$20,250-($24,200) 123 4.4 31 12.1 283 10.7 437 7.7 10.0 11.8 
$24,200-($29,200) 149 5.3 37 14.5 273 10.4 459 8.1 10.0 11.4 
$29,200-($36,650) 134 4.8 34 13.3 280 10.6 448 7.9 10.0 11.7 
$36,650 and over 162 5.8 46 18.0 433 16.4 641 11.2 10.0 14.0 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------Total 2803 100.0 256 100.0 2635 100.0 5694 100.0 100.0 100.0 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------Source: See text for derivation. 
Total government direct expenditures are consumed in the greatest 
proportion by the three lowest household-market-income deciles. As shown 
by Column H, this 30 percent of households is estimated to consume 40.7 
percent of government-provided direct goods and services. This share is 
much greater than the 20.1 percent share of private-household occupants 
who reside in households in the three lower income brackets. 
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Direct monetary benefits consist of national superannuation, all 
other social welfare income support (including the family benefit) and 
Supplementary Minimum Price payments to farmers. They are distributed 
most in favour of the low-income groups. Nearly 60 percent of monetary 
benefits are consumed by the 30 percent of households in the three lowest 
income groups. 
Direct subsidies are consumed in the greatest proportion by the four 
highest-income groups. Direct government subsidies include subsidies to 
farmers, subsidies under the private sector employment scheme, milk 
subsidies, as well as subsidies on long-distance and urban travel. 
Government-provided private goods seem to be more evenly spread 
through the private household population than the other major expenditure 
items. Private goods include the components of education and health 
where a specific beneficiary can be identified (administration is 
excluded from each). Also included are expenditures by Agriculture and 
Fisheries which have a direct benefit to farmers, Maori Affairs 
expenditures which benefit Maoris and expenditures by the Housing 
Corporation which have an identifiable beneficiary. 
G.l.b: Share of Total Government Expenditures Consumed by Household 
Income Group 
Stage Two takes the view that ultimately households are the 
consumers of everything that the government provides. All 1981/82 
central government expenditures (as defined in the NZSNA income and 
outlay accounts) are allocated by household income group. These 
expenditures include government goods and services which are only 
indirectly consumed by households. Indirect consumption can arise 
because households own market-place enterprises which initially consume 
government-provided goods and services. For example, police surveillance 
of an industrial plant benefits the households who own the plant (as well 
as those who work at the plant). Another way in which households 
ultimately consume government "indirect" expenditures is when they 
consume privately-produced products which are subsidised by the 
government. 
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Table 6G.2 
STAGE TWO: 11-£ ESTIMATED DISTRIBUTI~ OF TOTAL GOVERI+£NT C~ENT 
EXPEND!~: ~-UCOt-E VALl£ BY If\COME GROUP IN 1981/82 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------~---t-busehold Social Collective 
Market Welfare Government Subsidies Interest Total 
Income Group Benefits Expend realth Educ- (includes and Govnt 
($ p.a.) (excludes 
SWS) (Case 1) (Case 1) at ion SWS) Other Expend 
A 8 c 0 E F G 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------$ Million 
Less Than $250 648 101 152 52 16 18 987 
$250-( $3,950) 596 124 146 37 18 31 952 
$3,950-( $9,750) 371 168 132 89 71 75 906 
$9,750-($13,450) 191 195 113 101 49 53 702 
$13,450-($16,900) 167 233 122 133 60 64 779 
$16,900-($20,250) 144 269 118 159 53 59 802 
$20,250-($24,200) 102 287 116 169 63 65 802 
$24,200-($29,200) 118 329 109 168 81 81 886 
$29,200-($36,650) 114 398 111 176 68 85 952 
$36,650 and over 134 484 138 209 93 158 1216 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------~--Total 2586 2588 1257 1293 572 688 8984 
. 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Proportion of Total (%) 
Less Than $250 25.1 3.9 12.1 4.0 2.8 2.6. 11.0 
$250-( $3,950) 23.0. 4.8 11.6 2.9 3.1 4.5 10.6 
$3,950-( $9,750) 14.3 6.5 10.5 6.9 12.4 10.9 10.1 
$9,750-($13,450) 7.4 7.5 9.0 7.8 8.6 7. 7 7.8 
$13,450-($16,900) 6.5 9.0 9.7 10.3 10.5 9.3 8.7 
$16,900-($20,250) 5.6 10.4 9.4 12.3 9.3 8.6 8.9 
$20,250-($24,200) 3.9 11.1 9.2 13.1 11.0 9.4 8.9 
$24,200-($29,200) 4.6 12.7 8.7 13.0 14.2 11.8 9.9 
$29,200-( $36,650) 4.4 15.4 8.8 13.6 11.9 12.3 10.6 
$36,650 and over 5.2 18.7 11.0 16.2 16.2 22.9 13.5 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Source: See text for derivation. 
Table 6G.2 summarises the results derived in this Chapter based on 
the Stage Two assumptions. Social welfare benefits (Column A) are 
distributed most in favour of the low income groups while interest and 
other (Column F) are distributed most in favour of the highest income 
group. Although health (Column C) is the most evenly distributed 
government expenditure, it is also the second-most favourable to 
low-income groups. 
CHAPTER SIX GOVERN£NT SPEJII)ING BY HaJSEt-0..0 INCOME GRCl.JP 336. 
CHART 6.7 
GOVERN£NT EXPENJITI.RE SHARES TO HClJSEHJLD MARKET INCCJ.£ DECILES 
STAGE 0~ AKl STAGE TWO DEFINITIONS COt-PARED 
G.l.c: 
Share (%) 20 ~-------------------, 
15 
10 
5 
Sources: Tables 6G.1,6G.2 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Household ~.arket Income Grouos 
Stage Two 
Stage One 
(Ananged in Deciles Going From LO\~est Harket· Income to Highest) 
Comparing the Share of Direct and Total Government Spending by 
Income Class 
As Chart 6.7 shows, the U-shaped pattern of the money-income shares 
of total government expenditure by household income decile emerges 
regardless of the different approaches in Stage One and Stage Two. It 
also emerges when assumptions about the consumption of collective goods 
and about the value of health to the elderly are varied. Many of the 
assumptions used to impute a money-income value of government 
expenditures to household income groups are necessarily rough. The fact 
that similar results are achieved when a range of assumptions is adopted, 
however, suggests that the approach is robust enough to give an 
indication of the general pattern of consumption of central government 
non-market production. 
Although the U-shaped pattern holds even when the assumptions 
applied to impute expenditures by household income group are varied, the 
distribution to low-income households is more pronounced in Stage One 
than Stage Two (see Table 6G.l (Column H), Table 6G.2 (Column G) and 
Chart 6. 7). In the case of Stage One, the bottom three income deciles 
are each found to receive a larger share of direct central government 
expenditure in 1981/82 than the other seven income groups. The next 
highest share (11.3 percent) is that of the highest income group, 
although remember that there is a larger number of occupants per 
household in this category. 
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The results of the Stage One approach show that the bottom 30 
percent households (representing 20.1 percent of the occupants of private 
households) receive 40.7 percent of the money-income benefit from direct 
government expenditures. In contrast, when all government expenditures 
are taken into account in the context of Stage Two, the lowest 30 percent 
of households receive only a 31.7 percent share (see Table 6G.2). 
The main difference between the Stage One and Stage Two approach is 
the inclusion of indivisible or collective government expenditures. A 
variety of assumptions about the distribution of the money-income value 
of collective expenditures are tested in Section B of this Chapter. The 
results show that regardless of the assumptions made, the inclusion of 
collective expenditures in the analysis results in much less 
redistribution in favour of the low-income groups than indicated by the 
Stage One results. This conclusion affirms the decision to analyse the 
entire expenditure side of the budget when attempting to assess its 
influence on household income distribution. 
G.l.d: Individual Stage Two Expenditures Compared 
As graphically illustrated by Chart 6.8, social welfare expenditure 
is strongly redistributive towards low-income groups while the shares of 
collective and education expenditures are larger for the higher income 
groups. 
CHART 6.8 
Tl£ SHARE CF GOVERNENT ~ITl..RES TO I-O.JSEHl.J) INOJv1E DECILES: 
FCXJR LARGEST EXPEN:liTURES COtoPARED WITH TOTAL GOVERNtENT EXPEM)!TURE 
(Stage Two Approach) 
-----------------------~--------------------------------------------------1 
Share (\) zs -,..::::------------------
20 
lS 
10 
5 
Source: Table 6G.Z 
l 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Collective 
Expenditure 
. . Househ~ld Market Income Groups 
(Arranged m DeCJ.les Gomg From Lm-1est Market Income to Highest) 
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The degree of equality of distribution varies depending on whether 
it is analysed per household or per person, as the two diagrams in Chart 
6.9 show. For example, when health expenditure is analysed by household, 
its distribution is near the line of equality (see left-hand Chart). 
When account is taken of the number of occupants in private households, 
health expenditure is more heavily redistributed towards those on lower 
incomes (the line of equality bows out to the left, see right-hand Chart). 
CHART 6.9 
RELATIVE EQUALITY OF MAIN GOVER.t+ENT EXPEMliTURES (STAGE TWO) 
LORENZ DISTRIBUTION BY HJUSEHOLD AN) BY OCClPANTS OF PRIVATE 
1-WSEHl..DS a:JtPARED 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------By f-busehold By Person 
J.OO r----------------~=- Perceru: 100 ..---------------~ 
Source: T~1es 6C.8,6G.Z 
~ m ~ ~ ~ ~ ro ~ ~ ~ 
Puam. of Houleilalcis '9y Market rna:.. (O.U.tiw) 
of Share 
of lobney-90 
IIICCIIIe 
Value or 
~end- 80 
l'tllnl 
(Omulatiw) 
Source: T~les 6C.8,6G.Z 
6.Z lZ.O 20.1 29.3 ~.1 S1.Z 63.0 74.4 86.1 100.1 
PerCmc. a£ ~ts By Private-!busellold Marlce1: :rnc:cn. 
(Cizulaaw) 
Education and collective government expenditures are both more 
equally distributed when their incidence is analysed by private household 
occupants. When analysed by household, these two expenditures are both 
clearly unequally distributed with those in the bottom market-income 
deciles estimated to receive a share of education and collective 
expenditure which is considerably less than their share of the household 
population. When account is taken of the average number of household 
occupants, the picture changes. For social welfare benefits, the Lorenz 
diagrams for households and household occupants do not differ so much. 
The Lorenz distribution by person is bowed slightly more to the left than 
the distribution by household. 
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G.l. e: The Expenditure Benefit of Stage Two Expenditure 
Another standard for analysing the extent of redistribution is the 
measure of the effective benefit of government expenditures. The 
effective benefit is defined as the ratio of the money-income value of 
government expenditures consumed by households compared to their income. 
Table 6G.3 shows the effective benefit using four different income 
measures. In all four cases, the effective benefit for the three lowest 
groups is significantly greater than the benefit for the other groups. 
As the final two columns (Columns E and F) of Table 6G.3 show, the lowest 
household market income groups are also estimated to consume a larger 
money-income value per household and per household occupant than most of 
those on higher incomes. 
Table 6G.3 
ST~ TWO GOVERNENT EXPENDITURE: EFFECTIVE BENEFIT RATES AND 
At-N.lAL AVERAGE toO£Y-INCOt-E VALLES_ IN 1981/82 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Household 
Market 
Income 
($ p.a.) 
Stage Two Central Government 
Expenditure as a Proportion of: 
Market 
Income 
A 
Total 
Income 
B 
H'hold 
Expend 
c 
Stage 
Two 
·Final 
Inccmea 
0 
Average Money-Income 
Value of Government 
Expenditure 
Per 
Household 
E 
Per 
Person 
F 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Effective Benefit (%) $ p.a. $ p.a. 
Less Than $250 (-)440o.ob 170.0 150.0 122.6 9580 5114 
$250-( $3,950) 550.0 130.0 120.0 109.3 9150 5318 
$3,950-( $9,750) 120.0 83.0 83.0 73.4 8800 3595 
$9,750-($13,450) 57.0 50.0 56.0 50.2 6820 2472 
$13,450-($16,900) 49.0 45 . 0 52.0 46.7 7530 2332 
$16,900-($20,250) 41.0 38.0 45.0 42.6 7710 2345 
$20, 250-( $24, 200) . 35.0 33.0 43.0 37.8 7790 2191 
$24,200-($29,200) 31.0 30.0 41.0 36.2 8520 2510 
$29,200-($36,650) 27.0 27.0 36.0 33.8 9150 2630 
$36,650 and over 24.0 23.0 39.0 30.6 11800 2808 
Average (%) 46.0 41.0 53.0 46.9 8680 2900 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Notes: a) See Chapter Seven for derivation of Final Income. b) Market income 
is negative for this group. Sources: Chapter Three income and expenditure; 
Chapter Six, central government expenditure; Chapter Seven, Stage Two Final 
Income. 
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CHART 6.10 
EFFECTIVE GOVERNENT EXPEJIDITIJRE: TOTAL GOVERN-ENT EXPENOiiURE 
AS A PERCENT OF TOTAL INCOt-E, ADJUSTED ~ INCOME (STAGE TWO 
DEFINITION), AND ADJUSTED G.O.P. (STAGE THREE DEFINITION) 
Effective 30 ~---+--~ ...... ---------------, 
Benefit 
(9;) 
70 
60 
50 
~0 
340. 
30 
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t·larket Income 
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0 
Source: Tables 1E.l,6G.2 
1 2 3 4 5 6 10 
HouseholJ Market Income Groups 
(Arranged in Deciles Going From Lol·rest Market Income to Highest) 
Total Income 
Adjusted G.D.P. 
(Stage 3) 
Chart 6.10 graphs Columns 8 and D of Table 6G.3 and the effective 
benefit based on the broader Stage Three income definition. In all cases 
the pattern of effective benefit is similar, with the low income groups 
shown to consume a considerably greater proportion of government spending 
in relation to their income, no matter how income is defined. 
G.l. f: Direct and Total Government Expenditures Analysed By Household 
~ 
The results for Stages One and Two are tabulated by household type 
in Tables 6G.4 and 6G.5 on the following pages. The most significant 
finding is that two-adult, national-superannuitant households receive a 
greater money-income benefit from government expenditure than any other 
household type. Two-adult, national-superannuitant households consume 
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22.1 percent of Stage One expenditure compared with 16.9 percent of Stage 
Two government non-market expenditures. 
According to the results, both one-adult and two-adult 
national-superannuitant households end up with a share of government 
spending which is estimated to be considerably larger than their share of 
the population. These households only represent 23.2 percent of 
households and 11.9 percent of persons in private households but are 
estimated to account for 34.8 percent of government outlays in Stage One 
and 26.1 percent in Stage Two. 
Table 6G.4 
STAGE 0~: GOVERI+ENT DIRECT EXPei)ITt.JRE -
ESTIMATED DISTRIBUTION BY I-OJS8-IOLD TYPE IN 1981/82 
f-busehold Type 
1 Adult 2 Adults 2 Adults 
with 
O'tildren 
3 or More 1 Adult All 
Nat Oth Nat Oth 1 
Sup Sup 
Adults with House-
2 3+ No With 
O'lil- O'til-
dren dren 
O'tld'n halos 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Money-Income Amount : $Million 
Monetary Benefitsa 540 86 943 92 87 150 177 203 326 199 2803 
Govt Prvte Goodsb 180 46 306 141 185 403 545 223 499 107 2635 
Direct SubsidiesC 3 8 10 38 18 31 38 41 64 5 256 
Total 723 140 1259 271 290 584 760 467 889 311 5694 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Monetary Benefits 
Govt Prvte Goods 
Direct Subsidies 
Total Expend.(%) 
H'holds by Type 
Total Persons in 
Private H'holds 
Percentage Distribution of: 
19.3 3.1 33.6 3.3 3.1 5.4 6.3 7.2 11.6 
6.8 1.7 11.6 5.4 7.0 15.3 20.7 8.5 18.9 
1.1 3.1 3.9 14.9 7.0 12.1 14.9 16.0 25.0 
12.7 2.5 22.1 4.8 5.1 10.2 13.3 8.2 15.6 
Comparative Distributions: 
10.8 8.7 12.4 15.0 7.8 12.6 10.4 8.3 10.3 
3.6 2.9 8.3 10.0 7.9 16.9 19.0 9.4 18.7 
7.1 100.0 
4.1 100.0 
2.0 100.0 
5.5 100.0 
3.7 100.0 
3.4 100.0 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
a) Includes national superannuation, social welfare cash benefits ana 
supplementary minimum prices. b) Includes health, education and other. 
c) Excludes SMPs. Sources: See text for derivation. 
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Table 6G.s 
STAGE 'TWO: MOtEY-Il'CrH: VALLE OF TOTAL GOVE:Rt+ENT EXPEKIITURE -
ESTIMATED DISTRIBUTION BY HOUSEHOLD TYPE IN 1981/82 
f-busehold Type 
342. 
1 Aau1t 2 Adults 2 Adults 
with 
O'lildren 
3 or More 1 Adult All 
Nat Oth Nat Oth l 
Sup Sup 
Adults with House-
2 3+ No With 
O"lil- O'lil-
dren dren 
O"lld'n holds 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------A. Amount $ Million 
Social Welfare Benefits 
(excluding SlvPS) 535 79 933 65 73 122 132 172 277 198 2586 
Collective Expend. 91 129 225 424 210 396 297 334 423 59 2588 
realth 145 36 234 103 93 162 162 114 179 29 1257 
Education 2 13 8 57 71 251 387 93 336 75 1293 
Subsidies 12 19 29 81 41 74 95 84 129 8 572 
Interest & Other 45 28 91 91 58 84 82 98 101 10 688 
------------------------------------------------------------Total Govt Expend 830 304 1520 821 546 1089 1155 895 1445 379 8984 
8. Average Money-Income value of Government EXpenditures EXpressed in $boos 
Per Year: 
By t-busehold 7.5 3.4 11.9 5.3 6. 7 8.3 10.7 10.4 13.5 10.0 8.7 
By Occupant 7.5 3.4 5.9 2.6 2.3 2.1 2.0 3.1 2.5 3.6 2.9 
~- Propor~ion ol To~ai ~%} 
Social Welfare Benefits 
(excluding SMPS) 20. 7 3.1 36.1 2.5 2.8 4.7 5.1 6.6 10.7 7. 7 100.0 
Collective Expend. 3.5 5.0 8. 7 16.4 8.1 15.3 11.5 12.9 16.3 2.3 100.0 
!-Jea1th 11.6 2.9 18.6 8.1 7.4 12.9 12.9 9.1 14.2 2.3 100.0 
Education 0.2 1.0 0.6 4.4 5.5 19.4 29.9 7.2 26.0 5.8 100.0 
Subsidies 2.1 3.4 5.1 14.2 7.2 12.9 16.6 14.7 22.5 1.4 100.0 
Interest & Othe~ 6.5 4.0 13.3 13.3 8.4 12.2 11.9 14.3 14.7 1.4 100.0 
-------------------------------------------------------------Total Govt Expend. 9.2 3.4 16.9 9.1 6.1 12.1 12.9 10.0 16.1 4.2 100.0 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Source: For derivation, see Chapter Six, Sections A through F. 
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In contrast to national-superannuitant households, two-adult 
households with-one-child do not consume a share of government 
expenditure which is equal to their share of the population. This group 
makes up 7.8 percent of total private households and accounts for 7.9 
percent of the occupants of private households. Under Stage One 
conditions, its share of 1981/82 direct government expenditures is 5.1 
percent. Its share of total government expenditures under Stage Two 
conditions is 6.1 percent. A major factor explaining the small share of 
government expenditure consumed by two-adult households with-one-child is 
that this group consumes the smallest share of monetary benefits. 
Childless two-adult households consume a share of government 
expenditure that is nearly twice as great under Stage Two conditions as 
under Stage One conditions. This household type covers 15.0 percent of 
private households and includes 10.0 percent of the population of private 
household occupants. Its share of Stage One direct government 
expenditure is only 4.8 percent while its share of Stage Two government 
expenditure is 9.1 percent. This descrepancy is largely explained by the 
inclusion of collective goods in the Stage Two definition of government 
expenditure. 
It is possible to see why childless, "young" (non-national-
superannuitant) households could be perceived in two completely different 
ways. On the one hand, the Stage One results suggest that young 
childless households receive a relatively small share of the direct 
benefits provided by the government. In total, young childless 
households represent 22.3 percent of the people occupying private 
households but only consume 15.5 percent of government-provided goods and 
services according to the Stage One definitions. It appears that their 
taxes are used to provide government goods to others. 
On the other hand, the Stage Two results suggest that the economic 
status of young childless (one-, two- and three-or-more adult) households 
benefit from government expenditure in proportion to their share of the 
population. This group is estimated to consume 22.5 percent of 
government-Provided goods and services in relation to other groups. The 
differences arise between the Stage One and Stage Two results because 
childless young households consume a large share of government-provided 
collective goods. These include goods such as police, justice and 
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defence - the expenditures broadly associated with the protection of 
private property. 
In all, there are four household types whose share of government 
expenditure is greater than their share of the population of private 
household occupants under the Stage One conditions. They are: 1) 
one-adult, national-superannuitant households; 2) one-adult, other 
households: 3) two-adult, national-superannuitant households; and, 4) 
one-adult households with children. 
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Under the Stage Two conditions, there are five household types whose 
share of expenditure exceed their share of the population. They include 
the four types mentioned for Stage One as well as childless three-adult 
households. 
Of all the household types whose share of government expenditure is 
greater than their share of the private-household occupants, only one 
type includes children. The clear pattern that emerges is that any 
redistribution of money income which takes place because of government 
activity is from households with children to childless households. 
Another way of analysing the results is to calculate the average 
money-income value of annual government spending by person and by 
household for each household type. These calculations are illustrated by 
Block B, Table 6G.5. As is the case with the rest of the results, the 
numbers themselves must be seen as indicative only. They do, however, 
give a perspective on the relative size of government expenditures 
consumed by household type. 
In 1981/82, single-adult, national- superannuitant households are 
estimated to consume an annual average money-income value of Stage Two 
government expenditures equal to $7,500 a year per occupant. Occupants 
of two-adult, national-superannuitant households consumed government 
expenditures with a money-income value of $5,900 each. Childless, 
two-adult, non-national-superannuitant households consumed $2,600 worth 
of government expenditures. In comparison, households-with-children 
consumed only between $2,000 and $2,500 of government expenditure per 
occupant. 
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G.l. g: Limitations of Stage One and Staqe Two Approaches 
As has been acknowledged throughout this thesis, the Stage One and 
Stage Two approaches suffer from a number of important limitations which 
must be taken into account when interpreting the results. There are some 
which pertain explicitly to the expenditure side of the budget which 
require further discussion. They centre on: 1) the use of eligibility 
requirements to identify the consumers of government-provided goods; 2) 
the measurement of government output in relation to expenditure on 
inputs; 3) lack of an equivalency scale for analysing the results; 
and 4) failure to take account of the economic incidence of government 
expenditures. 
G.l.g.i: Results Based on Eligibility Requirements 
Eligibility criteria are the main basis used to estimate the pattern 
of consumption of government expenditures in Chapter Six. These criteria 
indicate the policymaker's objectives for particular expenditure 
functions. By using eligibility criteria, the approach in Chapter Six 
neglects to take adequate account of such things as the take-up rate for 
the family benefit, the possibility of insufficient usage of health care 
by low income families and so on. 
For example, LeGrand (1983) finds that the United Kingdom's 
National Health Service is equally distributed in the same sense as 
health appears to be equally distributed in New Zealand. That is, those 
in the low-income groups consume about as much public health care as 
those in the high income groups. But Le Grand believes: 
" .•• this does not take account of the fact that the 
poor suffer more ill health than the rich; so per 
person ill, they receive less". (LeGrand, 1983, p.6). 
In the end, this framework for analysing the influence of the 
government budget is about what actually occurs, not what the policymaker 
thinks is supposed to happen (or wishes would happen~). A significant 
aspect of social and economic behaviour is that the simple availability 
of a government-provided good does not guarantee that access to the good 
is the same for everyone. Nevertheless, while the Stage One and Stage 
Two approaches do not measure the degree of access by households, the 
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research framework could easily be respecified to incorporate the results 
of an analysis of the actual use made of government-provided goods. In 
some cases it might be difficult to find an appropriate method of 
measuring the degree of accessibility. In ather cases, such as 
education, information exists about expenditure by geographical 
location. Here, a detailed analysis of the distribution of income by 
region might yield more meaningful results. 
G.l.e.ii: Measurement of Government Output 
An important area of further research is conceptual analysis of the 
value of government output of goods and services as distinguished from 
government expenditure on providing the goods and services. Information 
about the amounts spent by the government on education, health and other 
services does not say anything about the level of the service rendered 
since the data are only for inputs. Lacking are analogs to the physical 
units found in the real sector (tonnes of coal, number of refrigerators) 
since government non-market output consists largely of services, not 
goods. 
Also lacking is the market price information available for services 
supplied in the private sector. In the NZSNA accounts of central 
government economic activity, the value of non-market output is 
understated when compared with that of market output because of the 
omission of any surplus or measure of fixed capital from the non-market 
account. 
Measures of the value of government outputs could have a number of 
implications for the results. In particular, it might be shown that 
health output has a greater value than the cost of inputs to produce 
health. On the other hand, another government service (an inefficient 
one) could be found to cost the taxpayer more than the value of its 
output. Again one of the strengths of a quantitative approach like this 
is that an improved technique to value government output could be linked 
to it. 
G.I.g.iii: Equivalency Scales 
An attempt has been made to present the results of this analysis of 
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the budgets' redistributive influence in a large variety of ways. No 
attempt has been made, however, to adjust the results to take account of 
the variations in individual budget constraints. An individual's income 
and expenditure level may be determined by factors such as the 
individual's age, the composition of the household where the person 
resides (including the number, relationship, and ages of the other 
occupants) and so on. Equivalency scales are intended to generalise 
information about these factors so that results like those in this 
Chapter can be adjusted to reflect the different budget constraints of 
the population that is analysed. 
If an equivalency scale were to be applied to the results 
illustrated by Table 6G.5, it is likely to indicate slightly greater 
redistribution by the government to households with children. This is 
because the budget constraints of children tend to be lower than those 
for adults. Therefore, the money-income value .of government expenditures 
is probably worth more when distributed to children than it is when 
distributed to adults. The application of an equivalency scale might 
also indicate greater redistribution in favour of national 
superannuitants for much the same reason. 
G.l.g.iv: Economic Incidence of Expenditure Measures 
This thesis uses available data to identify the impact or statutory 
effects of the expenditure side of the budget. Whereas the Stage Two 
approach uses the results of the latest incidence literature to analyse 
the revenue side of the budget (see Chapter Five), Chapter Six's main 
concern is to identify the "initial" consumers of government 
expenditures. This approach was adopted because few incidence results 
exist which are appropriate for the analysis of government expenditures. 
As Chapter Two and Four discuss, HMM and SWF general equilibrium studies 
explicitly designed to measure budget incidence often fail to incorporate 
information about the economic incidence of government expenditures. 
To identify the initial recipients of subsidies and collective 
goods, assumptions were adopted about what the economic effects of these 
government expenditures might be. The scarcity of general equilibrium 
research in this area however, means that the assumptions are only very 
roughly based on economic analysis. 
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Section G.2 below briefly discusses how a further study could be 
specified to measure expenditure incidence. 
G.2 Expenditure Incidence: Stages Three and Four 
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Looking specifically at the expenditure side of the budget, two 
components were distinguished by Mclure (1974), expenditure incidence and 
benefit incidence. Musgrave. (1959, pp. 213-215) made a similar 
distinction. Expenditure incidence is an assessment of how government 
spending affects private incomes and benefit incidence is an assessment 
of who receives the benefits of government services. Total incidence, 
then, is: 
"The burden (and benefits) of taxes used to: finance public 
activity, the benefits of public services and the 
redistribution of income resulting from the changes in 
relative factor rewards and product prices induced by the 
shift of purchasing power from the private to the public 
sector. For convenience, we can refer to these three effects 
as tax, benefit and expenditure incidence, respectively." 
(Mclure, 1974, p.7). 
Meerman (1978) found Mclure's basic tripartite distinction was 
confusing for several reasons. First, the benefits from public services 
have private income equivalents. As commonly defined, there is a 
money-income return from publicly provided goods such as transfer 
payments, rent allowances, and public medical care received free or at 
subsidy. Certainly these items are regarded as private income by their 
recipients. In light of this reasoning, Mclure's distinction between 
expenditure incidence and benefit incidence defines income rather too 
r i gorously as solely returns to factors of production and, on the 
spending side, solely the goods and services which those returns can t 
purchase. 
Second, it is very common, among economists, to use "expenditure 
incidence" to refer to benefit incidence alone or to benefit incidence 
plus Mclure expenditure incidence. This leads to unnecessary confusion, 
and a great deal of explanation. 
Finally, the common practice of assessing aggregate tax incidence 
(the amount of change in household income as a result of taxation) is to 
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define aggregate household tax payments as exactly equal in value to tax 
receipts. Some studies of "expenditure incidence'', on the other hand, 
deal with the possibility that the value of expenditure to a beneficiary 
(and hence, aggregate expenditure incidence) may be different from its 
resource cost. 
This practice may give the impression that only expenditure 
measures have effects on relative prices, on techniques and on the 
composition of output. But taxes have similar effects. In addition, 
both taxes and expenditures may contain an element of excess burden or 
consumer surplus. 
Recall from Chapter Two that Meerman deals with these problems by 
keeping the Mclure tri partite distinction, but defines the contents under 
the heading of tax, expenditure and benefit incidence, differently. 
Basically, tax and expenditure incidence are defined where the effects on 
relative prices, techniques and the composition of output are assumed to 
be zero. 
The Stage Three methodology is consistent with Meerman's definition 
of expenditure incidence. According to this approach, the value of 
government-provided goods and services to those cons~ming them would, by 
assumption, be equal to the amount the governments spend on providing 
them. This is similar to the approach in Stage Two. The difference 
between a Stage Three and a Stage Two approach is that the Stage Three 
approach would specify the determinants of the demand and supply of 
government-provided goods, whereas Stage Two only attempts to identify 
the consumers of government-provided goods. For example, an aspect of 
the supply of government goods which has direct relevance to households 
is the salaries of public servants. 
Greene, Neenan and Scott (1974, p.30) point out that total salary 
payments could overstate the net gain to public employees from these 
outlays. Under competitive conditions, where resources are assumed 
always to be fully employed, it follows that, say, a police officer -would 
have been employed in the absence of the outlay for police salaries, 
although possibly at a different wage. "Only the difference between his 
wage, given the actual outlay, and what he would have received without 
the public outlay can be properly called his source of income benefit" 
[from the government]. 
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The SWF models could be applied to analyse expenditures using the 
Stage Three approach. Most are specified to measure both the supply and 
demand effects of government budget transactions, under competitive 
conditions where there is full employment. To date, however, the SWF 
models have not treated government expenditure comprehensively. The 
point of the Meerman argument is that if it makes theoretical sense to 
treat tax incidence using a general equilibrium approach and assuming 
RITO incidence to be zero, then it also makes sense to treat expenditure 
incidence in the same way. 
Perhaps of greater importance to policymakers is knowing the effects 
of government expenditure on relative prices, technology and output in 
non-competitive markets where there is no full employment. Here a Stage 
Four approach would yield relevant results. Before this issue can be 
treated in a rigorous fashion, however, further work is required to 
define government expenditures under Stage Three conditions using the SWF 
approach. When it becomes possible to evaluate the effects of government 
expenditures when RPTO incidence is zero, then it makes sense to develop 
models which relax the restrictive assumptions of perfect competition and 
full employment. 
G.3: Comparing the Results With Those Derived for other Countries 
The methodology for inputing a money income value for government 
expenditures discussed in this Chapter was designed independently to 
research of a similar nature carried out overseas. A study of this type 
involves considerable detail and overseas studies tend to publish their 
results, rather than their methodology. Since there was a considerable 
amount of relevant data contained in the New Zealand Household Survey, 
the structure of the analysis in this thesis was shaped by the desire to 
make the best use of this valuable data source. Nevertheless, even 
though the approach in this Chapter was structured independently of 
overseas research, the results have an uncanny similarity to studies for 
Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom. 
The general conclusion which emerges from this quantitative study 
and those carried out overseas is that the shares of government 
expenditures are more or less equally distributed when the households are 
grouped into income groups. 
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When the expenditures are compared with household income to 
calculate effective benefit rates, the effective benefit tends to be 
greatest the lower the income. In other words, the distribution of 
government expenditures appears to be pro-low-income. This general 
result is gained from studies by Gillespie (1956, 1966), Musgrave et al 
(1974), Reynolds and Smolensky (1977), and O'Higgins and Ruggles (June 
and September 1981). 
Turning to the most recent analysis of government spending by 
household-income group, O'Higgins and Ruggles (June and Sept. 1981), 
analyse total government expenditure in the United Kingdom in 1971 and 
the United States in 1970. They find that total government expenditure 
shares are nearly equally distributed by household-income decile in the 
United Kingdom while the United States data show a slight tendency for 
households in the bottom twenty percent to receive less than average 
shares : 
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The O'Higgins and Ruggles (OR) approach is similar to the Stage Two 
approach in this thesis where the entire government budget is analysed. 
Another U.K. study, that by the United Kingdom Central Statistical Office 
(CSO) follows an approach similar to the Stage One approach in this 
thesis. The CSO analysis of the distributional impact of U.K. public 
expenditure presents a picture which is markedly more favourable to 
lower-income deciles than that which emerges from the OR analysis of 
total government expenditure. This is similar to the difference between 
the Stage One and Stage Two results in this thesis. 
Ruggles and O'Higgins (June 1981) reached remarkably similar 
conclusions for both the United Kingdom and the Unitea States. However, 
the distribution of the various types of government expenditures 
differed. For example, while the two countries are similar in that the 
absolute value of education expenditures rises as income rises. The 
countries differ because the presence of a relatively large number of 
student households in the bottom deciles gives one element of U.S. 
education funding (higher education) a redistributive appearance not 
evident in the U.K. results. It explains why the distribution of 
educational expenditures in the Gillespie (1965) and Musgrave et al 
(1974) studies of the United States is more pro-low-income than the 
results for New Zealand. 
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Turning to health expenditure, U.S. public health expenditures are 
very much more focussed on the poor than in the British National Health 
Service. O'Higgins and Ruggles (Sept. 1981, p.320) find that U.K. health 
expenditure increases slightly with household income. Their study shows 
that the correlation between household size and income outweighs the 
greater value of the expenditures attributed to the "elderly" households 
who predominate in the bottom two deciles. As in New Zealand, the 
households occupied by elderly members of the population tend to be 
smaller. Unlike New Zealand, it appears that the expenditure in hospital 
treatment for the elderly is not great 
attributed to the lower-income groups. 
other types of care for the elderly in 
enough to increase the total share 
This may reflect the existence of 
the United Kingdom. 
According to the OR results, income maintenance expenditures in both 
the United Kingdom and the United States are of greater absolute and 
relative importance to the lower half of the household population than 
are other forms of government expenditure. This is similar to the 
results for New Zealand. The United States results, however, indicate 
the possibility of "middle class capture" with the third decile deriving 
the greatest benefit from social security and public assistance, followed 
by the second, fourth and fifth deciles. Only the top two deciles 
receive less income-maintenance than the bottom-income decile. This is 
explained by the large numbers qf students, unemployed persons without 
dependants and public hospital patients (who do not receive income 
support) in the bottom decile. In contrast to the U.S., in the U.K., 
those in the bottom decile receive the largest share of income 
maintenance and the amount declines consistently through the deciles. 
Since income maintenance has been analysed by the CSO work over a number 
of years, this may be a tribute to the assistance of such an approach to 
policymakers who wish to target income maintenance. 
In summary, then, when the results of Chapter Six are analysed by 
household income group, they tend to show that the overall pattern of 
government-provided goods and services is distributed fairly evenly to 
income groups. This same tendency is indicated by quantitative studies 
carried out in Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States. There 
are, however, differences in the pattern of distribution for different 
types of government expenditures. Finally, when the effective benefit is 
estimated, New Zealand's distribution of expenditure appears more 
redistributive in favour of low-income groups. 
C~PrrR SE~ 
CONCLUSION: AND WHERE TO GO FROM HERE 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
Everyone has an opinion about how government budget measures affect 
income distribution. These issues are extremely complex, however, if 
only because of the variety of activities governments are involved in. 
An evaluative method is required to assess the effects of tne budget 
based on available information. 
This thesis analyses budget incidence, illustrating the various 
theoretical approaches by defining four stages. The concept of budget 
incidence becomes more complex with each stage, as does the income 
concept. 
Five main conclusions emerge from the quantitative study of the 
distribution of the central government current non-market revenues and 
expenditures by household income group and household type in New Zealand 
for 1981/82. 
1) The 1981/82 central government budget does redistribute money income 
from the higher-income households to lower-income households. The 
personal income tax is the most important redistributive policy. 
2) The household types which are estimated to receive the greatest net 
benefit from the 1981/82 central government non-market budget are 
one-adult and two-adult national-superannuitant households. These 
households are the main consumers of social welfare expenditure and 
government-provided health services. 
3) Related to 2) above, when the money-income value of government 
expenditures are quantified by household type, the results show a 
redistribution from households with children to households without 
children. 
4) Priority areas for a study focussing on the effect of the budget on 
income distribution include: the personal income tax, social 
welfare, health and educational expenditure. 
5) Finally, the more theoretically comprehensive the evaluative 
approach, the less redistributive is the budget. This finding can 
only be tentative because the more theoretically consistent 
approaches, Stages Three and Four, were not carried out ·in a 
rigorous fashion. Nevertheless, it provides an argument for further 
development of the empirical general equilibrium incidence models. 
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Chapter Seven discusses the analysis which leads to the above 
conclusions. First, the quantitative results as derived in Chapters 
Three through Six are summarised in Section A. Section 8 then outlines 
some further areas of research which could be linked to the taxonomy 
developed in this thesis. Finally, Section C considers the issues 
involved in the specification of a computational general equilibrium 
model designed to analyse the effects of the government budget in 
relation to household income. The advantages of such a model are that 
economic effects of budget measures can be evaluated in a consistent 
fashion and it is possible to use the same index (household income) to 
assess distributional changes and efficiency changes. 
A. THE QUANTITATIVE RESULTS 
354 . 
This section discusses the quantitative results in relation to the 
four stages elucidated in Chapter One, Section C. Each stage progresses 
from observable household market income data to a more comprehensive 
income measure. 
Stages One and Two are accounting relationships. Recall, Stage One, 
money income including direct government transactions, is similar to 
the non-economist's view of the budget. The government is treated as an 
entity which taxes household incomes directly and provides goods with 
private benefits. Stage Two, money income adjusted for all budget 
non-market activities, broadens the definition of final household income 
to include the money-income effects of all central government current 
non-market transactions. 
Stages Three and Four are discussed as a means of illustrating some 
of the economic behavioural relationships which are important to the 
determination of budget incidence. Stage Three, broad measurement of 
household income including budget transactions, attempts to take the 
on-going economic effects of government transactions into account in the 
initial income concept. Finally, Stage Four, economic measure of budget 
incidence by household income and type, is included to illustrate some 
of the issues involved if budget incidence were to be evaluated using a 
consistent economic theory. 
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A.l: Results from Stages One and Two 
When household income is defined to take account of a money-income 
value of government budget transactions, it is distributed more equally 
than household market income. This conclusion holds in both the Stage 
One and Stage Two cases. On both of these cases, the effect of 
government current activity in 1981/82 is to reduce the share of final 
income accruing to the 50 percent of households in the upper income 
groups and increase the share of final income accruing to the 50 percent 
in the lower income groups. 
Stage One and Two quantitative results are summarised in Tables A7.1 
to A7.6, published in Appendix Seven. Looking at the final income 
distributions, the results of Stages One and Two seem very similar. 
However, as shown by a comparison of columns 0 and F in Table 7A.l below, 
the distribution of government expenditures for Stage One is quite 
- different from Stage Two. 
Table 7A.l 
PERSONAL INCOME TAX DISTRIBUTION 
COMPARED WITH DISTRIBUTION OF STAGE ONE AND STAGE TWO GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE 
(By Household Income Group for 1981/82) 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------Comparative 
Figures 
---------------Personal Stage One: Stage Two: 
Household Income Tax Gov' t Diret Total Govt H'holds 
Market Stage 1 & 2 Expenditure Expenditure House- Occu-
Income 
------------ ------------ -----------
holds pants 
Amnt Dist Amnt Dist Amnt Oist 
($ p.a.) A 8 c 0 E F G H 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------$M % $M % $M 0/ % % 10 
Less than $ 250 50 0.9 854 15.0 987 11.0 10.0 6.2 
$ 250 - ($ 3,950) 89 1.6 792 13.9 952 10.6 10.0 5.8 
$ 3,950 - ($ 9, 750) 156 2.8 672 ll.8 906 10.1 10.0 8.1 
$ 9, 750 - ($13,450) 255 4.6 452 7.9 702 7.8 10.0 9.2 
$13,450 - ($16,900) 366 6.6 478 8.4 779 8.7 10.0 10.8 
$16,900 - ($20,250) 483 8.7 461 8.1 802 8.9 10.0 11.0 
$20,250 - ( $24,200) 594 10.7 437 7.7 802 8.9 10.0 11.8 
$24,200 - ($29, 200) 777 14.0 459 8.1 886 9.9 10.0 11.4 
$29,200 - ( $36, 650) 994 17.9 448 7.9 952 10.6 10.0 11.7 
$36,650 and over 1788 32.2 641 11.2 1216 13.5 10.0 14.0 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Total 5552 100.0 5694 100.0 8984 100.0 100.0 100.0 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Sources: Appendix Tables 7.1, 7.4. 
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The main difference between the Stage One and Stage Two approaches 
is the addition of collective government goods in Stage Two. Since 
collective goods account for about a third of government current 
expenditure, their inclusion makes a difference. It is noteworthy that 
the fact of their inclusion makes a difference, as well as the pattern of 
their distribution. Comparisons in Chapter Six (Section B) showed that 
different assumptions about the consumption or-collective goods by 
household income only make a major difference to the distribution of 
total government expenditure to the upper income decile. 
Even though the Stage One and Stage Two distributions of government 
expenditure shares are quite different, the final income distributions 
which take account of the budget are very similar. The reason for this 
is the significance of the personal income tax as a redistributive 
force. The amount of government expenditure in Stage One ($5,697 
million) is considerably less than that in Stage Two ($8,984 million). 
Hence, although the Stage One approach estimates that government-provided 
goods are distributed more in favour of lew-income groups than the Stage 
Two approach, the combination of the revenue and expenditure side of the 
budget does not result in a final Stage One income distribution which is 
more equal than that derived by Stage Two. 
Stage One assumes that the economic effect of a budget transaction 
is the same as its legal effect. Based on the results in the general 
equilibrium literature, Stage Two also adopts the assumption that the 
personal income tax is not shifted. So, in both Stages One and Two, the 
personal income tax is treated the same, though for different reasons. 
A comparison of the Stage One and Two results succeeds in showing 
the significance of the personal income tax in terms of income 
distribution. This result highlights a major weakness in tax incidence 
studies, be they quantitative studies or general equilibrium studies. 
More analysis is required of the detail of the personal income tax, both 
in relation to its legal effects and to its economic effects. This is 
discussed further in Section B of this Chapter. 
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A.l.a: Distribution of Payments and Expenditures 
This section summarises the distribution of total payments and 
expenditures based on the Stage Two approach. Since Stage Two takes the 
view that ultimately households make all the payments to and consume all 
the goods produced by the central government, it is necessary to assume 
some behavioural relationships and this involves the results of general 
equilibrium studies. 
Chart 7.1 below illustrates that the share of total payments to 
central government is much greater for households in the upper income 
deciles than for households in the lower deciles. On the other hand, the 
shares of government expenditures consumed are around 10 percent for each 
10 percent of households. From this illustration of the Stage Two 
results, it appears that payments to government are very redistributive 
while government expenditures are roughly proportional. 
OiART 7.1 
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PAY~S AND EXPENDITURES 1981/82: STAGE TWO OEFINITI~S 
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Total Payments 
Total Govt. E~end. 
(Arranged in Deciles from the Lowest 1•larket Income to the Hig.l,.est) 
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A.l.b: Net Money Income Change From Budget Activities 
Another way of summarising the results of the Stage Two treatment of 
central government non-market transactions by household income group is 
to calculate the net money-income gain (loss) from government budget 
transactions. The estimated net changes for each income group by 
household type are illustrated by Table 7A.2. 
A.l.b.i: Net Change By Income Group and Cell Grouos 
As the final two columns of Table 7A.2 show, the net impact of the 
government's non-market budget was to redistribute money income from the 
upper five household income deciles to the lower five income deciles. 
On average, the 10 percent of households earning a market income of 
less than $250 are estimated to have received a net money-income benefit 
of $7,955 from the government non-market budget in 1981/82. This works 
out at about $3,978 per person occupying households in this income 
group. In contrast, households earning $36,650 or more paid out $12,104 
more to the government than the money-income value of the 
government-provided goods they consumed. The net contribution per person 
in the highest income group is $3,026. 
Perhaps the most interesting results illustrated by Table 7A.2 are 
those for the individual cells. Unfortunately, because these cells rely 
on fewer observations when Household Survey information is applied, it is 
not possible to have as much confidence about the actual magnitudes as it 
is for the more aggregated figures. The patterns that emerge, however, 
bear further investigation. For example, the household types making the 
largest net contribution appear to be those one-child, two-adult 
households with market incomes in the upper 10 percent. The next largest 
contribution is made by two-adult households with two children. But 
while the largest average contribution is made by these particular 
high-income households which include children, the households with the 
greatest probability of making a net contribution to the government 
budget are childless households with two or more adults who do not 
receiv~ national superannuation. 
Table 7A.2 
ANNUAL AMOUNT BY WHICH H£ t.()NEY-INCot-£ VALl£ Of 1981/82 CENTRAL GOVERNH:NT EXPEtfHTlflEa CONSlJt.ED BY A PARTICu.J\R HOUSEHOLD 
EXCEEDS WHAT THAT HOUSEHOLD PAYS TO GOVERNMENT 
(Average By Range of Household Market Income and Household Type) 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
~usehold Type 
1 Person 2 Adults Only 2 Adults With Children 3 or More Adults 1 Adult All Per 
-------------------- with ~buse- Person 
Nat.Sup. Other Nat.Sup. Other One Two Three+ No Chldrn W/Chldrn Children 1-blds 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------($s) Dollars Per ~usehold Per Year 
Less Than $250 5624 5280 9237 8882 8390 12035 12072 - - 10678 7955 
$250-( $3,950) 5222 4383 8602 6074 4440 6405 . 10720 - - 9583 6764 
$3,950-( $9,750) 4096 -109 7164 2786 4409 5176 7807 9659 10467 5942 4936 
$9, 750-($13, 450) 988 -2386 4735 -442 1211 2811 5509 3982 6063 1125 1794 
$13,450-($16,900) - -3302 2454 -1520 12 1355 3182 5267 6638 - 1062 
$16, 900-($20, 250) - -4974 1122 -3293 -1901 -147 2370 1140 5589 - -402 
$20,250-($24,200) - -6393 -1516 -3528 -2848 -1757 792 -1092 2439 - -1545 
$24,200-($29,200) - -9121 -1442 -5804 -5341 -3082 -833 -3383 2389 - -3087 
$29,200-($36,650) -2205 -8298 -7701 -4516 -3691 -5482 -2283 . -5375 - - -
$36,650 and over - - -13906 -14801 -24435 -17694 -12164 -11956 -7009 - -12104 
Total Per ~usehold 4626 -1698 5456 -4435 -2400 -1296 1061 -4370 -181 7209 0 
Total Per Person 4626 -1698 2728 -2218 -800 -324 212 -1457 -36 2403 0 
Note : a) Government expenditure is as defined for the Stage Two approach. Cells with insufficient observations 
designated (-). 
Source : Stage Two methodology as spelled out in Chapters Three through Six. 
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A.l.b.ii: Net Change From Budget by Household Tyoe 
Generally, the household types with the greatest likelihood of being 
net recipients from government are single-adult households with children, 
one- and two-adult national superannuitant households and two-adult 
households with three or more children. It is useful to take each of 
these groups in turn and analyse the extent to which these net receipts 
make them better off. 
Single-adult households with children are considerably assisted by 
the government budget. Indeed, reference to Appendix Table A7.6 shows 
that this group earned only 0.9 percent of market income, but it is 
estimated to receive 2.4 percent of income adjusted for all government 
transactions. However, as the comparative distributions in Appendix 
Table A7.3 record, one-adult households with children account for 3.4 
percent of the persons occupying private households. Hence, even after 
the redistributfve effects of the budget are taken into account, this 
group does not receive a share of money-income equal to its share of the 
population. To get a proper perspective on what the share going to this 
group should be, it would be necessary to know if there are any relevant 
household equivalences to take into account. For example, do children 
require a lower level of money income to survive than adults? 
In contrast to single-adult households, national-superannuitant 
households appear to receive a share of final Stage Two income which is 
greater than their share of the population. For example, the average 
single-person, national-superannuitant household is estimated to have 
received a net money-income increase of over $4,600 in 1981/82 because of 
government budget activities (see Table 7A.2). In aggregate, this type 
of household received an estimated 4.8 percent share of final Stage Two 
income (see Appendix Table A7.6). This share is substantially greater 
than their 1.9 percent share of market income. It is also considerably 
greater than their 3.6 percent share of the population of private 
household occupants. Similarly, two-adult,national-superannuitant 
households are estimated to receive 9.6 percent of market income adjusted 
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for the government but represent only 8.3 percent of the total persons 
occupying private households. 
According to Table 7A.2, the other group to receive a net benefit 
from the government budget is two-adult households with three-or-more 
children. Table 7A.2 shows that this group started out receiving 11.9 
percent of market income and ended up with 12.9 percent of Stage Two 
final income. This share is substantially below the household type's 
19.0 percent share of the private household population which resides in 
two-adult households with three-or-more children. 
361. 
Again, because of the large proportion of children in two-adult 
households with three-or-more children, an analysis of equivalences would 
assist in putting the results in perspective. It is food for thought 
that this household type is estimated to receive an average net 
money-income gain from the 1981/82 government budget of approximately 
$1060 per household but this translates -to onl~ ar.ound $210 per year per 
occupant. 
A.l.b.iii: Analysis of Net Change: Conclusion 
In conclusion, this Section has analysed the budget in terms of the 
difference between the payments from households to the government and the 
money-income value of the government-provided goods consumed by 
households. It shows that the government budget is redistributive, in 
the sense that some groups receive a net money-income gain from 
government activity while others are net contributors. 
Large net money-income gains because of govern~ent activities, 
however, do not always improve the relative money-income position of some 
groups. For example, the relative positions of single-adult households 
with children and two-adult households with three-or-more children are 
only slightly improved, even though the average net benefit from the 
government to these groups is substantially higher than for most others. 
In contrast, the relative money-income position of 
national-superannuitant households is improved more than is justified by 
the share of the population represented by this group. 
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A .1. c: Differences Between Distributions by Households and Persons 
Chart 7.2 is a Lorenz diagram for final Stage Two money income (the 
measure of income which takes into account the net money-income of budget 
activity). The Chart shows that the equality of distribution varies for 
households and persons occupying private households. The distribution of 
final Stage Two income by occupant is closer to the line of equality than 
the distribution by the final income of households. 
All persons are treated as homogeneous for the purposes of analysis 
in Chart 7.2. Further work to develop equivalency scales based on the 
different characteristics of the occupants of households could result in 
a different Lorenz curve. 
CHART 7.2 
C~ARISON OF TI-E EQUALITY OF DISTRIBUTION OF STAGE Tlt«J FINAL INCG£ 
BETWEEN PERSONS AND HOUSEHOLDS IN 1981/82 
(Takes Account of Total Central Government Non-Market Activity) 
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A.2: Conclusions from Analysis of Stages Three and Four 
Stage Three takes the view that if households are the basis for the 
analysis of the effects of the entire budget, then their income and 
demand must be defined to include all transactions which might be 
influenced by the budget. Stage Four takes the view that a consistent 
attempt should be carried out to include all of the economic effects of 
the budget. Some of the developments required to carry out Stages Three 
and Four are discussed in Section C of this Chapter. 
Initial Stage Three income is a broad measure of income. In effect, 
gross national product has been imputed to households to recognize 
household involvement in enterprise. Adjustment to income aggregates are 
carried out to reflect the pre-tax value of these income aggregates. The 
calculations of payments to government and the money-income value of 
central government non-market expenditures are the same as the Stage Two 
approach carried out in Chapters Five and Six respectively. 
The most important outcome of the Stage Three approach is that it 
shows the government budget to be less redistributive than shown by the 
Stage One and Stage Two approaches. The top decile's Stage Three final 
income share is 23.4 percent, which compares with a share of 20.4 percent 
Stage Two final income. The bottom decile's share of Stage Three final 
income is 3.4 percent compared with 4.2 percent for Stage Two. 
Since the Stage Two and Stage Three treatment of the government 
budget are the same, the differences in the results are explained by the 
treatment of income at the base. Specifically, those in the highest 
income group start out with a bigger share of "broad" income in Stage 
Three because they tend to be the owners of the companies whose income is 
imputed to households. 
When the Stage Three results are analysed by household type (see 
Appendix Table A7.8), they show a larger final income share going to one-
and two-adult national superannuitant households than was shown by the 
Stage Two approach. This reflects the fact that, besides high-income 
households, retired people tend to own company equities. Their share of 
"broad' income is larger than their share of market income. 
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When the effects of budget policy are also taken into account 
following the Stage Three approach, the national-superannuitant share of 
the final distribution is considerably above their share of the 
population. In contrast, single-adult households with children end up 
with a much smaller share of final income under the Stage Three approach 
than under the Stage Two approach. 
The approach in Stage Three has not been nearly as systematic as the 
approach in Stage Two, so these results must be seen as even less 
indicative than Stage Two. Even so, they serve to emphasise the 
importance of the definition of income at the base of a study such as 
this one. 
A.3: Effective Rates of Payments and Expenditures 
Another method for analysing the results of quantitative studies is 
to express them in terms of effective rates. An effective rate is 
defined as the proportion the money-income value of the government 
payment or expenditure is of some measure of household income. For 
example, if total payments to the government by the highest income decile 
are S2,53l million and the market income accruing to this decile is 
$5,211 million, the decile's effective payment rate is 48.6 percent. 
Table 7A.3 analyses effective payment rates and effective 
government-provision rates in relation to seven different measures of 
income. The seven measures include market income, the Stage Three 
definition of "broad" income, the Stage Four definition of adjusted 
broad income, the Stage One definition of household income available to 
spend, a definition of income which excludes direct monetary benefits 
and personal income taxes and the Household Survey definition of total 
income and the Stage Two definition of final income. Table 7A.3 shows 
that there is a considerable difference in the effective rates, depending 
on the definition of income which is applied. 
Total payments are all payments to government analysed by the Stage 
Two approach (see 8 Columns, Appendix Table 7.4). Total government 
provision is the money-income value of all government expenditures as 
analysed by the Stage Two approach (see C Columns, Appendix Table A7.4). 
Table 7A.3 
EffECTIVE RATES Of PAYMENT AND EXPENDITURE: DiffERENT DEfiNITIONS 
Government Revenue as at % of: Government Expenditure as % of: 
H'hold H'hold 
Income Income 
Avail. Avail. 
Market Adjus. to Spend Market Adjust to Spend 
Income Broad Broad H'hold Less Stage Income Broad Broad H'hold Less Stage 
1-busehold Stage Income Income Income Direct Total Two Stages Income Income Income Direct Total Two 
Market Income One Stage Stage Avail. Monetary Income final One Stage Stage Avail. Monetary Income Final 
($p.a.) & Two lhree four to Spend Benefits Income & Two Titree four to Spend Benefits Income 
A B c D E f G H I J K L M N 
Effective Government Payment Rate Effective Government Benefit Rate 
% % % % % % % % % % % % % % 
Less lhan $250 -727.3 114.3 500.0 27.5 -221.6 25.4 19.9 -4486.4 705.0 3084.4 69.6 1366.4 156.3 122.6 
$250-( $3,950) 147.6 42.8 57.7 36.7 310.6 32.5 28.8 560.0 162.2 218.9 139.4 1179.3 123.3 109.3 
$3' 950-( $9' 750) 55.1 27.8 30.3 40.9 69.9 35.3 32.6 123.9 62.5 68.2 91.9 157.4 79.4 73.4 
$9,750-($13,450) 42.9 28.6 30.3 44.4 54.3 36.5 37.3 57.6 38.4 40.7 59.7 73.0 49.0 50.4 
$13,450-($16,900) 43.1 29.3 29.5 48.4 56.2 38.3 40.3 49.8 33.9 34.1 55.9 64.9 44.2 Lt6. 6 
$16,900-($20,250) 43.9 31.1 36.7 52.7 58.7 40.5 44.9 41.7 29.6 34.9 50.1 55.8 38.5 42.7 
$20,250-($24, 200) 42.2 31.2 34.5 53.2 57.0 40.1 45.6 35.1 25.9 28.6 44.1 52.2 33.3 36.2 
$24,200-($29,200) 43.7 32.0 42.6 56.4 60.6 41.4 49.4 31.9 23.4 31.1 41.2 44.3 30.3 37.7 
$29,200-($36,650) 44.9 32.7 37.8 60.2 63.6 43.2 53.9 28.1 20.4 23.7 37. 7 39.8 27.0 33.8 
$36,650 and over 48.6 31.8 23.6 70.6 73.9 47.1 65.0 23.4 15.3 11.4 34.0 35.6 22.7 31.2 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Total (%) 47.2 31.9 31.9 55.1 66.3 41.2 47.4 46.7 31.5 31.5 54.5 65.6 40.8 46.9 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Note: (-) minus sign means the effective rate is calculated in relation to a negative income value (loss). 
The effective payment rate is all non-market payments to central government as a proportion of the income definition. The effective 
government benefit rate is the money-income value of all government expenditures as a percentage of the income definition. Source: see 
text for derivation. 
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A.3.a: Effective Payments and the Concept of Ability to Pay 
The significance of the effective rate calculations is that they put 
the principle of ability to pay into context. A reasonable 
interpretation of this principle is that ability to pay for government 
should be an increasing function of income. In this sense, the payments 
structure appears to measure up quite well. Referring to Appendix Table 
A7.4, those in the lowest five income deciles contribute a relatively 
small share of total government revenue. Certainly, the share 
contributed is considerably less than the 10 percent share of households 
in each group. 
When the amount paid to the government by the lower-income groups is 
measured in proportion to their market income, (see Column A, 
Table 7A.3) the picture of how the ability to pay criteria are carried 
out in practice changes somewhat. The two lowest income deciles pay a 
far higher effective rate than the other deciles. Indeed, their 
effective rates are more than 100 percent of market income. 
When Stage Three broad income or Stage Four adjusted broad 
income are the basis for comparison (see Columns Band C, Table 7A.3), 
the effective rates are also more than 100 percent for some of the lower 
income deciles. As is the case with market income, these income 
definitions reflect a concept of income before government transactions 
are taken into account. Consistent with this concept, no direct payments 
to government are deducted and no direct payments from government are 
added to the income base. 
Another interpretation of ability to pay is that the relevant 
concept is an income concept which includes transfer payments from the 
government. Two income measures which include transfer payments 
(monetary benefits) are household income available to spend (a concept 
of disposable income which excludes personal income taxes) and total 
income. The effective payment rates based on these concepts are 
illustrated by Table 7A.3, Columns band F. In both these cases, the 
effective payment rate is an increasing function of income and the three 
lowest income deciles pay a considerably lower effective rate than the 
other cases. 
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Another possiblity is that the concept of ability to pay turns on 
the definition of a household's purchasing power before 
govenment-provided benefits (including monetary payments) are taken into 
account. The concept is represented by Column E, household income 
available to spend less direct monetary benefits. Based on this 
concept, the effective payment rates for the bottom income deciles are 
several times the amount of purchasing power accruing to the households. 
Over the whole income range, however, the effective payment rates in 
Column E form a U-shaped pattern. After falling for the bottom four 
income deciles, the effective payment rate becomes an increasing function 
of income for the upper six income deciles. A major reason for this is 
the treatment of personal income taxes. They are in a sense double 
counted, acting both to reduce the denominator and increase the numerator 
of the effective rate comparisons. 
Whatever income measure is at the base of effective rate 
calculations, it should be consistent with the economic concepts applied 
to evaluate the effects of the budget. Based on this view, another basis 
for calculating the effective payment rate is Stage Two Final Income. 
This income measure is calculated using the same methodology applied to · 
calculate the distribution of payments by household income decile. 
Column G shows the rate of payment to be an increasing function of Stage 
Two Final Income. This effective rate calculation also suffers from 
double counting because personal income taxes are subtracted from bath 
the denominator and the numerator. This results in a higher effective 
rate for those (upper) income deciles paying the most personal income tax. 
For the majority of households, those in the middle--income groups, 
the effective payment rate is roughly proportional. The average 
proprotional rate varies with the income definition at the base, ranging 
from a low of 31.9 percent to a high of 66.3 percent. 
The analysis of effective rates in this Section suggests that in 
actual practice, the principle of ability-to-pay is interpreted in an 
absolute sense. In other words, the absolute amount paid to the 
government increases with the household's income but it is about the same 
proportion of income for every income level. 
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A.3.b: Effective Benefits 
Turning to the effective "benefit" rates, the general pattern that 
emerges is one where the proportion of government-provided goads is a 
declining function of household income, however defined. Of course, 
underlying these results is the implicit assumption that the index of the 
marginal utility of income is constant as income rises. If the view is 
taken that the marginal utility of income rises with income, then the 
effective benefit far those in higher groups would be greater. 
A.3.c: Comparisons with Results of Other Studies 
The pattern of effective payment and benefit rates is broadly 
similar to that found by Gillespie (1965, 1966) in studies far Canada and 
the United States. It is also similar to the pattern found by the 
Musgrave et al (1974) and Reynolds and Smolensky (1977) far the United 
States and O'Higgins and Ruggles (June and Sept. 1981) for the United 
Kingdom and the United States. 
But while the patterns are similar, the extent of redistribution in 
New Zealand is greater, according to the results of this thesis. This is 
far two reasons. First, the distribution of payments to the government 
is steeper for the New Zealand case, suggesting that those an high 
incomes contribute a greater share of government revenue here than 
overseas. Secondly, the distribution of expenditures is not as flat in 
the New Zealand case suggesting that those an law incomes benefit to a 
greater extent here than overseas. 
Research conducted by the Institute of Policy Studies analyses the 
impact of the proposed goods and services tax (see Broad and Bacica, 
1985: Scott, Goss and Davis, 1985). Their results were mainly expressed 
as effective rates when disposable income or household expenditure was 
the tax base. It is not easy to make a direct comparison with the 
results of the Institute of Policy Studies Reseach because of the way in 
which the results are published. The results are broadly consistent with 
those in this thesis. The personal income tax appears to be slightly 
more redistributive in 1981/82 than it was for June quarter 1986 (the 
base period far the quantitative research carried out by Broad and 
Bacica). 
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This difference is largely explained by two factors. First, there 
were changes to the tax structure since 1981/82. Secondly, Broad and 
Bacica made a number of changes to the treatment of the personal income 
tax which were not incorporated in ASSET when the work for this thesis 
was being carried out. 
CHART 7.3 
EFFECTIVE RATES OF PAYlo£NT, BENEFIT AND 
NET RESIDUE FROM CENTRAL GOVERN~T BUDGET 
TRANSACTIONS BY HOUSEHOLD TOTAL INCOME IN 1981/82 
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Chart 7.3 above compares the effective payment (tax) and expenditure 
(benefit) rates for New Zealand, using total income as the denominator. 
It shows that the effective rate of tax increases slightly as income 
rises while the effective rate of expenditures (benefits) increases 
sharply as income decreases, especially for the low-income groups. 
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Sawyer (1976, p.l4) compares New Zealand's income distribution with 
that of twelve other members of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation 
and Development. His comparisons show New Zealand's pre-tax and post-tax 
distribution to be more equal than the DECO average for the late 1960's, 
early 1970's. The results of this thesis are also more equal than the 
DECO average that is _calculated by Sawyer. 
Another fascinating comparison is between the Stage One and Stage 
Two results in this thesis and the O'Higgins and Ruggles' (1981) and 
Central Statistical Office (CSO) results in the United Kingdom. The CSO 
quantitative studies have generally avoided allocating those taxes and 
expenditures where methodological uncertainties exist about their 
incidence so that about one-third of government revenue and over one-half 
of expenditures are excluded from their estimates. O'Higgins and Ruggles 
attribute this to the reticence of an official government agency to take 
sides in unresolved methodological disputes. The outcome is that the CSO 
methodology is like the Stage One approach where only "direct" 
expenditures and taxes are allocated. Similar to the results of this 
thesis, the decision to exclude certain budget items makes a difference 
to the final distribution of the items that have been included. 
The main difference between the CSO work and the O'Higgins and 
Ruggles' results is that the CSO allocation finds both expenditures and 
taxes to be more pro-low-income group. In comparison, the Stage One 
approach in this thesis shows taxes to be distributed in about the same 
pattern as the Stage Two approach, but expenditures are distributed in a 
more pro-low-income pattern. The main reason that the Stage One taxes 
are not also more pro-low income is because this thesis analyses some 
"direct" indirect taxes which are not included in the CSO analysis. 
An interesting feature of the O'Higgins and Ruggles' results is that 
in moving from the CSO partial allocation of the government budget to 
total allocation (similar to the Stage Two approach in this thesis), the 
greatest net gains are to the middle-income deciles. The authors see 
this as evidence that the earlier CSO results generally overstate the 
degree of income redistribution in the U.K. Certainly, the similar 
conclusion in this thesis, from a comparison of the Stage One and Stage 
Two approaches, is evidence that the more theoretically-comprehensive 
approaches show the budget to be less redistributive. 
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B. FURTHER AREAS OF RESEARCH 
If nothing else, the results of this thesis show that the study of 
the influence of the governments budget on income distribution is 
extremely complex. To date, the task of researchers has been to design 
an approach which is extensive enough to take account of the most 
important legal, statistical and economic effects of the entire budget. 
A job of such breadth could only be accomplished by the adoption of a 
large number of rough assumptions. 
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Having adopted similarly rough assumptions, this thesis suffers from 
many of the same limitations of the earlier empirical and quantitative 
studies. But an important aspect of this analysis is that it has 
attempted to describe the various components of the budget in detail. 
Hence, it is possible to identify the areas where the most is to be 
gained from a more rigorous economic approach. 
For example, the personal income tax (as it was structured in 
1981/82) appears to be by far the most important redistributive budget 
measure. Therefore, additional research to refine the ASSET model is of 
clear value. Other rewarding research includes further analysis of 
monetary benefits, health, education and collective expenditures (in that 
order of priority). Finally, an area where further research is required, 
which has not given explicit treatment in the quantitative results is the 
influence of the government budget deficit on household incomes. 
B.l: The Incidence of the Personal Income Tax 
The results show that the most important redistributive force is the 
personal income tax. To derive Stage One quantitative results, it is 
assumed that the personal income tax is a direct tax and is not shifted, 
or in other words, it is paid by those who are legally liable. Looking 
only at the direct effects of the tax, it is likely that there is a 
difference between the legal liability for the personal income tax and 
what people pay (their actual liability). The ASSET model has been 
designed to specify the parameters of legal liability for the tax, based 
on the Household Survey. Further analysis is required to more fully 
integrate the Inland Revenue Department information about actual tax 
payments with the ASSET model. Some specific areas for further work 
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include a fuller specification of tax paid by the self-employed 
(including an analysis of expenditures incurred while deriving an income) 
and of the first-home-owner rebate. 
Priority should be given to the analysis of the incidence of the 
personal income tax. The main issue is the validity of the mainstream 
view in the economics literature that the personal tax is paid directly 
out of household income. 
Chapter Two shows that the Shaven, Whalley, Fullerton (SWF) 
general-equilibrium models are very thorough in their coverage of taxes. 
However, their treatment was rather broadbrush in that the taxes are 
specified in relation to some theoretical equivalent and not according to 
the way liability for the tax is defined by law. Moreover, while recent 
versions of SWF models have treated the personal income tax in greater 
detail, (see Piggott, 1983), there is much more work required to refine 
key behavioural relationships such as the labour/leisure trade off. 
If the economic incidence of a carefully specified personal income 
tax were assessed, it seems likely that the resulting household income 
redistribution would be less than that indicated by the results of this 
thesis. What little evidence there is suggests that those on higher 
incomes have a greater opportunity (because of the economic power 
reflected by their higher income) to change their behaviour so as to 
reduce their tax contribution. 
8.2: The Incidence of Government Expenditures 
On the expenditure side of the central government budget, more data 
are required to identify the users of government-provided goods. Then, 
the next step is to analyse how the distribution to initial users is 
changed when economic effects of the budget are taken into account. 
B.2.a: Mare an Monetary Benefits 
The quantitative results show that social welfare programmes 
(including national superannuation) are the second-most redistributive 
after the personal income tax. This is based an a comparison with market 
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incomes, where national-superannuitant households are found to be mainly 
distributed in the lower-income groups. 
It is possible that the value of assets owned by those over 60 is 
greater than for other age groups on average. Some issues, such as the 
ability to make payments to the government and the determination of need 
for social welfare support, could be treated more fully if the income 
concept included more details about ownership of assets, especially home 
ownership. A further research project would be to analyse the Household 
Survey data about household assets and the Census data on home ownership 
to discover if national-superannuitant households fall in low-income 
groups when the income concept is expanded to include a value for assets. 
To some economists, national superannuation is not like other income 
maintenance schemes. It is seen as a transfer of risk to the government 
instead of individuals planning for themselves. Clearly, to get a 
perspective on this issue, it would be valuable to learn more about 
household life--cycle income behaviour and the effect of national 
superannuation expenditure on patterns of long-term savings. 
8.2. b: More on Health Expenditures 
Also a priority is to find out more about the users of hospital and 
of the health services. If the Population Census data were integrated 
with the National Health Census, fuller details about income, race, 
family background, and type of hospital treatment could be known. To 
measure the distribution of health expenditure, information about the 
cost, and some measure of the quality of bed-care services by patients is 
also required. 
In combination, nation~l superannuation and health expenditure 
represent major resource transfers in favour of those over 60 years of 
age. This improves the relative economic positions of national 
superannuitants, providing them with a final money-income share which is 
greater than their share of the population. Further research is required 
to establish whether the weighting for hospital costs used in this thesis 
accurately reflect the costs of care to the elderly. 
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8.2.c: More on Education 
Another area where improved data are required, is education usage. 
Fuller details about the income and race of students and the quality of 
education services consumed are required. 
The Census information is able to be broken down into regions and 
another area for further research might be to analyse the effect of the 
budget by region. Of particular interest is educational expenditure by 
school district, disaggregated by level at school so that it could be 
analysed by the regional distribution of household income using age as 
the distributor. 
8.2.d: More on Collective Goods 
The treatment of collective goods seems to explain the difference 
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__ _ between the Stage One and Stage Two results. Thus, an attempt should be 
made to identify whether there are any direct beneficiaries from the 
expenditures classified as government collective goods in this thesis. 
For example, there may be some aspects of defence expenditure which are 
similar to private goads and should, therefore, be analysed by the Stage 
One approach. 
In addition, this is an area where further research is required to 
establish the incidence of government expenditure. Collective goads are 
distinct from private goods. The challenge is to model them sa that the 
pertinent differences can be taken into account. 
I 
8.2.e: Mare an Government Expenditures 
Meerman (1978) makes a case for analysing government expenditure 
incidence to complement studies of tax incidence. In addition, further 
work is required to analyse the effect of transfer payments an income at 
the margin. Other work is required to derive appropriate relative prices 
for government-provided health and education as opposed to the prices of 
similar goods provided by the market. Finally, research is required to 
determine whether externalities have significant redistributive 
consequences. 
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8. 3. : The Effects of the Budget Deficit By Household 
Budget deficits have become a fact-of-life of modern mixed 
economies. While it may be acceptable for models of tax incidence to 
ignore the budget deficit, it does not make sense for redistribution 
studies. The choice of a particular budget-balancing technique may in 
fact obscure the incidence of a particular budget proposal and limit the 
usefulness of a model. 
There are a number of factors related to the budget deficit which 
could have significant consequences for redistribution. Among them are 
the questions of whether the budget deficit redistributes income to past, 
present or future generations. Recent deficits have been at least as 
large as major government expenditure items such as national 
superannuation, health, education and so on. Thus, the incorporation of 
more information about the deficit's distributive effect could make a 
considerable difference to the results of a study of the redistributive 
effect of the government budget. 
Government expenditure to pay interest on its debt has been one of 
its most rapidly increasing expenditures in recent years. To ·assess this 
in relation to household income distribution, it is necessary to discover 
more about the owners of government debt, how this effects economic 
activity and what the implications are for households. 
B .4: Pot Pourri 
Quantitative studies have several major limitations and the one 
carried out in this thesis is no exception. The most basic, but also the 
most problematical limitation, is the assumption that the distribution of 
earnings before the budget is unaffected by the ongoing fiscal process. 
A second limitation is the necessity to hypothesize aoout the shifting of 
various payments to government and the provision of government goods 
leading to results based on inconsistent macro and micro-relationships. 
A criticism of quantitative redistribution studies is that they are 
merely a snapshot of the economy at a given point in time and do not 
capture the cause and effect of change. Given that one of the implied 
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reasons for studying income distribution is to predict policy responses 
which may improve it, this is a valid criticism. But certainly the first 
step must be to analyse the distribution of income against some 
standard. In this case, a snapshot is a perfectly acceptable frame of 
reference. 
Comparison of post-budget household-income distribution with the 
distribution of market income over a number of years may show some 
correlation between budget measures which appear to change (increase or 
decrease) relative money income in a particular year and longer term 
changes in income distribution. 
Chapter Four was written from the angle of the wealth of material in 
the national accounts which is largely ignored by researchers who have 
designed their models from the point of view of theoretical economic 
concepts. The achievement of better results, however, will be an 
iterative development because as more is learned about economic effects, 
chere will be an identification of things not presently measured. 
General equilibrium analysis, perhaps the most widely used theoretical 
framework for economy-wide micreoeconomic analysis, is only explicitly 
recognized in the construction of current national income accounts in the 
aggregate income-expenditure identity, but not in aggregate detail. 
General equilibrium models of the SWF variety provide the key to 
reducing some of the limitations of quantitative studies. For questions 
of income maintenance, the models need to be specified in such a way that 
they can distinguish short-run from long-run effects. Before meaningful 
results can be derived, however, there is a need for more information 
about households' ownership of assets. 
The next step will be to reduce some of the restrictive assumptions 
of general equilibrium models which may impinge on income distribution. 
For example, the models are based on restrictive assmptions such as full 
employment and perfect competition which may obscure significant 
redistributive effects. 
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C. WHERE TO FROM HERE : COMPUTATIONAL GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODELS 
As Shoup pointed out in 1972, econometric models do not take a 
realistic view of the institutional effects of government expenditure and 
taxation. On the other hand, quantitative studies may be able to discuss 
various institutional effects, but without a systematic model it becomes 
more difficult to maintain internally consistent economic relationships. 
Commenting on Shoup (1972), Musgrave said: 
..... to construct a general equilibrium model of the 
Walrasian type which includes not only all relative 
product and factor prices but also their relationship 
to the size distribution of income is an enormous, if 
not impossible tas~· (p.68). 
Over the fourteen years since Shaven and Whalley (1972) first 
pioneered the multi-sector approach to the analysis of tax effects, the 
advent of less expensive and more consumer friendly computers has eased 
the execution of general equilibrium models. It is no longer the 
solution methods that constrain model applications. Instead, it is the 
availability of data and the ability of modellers to specify key 
parameters which determine how the models can be applied. 
The most important contribution of the developing framework for 
evaluating the effects of budget policy is the new insights offered to 
policy issues. Amongst these is the ability to address distributional 
and efficiency aspects. 
C.l Income Distribution Versus Excess Burden 
Shaven and Whalley (1984) discuss the reaction of policy makers to 
the results of tax research in the United States: 
11 For several years following the original Harberger 
work on the resource allocation effects of taxes in 
the United States, public finance economists argued 
that deadweight losses from taxes were small (perhaps 
one percent of GNP per year) . When combined with the 
results of incidence studies, [e.g. Pechman and Okner, 
1974] ... suggesting little redistribution from the tax 
system, this often led to a policy stance in favour of 
redistributive tax changes with only limited attention 
focussed on changes designed to improve allocative 
efficj.ency" .. (p.l032) 
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Shaven and Whalley go on to say that a striking feature of the 
results from the general equilibrium tax models is their suggestion .of 
considerably larger deadweight losses (efficiency losses) from tax 
distortions than previously assessed. In addition, "they do seem to 
indicate that tax policies may have more redistributive power when their 
general-equilibrium effects are taken into account". (p.l032) 
They do not pursue this latter point in detail. Instead they note 
that the combination of a graduated schedule of marginal tax rates and 
the existence of a variety of preferences on assets held by households 
could result in a more progressive tax system than might initially 
appear. This is because the general-equilibrium solution yields reduced 
before-tax returns on the preferred assets, relative to fully-taxed 
assets, thereby lowering the after-tax returns available to higher-income 
households. 
Further research is required to prove this point. As discussed in 
Section a of this Chapter, the modelling of the personal income tax needs 
much development. If factors such as avoidance of tax turn out to be 
significant, th~se could offset the progressive effects mentioned by 
Shaven and Whalley. 
The clear message of recent policy initiatives is that whether its 
true or not, policymakers consider that the excess burden effects of 
budget policies are significant. Indeed, in some cases they are held to 
be so important that it is not considered worthwhile to adopt 
redistribution policies because they would be undone by excess burden 
effects. Thus, when a budget change is introduced, there is a need for a 
measure of the desirability of the change which takes account of both 
efficiency and distributional aspects. 
As discussed in Chapter Two, the Harberger model was originally 
designed to measure both incidence and efficiency loss. The efficiency 
cost of capital taxation was measured by the change in capital. A unit 
of capital was defined as that which earns a dollar net of all taxes and 
hence this change in capital could be interpreted in income terms and 
compared to national output. Incidence was measured by the change in the 
price of capital relative to the size of the tax. 
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SWF general equilibrium models measure welfare changes and their 
distribution among households in terms of income changes. Such a measure 
is based on a social welfare function. Ballentine and Thrisk (1979) and 
Piggott (l980b), amongst others, generalize the function implicit in the 
use of sums of compensating and equivalent variations (measures of 
welfare cost widely used in welfare economics). 
When there is an explicit utility function generating demands, the 
comparison is based on the change in income that would compensate each 
household for any tax changes. As is well known from index number 
theory, compensating and equivalent variation provide bounds on the 
welfare change. 
With this method, unambiguous rankings of alternative tax 
arrangements are possible, given estimates of their efficiency and 
distributional effects. Piggott (l980a, 1980b, 1983) indicates the 
distributional effects of taxes by incorporating summary measures of 
equality, including the Gini coefficient and the Atkinson variation, to 
calculate the overall changes in the equality of incomes. 
Piggott (l980a) found for Australia that personal taxes are the most 
important of taxes analysed in terms of both welfare and distribution. 
There would be a very substantial welfare gain if personal taxes were 
removed. This gain comes about because of the trade off between labour 
and leisure and the tax break available to households who are 
owner-occupiers. On the other hand, the elimination of personal taxation 
has a considerable influence on increasing the inequality of income 
distribution. 
To date the research into distributional equality and efficiency has 
largely focussed on the effects of taxes. The difficult theoretical 
problem is how to incorporate government expenditures into the analysis. 
C.2: Developing SWF Models to Analyse Budget Policy By Households 
SWF general equilibrium· modeling has developed in an innovative 
fashion and some researchers indicate an apparent interest in budget 
policy. Nevertheless, the SWF models do not presently specify a number 
of key parameters for the study of the redistributive effects of the 
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budget. This thesis is designed to show what some of them are. 
In other words, this thesis takes the opposite position from the SWF 
general tax incidence equilibrium studies. Tne general equilibrium 
studies fit observable data into models which specify economic and 
behavioural relationships. This thesis starts from the perspective of 
observable data, first to discover what it shows in relation to household 
income distribution and second to analyse what insights this provides for 
specifying relationships in the more formal SWF models. 
With the development of computational techniques, the SWF models 
have been extended to where the detail contained includes input-output 
transactions tables, national accounts, household income and expenditure 
data, taxation statistics, foreign trade statistics and flow-of-funds 
information specified in terms of several production sectors and 
household income groups (see St. Hilaire and Whalley, 1983). 
Sophisticated calibration techniques have been designed to adjust all of 
these sources for mutual consistency. 
Mutual consistency is determined in light of the equilibrium 
conditions adopted. The four sets of equilibrium conditions which are 
generally specified in in SWF models of tax incidence are: 
1) Demand equals supplies for all commodities; 
2) Non-positive profits are made in all industries; 
3) All domestic agents have demands which satisfy their budget 
constraints; and, 
4) The economy is in zero external sector balance. 
The primary behavioural equations in SWF models are production and 
demand equations. Elasticities of substitution between factors or goods 
are usually selected from previous econometric studies, sometimes carried 
out for entirely different purposes than the assessment of tax 
incidence. This means that either the range of parameters used is chosen 
based on the range of estimated values available or that specific 
estimates for the parameters are chosen from particular studies. If the 
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SWF studies were based on elasticities consistent with the data used in 
their empirical models, their results would be more robust. 
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Instead, estimates of parameters may vary from study to study and 
there are no clear rules for deciding among alternatives. The unclear 
time frame of general equilibrium models adds to this problem. According 
to the Fullerton, Henderson and Shaven (1982, p.48) survey of th~ SWF 
literature, the results are very sensitive to alternative parameter 
values. This indicates "the importance of developing careful 
parameterization procedures•. 
A dynamic model may be more applicable to the analyis of 
redistribution. Welfare changes are more complicated in a dynamic 
model. It is necessary to use a present value calculation which will be, 
of course, sensitive to the discount rate chosen. In addition, the 
present value welfare gains should be measured only for the initial 
population, so that the steady state growth rate does not distort the 
results. 
The main difficulty with the existing literature, however, comes 
down to the treatment of the expenditure side of the budget. The 
valuation of -government-provided private goods is important for two 
reasons. First, it makes a difference to households that they are 
provided with goods and services by the government. Related to this is 
the second consideration that it makes a difference whether the goods are 
provided by the government or by the private sector. The importance of 
this difference is a matter of belief for many. But to simply assume 
that the publicly-provided goods are pure substitutes for 
privately-provided goods, as the SWF literature does, is to finesse the 
most important issues. 
What the literature about the economic effects of expenditures shows 
is that the expenditure side of the budget affects income distribution in 
two ways: 
1) through the expenditure per se 
2) through the output of goods and services associated with these 
expenditures. 
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The valuation of government-provided private goods is fundamental to 
an objective assessment of the efficiency of government spending. 
Differences between government-provided goods and those provided by the 
private sector may centre on esoteric features of the goods related to 
consumers' assessment of their "quality". There are difficulties in 
assessing what consumers think about such things, not least because of 
free-rider problems where to avoid compulsory levies, taxpayers disquise 
their true preferences. 
Keller and Piggott attempt to specify the expenditure behaviour of 
the government more precisely than other SWF models. But in the end, 
their description of how consumers choose government-provided private 
goods is little different from the original Shaven and Whalley (1972) 
approach which simply treated government goods as perfect substitutes for 
private goods. 
Meerman (1978) shows that there is no reason why the econometricians 
should need to ignore the expenditure side of the budget. Although there 
are difficulties in modelling it, these are no different than the 
difficulties faced with modelling the tax side. Reynolds and Smolensky 
(1977) attempt to solve some of the same problems t hat interest Meerman 
and end up carrying out a quantitative study with the innovation of 
extending the analysis over three calendar year periods. 
Not least because of its greater elegance of expression, Meerman's 
approach is preferable to that of Reynolds and Smolensky. However, until 
it can be incorporated into a general equilibrium model which overcomes 
some of the shortcomings outlined in Chapter Two, the Reynolds and 
Smolensky approach offers a method for analysing the influence of both 
the revenue and expenditure side of the government's budget. 
This thesis has tended to highlight the features of the 
computational general equilibrium models which are common to each of the 
SWF models. This has been necessary to describe their strengths and 
limitations when it comes to the analysis of income distribution issues. 
It would be extremely misleading, however, to leave the impression that 
these models are all the same. Each of the models differ in structure in 
several ways. To a large extent, these differences arise because of the 
different interests of the researchers. The core models are quite 
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detailed, so the choice of further elaboration will depend on the topic 
of analysis and the balance between simplicity and accuracy of detail. 
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Besides augmenting the models to better explain the relationship of 
the household sector to the rest of the economy and to treat government 
expenditure more realistically, another area for further development is 
the treatment of government deficits. To handle a government budget 
which is out of balance requires the specification of a government bond 
market. In common with most incidence research (both quantitative and 
empirical) this thesis has centred on the money-income effects of the 
real economy. 
Lacking a flow-of-funds account in New Zealand, it would have been 
difficult to incorporate a rigorous analysis of financial markets. As 
described in this thesis, some SWF studies have begun to model financial 
behaviour, but substantially more could be done in this area. 
One way of modeling the general-equilibrium effects of the budget in 
New Zealand would be to augment existing general equilbrium models. Two 
candidates are the University of Canterbury SWF-type model and the 
Victoria University Joanna model. Both are discussed in Chapter Two, 
Section D. 
One of the virtues of Victoria University's Joanna model is that it 
provides a wealth of information aobut the effects of a policy change 
both at the level of the macroeconamy and at the sectoral/commodity 
level. Joanna can be applied to analyse the economic implications of a 
tax change in relation to exports, imports and the balance of payments, 
for employment, economic activity and real grass domestic product and for 
individual sectors of the economy. 
A lang-run version of the Joanna model was used to simulate the 
imposition of the goads and services tax and the removel of wholesales 
sales tax. Personal income tax cuts which are intended to accompany 
these indirect tax changes are determined by the model by constraining 
the ex-past implications to an assumption of no change in the 
government's Budget Table 2 deficit. The results for disposable incomes 
are expressed in aggregate with the income tax cuts modelled as being 
across-the board over all households. According to the Research Project 
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on Economic Planning (RPEP): 
"The modelling of selective income tax reductions and the maintenance 
(or improvement) of the 'living standards' of certain households 
disaggregated by income division) could be one of the items on the 
agenda for further GST/WST research to be undertaken by 
[RPEP]". (Nana and Philpott, 1985, p.4). 
C.3: Meanwhile, Back to Basics 
It may take some time before some of the conceptual problems 
involved in measuring budget incidence can be solved. Meantime, an 
alternative way of analysing the income distributive effects of the 
budget is to repeat the quantitative approach at the base of this thesis 
over a number of years, looking for any pattern of changes in 
macroeconomic variables such as unemployment, output and so on. 
This approach has at least three things in its favour: 
1) It is easily understood because the economic effects which are 
incorporated are discussed explicitly. This allows policymakers the 
opportunity to involve the public in its decision making; 
2) It makes use of available data, some which is already designed for 
such analyssis including that incorporated in the Department of 
Statistics ASSET model; 
3) It can be easily improved through the involvement of others because 
the main framework is accessible even to non-economists. 
Finally, despite their greater sophistication, the incidence results 
of computational general equilibrium models do not differ all that much 
for the results of quantitative studies. For example, in both cases the 
personal income tax is redistributive towards low-income households. At 
this stage, the value of the SWF models is the potential to measure both 
distribution and efficiency aspects. But this cannot be developed 
further until more is understood about the effects of government 
expenditures. 
There is still a considerable amount to learn about the effects of 
government expenditures using the quantitative approach. 
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C.4: Evaluating the Budgets' Influence in New Zealand 
The introduction of the goods and services tax from 1 October 
provides an opportunity to see if any significant economic effects could 
be isolated using a quantitative approach such as this. For example, if 
there are changes to the economy beyond those expected because of the 
change in the budget, then these changes could be identified as being 
part of the response to the changes in taxation. 
Developments in the design of general equilibrium models of the New 
Zealand economy also provide the opportunity for more consistent 
treatment of the economic problems of analysis of the income-distributive 
effects of the budget. 
APPeVICES 
APPEJIIliX ONE 
NOTATION USED IN THIS THESIS 
Listed below is the notation used in this thesis. Notation is first 
used in Chapter One. However, it appears most frequently in Chapter Two. 
A = All factors owned by household. 
Bg = Marginal value of unit of G. 
aP = Marginal value of private good Q financed by government. 
"' Ct = an "expanded" concept of current potential consumption. 
d = Sign for differential. 
E = Elasticity of demand (usually for product x) 1 
G = Quantity of public good. 
gg = Government expenditure on group consumption goods. 
gk = Government capital formation 
gP = Government expenditure on specific goods and services (private 
goods} 
gt = Transfer payments. 
H = ~ousehold income (aggregate) . 
... Ht = All current net inflows of resources available to the 
h 
K 
Kx 
Ky 
L 
p 
Px 
Py 
Q 
R 
rc 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
household 
Individual household income. 
Capital. 
Capital allocated to producing x. 
Capital allocated to producing y. 
Labour. 
Prices corresponding to Q. 
Price of product x. 
Price of product y. 
Private goods and services. 
Total government receipts. 
Public charges and fees. 
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rP = Profits and miscellaneous income from the Government's trading 
corporations. 
= Taxes on the sources of income. 
= Taxes on the uses of income. 
= Elasticity of substitution. 1 
= share of net worth available for consumption. 
= Ad valorem or unit tax or negative tax. 
= time period 
= Ad valorem or per unit tax on capital used in the production of x. 
= Return to all factors owned by households. 
= Economic welfare. 
= Product x. 
= The marginal product of capital in the x industry X 2 
= The marginal product of labour in the x industry X 2 
L 
Y = National income. 
y = Product y. (Note: generally y is the numeraire good and sometimes 
the only good). 
yK = The marginal product of capital in the y industry. 2 
yl = The marginal products of labour in they industry. 2 
1. E and S are defined to have negative presumptive signs in the derivation 
of the Harberger model. 
2. Use of the convention that all prices are unity in the HMM model results 
in xl and xK representing the initial relative shares of labour and 
capital respectively in the total costs of producing x. Under the same 
convention, YL, YK are the relative shares of factors employed in y. 
APPei>IX TWO 
TAX INCIDENCE CONCLUSICJ6 FROM HMM STUDIES 
SECTION ONE: THREE CONCLUSIONS FROM THE HAR8ERGER MODEL 
Recall equation (821) given in the text of Chapter Two (Section 8) 
for tax incidence: 
E.xK[-:y-X - ~ + Sxl( XLKX + XKLXJ 
dwK = __________ K_Y __ L_Y ____ _ 
.T 
(821) 
ErKx - Lxj1 
KY LY 
setting A equal to: 
sx rxLKX + XLLX] 
l Ky Ly 
setting 8 equal to: 
and setting D equal to the denominator: 
E (YK - XK) l( KX - LX] - Sy -Sx r x~KX + XKlxl 
Ky ly l Ky ly 
then equation (821) can be rewritten: 
d~ = XK (A+ 8).T (A: Al) 
0 
The economic implications of (821) become more perspicuous when A, B 
and Dare examined individually. Once understood, A, 8 and D can be 
easily ordered into equations solving for all possible tax (subsidy) 
burdens within the Herberger model. 
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First, it can be established that the denominator of (821), D, is 
necessarily positive. The presumptive signs of E, Sx and Sy are 
negative. Taking the third expression in D: 
All the terms in the bracket are positive. The expression is 
preceded by a minus sign, but since Sx is negative, this makes the entire 
expression positive. Since the presumptive sign of Sy is also negative, 
a minus sign in front of Sy makes the second expression in D positive. 
Turning to the first expression in D -
E is negative, so for D to be positive, the rest of the first 
expression must be shown to be negative or zero. 
If yK is greater than xK, the industry producing goad y is 
more capital intensive than the industry producing good x and therefore 
f
Kx - Lxjl must be negative (since Kx would be a smaller fraction than 
KY LY KY 
L x and the indicated product for ( YK - ~) [Kx - L x] must be 
Ly Ky Ly 
negative). Likewise, if the industrY producing xis more capital 
intensive, then (yK - xK) is negative and [Kx - Lx} will be 
KY LY) 
positive. The indicated product far (yK - xK) [Kx - Lx~j must again 
Ky Ly 
be negative. Finally, if yK is equal to xK, then (yK - xK) will 
be zero, making the whale first expression in D zero. 
Summing up, the first expression in D can be either positive or zero 
and the second and third expressions are always positive, so the entire 
denominator, 8, of (821) is positive in all possible cases. 
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Since 0 is always positive, the sign of dwK (the change in 
capital's wage) will be determined by the sign of the numerator of 
equation ( 821) . 
Recalling that in deriving (A:Al), A has been set equal to: 
ElrKx _ Lx] 
KY LY 
the presumptive sign of E is negative, so the sign (A) 
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When the production of x is more capital intensive than the production of 
y, the expression in the brackets will be positive and when the sector 
producing x is the more labour intensive sector, then the bracketed 
expression will be negative. If the amounts of capital labour are the 
same in each sector (making the capital and labour production 
coefficients the same), then the bracketed expression will be zero, as 
will the entire expression A. 
--- - ---- --
Expression B will always be negative. As set out above, 8 is equal 
to: 
The presumptive sign of Sx is negative and the expression in the brackets 
will always be positive, making the entire expression negative. 
Taking the entire expression (A:Al) 
dwK = (xK A + B) T 
0 
it has been shown that expression 0 is always positive, 8 is always 
negative and A can be positive, negative or zero. The remaining two 
variables, ~ and T are positive. So, if A is positive and the 
absolute value of xK A (expressed asjxK Aj) is greater than the 
absolute value of B <lsi), then (A;Al) will be positive in sign. If A is 
positive and lxK AI is less than IBI or if A is simply negative, then 
the sign of (A:Al) will be negative. If A is positive and lxK Ajis 
equal to IBI, then (A:Al) will be zero. 
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Certain general conclusions emerge when the components of (821) are 
considered separately. To give a flavour to the Harberger approach, 
three of the general conclusions from his model are discussed in some 
detail below. 
1. Only when the industry wherein capital is taxed is 
more labour intensive can labour bear a proportion 
of the tax on capital used in producing x greater 
than its initial share in national income. 
Recall that when dwK is zero, the earnings of capital are the same 
after the tax distortion. Equilibrium is established without any shift 
of factors between sectors and labour and capital bear the tax precisely 
in proportion to their initial shares of factor earnings. For labour's 
share of the tax burden to be greater than this, dwK must be positive. 
When dwK is positive, .the tax distortion has resulted in an increase in 
capital's after-tax earnings. For this to happen, labour's share of the 
tax burden must be greater as a proportion of its initial share of 
national income, than capital's. Since 0 is always positive, the sign of 
dwK will be determined by the sign of the numerator in (821). Since 
expression 8 is necessarily negative, dWk can be positive only when A 
is positive and greater in absolute magnitude than B. Expression A can 
be positive only if 
rKX - LX] is negative and this can only occur if the industry producing 
1..KY LY 
good x is relatively more labour intensive (and less capital intensive) 
than the industry producing y. Q.E.D. 
2. If the absolute value of the elasticity of 
substitution between labour and capital taxed in 
producing x is as great or greater than the absolute 
value of the elasticity of demand for the product 
whose capital input is taxed, then capital's share 
of the tax burden will be higher than its initial 
income share (and labour's share will be smaller 
than its initial share). 
Remembering that A = E rKx _ Lx] 
lKY Ly 
and dWK = XK (A+ B).T 
0 
(A:Al) 
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The only term which gives the numerator of (A:Al) a positive sign 
is 
xK.E·[-Lxl and this term is dominated by Sx.xK[L~] 
LYJ LY 
When ISxl xK [~:t I EXK [-~:]I , then dwK < 0 , 
3. If the elasticity of substitution between labour and 
capital in the taxed industry is as great in 
absolute value as the elasticity of substitution 
between the final products, then capital must bear 
mare of the tax than labour, relative to their 
initial income shares. 
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This holds from conclusion (2) above, since the elasticity of 
substitution between factors in producing x and y must be greater in 
absolute value than the elasticity of demand for x. The formula far 
relating the elasticity of substitution between x and y can be denoted by 
Exy· In terms of the elasticity of demand for x, E, 
E = Exy l( y ] 
X + y • 
The relationship holds when the relevant elasticity of demand is one 
which excludes first order income effects. This relationship had 
particular relevance in Herberger's original work where the government's 
demand far goods was treated an a par with consumer demand. 
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SECTION TWO: DERIVATION OF EXTENSIONS TO HAR8ERGER 
Using asterisks to indicate factor prices inclusive of factor taxes, 
the following equations indicate the elasticities of substitution in the 
sectors producing x andy: 
dKXfLX = Sx. d(WK* fWL *) - (A: AAl) 
Kx/Kx w */w * K L 
and dKY/LY = Sx.d(WK*/wl*) 
KYJKY w */w * K L 
Now disaggregating T into taxes on factors, the gross factor prices 
in industry x can be related to the corresponding net factor prices in 
the following way: 
WK* = WK + TKX + TK 
WL* = WL + TLX + TL 
where TKx is a tax on capital in x, TK is a tax on capital, Tlx is 
a tax on labour and Tlx is a tax on labour employed in producing x. 
(A:AA2) 
Differentiating the above equations defining the elasticities of 
substitution and the relationship between gross and net factor prices, 
substituting for the starred price variables, setting all factor taxes 
initially equal to zero and making use of the convention that all initial 
prices are unity, the standard Harberger equations (85) and (86) can be 
extended to: 
The relation of changes in product prices to changes in tax 
inclusive factor prices and sales taxes is: 
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where Tx and TY are taxes on products x and y respectively and Tc 
is any ad valorem retail sales tax. 
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( A:AA3) 
In other words, the percentage change in the price of a product is 
the weighted average of the percentage changes in the tax-inclusive 
prices of factors (where weights are factor shares), plus any ad valorem 
excise tax on the product itself and any general ad valorem sales tax. 
The standard Harberger expressions for the relationship between product 
prices, net factor returns and various kinds of taxes can be found by 
substitution, 
(A:AA4) 
(A:AA5) 
AA.l: · Tax Equivalences 
Although the HMM version of the Harberger model is specified to 
include nine possible taxes (or subsidies), only four need to be analysed 
in order to derive the complete incidence picture. This may be best 
illustrated by the following matrix (note 11 indicate vertical identities): 
Tc = TLK = TL + TK 
II II II 
T = Tlx + TKx X 
+ + + 
T = Tly + TKy y 
Txy 
Given these identities, knowledge about the incidence of a single 
commodity tax, T , for example, makes it possible to derive the 
X 
incidence of the other commodity tax. Similarly, with factor taxes, 
APPEN)!X TWO TAX INCII:ea: CONCLUSICJ.6 FROM H~ STUDIES 396. 
knowledge about the incidence of one of the factor taxes such as TK 
makes it possible to derive the incidence of the other factor tax. 
Finally, once the incidence of a tax on one factor used in the production 
of one good is determined, say TKx, then TKy and Tlx can be 
determined directly and these two results may be used to obtain Tly. 
In addition, since there is no saving, income and consumption are 
equivalent. So, a tax on consumption is equivalent to a tax on income. 
Mieszkowski (1967) demonstrated these equivalences applying Harberger's 
assumption of complete factor mobility. 
AA.2: Derivation of Expressions for Determining the Incidence of 
Other Partial Taxes. 
Recalling equation (A:Al), specifying T more precisely as TKx: 
dwK = (xK.(A + 8) .TKx) 
0 
it is possible to derive expressions which give a general solution for a 
tax on labour employed in producing x, for labour employed in producing 
y, for capital employ~d in producing y, for product x and for product y. 
The general solution for the incidence of a per unit tax on labour 
employed in the production of x is fully derived to provide an example 
for deriving the remaining four taxes. 
Equations (81) to (85) in the text remain unchanged. These are: 
dx = E.d(pxiPy) (81') 
x px/py) 
dx = E (dpx - dpy) 
X 
dx = XL.dlx + XK.dKX 
X LX Kx 
(82 I) 
(83 I) 
(84 I) 
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dKY _ dLY = Sy.(dWK- dwL) (85 I) 
KY LY 
Equation (86) becomes: 
dKx _ dlx = Sx.(dWK- dwL- TLx) (861) 
Kx Lx 
Equations (87) through (814) remain the same. Repeating the main 
ones: 
dwl = 0 
cJ<Y = -d<x 
cl.y = -d,_ X 
Equation (815) becomes: 
dpx = xl(dwl + TLx) + xK.dwK 
(87 1 ) 
(88 1 ) 
(89 1 ) 
(814 I) 
(815') 
Equations (87 1 ), (814 1 ) and 815') can be substituted into equation 
(81 1 ) giving: 
dx = E(xK (dWK) - YKdWk + xKTLx] 
-X 
Equation (817) remains the same: 
Kx (-dKX) -LX (-dLX) = Sy.dWK 
KYKX LYLX 
Equation (818) is changed by substituting equation (88') into 
equation (85 1 ): 
di(X _ cf_X __ 
-Sx. TL x 
dx 
( 816') 
(817') 
(818') 
x can be eliminated by equating equations (83 1 ) and (816' ). This 
leaves three equations and three unknowns, dwK, dlx and dKx. 
Solving for dwK gives the answer to the incidence question. 
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ExL XL XK 
0 -LX Kx 
LY KY 
dwK = -Sx -1 1 TLx 
E(yK - 1<) XL XK 
- Sy - LX Kx 
-Ly Ky 
-Sx -1 1 
Making use of the assumption that xL + xK = 1 and expanding 
the determinant gives: 
[
Kx LXl [xLKX xKLX l ExL ---j + Sx _+ __ 
dWK = KY LY KY LY 
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(A:AA6) 
(A:AA7) 
The denominator of this expression is the same as the denominator of 
the now familiar equation in the text of Chapter Two (821) which was 
solved for the incidence of a tax on capital employed in producing x. In 
equation (A:Al), this denominator was set equal to D. The elasticity of 
demand for x times the first bracketed expression in the numerator was 
set equal to 8 and the entire second expression was set equal to 8. So, 
equation (A:AA7) may be restated as: 
For a tax on capital employed in the production of y: 
dwK = (-yKA + Sy) TKy 
and the imposition of a tax on labour in the production of y: 
dwK = (-yLA + Sy) TLy 
A partial commodity tax on good x has the following incidence: 
dwK =A Tx 
-0-
(A:AA8) 
(A:AA9) 
(A:AAlO) 
( A:AAll) 
- - --- - - - -
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and a partial commodity tax on good y is determined by: 
dWJ< = A Ty 
u-
AA.3: Examination of the General Solution. 
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(A:AA12) 
Recalling the discussion about the general solution to the original 
Herberger model, 0 (the denominator in equations (A:AA8) through (A:AA12) 
above), is always positive. Consequently, the sign for dwK for all the 
equations depends on the sign of the numerator. A positive sign for 
dwK (i.e. dwK < 0) means that capital will bear a smaller tax burden 
than labour relative to their initial income shares and a minus sign 
means that the proportion of capital's initial income paid in tax will be 
greater than the proportion of income labour pays in tax. 
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DATA ON HOUSEHOLD INCOME DISTRIBUTION IN NEW ZEALAND 
SECTION ONE: INCOME DEFINITIONS MEASURED BY FOUR NEW ZEALAND DATA 
SOURCES 
The four major sources of information about New Zealand incomes are 
Incomes and Income Tax, Census of Population and Dwellings, the 
Household Survey and the System of National Accounts. All of these 
are Department of Statistics publications but data for Income and Income 
Tax are collected by the Department of Inland Revenue from tax returns. 
This section discusses some of the pertinent aspects of these data in 
relation to the approach adopted by this thesis. 
None of the above data meets entirely with the requirements of this 
thesis. In particular, the personal income definitions do not measure a 
comprehensive income concept suitable for evaluating income 
redistribution as discussed in Chapter Three. Personal income data are 
grouped into household income groups by both the Census and the Household 
Survey. The definitions of household income differ because of the 
different income measures and because ·of different methods of combining 
persons into households. To analyse the budget's influence on household 
income, it is necessary to apply all of the above data sources and more. 
A. INCOMES AND INCOME TAX 
Incomes and Income Tax publish data recording taxable and 
I 
ass'essable income for persons and companies. The definition of income is 
that required to be reported for tax purposes. 
Personal Income is defined for tax purposes to include nearly all 
salary and wage income (which is taxed at source), earnings of 
shareholder employees, and the assessable profits of self-employed 
persons, interest (less exempt interest) earned by persons, net rent and 
royalties, taxable dividends, assessable income from estates, universal 
superannuation, annuity income, individual shares of partnership incomes 
and some overseas income1. 
1. In most cases, if income is already taxed overseas it does not need 
to be included on a New Zealand tax return. 
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Three types of income losses may be deducted in calculating personal 
income for tax purposes. These include current losses, current business 
losses to be carried forward, and previous losses. Current losses are 
not the full amount of the loss, but the amount required to reduce income 
from other sources to "nil". Current business losses refer to the amount 
of loss incurred in the current year in excess of income from other 
sources. Current losses and current business losses may be carried 
forward indefinitely and set off against assessable income in subseqwent 
years. Previous losses are the amount of business losses set off against 
assessable income for the current year. 
A sample of income information from income tax returns and tax 
deduction certificates provides the personal income statistics for a 
particular tax year. The data vary from year to year, depending on 
changes in tax legislation. For example, recent collection of 
information about low-income earners is hampered by the fact that those 
earning below $2,600 before 31 March 1981 and, since then, those earning 
below $11,500 (whose only income is from salary, wages, pensions for past 
war service and national superannuation) a~e not required to submit tax 
returns. 
B. THE CENSUS 
There are two separate Census forms - one for individuals and the 
other to cover either an occupied private dwelling or a public 
(non-private) dwelling. The individual Census form collects information 
about income. 
Income for Census purposes refers to all earnings, plus income from 
other sources such as rents, dividends on shares, interest on investments 
and savings before the deduction of taxes or insurance. Income derived 
from social security benefits or war pensions is not included in Census 
income. 
Census income information varies from one Census to another because 
the question about income is changed and because the question may be 
placed differently in relation to other Census questions. Instead of 
giving a precise income figure, respondents choose from a broad-banded 
range of income categories. 
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8.1: Census Income 
Personal income is measured by asking all individuals filling in a 
Census form to tick a broad-banded income category. The income question 
appears on the individual Census forms (a form is also filled out for 
each occupied dwelling, but it does not contain an income question). 
Household income is personal income as defined for Census purposes 
plus social security income, aggregated for all members of the 
household. The incomes of the occupants of private dwellings are 
aggregated based on the mid-point of the broad-banded income range 
selected. 
8.2: Census Households 
Table A3.l shows in the number of occupied dwellings and the change 
between the 1976 and 1981 Census. 
Table A3.1 
OCCt.FIED DWELLINGS CENSUS NIGHT 1976 AND 1981 
Intercensal Change 
Occupied Dwellings 
Permanent and Private 
Temporary Private 
Non-Private 
Total Occupied 
1976 
923,257 
3,227 
6, 776 
933,260 
1981 
1,003,113 
2,376 
6,393 
1,011,882 
Number 
+79,856 
-851 
-383 
+78,622 
Source: 1976 and 1981 Census of Population and Dwellings 
Percent 
8.6 
-26.4 
-5.7 
8.4 
A household on Census night consists of the total occupants of one 
permanent and private dwelling. Households are further divided into (1) 
one family only households; (2) other family households; (3) non-family 
(multi-persons) households; and (4) one-person households. 
The households analysed in this thesis are those occupying permanent 
and private dwellings, with some adjustments. These dwellings make up 
about 99 percent of total occupied dwellings and account for about 95 
percent of the population. 
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8.3: Census Information on Private Dwelling Ownership 
The Census does not presently request information about the value of 
assets owned by persons and households. It does, however, seek 
information about whether occupied permanent dwellings are owned, rented 
or leased or provided with the job. 
Ta51e A3.2 summarises the 1976 and 1981 data about dwelling tenure. 
Table A3.2 
OCOJ=liED PERMANENT AND PRIVATE DWELLINGS BY TENURE 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
Tenure 1976 
Proportion of 
Permanent and 
1981 Pvte Dwellings 
Intercensal 
Increase 
1976 1981 Number Percent 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------253,567 
387,078 
248,356 
Owned without a mortgage 
Owned with a mortgage 
Rented or leased 
Provided free with job 
Provided free not with 
Not Specified 
22,678 
job 8,649 
2,929 
287,343 
423,459 
253,386 
21,213 
12,321 
5,388 
27.6 
42.1 
27.0 
2.5 
0.9 
28.8 
42.4 
25.4 
2.1 
1.2 
+33,776 
+36,381 
+5,030 
-1,465 
+3,672 
+2,459 
13.3 
9.4 
2.0 
-6.5 
42.5 
84.0 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------Total 923,257 1,003,113 100.0 100;0 +79,856 8.6 
Source: 1976 and 1981 Census of Population and Dwellings. 
An area for further research would be to analyse these data by 
household income group and type. For example, it would put the results 
of this thesis into perspective if it were known whether there is a 
greater propensity for national superannuitants to live in households 
which are owned without a mortage. 
To test the hypothesis that permanent income (some concept of income 
taking accouunt of life cycle and other expected changes) is a better 
basis for designing a superannuation policy, it would be helpful if 
future Censuses could include two questions about assets. One would list 
possible household assets (shares, debentures, life policies and so on) 
leaving a space to write an estimated value. The other would be designed 
like the income question with broad-banded categories but asking dwelling 
questionnaire respondents to estimate the value of their house. 
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C. THE HOUSEHOLD SURVEY 
Since 1973/74, the Department of Statistics has conducted a survey 
to determine household expenditure and income patterns. This survey was 
originally referred to simply as the Household Survey but more recently 
as the Household Expenditure and Income Survey (HEIS). 
A sample of households are surveyed each year and recent surveys 
have defined income very comprehensively. Income data is collected on 
both an individual and a household basis. 
This thesis is based on the 1981/82 Household Survey. In that year, 
3,487 households responded to the Survey, being interviewed in 
approximately equal numbers each month. 
C.l: Household Survey Income Definition 
Incane ("total income") is the current gross income from all 
sources (including social welfare and ather benefits) far each income 
recipient in the household. The one exception to this is interest from 
deposits in savings banks. If a respondent's only income is from this 
source and is less than $200 per annum, income figures are not collected. 
Up to the 1977/78 collection year, no endeavour was made to obtain 
precise income details from the respondents. The method of collection 
used was along similar lines to that used in the Census, where 
respondents had a broad-banded range of income categories and marked the 
category pertaining to themselves. From the 1978/79 year, the Household 
Survey questionnaire was redesigned to include a detailed individual 
income questionnaire. 
Income sources covered by the Household Survey include wages and 
salaries, self-employment income, investment income, social 
welfare benefits and other regular income. All regular income from 
these sources combines to the measure of "total income". 
Wages and salaries mainly comprise wage, salary and piecework 
payments for jobs currently held. Overtime, commissions and taxable 
allowances are all classified as wage and salary income. 
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Self-efl1)loyment income is the before-tax profit or loss fro.m the 
respondent's business, trade or profession. In the case of a 
partnership, only the respondent's share of the profit or loss is 
recorded. Self-employment and rent income are measured after the 
deduction of expenses incurred in producing the income, but before tax. 
That is, they are net profit or loss measures, not "gross income" in 
accounting terminology. The existence of losses results in a negative 
income for some household income groups. 
Investment income includes interest income, dividend income, rent 
and royalties. 
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Social welfare benefit income includes income from national 
superannuation, the family benefit, the unemployment benefit and other 
benefits including domestic purposes, invalids, sickness, widows and war 
pensions and maintenance payments. The pre-tax value of these benefits 
is included in the ftlusehold Survey measure of "total income". 
Other regular income includes some income which is assessabls for 
tax purposes and other forms which are not taxable. The taxable 
component consists of superannuation (other than national superannuation) 
and income from trusts. The exempt component consists of educational 
scholarships and bursaries and other regular income not falling into any 
of the other categories and therefore for which insufficient information 
is available to specify more precisely. 
Matrices set up with income levels on one axis and types of 
households on the other provide a better picture of the variation in 
income for policy purposes. Within households, unique people are 
identified. The identification of people within households allows 
accurate merging for analysis of the effects of taxes and expenditures. 
The computer package SAS includes matrix manipulation procedures such 
that tax calculations, for example, can be performed for a whole matrix 
(or table) of households or individuals at once. 
Certain eligibility criteria must be met by households approached 
before they are included in the Survey. Basically, the household must be 
a private New Zealand household and able to provide the required 
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information at the same address during the month of approach. The 
household as a whole provides answers to the expenditure questionnaire 
and each person aged 15 years and over keeps a diary for a period of two 
weeks and completes an income questionnaire. 
A comparison of the 1981/82 Household Survey income data with the 
1980/81 Incomes and Income Tax data (taking inflation int~ account) did 
not show unambiguous bias in taxable incomes. Although there was 
evidence of some under and over-estimation depending on income source, 
total taxable income matched well. However, the data comparison provides 
evidence that the Household Survey under-represents people with high 
incomes. At the other end of this scale, a comparison with Department of 
Social Welfare figures on benefit income revealed substantial 
under-coverage of benefits other than national superannuation and the 
family benefit. 
As is not uncommon for a survey of this type, households' total 
expenditure exceeds their disposable income, on average, for all but the 
10 or 20 percent of households in the top income groups. Expenditure 
patterns are likely to be a function of permanent income measures, but 
the Household Survey only asks for current (rather than historical) 
income levels. For more discussion of the mismatch between income and 
expenditure see Broad and Bacica (1985, p.l6). 
C.2: Time Period of Data 
Household Survey data nominally represent a fiscal year, in the case 
of the quantitative research in this thesis, 1981/82. However, the 
characteristics of the data are somewhat different from this. The 
continuous nature of the survey results in data being reported for 
periods beginning up to two years before the start of the 1981/82 year. 
For the standard recall variables, the respondent is asked to note income 
received in the twelve months preceding the interview. Examples are 
interest, income from overseas and from occasional employment. Data 
values for these variables have one parameter, the end of the period 
covered, say e. Thus, standard recall variables are of the form: y (e, 
1) • 
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Current data refers to income received from various sources for 
which the rate of receipt was known only for the time of interview. 
Examples are wages and salaries and the benefits received at non-standard 
rates. Data values for these variables have t hree parameters: 
e = end of period covered (= interview date) 
1 = length of period covered 
r = date to which the rate element of income refers (because of the 
question format, this relates to the latest "normal" receipt). Thus, 
current data variables are of the form: y (e, 1, r). 
Business income is the net profit made by the business (or share of 
the business in the case of partnerships) , for some period previous to 
the interview. This might be any period for which accounts are available 
but is generally the most recent tax year. The way in which the reported 
data relates to income in the standard recall year is not known (i.e. 
whether the business operated for the full twelve months, and whether the 
individual's participation in the business changed). Normally it is 
assumed that the business operated for the full recall year in the same 
manner as the reporting period. Data values for business income are of 
the form: y (e, 1). 
C.3: Age 
Date of birth is not collected in the Household Survey, just age at 
the date the survey is taken. Survey respondents are treated as though 
they remain the same age throughout the year, even though the total 
respondents are made up from groups surveyed at different times over the 
year. 
C.4: Household Income: Household Sample Survey 
A household is defined as either a single individual living in a 
dwelling who makes his or her own housekeeping arrangements or a group of 
persons living in or sharing a private dwelling for most of the reference 
period who participate (in some measure at least) in consumption of food 
purchased for joint use by members, or who, if not dependent upon a 
household member, contribute some portion of income towards the provision 
of essentials of living for the household as a whole. 
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Persons living in institutions or group living establishments such 
as boarding houses, hotels, motels and hostels are nat included in the 
Household Survey. However, children at boarding school were accounted 
far by including expenditure an behalf of those children in the 
recardkeeping of the parent or guardian. If at the interview stage 
persons occupying a permanent private dwelling caula be separated into 
groups, each achieving independence with respect to the purchase of food 
and the sharing of meals, then each group was considered a separate 
household for survey purposes. 
Household income is obtained by adding together the values 
attributed to each income earner in the household. The Household Survey 
measures total weekly income and this is grossed up to annual income in 
this thesis by multiplying by 52 weeks. 
A useful feature of the Household Survey data and the Census is that 
unit record data can be used to classify households in different ways. 
For example, the information could be tabulated by region, as well as by 
income group and household type. 
The sample design of the Household Survey and details of the 
collection methods are described in Survey reports (see far example, 
Department of Statistics, 1984 c). The Survey attempts to provide 
overall average expenditures far the main commodity groups with a 
sampling error of less than 5 percent. The possible sample error 
increases as the information is disaggregated to form estimates based on 
fewer households. To avoid the possibility of misleading results in this 
thesis, information in individual cells has been suppressed where there 
are less than four observations. 
Non-sampling errors such as nan-response, measurement errors and 
processing errors have not been investigated in depth. However, a 
comparison of the household type distribution in the 1982 Household 
Survey and the 1981 Census of Population and Dwellings reveals that 
single--person and three-or-mare adult households with children are 
under-represented in the Household Survey, while there is an 
over-representation of two-adult households and twa-adult households with 
twa children. 
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D. NATIONAL INCOME ACCOUNTS 
National accounting statistics are designed to provide a consistent 
and systematic summary of the transactions taking place in the economy. 
The New Zealand System of National Accounts (NZSNA) is based on the 
United Nations System of National Accounting. The system has been 
largely designed from a macroeconomic perspective and does not always 
achieve consistency among microeconomic transactions. 
In recent years, the Department of Statistics has adopted common 
classifications and concepts for many of its major macroeconomic 
statistical collections. There is not yet exact consistency, however, 
between the "income earned by New Zealanders" concept in the NZSNA and 
that measured by the Census, Household Survey or Incomes and Income Tax. 
NZSNA information is provided in aggregate and by production account 
(production of goods and services by economic activity as defined by the 
owners of. that activity). The Owners of that activity can be either 
private or government (central or local authority). The activities can 
be further broken down into market and non-market grouping. However, the 
NZSNA data presently cannot be disaggregated into a personal or household 
sector. 
The amount of income accruing to persons is compensation of 
employees for the financial year ending 31 March. Compensation of 
employees includes payments of salaries and wages, whether in cash or in 
kind to employees, contributions paid on employees' behalf to 
superannuation funds, private pension schemes, the Accident Compensation 
Commission and to casualty and life insurance schemes. 
A person may also gain income from awning a business. This gain is 
called operating surplus, approximately equal to accounting profit 
before the deduction of direct taxes, dividends, bad debts and before the 
deduction of interest paid or the addition of interest received. The 
annual change in the value of the person's capital is measured by 
consumption of fixed capital, which is the value of depreciation at 
ordinary rates allowed far taxation purposes plus an estimate for the 
normal rate of accidental damage, based on the insurance claims by 
industry groups. 
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The transactions recognised in the national accounts are flows and 
are brought to a common denominator of money in current values. The 
money value of income may be reduced by indirect taxes and increased by 
subsidies. 
Indirect taxes are assessed on producers in respect of production, 
sale, purchase and use of goods and services and are seen as adding 
directly to the market price of these goods and services. Subsidies 
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are grants made by the government to market-oriented producers who regard 
the transfers as an addition to income from current production. Under 
NZSNA, these grants include payments to guarantee prices or to enable 
market prices of goods and services to be held below the cost of 
production. Also included are transfers made by local authorities out of 
rate receipts to finance the losses of their trading departments and 
deliberately incurred losses of government trading organisations. 
0.1: A Household Income and Outlay Account 
NZSNA Income and outlay accounts measure current transactions not 
directly connected with productive activity. These transactions include 
the disbursement of factor incomes outside the production process, and 
the receipt and disbursement of other factor incomes such as direct 
taxation, government transfers, donations, gifts, expenditures of funds 
outside of New Zealand and savings. Indirectly, income and outlay 
accounts are linked to the production accounts because they record the 
initial receipt of factor incomes and final consumption expenditures on 
goods and services which are produced. 
The following is a simplified income and outlay account for the 
household sector. This is based on ongoing work by the Department of 
Statistics (1983). An official version of such an account for New 
Zealand has not yet been derived. 
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FIGURE A3.l 
A SIMPLIFIED HOUSEHOLD INCOME AND OUTLAY ACCOUNT 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------Outlay ($) 
Final Consumption Expenditure 
Property Income Paid 
-Interest: Consumer Debt 
Other Interest 
Direct Taxes on Income 
(income tax ) 
Compulsory Fees, Fines and 
Penalties 
Current Transfers n.e.c. to 
- Private Non-Profit 
Organisations 
- Other Residents 
- Rest of the World 
Savings (residual) 
Total Disbursements 
Source: Department of Statistics. 
D.2: A Flow-of-Funds Account 
Income Received ($) 
Compensation of Employees 
Withdrawals from Entrepreneurial 
Income 
Property Income Received 
- Interest 
~ Dividends 
Social Assistance Grants 
Current Transfers n.e.c. from 
- Other residents 
- Rest of the World 
Total Receipts 
One weakness of NZSNA is that these accounts do not show the 
interrelationships between transactions in financial markets. Polakoff's 
(1978) flow of funds approach is better suited to answering questions 
like how much of the public debt is distributed to the household sector. 
The flow of funds approach divides the ecdnomy into four sectors, 
consumers, business firms, government and the financial institutions. A 
sources and uses of funds statement combines both the balance sheet and 
the income statement into one. It includes both real and financial 
assets. In other words, it is possible to evaluate both the stock and 
the flow of asset transactions. 
A real asset is something which appears in only one balance sheet, 
that of its owner. Items such as inventories, plant and equipment, 
houses and automobiles are real assets. A financial asset, on the other 
hand, is defined as a claim against someone else. It must appear on two 
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FIG.JRE A3.2 
POLAKOFF'S GENERALISED USES AND SOURCES OF FUNDS ACCOUNT 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------Uses 
Current Expenditures 
Saving_C6 Net Warth) 
6 Real Assets 
~ Financial Assets 
~ Maney (hoarding) 
Sources 
Current Receipts 
~Net Warth 
~ Liabilities (Borrowing) 
balance sheets, that of its owner and simultaneously an the balance sheet 
of whoever awes it to that owner (as a liability). 
E. DATA USED ON THIS THESIS 
The Task Farce an Tax Reform (1982) matrix is adapted in this thesis 
where households are grouped by income and, according to their 
composition, determined by the number of adults and children in the 
household and the receipt of national superannuation. This makes it 
possible to analyse the income effects of budget measures within fairly 
homogeneous income groups. 
To measure the influence of the budget far the entire household 
papulation, the Household Survey data are aggregated to represent the 
private household papulation using the Census. This process is explained 
in the next twa sections of this Appendix. 
Income and Income Tax data provide information far analysing 
particular aspects of the personal income tax structure and the company 
tax. NZSNA data are used as the basis far measuring the money-income 
value of government income and outlays and for ather income aggregates. 
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SECTION TWO: WEIGHTS 
This thesis attempts to quantify the effects of the government 
budget over the entire population of private households. Although 
ideally, the entire population should be included, it could not be 
because the Household Survey does not sample activity of those resident 
in non-private households. 
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To scale up income or other distributions to the entire population 
of private households, 1981 Census data are used to weight the 1981/82 
Household Survey (HS) results. The aim of the weighting is to adjust the 
household income by household-type distribution of the Household Survey 
to match that of the Cenus. 
This note summarises the derivation of the scale-up weights, as 
carried out by Broad of the Department of Statistics. This scaling 
procedure adjusts the Household Survey data for differential non-response 
by household type and income level and for natural sampling variation in 
the representation of these characteristics in the sample. It appears 
that differential non-response is most significant for household type, 
while the adjustments to the income distribution are more cosmetic and 
aimed at smoothing out the Household Survey distribution to match the 
Census. 
The first step is to develop consistent income by household-type 
classifications from each source. The next Sections (Appendix Three, 
Section Three) shows how the Census information is grouped into the 
selected household types. 
The household-type classifications are chosen to reflect the 
composition of households which are apparently targetted either to 
receive income maintenance (primarily national supperannuation or 
child-related support) or to be excluded from such support. 
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Census income data are collected in broad-band income ranges and 
this dictates the choice of income classification. Since the HS income 
data are based on unit record observations, the HS information about 
households is able to be grouped into the Census income classes. 
The household survey income data are first adjusted for income 
growth between the Census year and the Household Survey year. 
Table AA3.1 below orders the 1981/82 HS data by Census income range 
and the designated household type. 
Table AA3.1 
DISTRIBUTI~ OF 1981/82 Hll.JSEHLD SURVEY SAt-A£ HOJSEHOLDS 
BY INCOME GROUP AND I-OJSEHOLD TYPE 
Houseilol c1 Type 
!ncome itange 1 Ac1ul t 2 ~c1ul ts 2 Ac1ul ts 'oli th Chi 1 dn!n 3 or ~M! Adults 
ts p .a. 19aa;a1 
do 11 ars) Nat. Sup. Otne r Nat. Sup. Ot.'1er One Two Thn!e• llo Ch1 d~, 11/Chldm 
L.ss Than $500 169 27 125 15 10 7 14 14 5 
$500-{ $3,500) 108 18 1ZZ 15 7 9 13 16 4 
$3,500-{ $5,000) 15 13 Z7 6 5 6 3 7 3 
$5,000-{ $6,500) 12 10 11 11 6 12 5 5 3 
$6,500-{ }3,000) 4 13 28 11 16 20 10 5 7 
~.ooo-< $1 a,oao l 7 50 19 15 19 37 2Z 15 d 
$10,000-{ $1 2,000) 4 38 27 47 36 60 37 19 18 
$1 2,000-{ $14,000 l 0 41 14 34 31 52 29 12 15 
$14,000-( $18,000) 1 32 21 80 56 83 73 25 43 
$18,000-{ $22,500) 2 19 25 144 43 88 62 42 59 
~ZZ,S00- ( $25,000) 5 s 44 3 36 23 30 29 
~25,000-( $30,000) 5 i 79 16 43 zz 41 46 
po, ooo-< $40, oaa 1 1 1 6 45 9 19 24 sa 48 
$40,000 .Jr Over 0 0 4 18 4 23 11 29 30 
To tal 345 212 442 504 256 495 349 316 3ZZ 
~of Total 9.3: 7.a~ 12.7~ 16.~ 7.6~ 14.~ 1 0.~ 9. I~ 9.~ 
1 Mult 
IIi ':.."1 
Chi 1 dn!n 
sa 
34 
i 
5 
5 
a 
.;. 
5 
5 
1 
1 
0 
0 
a 
135 
3.3!. 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------Source: 1981//82 Household Survey. 
Total 
445 
346 
9Z 
a2 
1ZO 
200 
2!l0 
23l 
4ZO 
485 
183 
260 
209 
119 
3487 
100.~ 
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Table AA3.2 shows the distribution of the private-household 
population on Census night, 1981, by household type and income ranges. 
The income ranges include fourteen broad-banded groups and one group 
called "not specified". "Not specified" refers to households where one 
or more members did not designate an income range on their Census form. 
Table AA3.2 
DISTRIBUTION OF CENSUS HOUSEHOLDS BY INCOME GROUP AND HOUSEHOLD TYPE 
415. 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
Household Type 
Not 
Income 1 Adult 2 Adults 2 Adults W/Ch1dn 3 or ~ore Adults C1 assi fi able 
Range 1 Adult 3ecause of 
($ p.a.l ~a e. Sup. Other Na t.Sup. Other One Two Three+ ~ Chldn ·.;;Ch1dn '.f /Cill dn Absentees 
Not Spec1 f1ed 9130 5330 14540 13740 10420 15420 14090 14270 20690 5220 10830 
Lass Than $500 43740 9530 27540 3840 2030 1760 1610 1230 1020 15080 9230 
$500-( $3500} 24010 5970 21870 3170 1700 1210 1100 1420 790 3840 5090 
$3500-( $5000) 5940 2540 5690 1250 730 800 570 720 430 1060 1920 
$5000-( $6500) 3800 3670 5310 2300 1630 1640 1250 1090 820 1..00 2680 
$6500-( $8000) 2910 5680 5580 3060 2700 3140 2190 1330 960 1180 2640 
$8000-( $10000) 2590 9300 3050 5680 5020 6410 5360 2520 1960 1580 4620 
$1 0000-($1 2000) 2060 11320 7130 6280 7310 10910 8510 2770 2390 1940 5420 
$1 2000-( $14000) 14.10 8010 5410 8440 7050 11130 8510 3150 2930 1170 4560 
$14000-( $18000) 1340 9310 7510 22980 12380 22970 16160 8030 7060 1300 8110 
$18000-( $22500) 690 4-510 5300 29450 9010 18010 12930 9620 9310 620 7490 
$22500- ( $25000) 180 1210 1590 11150 3130 5820 4730 6060 5880 120 3150 
$25000-( $30000) 250 lOCO 2490 18190 4230 7900 6090 11280 9780 90 4940 
$3 0000- ( $40000) 320 790 1770 8520 2490 5030 3690 14200 9740 90 4iZO 
$40000 0 r a~ r 150 550 1240 3630 1620 3400 3550 10030 6460 70 ~660 
To ta 1 s 98540 79820 12Z110 144660 71440 116540 90450 87720 80200 34830 80070 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------Source: 1981/82 Census of Population and Dwellings 
Some people did not specify their income in the Census, and some 
households had members absent on Census night, so not all households in 
the Census can be classified exactly into the groups required. 
To ta is 
134670 
116600 
70170 
21850 
26650 
31370 
54090 
68030 
517i0 
117250 
106940 
44010 
56250 
51370 
35360 
1006360 
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Operations carried out to reallocate the Census "not specified" 
income and non-standard household type groups are briefly set out as 
follows: 
1) Household with Absentees 
416. 
It is not possible to be certain of whether absentees on Census 
night are children eligible for the family benefit or not. The only 
related information recorded is their "family role" (i.e. mother, 
father, child, other). It is assumed that all child roles do 
represent dependent children. Where only children are absent on 
Census night, the household type is adjusted accordingly and counts 
added directly to the corresponding column in the table. If any 
_adults are absent, the household type could still be adjusted simply 
but since the adults could contribute to the household income, the 
income level had to be considered as well. Neglecting the 
possibility of losses, the counts were allocated pro-rata to cells 
in the main table with the corresponding household type and th~_ ?am~ 
or greater income level. 
2) Occupants Temporarily Away 
On Census night, some dwellings are unoccupied because all the 
occupants are temporarily absent. These accounted for some 30,200 
dwellings in 1981. Some of these represent second dwellings for the 
household (e.g. holiday homes, "town houses'') so that the occupants 
may have been properly enumerated as usually resident elsewhere; but 
enumerators attempt to identify and classify these cases as 
unoccupied. A reconciliation of visitors and absentees in Section 
Three of Appendix Three concludes that 36,400 people usually reside 
in these OTA ("occupants temporarily away") dwellings. This implies 
an average household size of 1.2 people, so single person households 
must be disproportionately represented in the OTA group. By making 
some simple assumptions about the independence of the probabilities 
of adult household members being absent and the effect of the 
presence of children on these probabilities, estimates of the OTA 
counts for each household type are made. These imply approximately 
the expected number of people in OTA DWELLINGS. A 
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reconciliation of the number of National Superannuitants in private 
dwellings is used to split the one- and two-adult groups into 
national-superannuitant households and "othe~'. 
3) Incomes Not Specified 
The income groups of the OTA households were unknown, putting them 
in the same situation as the top row of Table AA3.2. All these 
households were allocated pro-rata over the income groups within the 
corresponding household type group. 
Once the above adjustments have been achieved, it is possible to 
make the comparison illustrated by Table AA3.3 of the houseshold type 
representation in the 1981 Census and the 1981/82 Household Survey. 
Table AA3.3 
COM'ARISON OF HD.JSEJ-0_{) TYPE REPRESENTATIIJit _ .. _ 
IN 1l£ 1981 CENSUS AND THE 1981/82 HJUSEHOLO SURVEY 
-----~nsusl H.Ss2 01 l'fe re!!Ce 
iiousehold Type (000) (~) (000) (:~) (000) 
One Adul:: - ~a tl Superannui tan t 111 10.8 96 9.3 -15 
- Other 90 a.i 81 7.8 _, 
Two Adults - !nc:l ~atl Superannuitant lZS 12.4 131 12.7 3 
- Other 155 1 s.o 167 16.Z lZ 
Two Adul ts ·~; th - One Chi 1 d* ao 7.7 79 7.6 -1 
- Two Chi 1 dren 1Z7 1Z.Z 147 14.Z 20 
- Three Or :.Ia re Chi 1 dren 104 10.1 104 10.0 a 
Three Or :.lore Adults - ~o Chi 1 dren 99 9.3 94 9.1 ~ 
- ·~; th Chi 1 d( ~n) 103 10.0 96 9.Z -7 
One Adul:: - ·~; th Chi1 d( ren) ,. _, 3 • .5 40 3.9 3 
~ ~ 1.Qli 100.0 ~ 
Notes: 1) From Table AA3.2. 2) Estimated by taking percentage distribu-
tion of household types in HS (see bottom row table 3.3A) by 1,035,000 
Census households. 3) Difference (000) expressed as percentage of 
number of Census households in group. 4) "Child" denotes a person 
eligible for payment of Family Benefit. Sources: 1981 Census and 
Section Three, Appendix Three. 
(~)3 
-13.3 
-10.2 
Z.l 
7.8 
-1.0 
15.9 
~.5 
-5.0 
-7.6 
a.o 
~ 
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Table AA3.4 reflects the adjustments made to the Census data 
discussed above. 
Table AA3.4 
Income il.anqe 
( ~ ?.A.} 
Less Than $500 
$500-( $3500) 
~500-( $5000 l 
$5000-( $6500 l 
$6500-( $8000) 
$8000-( $10000) 
$1 0000-{ $12000) 
$12000-($14000) 
$14000-{ $18000) 
$1 8000-( $22500) 
$22500-( $25000 l 
$25000-( $30000) 
$30000-( $~0000) 
$40000 or over 
ADJUSTED OISTRIBUTI~ OF 1981 CENSUS HOUSEHOLDS 
BY INCOME GROUP AND HOUSEHOLD TYPE 
Household Type 
1 AdUlt 2 Adults 2 Adul t.s '~/Chi 1 dren 3 01" ~re Adul ~ 
14a t.Sup. Other 14a t.Sup. Other One Two Three+ No Chldrn '~/Chldrn 
54430 11650 32180 4320 2830 2270 2190 1470 1540 
29890 7300 25750 3600 2320 1490 1530 1720 1160 
7390 3230 6710 1430 990 1000 930 880 530 
4730 4480 7470 2620 2220 2110 1880 1340 12SO 
3620 6950 5o4o 3500 3350 3860 2980 1640 1490 
3220 11380 9650 7720 6430 7850 7290 3150 3060 
2560 13840 8640 9670 9160 13460 11130 3510 3770 
1750 9800 6010 9940 8940 13780 11090 4030 4630 
1670 11380 9390 27340 15810 28420 :i570 10470 11760 
860 5510 6580 35230 11840 22630 17590 12830 15790 
230 1480 1980 13360 4190 8630 6540 8160 9820 
3:!0 1230 3100 21840 5710 10110 8480 15430 17180 
400 970 2210 10260 3520 6460 5450 19770 i7980 
200 670 1570 4420 2430 47ZO 5420 14300 13430 
418. 
1 Adult 
'rli th 
:hi 1 dre!! To tal 
18800 131690 
4870 79620 
1380 24570 
1800 29890 
i 470 35500 
2010 61770 
2570 78310 
1510 72090 . 
1710 139510 
800 129670 
150 54530 
11 0 83530 
110 67120 
90 4i250 
Total 111280 89870 128480 155250. 79750 126780 104070 98700 103490 37380 103':060 
-------------------~------------------------------------------------------Source: See text of Appendix Three, Sections Two and Three, for 
derivation. 
The one remaining difficulty in calculating the post-stratification 
weights is the existence of empty cells in the HS Table AA3.1. These do 
not allow direct division of all cells in Table AA3.4 by corresponding 
cells in AA3.1. The solution used is to somewhat arbitrarily aggregate 
income groups for the three affected household types before calculating 
the weights. The neighbouring cells are often small so several are 
aggregated. This is done so as not to weight any particular survey 
household excessively. Otherwise, this could have generated more 
problems in the way of outliers in later tables, something the 
approximate weighting was meant to solve. 
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The final weights used to scale up the Household Survey information 
are derived by dividing the number of observations in each cell (or group 
of cells as just explained) of Table AA3.4 by the number of observations 
of the distribution of sample households by income group and househol d 
type in Table AA3.1. Table AA3.5 below illustrates the final weights to 
be applied to the Household Survey data. 
Table AA3.5 
FINAL WEIGHTS TO BE APPLIED TO HOUSEHOLD SURVEY DATA 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
Household Type 
1 Adult 2 Adults 2 Adults 'IIi th Ch11 dren 3 Or- :-lore Adults 
rnc:::~me Range 
($ ? .A.l Na t.Sup. Otl1er- Nat. Sup. Other One T1o10 Thnee+ No Cnldrn 11/Cilldrn 
l.ess Than ~00 3Z2 431 257 288 283 324 157 105 2c:-.o 
~00-( $3,500) Z77 405 Z11 240 331 163 118 107 16o 
$3,500-( $5,000) 493 249 Z49 238 198 167 308 1Z6 21 1 
$5,000-( $6,500) 394 448 579 Z38 369 175 313 Zfi7 416 
$6,500-( $8,000) 904 535 237 319 209 193 298 328 213 
$8,000-( $10,000) 400 ZZ8 508 514 339 Z12 332 ZlO 383 
$10, 000-( $1 Z,OOO l 977 364 320 Z06 Z53 Z24 301 185 Z09 
$1 2,000-($14,000 l 0 239 472 29Z 289 253 383 336 309 
$14,000-($18,000) 977 35o 447 342 282 342 2S6 419 273 
$18,000-( $22,500 l 977 290 Z63 Z45 275 257 284 306 26~ 
$22,500-($25,000) 385 395 329 304 524 240 284 272 339 
$25,000-( $30,000 l 385 395 443 277 357 2:35 386 376 374 
$30,000-($40,000) 385 395 368 228 391 340 227 353 375 
$40,000 or- 0'4er 0 a 39Z 245 608 205 ~92 49:3 448 
Average 34Z 330 291 275 300 256 298 312 321 
Source: See text far derivation. 
1 Adult 
'.tlf th 
Chi! dnen 
3Z4 
143 
197 
300 
246 
Z52 
642 
303 
285 
629 
529 
a 
a 
a 
275 
APffiVIX THREE DATA ON HOUSEHOLD INCOME DISTRIBTION IN NZ 420. 
To see the relative effect of the weighting more clearly, Table 
AA3.6 below shows the ratio of each weight to the overall average weight. 
Table AA3.6 
RELATIVE WEIGHTS : FINAL RATIOS FOR MUL TIA.. YING 
1981/82 HOUSEHOLD SURVEY DATA TO 1981 CENSUS TOTALS 
-
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
?ri va t2 Househo 1 d Type 
1 Aau1 t 2 Adults 2 Adu 1 ts '.Of tl1 Chi 1 dren 3 Or .11ol"'!! Aau1 ts 
Income Range 
( $ i' .A.) lla t.Sup. Otl'ler Na t.Sup. Other One Two Three ... ~ Ci11drn '..UCh1 drn 
Less Than $500 1.09 1. ~5 0.37 0.97 0.35 1.09 0.33 0.35 O.S6 
$500-( $3,300) 0.33 1.37 o. 71 0.31 1.12 0.56 o.~o 0.36 0.56 
$3,500-( $5,000) 1.55 0.34 0.34 0.30 0.67 o.S5 1.04 0.~2 o.n 
$5,000-( $6,500) 1.33 1.51 2.29 o.so 1.24 0.59 1.06 0.90 1.~0 
$6,500-( $8,000) 3.05 1.80 o.ao 1.07 0.70 0.65 1.00 1 .11 0.72 
$8,000-($10,000) 1.55 0.77 1. 71 1.73 1. 14 0.72 1. 12 o.n 1.29 
$1 o,ooo-< $1 2,ooo 1 3.29 1.23 1.08 0.69 0.86 0.76 1.01 0.62 o.n 
$12,000-($14,000) 0. 81 1.59 0.99 0.97 0.89 1.29 1.13 1.04 
$14,000-( $18,000) 3.29 1.20 1.51 1.15 0.95 1.15 1.00 1. 41 0.92 
$18,000-($2Z,SOCl 3.29 0.98 0.89 o.82 0.93 0.87 0.96 1. 03 0.90 
$22,500-( $25,000) 1.30 1.33 1.11 1.02 1.77 0.31 0.96 0.92 1.14 
$25,000-($30,000) 1.30 1.33 1 .~9 0.93 1.20 0.79 1.30 1. 27 1.26 
$30,000-($40,000) 1.30 1.33 1.24 0.77 1.32 1.15 0.76 1.19 i.Z6 
$40,900 or over 1.32 0.83 2.05 0.69 1.66 1.65 1 .Sl 
Average 1;15 1.11 0.98 0.33 1.01 0.86 1.00 1.05 1.08 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------Source: See text for derivation. 
1 Adu1 t 
'Ai til 
Chi 1 dl"'!!n 
1.09 
0.~8 
0.66 
1.01 
0.83 
0.85 
2.16 
1.02 
0.96 
2.12 
2.12 
0.93 . 
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Table AA3.7 shows how the weights differ by income level within each 
household type; differences between household types have been removed by 
dividing each column by its average weight in Table AA3.6. 
Table AA3.7 
RATIO OF HOJSE}-()U)S IN SAM=U: SURVEY TO CENSUS HOJSEHOLDS 
STANDARDISED BY HOUSEHOLD TYPE 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
Prl va ta House no 1 d Type 
1 Adult 2 Adults 2 Adu I ts '.4it!t Chi 1 dren 3 Or ilore Adults 
!ncoli1Q Range 
( ~ ? .A.) )lat. Sup. Other )jat.Sup. Other One Two ihree+ No Ch1 dm II/Ch1dm 
less Than $5eO 0.9 1.3 0. 9 1.0 0.9 1.3 0.5 0.3 o.a 
$500-( $3,500) 0~8 1.2 0.7 0.9 1 .1 0.6 a.~ 0.3 a.s 
$3,500-( $5,000) 1.~ a.8 0.9 0.9 0.7 0.7 1.0 o.~ 0.7 
$5,000-( $6,500) 1.2 1.4 2.3 0.9 l.Z 0.7 1 . I 0.9 1.3 
$6,500-( $8,000) 2.6 1.6 o.a 1.2 0.7 o.a 1. 0 1. 1 0.7 
$8,000-( $10,000) 1.3 0.1 1.7 1. 9 1 .1 o.a 1.1 0.7 1.2 
$10 ,000-( $12,000) 2.9 1.1 1 ~ 1 0.7 o.a 0.9 1.0 0.6 0.1 
$1 2,000-( $1 4,000) 0.0 0.7 1.5 1.1 1.0 1.0 1.3 1: 1 1.0 
$14,000-( $18,000) 2.9 1.1 1.5 1.2 0.9 1.3 1.0 1.3 0.9 
$18,000-($ZZ,SOOl 2.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.3 
$22,500-($25,000) 1.1 1.2 1.1 1 • 1 1. 7 0.9 1.0 0.9 1. 1 
$25,000-( $30,000 l 1 .1 1.2 1.5 1.0 l.Z 0.9 1.3 l.Z l .Z 
$30, 000-{$40,000) 1. 1 l.Z 1.3 0. 8 1.3 1.3 0.8 1. l i . Z 
$40,000-Qr over a.o 1.1.0 , •. 1 0.9 z.o 0.3 1.7 1.5 1.4 
Average 1.0 1. 0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------Source: See text for derivation. 
1 Adu l t 
',jj th 
Chi 1 dren 
1.2 
a.s 
0.7 
1 .1 
0.9 
0.9 
2.3 
i .l 
1.0 
Z.J 
2.3 
o.o 
o.o 
0. 0 
1.0 
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SECTION THREE: GROUPING CENSUS POPULATION 
Table AAA3.l 
POPULATI~ BREAKDOWN BY LOCATI~ - DERIVATI(}.l OF DE J~E 
FROM DE FACTO DISTRIBUTION 1981 CENSUS 
422. 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
Present in 1>-ell i ng Usually Resident 
on Census ~; ght ?~pul ation 
Location Usual Absent on 
To tal '11 si tors Residents Census ~i ght To tal 
?ri va te Dwellings - Occupants Temporari 1 y Away 0 0 0 36,360 36,360 
- All Non-NZ Residents 1 ,900 1,900 0 0 0 
- 3 or more boarders 8,150 liO . 7,980 260 8,240 
- HS eligible 3,007,410 60 , 700 2,946,no 102,0SO 3,048,790 
~n-Pvt Dwellings -Attached Private Household 5,540 140 5,400 Z30 6,530 
-Resident Staff 7,320 0 7,320 240 7,560 
- rnmates ( temporary) (1 ) 88,000 88,000 0 0 0 
- r nma tas ( pe nnanen tl (Z ) 56,420 0 56,420 2, 100 58,520 
Subtotal in )1! (3 ) 3,175,740 150,900 3,024,340 141 ,270 3, 166,110 
Overseas 23,500 (4 ) 23,500 0 33,130 (S) 33, 130 
iotal(J) 3,199,240 174,400 3,024,840 174,400 3,1 99,240 
(A) (8) (C) ? (0) (El 
Notes: 1) Visitors to hotels, motels, private hotels, guest houses, 
hospitals, convalescent homes, youth or immigration hostels or camps, 
motor camps, prisons, police lock-ups. 2) Residents of boarding or 
rooming houses, educational, religious and welfare institutions, homes 
for the elderly, armed forces camps, staff quarters. 3) Components may 
not add to totals due to rounding. 4) NZ residents overseas. 5) 
Overseas residents in NZ on Census night. Sources: 1981 Census of 
Population and Dwellings, and Demographic Specialist Studies Section 
(for estimate of NZ residents overseas). 
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Table AAA3.2 
POPULATION BREAKDOWN BY LOCATION ON CENSUS NIGHT 1981 
BY AGE AND RECEIPT OF INCO~ - TOTAL POPULATION l 
A e 
Under- 15 and Over-
i.Qca t'l on 15 lncome 
~il ~n-lero Not Speci f~ ed 
?rivata o-..ellings -Occupants Temporarily Away () 0 0 0 
-All ~n-NZ itesidents(Zl 250 60 1,250 320 
- 3 o,. ;nor-e lloanler'S 2,310 ~20 4,340 580 
- . HS eligible 324,930 136,360 1 ,946,570 99,450 
.\lon-~vt Dwellings -. Attached Private Household 1,520 350 4,180 390 
- ~sfdent Staff a 100 5,030 2,190 
- Inmatas (telllporary) 10,.580 2,330 51 ,730 23,360 
- Inma ~s ( pe nnanen t) 11,440 5,280 35,090 4,500 
Suo to ta 1 i n ~z 851,140 144,900 2,048,810 130,390 
Oveneas 2~200 a a Zl ,3CO 
To tal 853,340 144,900 2,048,810 152,190 
423. 
Total 
0 
1 ,900 
8,150 
3,007,410 
5,540 
7,320 
88,000 
55,420 
3,175,740 
23,500 
3,199,240 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------Notes: 1) Analysis of column (A) in Table AAA3.1 Refer to notes to 
Table AAA3.1 also. 2) Estimated using average of distributions of "HS 
eligible" and "resident staff". Source: 1981 Census of Population and 
Dwellings. 
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Table AAA3.3 
POPULATI~ BR£AKOOWN BY LOCATI~ ON CENSUS NIGHT 
BY AGE AND RECEIPT OF INCOME - VISITORS 1 
~ae 
Under 15 and Ove!" 
Location 
15 !nccme 
Nil ~n-Zei"'' ~lot SpeC'! fi ed 
Private Oltlellings -Occupants Temporarily Away 0 0 a 0 
-All ~lon-NZ Residents(Z) Z60 60 l,ZSO 3ZO 
- 3 or more boarders 30 30 110 a 
- HS eligible 1a,790 1 Z,Sl 0 34,580 Z,3ZO 
~on-Pvt Oltlellings -Attached Privata Househo1d(Zl 20 30 70 10 
-Resident Staff 0 a 0 a 
• !nmatas (temporary) 10,580 2,330 51 ,730 Z3,360 
• !nma tas ( pe rmanen tl 0 0 0 0 
Sub to ta 1 in NZ 21 ,sao 14,960 a7 ,760 Z6,Sl 0 
Ovl!rseas z,zoo 0 a Zl ,300 
To tal 23,384 14,957 87,760 47,306 
Notes: 1) Analysis of column (B) in Table AAA3.1 Refer to notes to 
Table AAA3.1 also. 2) Estimated using same visitor/resident 
proportions as for "HS eligible", by age and income. Source: 1981 
Census of Population and Dwellings. 
424. 
Tcta 1 
a 
1,900 
170 
60,700 
140 
0 
68,000 
0 
150,900 
23,SCO 
174,400 
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Table AAA3.3a 
POPQATI~ BREAKDOWN BY LOCATI~ ON CENSUS NIGHT 
BY AGE AND RECEIPT OF INCOME - VISITORS (Pro-rata Allocation of Not Specified Incomes 1) 
Location 
Private Dwellings- Occupants Temporarily Away 
-All ~n-NZ ksidents 
- 3 or mare boal"ders 
- KS eligible 
~n-Pvt Dwell fngs - At-tached ?rivate Household 
- ~esident Staff 
Subtotal fn ~Z 
(Zl Overseas 
T~tal 
- Inmates (temporary l 
- Inmates (penaanen tl 
Under 
15 
a 
250 
30 
10,790 
zo 
a 
10,580 
a 
z1 ,oao 
2,200 
23,884 
15 .1nd Over 
Income 
Nf1 ~n-Za~ 
a a 
70 1,370 
30 110 
13,Z60 36,650 
40 80 
0 a 
3,330 7~,080 
0 0 
16,730 11 Z,490 
Z,760 18,540 
19.~0 131 ,030 
425. 
Tota 1 
0 
1,900 
17a 
60,700 
140 
a 
88,000 
a 
150,900 
23,500 
17~.400 
Notes: 1) Same as Table AAA3.3 with "Not Specified" column distributed 
over the "15 and Over" groups pro-rata. 2) Proportions "Nil" and 
"Non-Zero" estimated from "Subtotal in NZ" row. Source: 1981 Census 
of Population and Dwellings. 
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Table AAA3.4 
POPULATION BREAJ<OOWN BY LOCATICl-4 BY AGE AND RECEIPT OF 
INCOME - RESIDENTS IN USUAL DWELLING ON CENSUS NIGHTl 
Aae 
Under 1 S and Over 
!..oc:at"fon 
15 
rnc:ome 
1111 Non-Zero Not Specified 
?rivata Dwellings -Occupants Temporarily Away a Q Q a 
-All Non-iiZ ~esidents a a a a 
- 3 or i110M! boarders z,zso 390 ~.730 :so 
- HS eligible 8H,1~0 123,850 1,912,090 96,540 
Non-Pvt Dwellings - Attached ?rl vata Household 1,500 320 4,100 380 
-Resident Staff 0 100 5,0:30 2,190 
- ·Inmates ( temporary l a 0 0 0 
- !ntQa tas ( pe rmanen tl 11,440 5,280 35,090 ~.sao 
Suo tD ta 1 i n liZ 829,450 129,940 1,961 ,060 104,390 
Overseas 0 0 a 0 
426. 
iota 1 
a 
a 
7,980 
2,.946, 710 
6,400 
7 ,.320 
0 
56,420 
3,024,640 
0 
Total 829,450 129,340 1,.961 ,060 104,390 3,024,840 
----------------------------L---------------------------------------------Notes: 1) Analysis of column (C) in Table AAA3.1; refer to notes to 
Table AAA3.1 also. Source: 1981 Census of Population and Dwellings. 
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Table AAA3. 4a 
POPLLATION BREAKDOWN BY LOCATI~ BY AGE AND RECEIPT OF 
!NCO~ - RESIDENTS IN USUAL DWELLING ON CENSUS NIGHT 
(Pro-rata Allocation of Not Specified Incomesl) 
Location 
Under 
15 
?rivata Ol.ellinqs ·Occupants Temporarily Away 0 
- A 11 llon-HZ ilesi dents 0 
- 3 or mo~ ooar-jers z,zao 
• HS e 1 i gi o 1 e 81 4 , 140 
'lon-tlvt Dwellings ·Attached ~rivate flousehold 1,600 
- Resident Staff 0 
• Inmates (temporary) 0 
- rnma tas ( pe nnanen tl 11,440 
Subtotal in NZ 8Z9,450 
Overseas. a 
Total 849,450 
15 and Over 
rncome 
N11 Non-Ze~ 
0 0 
0 0 
~0 5,Z70 
129,720 z.ooz.sso 
350 4,450 
150 7' 180 
a 0 
5,890 39,a90 
136,540 z,osa,asn 
a a 
136,540 z,asa,aso 
427. 
iota 1 
0 
0 
7,380 
2,946,710 
6,400 
7,320 
0 
56,420 
0 
3,024,340 
--------------~----------------------------------------------------------Note: 1) Same as Table AAA3.4 with "Not Specified" column distributed 
over the "15 and Over" group pro-rata. Source: 1981 Census of 
Population and Dwellings. 
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Table AAA3.5 
1981 CENSUS POPlA..ATION BREAKDOWN BY USUAL LOCATI~ BY AGE 
AND RECEIPT OF INCOt-E - ABSENTEESl 
Location 
Under 
15 
Private Dwellings- Occupants Temporarily Away( 2) 1,960 
- All Non-NZ Residents 0 
- 3 or more boarders SO 
- HS eligible 19,570 
Non-Pvt Dwellings- Attached. Private Household 40 
- Resident Staff 0 
- Inmates (temporary l 0 
- Inmates (permanent) 240 
Subtotal in NZ 21,860 
Overseas 2,020 
To tal ·23,880 
A e 
15 and Over 
Income 
Nil Non-Zero 
360 34,040 
0 0 
so 160 
14,360 68,150 
40 150 
20 220 
0 0 
640 1 ,220 
15,460 103,951 
4,030 27,080 
19,480 131,030 
428. 
Total 
36,360 
0 
260 
102,080 
230 
240 
0 
2,100 
141 ,270 
33,130 
174,400 
Notes: 1) Analysis of column (D) in Table AAA3.1; refer to notes to 
Table AAA3.1 also. 2) The age/income distribution for the occupants 
was derived from the allocation of OTA households to household types 
(see Section Two, Appendix Three). Source: 1981 Census of Population 
and Dwellings. 
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Table AAA3.6 
1981 CENSUS POPULATION BREAKDOWN BY USUAL LOCATION BY AGE 
AND RECEIPT OF INCOME 
l.olca t:i on 
Under 
15 
?rivate Owe11inqs ·Occupants Temporarily Away 1,960 
• All Non-NZ ~si dents 0 
• 3 or more boarders Z,JZO 
- HS e 1 i gi b 1 e 833,700 
Non-Pvt Owellinqs- Attached l'ri •,ate Household 1,540 
-Resident Staff 0 
- Inmates (temporary) a 
- Inmatas (pennanentl 11,680 
Sub tD ta I 1 n ~4 851 ,JZO 
Overseas z,azo 
To ttl 853,340 
15 and Over 
Income 
"il Non-Zero 
360 34,040 
a 0 
480 5,430 
144,090 z,an ,aoo 
380 4,61a 
160 7,400 
a 0 
o,SZO 40,3ZO 
151 ,990 2,162,800 
4,030 27,080 
156,0ZO z, 189,980 
Source: 1981 Census of Population and Dwellings. 
429. 
Totai 
36,360 
0 
8,Z40 
3,048,790 
6,630 
7,560 
0 
sa;szo 
3,166,110 
33, i30 
3,199,240 
APPENDIX FOUR 
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CAPITAL ACCOUNT 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
This thesis defines the budget as the central government income and 
outlay account. An important item missing is government capital 
spending. This Appendix briefly summarises NZSNA information about the 
government capital account and treatment of government capital spending 
by studies of the government's redistributive influence. 
A. NZSNA GOVERNMENT CAPITAL ACCOUNT 
Table A4.l is the capital finance account for the entire economy. 
It shows trends in central government capital formation (line (B)). At 
the bottom of the Table, this is compared with other components of gross 
accumulation. 
Table A4.l 
Tt£ CAPITAL FINANCE ACCOUNT IN AGGREGATE 
(Includes Market and Non-market Production Groups) 
Year Ending 31 March: 1981 
($M) 
% 1982 % 1983 
Change ($M) Change ($M) 
Increase in Stocks 1,404 11.2 1,561 -34.8 1,018 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation 
(A) Private 2,983 42.9 4,262 12.9 4, 813 
(B) Central Government 1,032 41.6 1,461 40.9 2,058 
(C) Local Government 433 13.9 493 12.4 554 
Net Lending to the Rest of the 
World -736 102.7 -1,485 26.6 -1,880 
------------------------------------------Gross Accumulation 
Savings 
Consumption of Fixed Capital 
Statistical Discrepancy 
5,117 23.0 
3,605 33.4 
1,670 12.1 
-158 
Finance of Gross Accumulation 5,117 23.0 
Central Government Fixed Capital 
Formation (SM) 1,032 41.6 
as proportion of: 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation 23.2 
Gross Accumulation 20.2 
Gross Domestic Product 4.2 
6,292 4.3 6,563 
4,808 -3.1 4,657 
1,872 15.0 2,152 
-388 -245 
6,292 4.3 6,563 
1,461 40.9 2,058 
19. 7 
23.2 
5.0 
27.7 
31.4 
6.4 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------Source: Department of Statistics (latest available figures in March 
1985). 
APPENDIX FOUR CENTRAL GOVERl+ENT CAPITAL ACCOUNT 
Central government fixed capital formation is divided into capital 
formation related to market production and general government capital 
finance. Under the system of national accounts, the general government 
capital finance account would ideally include two sections. The first 
section records capital transactions in real capital assets and land. 
The second section would record the source of financial liabilities and 
assets related to the financing of Public Account expenditure. 
431. 
Table A4.2 is the record of real capital assets and land of the 
central government component of the non-market sector. The balancing 
item of the top half of the account represents the need of the sector to 
borrow (if negative) or the amount available to lend (if positive). Net 
lending is the difference between total income and total receipts, 
excluding transactions in financial assets. 
Table A4.2 
ll£ CENTRAL GOVERl+ENT CAPITAL FINANCE ACCOUNT: 
REAL CAPITAL ASSETS AND LAND 
Year Ending 31 March: 
Grass Fixed Capital Formation 
Stack Changes 
Strategic Stocks 
Land Purchase - Net 
Capital Transfers: 
New Zealand Residents 
Local Authorities 
Other 
Rest of the World 
Net Lending 
Gross Accumulation 
1981 
TIM) 
400.1 
5.2 
17.0 
7.0 
75.1 
30.4 
51.0 
-775.2 
-189.4 
% 1982 % 1983 
Change T$MT Change ($M) 
15.2 461 . 1 12.5 518.7 
34.6 7.0 11.4 7.8 
-87.6 2. 1 
65.7 11.6 -34.5 7.6 
5.3 79.1 0.6 79.6 
15.8 35.2 -18.5 28.7 
6.1 54.1 11.8 60.5 
23.0 -953.5 35.3 -1,290.0 
60.1 -303.3 93.6 -587.1 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------Savings -234.4 46.2 -342.6 82.8 -626.4 
Consumption of Fixed Capital 5.6 23.2 6.9 8.7 7.5 
Capital Transfers: 
New Zealand Residents 39.4 -17.8 32.4 -1.9 31.8 
Finance of Gross Accumulation -189.4 60.1 -303.3 93.6 -587.1 
Source: Department of Statistics (latest available figures in March 
1985). 
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The net lending figure and the deficit before borrowing figure as 
published in Budget Table 2 (the most common figure for the government's 
budget deficit) purport to measure similar things. In fact, they are not 
compatible. 'Net lending' is the net result of all the central 
government's public account transactions except any of those involving 
financial assets and liabilities. On the other hand, the Budget Table 2 
balance is the net result including some transactions, such as government 
loans to the Housing Corporation, which involve changes in financial 
assets and liabilities. 
Table A4.3 shows gross fixed capital formation classified by type of 
capital. 
Table A4.3 
GOVERNENT GROSS FIXED CAPITAL FORMAT!~ BY TYPE OF CAPITAL 
Year Ending 31 March 1981 % 1982 % 1983 
---------------------------------~!~l----~~~9~--~!~l ___ f~~~g~---~!~l ____ _ 
Buildings 
Other Construction 
Land Improvements 
Transport Vehicles 
Plant, Machinery & Equipment 
Other Tangible Assets 
Total Gross Fixed Capital 
Formation 
234.4 
47.6 
0.6 
12.0 
76.4 
371.0 
5.7 247.7 
37.6 57.8 
1.5 0.9 
9.2 13.2 
-0.8 75.8 
6.5 395.3 
4.2 258.0 
30.8 75.6 
0.9 
90.8 25.0 
28.5 97.4 
15.6 456.8 
Source: Department of Statistics, NZSNA (latest available figures in 
March 1985). 
A feature of the 1982 year was the growth in other construction, 
which partly reflected the non-market aspects of the investments in 
large-scale energy developments. 
By far the largest capital item is for buildings. The valuation of 
building capital formation is in terms of the cost incurred in the 
current year. 
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The Table A4.3 information is further disaggregated by government 
function by Table A4.4. For example, most building is for educational 
purposes and, in fact, education accounts for around a third of total 
non-market central government capital formation in recent years. 
Table A4.4 
CENTRAL GOVERt-IENT SERVICES: 
GROSS FIXED CAPTIAL FORMATION BY FUNCTION IN 1981/82 
Buildings 
Non-
Trans- Plant 
port Machinery 
433. 
Resident Resident 
Other 
Cnstrtn 
Land 
Improve-
ments Vehcls Equipment Total 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
General Admin. 
Defence 
Education 
Health 
Social Welfare 
Industries 
TOTAL 
Market Prod. 
Groups 
6. 1 
0.2 
5.5 
6.7 
2.8 
21.3 
35.2 45.3 
15.3 
107.6 3.0 
50.9 3.5 
13.7 1.7 
3.7 4.3 
226.4 57.8 
1.3 0.2 
0.3 5.7 11.6 104.2 
15.5 
1.4 24.1 141.6 
0.4 2.6 26.3 90.4 
0.2 1.5 10.2 30.1 
1.9 3.5 13.4 
0.9 13.2 75.8 395.3 
17.9 1.6 26. 7 47.6 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------Source: Department of Statistics (latest available figures in March 1985). 
A better understanding of the influence of the budget on income 
distribution would be gained from some different capital finance account 
information. For example, it would be useful to have information about 
government net borrowing or net lending as the first item of this part of 
the account. The account would also record how the net borrowing or 
lending was funded. It would be an account of financial assets and 
liabilities. 1 
1. The Department of Statistics is working on the development of the 
second section of the capital finance account, in recognition of 
the importance of information about the sources of financing 
Public Account deficits to economists and policymakers. 
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B. TREATMENT OF GOVERNMENT CAPITAL SPENDING IN STUDIES OF BUDGET 
INCIDENCE 
As Chapter Six of this thesis discusses, the valuation of 
government current spending in terms of its money-income cost has many 
limitations. In particular, there are several reasons why it may 
understate the value of government expenditures including the fact 
that it does not measure externalities. When it comes to government 
capital spending, the problems of valuation are increased because of 
the likelihood that current monetary expenditures fail to match the 
value of capital-intensive goods which may emanate from large capital 
investments in the past. Also, current monetary expenditures may 
produce benefits for future generations. 
Because of the difficulties of evaluation of government capital 
expenditures, most studies tend to aggregate them with other 
expenditures or ignore capital spending altogther. 
B.l: Q.Jantitative Studies Aggregate Current and Capital 
Gillespie (1965, 1966) introduced a particularly thorough 
approach to the analysis of the income-redistributive effe~ts of 
government expenditures. He is not specific, however, about the 
treatment of capital. 
It appears that he simply aggregates current and capital 
expenditures for each expenditure classification. So, for example, 
when he analyses educational expenditure, he takes account of the 
amount spent on buildings, as well as the amount spent on 
administration and teaching. 
Musgrave et al (1974, p.282) determine the value of an 
expenditure to its recipient as the costs incurred on behalf of 
various beneficiaries. ~rhus, in the cost of education, [they] 
considered the building or salary cost which may be imputed to the 
students attending a particular schoor•. 
434 . 
APPENDIX FOUR CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CAPITAL ACCOUNT 
Gillespie and Musgrave et al treat items of capital spending 
which are not associated with direct expenditure items as indivisible 
goods. As discussed in Chapter Six, these indivisible (or collective 
goods) are then allocated according to several different assumptions. 
Reynolds and Smolensky (1977, p.39) believe that in a highly 
aggregate study, little would be gained by an elaborate allocation of 
capital accounts overtime and instead assume these are stable over 
time. The treatment in this thesis is tantamount to the same thing. 
8.2: SWF Studies 
As is the case with most government expenditures, the Shaven, 
Whalley and Fullerton general equilibrium studies finesse the 
treatment of government capital expenditure. St. Hilaire and 1f'lhalley 
(1983) do not even mention it in their discussion of the data set for 
tax policy analysis. In his working paper about his model for the 
Australian economy, Piggott (1983, p.3) has one line about government 
expenditures: "Its expenditures cover not only Public Administration 
and Defence, of which it is the only consumer, but various other goods 
and services as well". 
As the SWF melthodologies are developed, however, there is 
potential to analyse government capital spending in greater detail. 
As discussed in Chapter Two, recent versions of the models are able to 
treat the existence of a government budget deficit and incorporate 
financial assets. Since it is a reality of modern times that 
government budgets are in deficit and capital spending is unstable 
over time, these developments are encouraging. From an income 
maintenance perspective, it is just as important to know the effects 
on household income of a government decision to undertake capital 
formation as for it to decide to spend more on education or health. 
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APPENDIX FIVE 
MORE TABLES : GOVERNMENT RECEIPTS 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
This Appendix includes tables which are supplementary to those 
published in the text of Chapter Five. These tables are numbered with 
letters indicating the relevant section of Chapter Five (B = Indirect 
Taxes, C = the Company Tax) and so on. 
Also included on Page 446 of this Appendix is a brief discussion 
about estate and gift auty taxes . 
FIG.J£ A5.1 
RATES OF STAMP DUTY IN 1981/82 
--~-----------------------------------------------------------------------Type of Document 
Transfer of -
Mortgage, debenture, shares, 
share rights, mining rights 
All other property, including 
land 
Leases -
Rentals 
Deed 
Duplicate or counterpart 
Cheques (as from 4 July 1980) 
Source: 1982 Yearbook. 
Rate of Duty 
40 cents for each $100 or part of $100 
of the value of the property. 
1 percent for the first $50,000 of the 
value of the property; 1.5 percent 
for the excess over $50,000 up to 
$100,000; 2 percent for the excess 
over $100,000. 
40 cents for each $100 or part of $100 
of 1 year's rent. 
$10.00 
$1.00 
5 cents for each bill of exchange 
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Table A5B.l 
1981/82 INDIRECT TAXES: ESTIMATED DISTRIBUTION BY HOUSEHOLD TYPE 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Household Type 
1 Adult 2 Adults 2 Adults 
with 
Children 
3 or More 1 Adult All 
Adults with House-
Nat Oth Nat Oth 1 
Sup Sup 
2 3+ No With 
Chi1- Chil-
dren dren 
Chld'n holds 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Amount of Tax: $ Million 
Direct Wholesale 
Sales Taxes 16 38 59 123 54 86 68 127 124 11 706 
Specific Taxes 16 28 45 81 39 54 51 90 91 8 503 
Racing & Lottery 
Duty 1 4 6 10 4 5 7 7 11 0 55 
------------------------------------------------------------Stage One: Direct 33 70 110 214 97 145 126 224 226 19 1264 -
"Intermediate" 29 41 71 135 67 126 95 106 134 19 823 
-------------------------------------------------------------TOTAL (Stage Two) 62 111 181 349 164 271 221 330 3~0 
Percentage Distribution (%) 
Direct Wholsesa1e 
Sales Taxes 2.3 5.4 8.3 17.4 7.6 12.2 9.7 18.0 17.5 
Specific Taxes 3.2 5.6 8.9 16.1 7.8 10.7 10.1 17.9 18.1 
Racing & Lottery 
Duty 1.8 7.3 10.9 16.4 7.3 9.1 12.7 12.7 20.0 
Stage One: Direct 2.6 5.5 8.7 16.9 7.7 11.5 10.0 17.7 17.9 
"Intermediate" 3.5 5.0 8.7 16.4 8.1 15.3 11.5 12.9 16.3 
Stage Two: Total 
Distribution of 
Households (%) 
3.0 5.3 8.7 16.7 7.9 13.0 10.6 15.8 17.2 
Comparative Figures 
10.8 8. 7 12.4 15.0 7.8 12.6 10.4 8.3 10.3 
Total Indirect Taxes as a Percentage of: 
38 2087 
1.6 100.0 
1.6 100.0 
0.0 100.00 
1.5 100.0 
2.3 100.0 
1.8 100.0 
3.7 100.0 
Market Income (%) 17.3 10.5 15.0 9.7 9.9 9.6 9.6 12.0 10.8 20.0 10.8 
Total Income(%) 6.9 9.9 8.5 9.6 9.5 9.2 9.1 11.4 10.1 10.6 9.6 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Source: Summarised from Tables in Section B, Chapter Five. 
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Table A58.2 
AVERAGE AMOUNT OF WHOLESALE SALES TAX PAID BY PRIVATE HOUSEHOLDS 
BY RANGE OF HOUSEHOLD W\RKET INCOME AND HOUSEHOLD TYPE 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Household 
Market 
Income 
CS p.a.) 
Less Than S250 
$250-( $3,950) 
$3,950-( $9,750) 
$9,750-($13,450) 
$13,450-($16,900) 
$16,900-($20,250) 
$20,250-($24,200) 
$24,200-($29,200) 
$29,200-($36,650) 
$36,650 and over 
1 Adult 2 Adults 
Nat Oth Nat Oth 
Sup Sup 
Household Type 
1 
2 Adults 
with 
Children 
3 or More 1 Adult All 
Adults with House-
2 3+ No With 
Chil- Chil-
dren dren 
Chld'n holds* 
Average Amount per Household per Year (Ss) 
74 120 180 280 210 200 460 240 160 
120 91 340 500 740 340 380 320 250 
330 360 370 410 510 600 620 510 670 480 440 
360 460 460 680 580 480 370 700 1000 270 520 
-
420 730 580 640 630 510 550 890 590 
-
590 890 900 670 710 680 920 850 760 
-
570 1100 710 590 590 640 1200 880 720 
-
940 600 920 730 750 790 1300 970 880 
-
420 880 760 730 760 1700 1300 - 1100 
- 1400 1100 1200 1000 900 2000 1500 - 1400 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Total 150 420 460 790 660 660 640 1500 1200 320 680 
Sources: Estimated using data from the Department of Statistics Household 
Survey 1981/82, and weighted using data from the 1981 Census of Population and 
Dwellings to represent the total population of private households. 
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Table A5C.l 
COMPARING DISTRIBUTIONS BY HOUSEHOLD TYPE OF TOTAL PAYMENTS USING 
SIX CASES FOR COMPANY TAX 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Household 
Market 
Income 
($ p. a.) 
1 Adult 2 Adults 
Nat Oth Nat Oth 
Sup Sup 
Household Type 
1 
2 Adults 
with 
Children 
3 or More 1 Adult All 
Adults with House-
2 3+ No With 
Chil- Chil-
dren dren 
Chld'n holds 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Company Tax 
(Case 1) 
Household Expend. 
(Case 2) 
1/3 Wages & Salary 
1/3 Oiv'nd Incom~ 
1/3 H'hold Expend. 
(Case 3) 
Dividend Income 
(Case 4) 
Dividend Income & 
Investment Income 
Estimated Proportion of Total (%) 
3.8 5.1 9.7 16.9 8.4 13.8 11.2 14.1 15.9 
3.4 5.2 9.0 17.1 8.3 14.1 ll.5 14.0 16.2 
3.5 5.1 9.3 16.8 8.6 13.9 11.3 14.3 16. 1 
4.0 4.9 10.3 l6.1 9.1 13.4 10.9 14.7 15.5 
(Case 5) 4.1 5.0 10.3 16.4 8. 7 13.5 11.0 14.4 15.5 
1/2 Oiv'nd Income 
1/2 Expenditure 
(Case 6) 3.7 5.1 9.6 16.6 8.7 13.8 11.2 14.3 15.9 
Source: See text Chapter Five for derivation, especially Section C. 
1.1 100.0 
1.2 100.0 
1.1 100.0 
1.1 100.0 
1.1 100.0 
1.1 100.0 
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Table A5C.2 
AMJUNT OF COt-PANY TAX PAY~NTS 
BY RANGE OF 1-()USEHOLD ~ INCO~ AND PRIVATE HOUSEHOLD TYPE 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Household 
Market 
Income 
($ p.a.) 
1 Adult 2 Adults 
Nat Oth Nat Oth 
Sup Sup 
Household Type 
1 
2 Adults 
with 
Children 
3 or More 1 Adult All 
Adults with House-
2 3+ No With 
Chil- Chil-
dren dren 
Chld' n haMs* 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------($M) 
Less Than $250 4 1 4 1 1 3 14 
$250-( $3,950) 14 2 14 1 1 1 2 35 
$3,950-( $9,750) 19 6 19 2 3 3 3 2 1 3 61 
$9,750-($13,450) 5 5 13 5 4 5 3 3 2 1 46 
$13,450-($16,900) 4 12 6 6 8 5 3 3 54 
$16,900~{$20,250) 5 12 9 5 10 7 4 3 55 
$20,~50-($24,200) 3 8 10 4 10 10 5 7 59 
$24,200-($29,200) 1 5 18 6 7 7 7 8 69 $29,200-($36,650) 9 16 4 14 5 17 20 86 
$36,650 and over 26 18 29 16 12 55 28 189 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Total 61 28 122 86 61 74 55 98 74 10 669 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Sources: Estimated using data from the Department of Statistics Household 
Survey 1981/82, and weighted using data from the 1981 Census of Population 
and Dwellings to represent the total population of private households. 
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Table A5C.3 
AVERAGE COMPANY TAX PAYMENTS PER PRIVATE HOUSEHOLD PER YEAR 
BY RANGE OF HOUSEHOLD MARKET INCOt-E AND HOUSEHOLD TYPE 
Household 
Market 
Income 
($p.a.) 
1 Adult 2 Adults 
Nat Oth Nat Oth 
Sup Sup 
Household Type 
1 
2 Adults 
with 
Children 
3 or More 1 Adult All 
Adults with House-
2 3+ No With 
Chil- Chil-
dren dren 
Chld'n holds* 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------$s Per Year 
Less Than $250 93 91 160 210 180 190 330 170 140 
$250-( $3,950) 320 180 430 340 320 250 230 240 340 
$3,950-( $9,750) 1100 370 830 260 320 310 330 620 340 500 590 
$9,750-($13,450) 1100 240 9320 430 310 320 260 720 550 270 450 
$13,450-($16,900) 
-
290 1200 410 450 370 330 740 450 520 
$16,900-($20,250) 
-
450 1400 470 400 530 390 470 470 530 
$20,250-($24,200) 
-
600 1400 430 410 440 640 750 590 570 
$24,200-($29,200) 
-
530 1100 590 710 490 580 670 510 670 
$29 ,200-( $36, 650) - 2400 620 510 960 610 900 890 830 
$36,650 and over - 8700 1200 5700 1600 1100 2000 880 
-
1800 
Total 550 310 950 550 750 570 510 1100 690 270 650 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Sources: Estimated using data from the Department of Statistics Household 
Survey 1981/82, and weighted using data from the 1981 Census of Population 
and Dwellings to represent the total population of private households. 
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Table A5C.4 
COMPANY TAX PAYMENTS BY PRIVATE HOUSEHOLDS 
BY RANGE Of HOUSEHOLD t-AAAKET INCO~ AND HOUSEHOLD TYPE 
Household 
Market 
Income 
($ p.a.) 
Less Than S250 
$250-( $3,950) 
$3,950-( $9,750) 
$9, 750-($13,450) 
$13,450-($16,900) 
$16,900-($20,250) 
$20,250-($24,200) 
$24,200-($29,200) 
". $29,200-( $3 6,650) 
$36,650 and over 
1 Adult 2 Adults 
Nat Oth Nat Oth 
Sup Sup 
Household Type 
1 
2 Adults 
with 
Oiildren 
3 or More 1 Adult All 
Adults with House-
2 3+ No With 
Chil- Chil-
dren dren 
Chld'n holds* 
As a Proportion of Total (Gross) Household Income (%) 
1.9 2.5 2.0 3.6 -36.0 3.1 200.0 
-
2.6 2.4 
5.1 4.0 4.5 5.9 6.8 7.1 4.0 3.4 4.7 
9.8 4.7 5.8 3.3 3.7 3.5 3.6 4.6 3.2 5.1 5.6 
6.8 2.0 5.0 3.7 2.4 2.6 2.0 4.8 3.6 2.1 3.3 
1.9 5.7 2.6 2.8 2.3 2.0 3.7 2.5 3.1 
2.4 5.8 2.5 2.1 2.8 2.0 2.2 2.1 2.7 
2.7 5.3 1.9 1.8 1.9 2.8 3.2 2.5 2.5 
1.9 3.5 2.2 2.6 1.8 2.1 2.5 1.8 2.4 
5.9 1.9 1.5 2.9 1.8 2.7 2.6 2.5 
-
14.0 2.7 8.5 3.0 2.2 3.9 1.7 3.5 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Total 6.9 2.5 5. 7 2.4 3.5 2.5 2.3 3.4 2.1 2.9 3.1 
Sources: Estimated using data from the Department of Statistics Household 
Survey 1981/82, and weighted using data from the 1981 Census of Population 
and Dwellings to represent the total population of private households. 
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Table A50.1 
AVERAGE ANNUAL PAYMENT FOR OTHER GOVERNMENT PAYMENTS IN 1981/82 
PER HOUSEHOLD BY RANGE OF HOUSEHOLD W\RKET INCOt-E 
Household 
Market 
Income 
($ p.a.) 
Less Than $250 
$250-( $3,950) 
$3,950-( $9,750) 
$9,750-($13,450) 
$13,450-($16,900) 
$16,900-($20,250) 
$20,250-($24,200) 
$24,200-($29,200) 
$29 ,200-( $36,650) 
$36,650 and over 
AND HOUSEHOLD TYPE (CASE ONE) 
Household Type 
1 Adult 2 Adults 2 Adults 
with 
01ildren 
3 or More 1 Adult All 
Adults with House-
Nat Oth Nat Oth 
Sup Sup 
1 2 3+ No With 
Chil- Chil-
dren dren 
$ Per Year 
190 200 330 440 400 430 690 
240 240 430 610 640 530 500 
330 370 460 500 690 640 580 590 730 
310 410 540 610 630 620 560 770 930 
-
530 690 660 720 720 670 720 890 
-
610 750 760 730 830 820 840 890 
-
560 980 780 760 850 820 940 960 
-
780 680 900 900 990 1000 1100 1000 
-
620 960 990 1600 1100 1200 1200 
- 1200 1200 1300 1400 1200 1500 1500 
Chld'n holds 
390 290 
470 350 
560 490 
440 560 
670 
780 
830 
950 
1200 
1400 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Total 250 430 520 820 770 900 820 1200 1200 470 750 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Sources: Estimated using data from the Department of Statistics Household 
Survey 1981/82, and weighted using data from the l98l . Census of Population 
and Dwellings to represent the total population of private households. Based 
on data in Table 5E.l where the total of general government receipts were 
imputed to households in relation to household expenditure. 
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Table A50.2 
AMOUNT OF OTHER GOVERNMENT RECEIPTS BY PRIVATE HOUSEHOLDS 
ALLOCATED IN PROPORTION TO HOUSEHOLD EXPENDITURE 
BY RANGE OF HOUSE!-0..0 MARKET INC()£ AND HOUSEHO..D TYPE 
Household Type 
444. 
1 Adult 2 Adults 2 Adults 
with 
Children 
3 or More 1 Adult All 
Household 
Market 
Income 
($p.a.) 
Nat Oth Nat Oth 
Sup Sup 
1 
Adults with ~ouse-
2 3+ No With 
Chil- Chil-
dren dren 
Chld'n holds 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------($M) 
Less Than $250 8 2 8 2 1 1 2 7 30 
$250-( $3,950) 10 2 14 2 2 1 1 3 37 
$3,950-( $9,750) 6 6 11 5 5 6 5 2 2 3 51 
$9, 750-($13,450) 1 8 7 8 8 9 7 3 4 2 58 
$13,450-($16,900) 7 7 9 9 15 11 3 6 69 
$16,900-($20,250) 6 6 14 9 16 15 6 7 81 
$20,250-($24,200) 3 5 18 8 19 13 7 11 86 
$24,200-($29,200) 2 3 27 7 15 13 12 17 98 
$29,200-($36,650) 2 25 8 22 10 23 28 119 
$36,650 and over 4 18 6 13 13 41 49 145 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Total 27 39 67 127 63 118 89 100 126 18 774 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Sources: Estimated using data from the Department of Statistics Household 
Survey 1981/82, and weighted using data from the 1981 Census of Population 
and Dwellings to represent the total population of private households. 
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Table A5E.l 
STAGE ONE: GOVERNMENT DIRECT PAYMENTS BY HOUSEHOLD TYPE 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Household 
Market 
Income 
($ p.a.) 
Personal 
Income Taxes 
Indirect Taxes 
Total 
Proportion of 
Total Direct 
Payments (%) 
Household Type 
l Adult 2 Adults 2 Adults 
with 
Children 
3 or More l Adult All 
Adults with House-
Nat Oth Nat Oth 1 
Sup Sup 
2 3+ No With 
Chil- Chil-
dren dren 
$ Million 
189 289 494 966 477 810 661 749 877 
33 70 110 214 97 146 126 224 226 
222 359 604 1180 574 956 787 973 1103 
3.2 5.3 8.9 17.3 8.4 14.0 11.5 14.3 16.2 
Chld'n holds* 
39 
19 
58 
5552 
1264 
6816 
0.9 100.0 
Source: Estimated based on the Department of Statistics 1981/82 Household 
Survey aggregated to the private household population based on the 1981 
Census. 
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ESTATE AND GIFT DUTIES 
There is no capital gains tax or personal wealth tax in New 
Zealand. The only wealth taxes are estate and gift duties. Since these 
are non-recurrent levies, they are excluded from the national accounting 
treatment in the public account. In recent years, the effect of tax 
policy has been to reduce existing taxes on wealth. 
Estate duty contributed 13.5 percent of total government revenue in 
1913, and even by 1935 it still made up almost 10 percent of taxation. 
It has declined since. The estate duty has not been a major source of 
tax revenue in recent years. It contributes around $50 million a year -
less than 1 percent of total tax revenue. Because of this, it was 
possible to increase the exemption level without a great loss in revenue. 
Gift duties and land tax are also intended to tax wealth. Gifts 
valued at less than $15,000 in any one year are exempt from tax and a 
progressive scale applies to larger gifts. But, of course, by making 
gifts over a period of years gift duties may be avoided. Land tax is 
asse~sed on non-agricultural land valued in excess of $175,000. 
1. Statutory Impact of Wealth Taxes 
Because the rate structures of estate and gift duties are 
progressive, and the exemptions for these taxes and the land tax are set 
to ensure the average wealth owner does not pay them, the burden of these 
taxes increases with wealth. Since there is a high correlation between 
wealth and income, then these taxes are also likely to burden those on 
high incomes more than those on low incomes. Estate and gift duties were 
originally intended to contribute to greater distributive equity by 
helping to close a tax avoidance loophole - income tax could not be 
avoided forever by accumulating wealth since the wealth would be taxed 
when it was transferred as a gift or at death. Under present 
legislation, however, it is not difficult to rearrange one's affairs to 
avoid these taxes. 
446. 
APPENDIX FIVE - MORE TABLES GOVERNMENT RECEIPTS 
The scale of rates of gift duty is set out in Figure A5.2. It 
applies to all dutiable gifts made on or after 22 June 1979. 
FIGURE A5.2 
SCALE OF GIFT DUTY RATES 
Value of Item "b" 
in section 62 ($) 
Not exceeding 15,000 
15,001-20,000 
20,001-30,000 
30,001-40,000 
Exceeding 40,000 
Rate 
Nil 
5 percent on excess over $15,000 
$250 plus 10 percent of excess over 
$20,000 
$1,250 plus 20 percent of excess over 
$30,000 
$3,250 plus 25 percent of excess 
over $40,000 
-----------------------------------------------------------------------Note: "Excess" means excess of the value in complete dollars. Source: 
1982 Yearbook. 
Two significant factors influence the statotory impact of wealth 
taxes. First, the impact of the taxes will depend largely on the 
amount of legal skill and effort applied to planniF1g an estate. An 
understanding of the impact of the tax would need to take into account 
under what conditions individuals are able to take the opportunity to 
minimise death taxes through planning before d~ath. In addition, the 
use of trusts and gifts to charitable foundations are specific 
techniques used for transferring property to avoid payment of wealth 
taxes. 
2. Who Pays Death Duties 
One of the more philosophical debates in taxation literature 
revolves on the issue of who pays death duties (and hence gift duties 
as gift duties are seen to complement death duties). The Benthamite 
approach holds that property passing at death does not inherently 
belong to anyone and thus any duty must be the responsibility of the 
deceased. On the other hand, Rolph and Break (1961) put the 
commonsense argument, "it seems reasonably clear that an estate or 
inheritance tax cannot rest upon the decedent (deceased). Those who 
bear the tax are those who would, but for the intervention of the 
government's tax claims, obtain title to the wealth previously owned 
by the decedent." 
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APPENDIX SIX 
NZSNA FINAL CONSUWTION EXPENDITURE: DISAGGREGATED 
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT SERVICES - NON-MARKET PRODUCTION GROUPS 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
The figures below disaggregate NZSNA figures far central government 
consumption expenditure (see Figure 4.3, p.l88) by departmental 
function. They provide another perspective an the data used in this 
thesis to represent the expenditure side of the budget. 
($000) % ($000) 
GENERAL ADMINISTRATION 1982 Change 1983 
901 General Administration 
Audit 1,615 15.3 1,862 
Crown Law 1,861 -15.0 2,188 
Customs 25,769 14.4 29,483 
Environment 953 7.0 1,020 
Foreign Affairs 48,732 ·- 11.1 54, 125 
Government Print 4, 778 -1.2 4,720 
In land Revenue 58,391 11.2 64,940 
Internal Affairs 32,940 13.1 37,240 
Justice 104,645 5.4 110,262 
Lands & Survey 16,269 14.5 18,622 
Legislative 13,198 11.4 14,697 
Maori Affairs 2,007 -6.7 1,873 
Police 159,538 6.0 169,108 
Prime Minister & S.I.S. 5,156 21.8 6,278 
State Services 32,177 7.1 34,448 
Statistics 24,472 -29.7 17,199 
Tourist & Publicity 4,691 -9.8 4,232 
Transport 38,512 7.0 41,223 
Treasury 58,924 124.8 132,444 
Valuation 9,123 -9.9 8,218 
Works 4,227 22.5 5,180 
Sub-Total General Administration 64 7,978 17.2 759,362 
115 Construction Services 
Works 89,845 67.5 150,466 
Sub-Total Construction Services 89,845 67.5 150,466 
117 Transport Services 
Internal Affairs 12 
Transport 21,380 44.3 30,861 
Works 89,940 11.8 100,593 
Sub-Total Transport Services 111,320 18.1 131,466 
119 Business Services 
works 14,366 -69.8 4,338 
Sub-Total Business Services 14,366 -69.8 4,338 
TOTAL GENERAL ADMINISTRATION 863,509 21.1 1,045,632 
--
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DEFENCE 
902 Defence 
TOTAL DEFENCE 
EDUCATION 
903 Administration of Education 
Education Prog.I 
Maori Affairs 
($000) 
1982 
587,266 
587,266 
20,964 
48 
Sub-Total Administration of Education 21,012 
983 Agriculture & Fisheries 1,499 
Education 1,248,604 
Maori Affairs 3,520 
Sub-Total Education Services 1,253,623 
TOTAL EDUCATION 1,274,635 
HEALTH 
904 Administration of Health 35,314 
Sub-Total Administration of Health 35,314 
984 Health Services 
Health 1,086,571 
Sub-Total Health Services 1,086,571 
TOTAL HEALTH 1,121,885 
INDUSTRIES 
906 Admin. of Specified Industries 
of Labour Services 
Agriculture & Fisheries 104,471 
Energy - Department of 3,661 
Energy Resources (Mines) 
Forest Services 8,061 
Labour 37,415 
Lands & Survey 8,691 
Maori Affairs 8,134 
Tourist & Publicity 6,116 
Trade & Industry 12,625 
Transport 20,693 
TOTAL INDUSTRIES 209,867 
% 
Change 
6.6 
6.6 
19.2 
60.4 
19.3 
-35.2 
10.8 
20.3 
10.8 
10.9 
6.3 
6.3 
8.1 
8.1 
8.1 
10.2 
81.2 
149.3 
10.4 
11.7 
15.5 
-57.4 
-35.1 
6.9 
( $000) 
1983 
626,191 
626,191 
24,998 
77 
25,075 
972 
1,383,903 
4,235 
1,389,110 
1, 414,185 
37,535 
37,535 
1,174,940 
1,174,940 
1,212,475 
f l5,089 
6,633 
20,095 
41,288 
8,961 
9,083 
7,067 
5,373 
13,427 
227,016 
449. 
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SOCIAL WELFARE 
905 Administration of Social Welfare 
TOTAL OF SOCIAL WELFARE 
SOCIAL AND RECREATIONAL SERVICES, 
RESEARCH 
($000) 
1982 
59,906 
59,906 
985 Social & Recreational Services and 
Scientific Research 
Agriculture & Fisheries 
Education 
Forest Service 
Internal Affairs 
Lands & Survey 
Maori Affairs 
OSIR 
Social Welfare 
Tourist & Publicity 
Transport 
39,442 
10,382 
22,623 
3,590 
14,981 
3,933 
55,741 
38,992 
415 
12,706 
TOTAL SOCIAL & RECREATIONAL SVCES ETC. 202,805 
MAIN EXPENDITURE CATEGORIES ( $000) 
General Administration 863,509 
Defence 587,266 
Education 1,274, 635 
realth 1, 121,885 
Industries 209,867 
Social Welfare 59,906 
Social Recreational Services and 
Scientific Research 202,805 
GRANO TOTAL 4, 319,903 
PERCENTAGE BREAKDOWN ~AIN EXPENDITURES (%) 
General Administration 20.0 
Defence 13.6 
Education 29.5 
Health 26.0 
Social Welfare, Social and 
Recreational Services Research 6.1 
Industries 4.8 
TOTAL 100.0 
% 
Change 
15.8 
15.8 
9.4 
17.6 
15.1 
21.9 
-1.3 
18.6 
10.1 
25.0 
-16.4 
6.8 
12.2 
21.1. 
6.6 
10.9 
8.1 
8.2 
15.8 
12.2 
11.6 
( $000) 
1983 
69,349 
69,349 
43,134 
12,210 
26,034 
4,377 
14,794 
4,665 
61,378 
48,723 
347 
13,564 
229,226 
1,045,632 
626,191 
1, 414, 185 
1,212,475 
227,016 
69,349 
229,226 
4,824,074 
21.7 
13.0 
29.3 
25.1 
6.2 
4.7 
100.0 
450. 
APPENDIX SEVEN 
SUMMARY TABLES OF THE QUANTITATIVE RESULTS 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------
The tables published in this Appendix summarise the quantitative 
results produced in Chapters Three through Six. The main text of the 
thesis (especially Chapters One and Two) discusses the limitations and 
strengths of the quantitative approach to analysing budget incidence. 
Unit-record survey data are the basic information applied to derive the 
quantitative results. The multitude of different formats by which the 
data can be presented is overwhelming. Further issues can be easily 
addressed through the application of Statistical Analysis System (SAS) 
computer techniques to regroup data. Supplementary (unpublished) tables 
analyse individual budget items: 
1) By total $000 amount; 
2) As a proportion of the total for each income range; 
3) As a proportion of the total for each household type; 
4) As a proportion of the total for all households; 
5) Average amount per household per year; 
6) As a proportion of compensation to households; 
7) As a proportion of total (gross) household income; 
8) As a proportion of household expenditure; 
9) Average amount per person per year. 
To ease assimilation of the main ideas, most comparisons in this 
thesis are with the distribution of household market income. Some of the 
limitations to keep in mind when evaluating the results are: 
1) Market income may not always be the relevant base for 
comparison. For instance, since some social welfare benefits 
are taxable, the distribution of personal income taxes by 
total income may yield patterns not evident in comparisons 
with market income. 
2) Market income has been specifically defined for this thesis to 
account for household earnings in the market place in a given 
year before they receive a money-income benefit from 
government provided goods and services. Other studies often 
format their results by another income concept and this must 
be recognized when making comparisons. For example, Broad and 
Bacica (1985) use total income, disposable income or household 
expenditure as the basis for most of their analysis. 
3) The complexity of the methodological approach makes it 
difficult to apply normal statistical tests to assess the 
reliability of the estimates. 
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Table A7.1 
STAGE ONE : DIRECT MONEY-INCOME 
EFFECTS OF THE 1981/82 BUDGET BY INCOME GROUP 
452. 
(Each Income Group Represents a Decile, 10%, of Private Households) 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------H'hold Money 
plus less Income plus less plus Income 
1-k:l usehold Direct Persnl Avail. Sub- "Dirct" Gv' ment W/Dirct 
Market Income Market Monetary Total Income to sidy Indirct- -Pri vate Gvt Tran~ 
($ p.a.) Income Benefits Income Taxes Spend Income Taxes Goods actions (A+B) (C-D) (E+F+H-G : 
A B c D E F G H I 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------$ Million 
Less Than $250 -22 654 632 50 582 6 34 194 748 
$250-( $3950) 170 602 772 89 683 7 50 183 ' 823 
$3950-( $9750) 731 410 1141 156 985 26 82 236 1165 
$9750-($13450) 1212 213 1425 255 1170 20 100 219 1309 
$13450-($16900) 1567 194 1761 366 1395 24 111 260 1568 
$16900-($20250) 1922 162 2084 483 1601 25 138 274 1762 
$20250-($24200) 2291 123 2414 594 1820 31 137 283 1998 
$24200-( $29200) 2774 149 2923 777 2146 37 162 273 2294 
$29200-($36650) 3387 133 3521 994 2527 34 195 280 2646 
$36650 and over 5211 162 5373 1788 3585 46 255 433 3809 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------TOTAL 19243 2803 22046 5552 16494 256 1264 2635 18122 
A B c 0 E F G H I 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------· 
Proportion of Total (%) 
Less Than $250 -0.1 23.3 2.9 0.9 3.5 2.3 2.7 7.4 4.2 
$250-( $3950) 0.9 21.5 3.5 1.6 4.1 2.7 3.9 6.9 4.5 
$3950-( $9750) 3.8 14.6 5.2 2.8 6.0 10.2 6.5 9.0 6.4 
$9 750- ( $13450) 6.3 7.6 6.5 4.6 7.2 7.8 7.9 8.3 7.2 
$13450-($16900) 8.1 6.9 8.0 6.6 8.5 9.4 8.8 9.9 8.7 
$16900-($20250) 10.0 5.8 9.4 8. 7 9.7 9.8 11.0 10.4 9.7 
$20250-( $24200) 11.9 4.4 10.9 10.7 11.0 12.1 10.8 10.7 11.0 
$24200-($29200) 14.4 5.3 13.2 14.0 13.0 14.4 12.8 10.4 12.7 
$29200-($36650) 17.6 4.8 16.0 17.9 15.3 13.3 15.4 10.6 14.6 
$36650 and over 27.1 5.8 24.4 32.2 21.7 18.0 20.2 16.4 21.0 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------· Notes: For definitions of each column, see Figure 7.1 following Table 7.3. Numbers 
may not add exactly because of rounding. Market income ranges have been defined so 
that each contains 10 percent of total private households. See Chapters Three, 
Five and Six for derivation. 
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Table A7.2 
STAGE ONE: DIRECT MONEY-INCOME 
EFFECTS OF THE 1981/82 BUDGET BY HOUSEHOLD TYPE 
Household Type 
1 Adult 2 Adults 2 Adults 
with 
Children 
3 or More 1 Adult All 
Market Income (A) 
(plus) 
Direct Monetary 
Benefits (B) 
Equals: 
Total Income (C) 
(less) 
Personal 
Income Taxes (D) 
Equals: 
Household Incane 
Aval. to Spend (E) 
(plus) 
Subsidy Income (less) 
(F) 
Indirect Taxes (G) 
(plus) 
Government 
Private Goods' (H) 
Eouals: 
Money Income 
W/Direct 
Gov Transactn (I) 
Adults with House-
Nat Oth Nat Oth 
Sup Sup 
1 2 3+ No With 
Chil- Chil-
dren dren 
$ Million 
357 1054 1204 3594 1656 2822 2296 2741 3329 
540 86 943 92 87 150 177 203 326 
897 1140 2147 3686 1743 2972 2473 2944 3655 
189 289 494 966 477 811 661 749 877 
708 851 1653 2720 1266 2161 1812 2195 2778 
3 8 10 38 18 31 38 41 64 
33 69 110 213 96 146 127 224 226 
180 46 306 141 185 403 545 223 499 
859 836 1859 2687 1373 2449 2269 2234 3115 
Chld'n holds 
190 19243 
199 2803 
389 22046 
39 5552 
350 16494 
5 256 
21 1264 
107 2635 
441 18122 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Note: For definition of each row, see Figure 7.1 see Chapter Three, Five and 
Six for derivation. 
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Table A7.3 
STAGE Of\E: PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTI~ OF DIRECT MONEY-INC().£ EFFECTS 
OF THE 1981/82 BUDGET BY HOUSEHOLD TYPE 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
1 Adult 2 Adults 
Nat Oth Nat Oth 
Sup Sup 
Market Income (A) 1.9 5.5 6.3 18.7 (plus) 
Direct Monetary 
Benefits (B) 19.3 3.1 33.6 3.3 
f-busehald Type 
2 Adults 
with 
Children 
1 2 
3 or Mare 1 Adult All 
Adults with Hause-
Chld'n holds 
3+ No With 
Chil- Chil-
dren dren 
Proportion of Total (%) 
8.6 14.7 11.9 14.2 17.3 0.9 100.0 
3.1 5.4 6.3 7.1 11.6 7 0 1 100.0 
-----------------------------------------------------------
-
Equals: 
T atal Income (C) 4.1 5.2 9.7 16.7 7.9 13.5 11.2 13.3 16.6 1.8 100.0 
(less) 
Personal 
Income Taxes (D) 3.4 5.2 8.9 17.4 8.6 14.6 11.9 13.5 15.8 0.7 100.0 
Equals: 
1-fousehold Income 
Avail. to Spend (E) 4.3 5.2 10.0 16.5 7.7 13.1 11.0 13.3 16.8 2.1 100.0 (plus) 
Subsidy Income (F) 1.1 3.1 3.9 14.9 7.0 12.1 14.9 16.0 25.0 2.0 1oo:o 
(less) 
In direct Taxes 
(an final goods 
only) (G) 2.6 5.5 8.7 16.8 7.6 11.5 10.0 17.7 17.9 1.7 100.0 
(plus) 
Government 
Private Goads (H) 6.8 1.711.6 5.4 7.0 15.3 20.7 8.5 18.9 4.1 100.0 
-----------------------------------------------------------Equals: 
Maley Income 
W/Oirect 
Govt Transactn (I) 4.8 4.6 10.3 14.8 7.6 13.5 12.5 12.3 17.2 2.4 100.0 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------Comparative Distributions: 
Proportion of H'halds 
of Each Type 10.8 8.7 12.4 15.0 7.8 12.6 10.4 8.3 10.3 3.7 100.0 
Percentage of Total Persons in Private 
Households by f-busehald Type 
3.6 2.9 8.3 10.0 7.9 16.9 19.0 9.4 18.7 3.4 100.0 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------Source: Based an Table 7.2 
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FIGURE A7.1 
NOTE TO TABLES A7.1, A7.2 and A7.3 
(A) Market income is current gross personal earnings. It includes income from 
salary and wages; dividends; interest; royalties; trusts; self-employed 
and partnership earnings. 
(B) Includes all direct social welfare benefits, national superannuation and 
supplementary minimum prices (SMPs). 
(C) Total income comprises market income plus direct monetary benefits. 
Note: This definition of total income includes SMPs. 
(D) Personal tax liability is calculated based on stated income in household 
survey. Takes account of: 1) marginal tax rate scale; 2) life insurance 
exemptions; 3) expenditures derived while earning an income; 4) rebates 
for property rates, donations and school fees, first-home mortgage 
interest, dividends, spouse rebate, single income family rebate, spouse 
rebate, low income family reb.ate and young family rebate. 
(E) Disposable income (includes supplementary minimum price payments to 
farmers). 
(F) Subsidies which have a direct effect only. In other words, price 
subsidies on final goods such as milk and rail travel or income subsidies 
such as those available for private sector employment or fertiliser price 
. subsidies and paid to farmers. SMPs are included as monetary benefits. 
(G) Indirect taxes which have a direct effect on the price of final 
expenditures only are included. Indirect taxes on intermediate goods, 
such as motor vehicles purchased by companies, which may also add to the 
prices of final goods, are excluded. 
(H) The money-income value of government expenditures where the ministry of 
private beneficiary can be identified. Included are; 1) Health; 2) 
Educational spending; 3) Expenditures by Agriculture and Fisheries which 
have a direct benefit for farmers; 4) Department Maori Affairs 
expenditures; and 5) Housing Corporation expenditures which have an 
identifiable beneficiary. 
Table A7.4 
STAGE TWO: Tl£ OISTRIBUTIOO 0'" IDJSEI-0..0 HJt.EY INC()£ AD.:USTED fOR TOTAL CENTRAL GOVERI+ENT NOO-~ BlDGET ACTIVITIES IN 1981/82 
(By ttlusehold Income Gro4): Each Gr04J Represents a D~ile, llllll, of Private ttluseholds) 
----------------------------------------------------------------~--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
~ Pa~ments to Government Mone~ Income Value of Government Exi:!enditure Adjust- Market 
1-busehold Social Collective ment for Income 
Market Personal Conpany Welfare Government Interest Total All Govt Adjusted 
Income Group Market Income Indirect Income Other Total Benefits Expend. and Govnt Non-Mkt for Govt 
($ p.a.) Income Tax Taxes Tax Receipts Payments (excludes (Case 1) Health Education Subsidies Other Expend. Activits. Budget 
.' (Bl-64) SI-PS) Cl-C6 (C-B) (A+D) 
A Bl 62 63 B4 B Cl C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 c D E 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------$Million 
Less than $ 250 -22 50 66 14 30 160 648 101 152 52 16 18 987 827 805 
$ 250 - ($ 3950) 170 89 90 35 37 251 596 124 146 37 18 31 952 701 871 
$ 3950 - ($ 9750) 731 156 135 61 51 403 371 168 132 89 71 75 906 503 1234 
$ 9750 - ($13450) 1212 255 161 46 58 520 . 192 195 113 101 49 52 702 182 1394 
$13450 - ($16900) 1567 366 185 54 69 674 167 233 122 133 60 64 779 105 1672 
$16900 - ($20250) 1922 483 225 55 81 844 144 269 118 159 53 59 802 -42 1880 
$20250 - ($24200) 2291 594 229 59 86 968 102 287 116 169 63 65 802 -166 2125 
$24200 - ($29200) 2774 777 266 70 98 1211 118 . 329 109 168 81 81 886 -325 2449 
$29200- ($36650) 3387 994 321 86 119 1520 ll4 398 111 176 68 85 952 -568 2819 
$36650 and over 5211 1788 409 189 145 2531 134 484 138 209 93 158 1216 -1315 3896 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Total 19243 5552 2087 669 774 9082 2586 2588 1257 1293 572 688 8984 -98 19,145 
-
A Bl 82 63 B4 - 8-- Cl C2 C3 C4 C5 C6 c b E 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Proportion of total (%) 
Less than $ 250 -0.1 0.9 3.1 2.1 3.9 1.8 25.1 3.9 12.1 4.0 2.8 2.6 11.0 4.2 
$ 250 - ($ 3950) 0.9 1.6 4.3 5.2 4.8 2.8 23.0 4.8 11.6 2.9 3.1 4.5 , 10.6 4.5 
$ 3950 - ($ 9750) 3.8 2.8 6.5 9.1 6.5 4.4 14.3 6.5 10.5 6.9 12.4 10.9 :10.1 Not 6.5 
$ 9750 - ($13450) 6.3 4.6 7.7 6.9 7.5 5.7 7.5 7.5 9.0 7.8 8.6 7. 7 7.8 re1e- 7.3 
$13450 - ($16900) 8.1 6.6 8.9 8.1 9.0 7.4 6.5 9.0 9. 7 10.3 10.5 9.3 8.7 vant 8.7 
$16900 - ($20250) 10.0 8.7 10.8 8.2 10.4 9.3 5.6 10.4 9.4 12.3 9.3 8.6 8.9 9.8 
$20250 - ( $24200) ll.9 10.7 11.0 8.8 11.1 10.7 3.9 11.1 9.2 13.1 11.0 9.4 8.9 11.1 
$24200 - ($29200) 14.4 14.0 12.7 10.4 12.7 13.3 4.5 12.7 8. 7 13.0 14.2 ll.8 9.9 12.8 
$29200 - ($26650) 17.6 17.9 15.4 12.9 15.4 16.7 4.4 15.4 8.8 13.6 11.9 12.3 10.6 14 . 7 
$36650 and over 27. 1 32.2 19.6 28.3 18.8 27.9 5.2 18.7 11.0 16.2 16.2 22.9 13.5 20.4 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100:0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: See Chapters Three, five and Six For derivation. 
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Table A7.5 
STAGE TWO: TI-E AMJUNT OF HOJSEHOLD MONEY INCOME ADJUSTED 
FOR TOTAL CENTRAL GOVERNMENT NON-MARKET BUDGET ACTIVITIES 
IN 1981/82 BY HOUSEHOLD TYPE 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Household Type 
------------------------------------------------------------1 Adult 2 Adults 2 Adults 
with 
Children 
3 or More 1 Adult All 
Adults with House-
Household 
Market 
Income 
($ p.a.) 
Nat Oth Nat Oth 
Sup Sup 
1 2 3+ No With 
Chil- Chil-
dren dren 
$ Million 
Market Income(A) 357 1054 1204 3594 1656 2822 2296 2741 3329 
Chld'n holds* 
190 19243 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Personal Income 
Tax Payments 189 289 494 966 477 811 661 749 877 
Indirect Tax 
Payments 62 111 181 349 164 271 222 330 360 
Company Income 
Tax (Case 1) 61 28 122 86 61 74 55 98 74 
Other Receipts 
(Case 1) 27 39 67 127 63 118 89 100 126 
Total Payments(B) 339 467 865 1528 765 1274 1027 1277 1437 
Social Welfare 
Benefits (exc. SMPS) 
Collective 
Govt Goods 
Health 
Education 
Subsidies 
Interest & Other 
535 79 933 65 73 122 132 172 277 
91 129 225 424 210 396 297 334 423 
145 36 234 103 93 162 162 114 179 
2 13 8 57 71 251 387 93 336 
12 19 29 81 41 74 95 84 129 
45 28 91 91 58 84 82 98 101 
Total Govt Exp.(C) 830 304 1520 821 546 1089 1155 895 1445 
Net Govt 
Activities (C-8) 491 -163 655 -707 -219 -185 128 -382 8 
Market Income 
Adjusted for 
Governnent 848 891 1859 2887 1437 2637 2424 2359 3337 
39 5552 
38 2087 
10 669 
18 774 
105 9082 
198 2586 
59 2588 
29 1257 
75 1293 
8 572 
10 688 
379 8984 
274 -98 
464 19145 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Source: See Chapter Three, Five and Six for derivation. 
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Table A7.6 
STAGE TWO: PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF ·HOUSEHOLD MONEY INCOME ADJUSTED FOR TOTAL 
CENTRAL GOVERN~T NON-tJARKET BUDGET ACTIVITIES IN 1982/82 BY HOUSEHOLD TYPE 
Household 
Market 
Income 
($ p.a.) 
1 Adult 2 Adults 
Household Type 
2 Adults 
with 
Children 
3 or More 1 Adult All 
Adults with House-
Chld'n holds* 
------------------------------------------------------------Nat Oth Nat Oth 
Sup Sup 
1 2 3+ No With 
Chil- Chil-
dren dren 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Proportion of Total (%) 
Market Income(A) 1.9 5.5 6.3 18.7 8.6 14.7 11.9 14.2 17.3 0.9 100.0 
Personal Income 
Tax Payments 3.4 5.2 8.9 17.4 8.6 14.6 11.9 13.5 15.8 0. 7 100.0 
Indirect Tax 
Payments 3.0 5.3 8.7 16.7 7.9 13.0 10.6 15.8 17.2 ' 1.8 100.0 
Company Income 
Tax (Case 1) 9.1 4.2 18.2 12.9 9.111.1 8.2 14.6 11.1 1.5 100.0 
Other Receipts 
(Case 1) 3.5 5.0 8.7 16.4 8.1 15.3 11.5 12.9 16.3 2.3 100.0 
------------------------------------------------------------Total Payments(B) 3.8 5.1 9.5 16.8 8.4 14.0 11.3 14.1 15.8 1.2 100.0 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Social Welfare 
Benefits (exc.SMPS) 
20. 7 3.1 36.1 2.5 2.8 4.7 5.1 6.6 10.7 7.7 100.0 
Collective 
Govt Goods 3.5 5.0 8.7 16.4 8.1 15.3 11.5 12.9 16.3 2.3 100.0 
Health 11.6 2.9 18.6 8.1 7.4 12.9 12.9 9.1 14.2 2.3 100.0 
Education 0.2 1.0 0.6 4.4 5.5 19.4 29.9 7.2 26.0 5.8 100.0 
Subsidies 2.1 3.3 5.1 14.2 7.2 12.9 16.6 14.7 22.5 1.4 100.0 
Interest & Other 6.5 4.0 13.3 13.3 8.4 12.2 11.9 14.3 14.7 1.4 100.0 
Total Govt Exp.(C) 9.2 3.4 16.9 9.1 6.1 12.1 12.9 10.0 16.1 4.2 100.0 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Market Income 
Adjusted for All 4.4 4.7 9.6 15.1 7.5 13.9 12.7 12.3 17.4 2.4 100.0 
Central Government 
Sources: Based on Table 7.5. 
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Table A7.7 
STAGE THREE: BROAD ~NT OF INC().£ DISTRIBUTED BY INCQt.£ RANGE 
Less than $ 250 
$ 250 - ($ 3950) 
$ 3950 - ($ 9750) 
$ 9750 - ($13450) 
$13450 - ($16900) 
$16900 - ($20250) 
$20250 - ( $24200) 
$24200 - ($29200) 
$29200 - ( $36650) 
$36650 and over 
Total 
Gross 
Domestic 
Product 
Income 
A 
140 
587 
1448 
1816 
2302 
2712 
3101 
3782 
4656 
7961 
28505 
Money Income Value of: 
Payments 
to 
Govnt 
8 
160 
251 
403 
520 
674 
844 
968 
1211 
1520 
2531 
9082 
Govnt 
Non-t\1arket 
Expenditures 
c 
$ Million 
987 
952 
906 
702 
779 
802 
802 
886 
952 
1216 
8984 
Source: See Chapters Three through Six for derivation. 
Broad Income 
Gross Domestic Product 
Adjusted for Govnt 
Amount 
D 
(A-B+C) 
967 
1288 
1951 
1998 
2407 
2671 
2935 
3457 
4087 
6646 
28407 
% 
Distribution 
3.4 
4.5 
6.9 
7.0 
8.5 
9.4 
10.3 
12.2 
14.4 
23.4 
100.0 
APPENDIX SEVEN - SUMMARY TABLES OF THE QUANTITATIVE RESULTS 
Table A7.8 
STAGE THREE: BROAD MEASUREMENT OF FINAL INCOME 
DISTRIBUTED BY HOUSEHOLD TYPE 
Household Type 
460. 
l Adult 2 Adults 2 Adults 
with 
Children 
3 or More 1 Adult · All 
Adults with House-
Nat Oth Nat Oth 
Sup Sup 
Gross Domestic Product 
l 2 3+ No With 
Chil- Chil-
dren dren 
Amt $M 1042 1481 2630 4860 2471 4013 3214 4031 4448 
Distribution% 3.7 5.2 9.2 17.0 8.7 14.1 11.3 14.1 15.6 
Money Income Value of: 
Total Govt Payments 
Amt $M 346 
Distribution % 3.8 
Total Govt Expend. 
Amt $M 830 
Distribution % 9.2 
Gross Domestic Product 
adjusted for Govt 
467 878 1527 761 1256 1022 1281 1440 
5.1 9.7 16.8 8.4 13.8 11.3 14.1 15.9 
304 1520 821 546 1089 1155 895 1445 
3.4 16.9 9.1 6.1 12.1 12.9 10.0 16.1 
Amt $M 1526 1318 3272 4154 2256 3846 3347 3645 .4453 
Distribution% 5.4 4.7 11.5 14.6 7.9 13.5 11.8 12.8 15 .7 
Source: See Chapters Three through Six for derivation. 
Chld'n holds 
315 28505 
1.1 100.0 
104 9082 
1.1 100.0 
379 8984 
4.2 100.0 
590 28407 
2.1 100.0 
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